JUDGMENT S.N. Dwivedi, J. - These two petitions are between the same parties and raise common questions of fact and law. They are accordingly being disposed of by a common judgment. 2. Although there are numorous parties in the petitions but the contest is confined between Mst. Qamar Jahan Begam and Mst. Sahaida Begam, the petitioners, and Sardar Husain, respondent no. 4. 3. The dispute relates to two houses, nos. 73 and 74, situate on Nadan Mahal Road, Lucknow. Sardar Husain is the owner of the houses. The houses were auction sold under the provisions of the Encumbered Estates Act to Mst. Qamar Jahan Begam and Mst. Sahaida Begam. The legality of the auction sale is challenged. 4. Facts giving rise to the auction sale are these. Sardar Husain is the landlord debtor under the Encumbered Estates Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The special Judge Bara Banki, passed decrees for debts due by Sardar Husain and transmitted them to the Collector, Bara Banki. He also sent a list of various properties owned by Sardar Husain which were found by him to be liable to attachment, sale or mortgage in satisfaction of the debts. 5. The Collector, Bara Banki, directed sale of the houses. Sardar Husain filed an objection before him that one of the houses was his residential house and was accordingly exempt from sale under Sec. 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Collector overruled the objection. From his order Sardar Husain filed an appeal before the Commissioner. He obtained from the Commissioner an order staying sale, which was fixed for June 25, 1948. Learned counsel for Sardar Husain states that the order of stay was communicated to the Collector, Bara Banki, 5 days before the date of sale. The sale was nevertheless held on the scheduled date by the sale officer, Lucknow. It appears from the order of the Addl. Commissioner, Faizabad, (annexure A to the affidavit of S. M. Mujtaba) that the order of stay did not reach the sale Officer, Lucknow, before the sale. 6. In the appeal the Addl. Commissioner held that his residential house was not exempt from sale as Sec. 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure did not apply. Commissioner, Faizabad, (annexure A to the affidavit of S. M. Mujtaba) that the order of stay did not reach the sale Officer, Lucknow, before the sale. 6. In the appeal the Addl. Commissioner held that his residential house was not exempt from sale as Sec. 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure did not apply. Accordingly he dismissed the appeal with the remark that "At first the property mentioned at No. 1 of the Special Judge's ranking list of property (the non-residential house) should be sold. If the debts cannot be satisfied by proceedings under Sec. 27 of the E. E. Act, after these steps have been gone through, the sale of the house will certainly have to be ordered." Notwithstanding the direction of the Addl. Commissioner the sale of the residential house was confirmed along with the sale of the non residential house by the Collector, Bara Banki, on January 14, 1949. Sardar Husain then filed an appeal from the order of the Collector confirming the sale. By his order dated April 9, 1949, the Addl. Commissioner allowed the appeal and set aside the auction sale. He was of opinion that the Collector, Bara Banki, could not sell the houses which were situate in Lucknow. Mst. Qamar Jahan Begam and Mst. Sahaida Begam filed a revision from the order of the Addl. Commissioner before the Board of Revenue. The Board of Revenue has affirmed the view of the Addl. Commissioner and maintained his order. 7. It would appear from the facts already stated that the main question in these petitions is whether the Collector, Bara Banki, could auction sell the houses which were situate in Lucknow which is beyond his territorial jurisdiction. The answer to the question will depend on the scheme and the provisions of the Act. The Act is designed to be :- "A code for the administration of the assets of the landlord debtor and for giving relief to' him in a number of ways against the contractual rights of his creditors." See Deputy Commissioner, Hardoi v. Rama Krishna Narain, 1954 S.C.R. 506 at 513. 8. The Act is designed to be :- "A code for the administration of the assets of the landlord debtor and for giving relief to' him in a number of ways against the contractual rights of his creditors." See Deputy Commissioner, Hardoi v. Rama Krishna Narain, 1954 S.C.R. 506 at 513. 8. The Scheme of the Act would make the proceedings under the Act akin to the proceedings in insolvency or in winding up of companies where-under the estate of the debtor is "represented by a statutory guardian so as to avoid creditors and other beneficiaries individually being necessary .parties in all proceedings, a course which, in cases where creditors are numerous, may well bring the administration to a standstill or make it so cumbersome as to be unworkable." per Mr. Justice Braund in Benaras Bank Ltd. v. Bhagwan Das, I.L.R. 1946 Alld. 891 = 1946 A.L.J. 402. The opinion of Mr. Justice Braund, who was in the minority, has been approved by the Supreme Court in Rama Krishna Narain's case, 1954 S.C.R. 506 at 513. 9. Courts in insolvency proceedings and in the winding up companies are not restricted, as they ordinarily are, to deal with the properties of the debtor within their territorial jurisdiction. They may also proceed against his properties which are situate beyond their territorial jurisdiction, The Scheme of the Act counsel that in the task of interpreting the provisions of the Act the Court should not set out with the assumption that courts are restricted to deal with properties situate within their territorial jurisdiction. On the contrary, the court, may presume that the Legislature intended to empower the Collector of the District to deal with the properties of the landlord debtor irrespective of his territorial jurisdiction, for otherwise the Collector cannot effectively, efficiently and expeditiously administer his encumbered estate. 10. Sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 4 provides that an indebted landlord may make an application to the Collector of the district in which his land or any portion of his land is situate stating the amount of his debts, situate and undecreed, and requesting that the provisions of the Act should be applied to him. S. 5 provides that he cannot make another application to any other Collector. Sec. 6 provides that the Collector shall forward the application to the Special Judge. S. 5 provides that he cannot make another application to any other Collector. Sec. 6 provides that the Collector shall forward the application to the Special Judge. Under Sub-Section (1) of Sec. 8 the Special Judge calls on the applicant to submit to him full particulars of his debts, the nature and extent of his property rights in land, the nature and extent of his property which is liable to attachment and sale, and the names and addresses of his creditors. Under sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 10 a person claiming to be a creditor is required to file his claim before the Special Judge. He has to give full particulars of his claim and may also give the nature and extent of the landlords proprietary rights in land, and the nature and extent of his other property, if any. Under Sec. 11 the Special Judge publishes a notice in the Gazette specifying the property mentioned by the landlord and by any claimant. If any objection is filed by any person that certain property mentioned in the notice is not liable to attachment sale or mortgage is satisfaction of the debts of the landlord the Special Judge decides the objection. There is nothing in all these sections to indicate that the Collector and the Special Judge are not empowered to take notice of any property of the landlord which is situate beyond their territorial jurisdiction. They, on the other hand, show that the entire property of the landlord is pooled together for purposes of effective administration. 11. After decrees with respect to debts are passed, sub-section (1) of Sec. 19 requires the Special Judge to send them to the Collector for execution in accordance with the provisions of Chap. V of the Act. The Collector, I think, means the Collector who forwarded the application of the landlord under Sec. 4 to the Special Judge. Sub-Sec. (2) of Sec, 19 provides that the Special Judge shall inform the Collector of the nature and extent of the property which he has found to be liable to attachment, sale or mortgage in satisfaction of the debts of the applicant. Sub-Sec. (2) of Sec, 19 provides that the Special Judge shall inform the Collector of the nature and extent of the property which he has found to be liable to attachment, sale or mortgage in satisfaction of the debts of the applicant. Sec. 24 has an important bearing on the question and pertinently reads :- "(1) The Collector shall first realise the value of such of the debtor's property other than proprietary rights in land as shall have been reported by the Special Judge to be liable to attachment or sale :- Provided that the Collector before passing orders under this section for the sale of any property shall hear any objection which the debtor may have to make to the sale of that property :- . . . . . . . . . Provided also that if the debt can be liquidated under Sec. 27 the Collector shall not sell any property to the sale of which the debtor has objected :- (3) For the purpose of execution against property outside the United Provinces the decrees passed by the Special Judge shall be deemed to be decrees in favour of the Collector. (4) For realising the value of the debtor's property under this section the Collector may exercise all the powers of a civil court for the execution of decree." 12. Sub-Sec. (1) evidently em-powers the Collector to realise the value of all the property of the landlord debtor, except the value of his proprietary right in land, which had been reported by the Special Judge to be liable to attachment or sale. He may realise the value of the landlord's property even though the property may be situate beyond his territorial jurisdiction. Sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 24 seems to me to approximate the position of the Collector to that of a Receiver under the Provincial Insolvency Act or of a Liquidator in winding up of companies. Like them he may deal with all the properties of the landlord regardless of their situs. This inference is strengthened by the first proviso to sub-Sec. (1). If the Legislature had intended that the Collector should not sell any property which is not situate within his territorial jurisdiction, the first proviso would not have been inserted in sub Sec. (1), Sub-Sec. (3) also indicates that it is the Collector who is empowered to proceed against the properties of the landlord. If the Legislature had intended that the Collector should not sell any property which is not situate within his territorial jurisdiction, the first proviso would not have been inserted in sub Sec. (1), Sub-Sec. (3) also indicates that it is the Collector who is empowered to proceed against the properties of the landlord. Sub-Sec. (3) makes the Collector a decree holder for the purpose of execution against property outside U.P. The object clearly is that the Collector alone should be invested with the power of proceeding against the entire estate of the landlord regardless of the situs of his various properties. Sub-Sec. (4) provides that where realising the value of the landlords property the Collector shall have all the powers of a civil court while executing a decree. As the Collector is not constituted by the Act a court for execution of a decree, he could not exercise the powers of a civil court executing a decree. Sub-Sec, (4) is enacted to invest him with the powers of a civil court executing a decree. The word "powers" in sub-Sec. (4) means powers which an execution court having jurisdiction to execute a decree may exercise and should not be confounded with the idea of territorial jurisdiction of the execution court. 13. The analysis of the language of Sec. 24, to my mind, indicates that the Collector may function "extra-territorially," if one may use that term albeit somewhat loosely. 14. It may be observed that Sec. 24 is confined to properties other than proprietary rights in land. The Collector has to proceed against proprietary rights of the landlord in land under subsequent provisions of the Act. Sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 28 provides that if the amount due by the debtor, exceeds the instalment value of his proprietary rights in land but does not exceed the instalment value of his proprietary rights in protected land, if any, together with the transfer value of his proprietary rights in unprotected land, if any, the Collector shall transfer to the creditors the debtor's entire proprietary rights in unprotected land. Sub-Sec. (2) provides that if the amount still due by the debtor exceeds the instalment value of his proprietary rights in protected land, if any, together with the transfer value of the proprietary rights in unprotected land, if any, the Collector shall transfer to the creditors the whole of the debtors proprietary rights in unprotected land, if any, and order the debtor to pay an amount equal to the instalment value of his proprietary rights in protected land, if any, in instalments over a period of 20 years with future interest. Sections 31 and 33 also authorise the Collector to deal with the landlord's proprietary rights in land. Sec. 34 provides that a creditor to whom a share of the debtor's proprietary rights in land has been transferred under Sec. 31 or Sec. 33 may within three months of the passing of the order of transfer apply to the Collector to have the share so transferred or any part thereof sold by public auction. The Collector shall sell such share or part by public auction. Sec. 35 provides that if at any time after the decrees granted by the Special Judge have been sent to the Collector under the provisions of Sec. 19 any person entitled to possession of any property under the provisions of the Act applies to the Collector to be put in possession of such property the Collector shall deliver possession of such property to him. 15. There is nothing in the foregoing provisions to indicate that the Legislature intended to confine the Collector to the landlords proprietary rights in land which is situate within his jurisdiction. The language of the provisions, in its ordinary\and grammatical meaning, is susceptible of the interpretation that the Collector may deal with the proprietary rights of the landlord in land situate within as well as without his territorial jurisdiction. That is also reasonable for otherwise the Collector cannot effectively administer the landlord estate which is a unity. 16. The scheme and the provisions of the Act, in my judgment, clearly point to only one conclusion that under Sec. 24 the Collector is empowered to deal with the property other than the proprietary rights in land whether it is situate inside or outside the Collectors territorial jurisdiction. The Board of Revenue has taken the view that under that provision the Collector cannot sell the property which is situate outside his territorial jurisdiction. The Board of Revenue has taken the view that under that provision the Collector cannot sell the property which is situate outside his territorial jurisdiction. According to the Board of Revenue where the Collector desires to sell a property situate beyond his territorial jurisdiction, either he or someone else should apply to the Board under Sec. 58 to transfer the proceedings to the court of the Collector within whose territorial jurisdiction the property proposed to be proceeded against is situate. Sec. 58 provides that the Board of Revenue may transfer any proceedings under the Act from the court of one Collector to that of any other Collector. Sec. 58 appears to me to be analogous to Sec. 24, C.P.C. and is, to my mind, conceived to provide for transfer of a case from one Collector to another Collector for reasons similar to the reasons specified in Sec, 24. There is no reason to think that Sec. 58 is intended to provide for the transfer of a case from one Collector to another Collector where the former Collector cannot proceed against a property which is situate within the territorial jurisdiction of the latter Collector. The Board of Revenue has first assumed that the Collector of the District cannot proceed against a property situate outside his territorial jurisdiction, and then has proceeded to search out a provision which can deal with such a situation. That would hardly be a sound approach in interpreting Sec. 58. A statute ought not to be interpreted with any preconceived motion. 17. Rule 90 of the U.P. Encumbered Estates Rules provides that the Collector shall, if the land revenue payable by the debtor in any other district is greater than the land revenue payable by him in the district in which the application under Sec. 4 was made, refer the case to the Board of Revenue for orders whether he should proceed with liquidation himself or whether the case will be transferred to another district. No inference can be drawn from the language of this rule that under Sec. 24 the Collector of the district cannot proceed against a property which is situate outside his district. This rule applies only if the land revenue payable by the landlord in the district in which the application under Sec. 4 was made is lesser than the land revenue payable by him in another district. This rule applies only if the land revenue payable by the landlord in the district in which the application under Sec. 4 was made is lesser than the land revenue payable by him in another district. Where the land revenue payable by him in the district in which the application under Sec. 4 was made is equal to or greater than the land revenue payable by him in another district Rule 90 does not apply. In that event the Collector of a district may proceed against a property which is situate outside his district. Then it is not necessary for him to refer the case to the Board of Revenue for order whether he should proceed with liquidation himself or whether the case should be transferred to another district. As rule 90 has got little bearing on the question in issue, it is not necessary to examine its legality. 18. Rule 6 provides that provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure shall apply to the proceedings under the Act except in so far as those provisions are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act. The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure dealing with the territorial jurisdiction of an execution court would, to my mind, be inconsistent with the provisions of Chapter V of the Act which provides for the realisation of the value of the estate of the landlord by the Collector of the district in which the landlord made his application under Sec. 4. Accordingly rule 6 also has little bearing on this case. 19. For the reasons already stated I am of opinion that the Board of Revenue has committed a manifest error of law in holding that the Collector, Bara Banki, had no jurisdiction to sell the houses of Sardar Husain situate in Lucknow. Learned counsel for Sardar Husain wanted me to send back the case to the Board of Revenue for decision of other questions involved in the case. The counter-affidavit of Sardar Husain does not indicate what other questions were involved in the case. An adjournment was solicited for filing a copy of the objection of Sardar Husain to show what other questions are involved in case. I am not inclined to adjourn the case which is already very old. It has been pending for 6 years. The counter-affidavit of Sardar Husain does not indicate what other questions were involved in the case. An adjournment was solicited for filing a copy of the objection of Sardar Husain to show what other questions are involved in case. I am not inclined to adjourn the case which is already very old. It has been pending for 6 years. The hearing of the case started yesterday and no request for adjournment was made either Yesterday or today until I appeared to have crystalised the view that the order of the Board of Revenue is manifestly wrong. 20. It appears from the judgment of the Board of Revenue that on behalf of Sardar Husain only two points were raised. One of them has already been dealt with by me; the other was that the decrees under the Act have been amended under the Zamindars Debt Reduction Act and the total amount of decrees was reduced to Rs. 12,000/-. The Board of Revenue has not dealt with this argument. I find it without substance. The decrees were amended under the Zamindars' Debt Reduction At long after the auction sale of the two houses. The amendment of the decrees has therefore, no relevance. 21. From the two judgments of the Addl. Commissioner it appears that the three other questions were involved is the case. One was that the residential house which has been sold was exempt from sale under Sec. 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Addl. Commissioner overruled this argument. No revision was filed by Sardar Husain from the order of the Addl. Commissioner to the Board of Revenue his judgment become, final Apart from that, learned counsel or Sardar Husain has completely failed to satisfy me how the residential house which has been found by the Special Judge to be liable to attachment, sale or mortgage in satis-faction of the debts, is exempt from sale under Sec, 60. 22. The Second question is whether the sale of the residential house could be confirmed by the Collector, Bara Banki, in view of the direction of the Addl. Commissioner in appeal. I have already quoted the direction of the Addl. 22. The Second question is whether the sale of the residential house could be confirmed by the Collector, Bara Banki, in view of the direction of the Addl. Commissioner in appeal. I have already quoted the direction of the Addl. Commissioner in paragraph 6 of the rejoinder affidavit on behalf of the petitioners states that the direction was ineffective; firstly because the house had already been auction sold and secondly, because the amount still due by the debtor was more than the instalment value of his proprietary rights in land. It is said that for the second reason the Collector, while confirming the auction sale, did not act in breach of the direction of the Addl. Commissioner. It is also said by learned counsel for the petitioners that no evidence was adduced by Sardar Husain in proof of his other objections. Sardar Husain has not even taken care to controvert the allegations contained in paragraph 6 of the rejoinder affidavit. For the reasons mentioned in paragraph 6 I think that the Collector could confirm the auction sale. 23. Another question involved in the case presumably was that, although the order of stay passed by the Addl. Commissioner in appeal had been communicated to the Collector, Bara Banki, a couple of days before the date of sale, the sale Officer still auction-sold the property. The Addl. Commissioner has recorded a finding that the order of stay could not be communicated to the Sale Officer, Lucknow, who was to auction property. The mere communication of the order of stay to the Collector, Bara Banki, could not invalidate the sale by the Sale Officer, Lucknow, as he himself was ignorant of the order of stay. The Sale Officer is 4.1 accredited agent of the court Kala Mea v. Harpering, I.L.R. 36 Cal. 323 (P.C.). The Court is his principal. Not the principal is bound by the act of his agent, if the agent is unaware of the fact that his authority has been revoked. As the Sale Officer was ignorant of the order of stay the Collector was bound by the act of sale by him, and he could not have said that he would not confirm the sale because he himself had received the knowledge of the order of stay. See Parsotam Saran v. Brahma Nand, 25 A.L.J. 530 (F.B.). As the Sale Officer was ignorant of the order of stay the Collector was bound by the act of sale by him, and he could not have said that he would not confirm the sale because he himself had received the knowledge of the order of stay. See Parsotam Saran v. Brahma Nand, 25 A.L.J. 530 (F.B.). The auction sale is, in my opinion valid notwithstanding that the Collector of Bara Banki had acquired knowledge of the order of stay, because the Sale Officer was ignorant of that order when he sold the property. 24. I allow the petition with costs and quash the order of the Board of Revenue.