JUDGMENT 1. This is a second appeal against an order dated the 20th November 1958 passed by the learned Additional District Judge of Alipore by which an order passed by the learned- Subordinate Judge, 3rd Court, Alipore dated the 31st day of May 1956 was reversed. The facts are briefly as follows: the respondent, the Royal Calcutta Golf Club is a body corporate, limited by guarantee, registered under Act VI of 1892. It owns land of the area of 49 Bighas and 2 cottahs being holding no. 18, Golf Club Road, at Tollygunge in the suburbs of Calcutta. The lands belonging to the Golf Club are maintained and used for the playing of golf and there are two courses, each course comprising of 12 holds in 18 greens with 18 tees. On the land there are also some structures and sheds forming part of the Golf Club. As I have stated above, the Golf Club (hereinafter referred to as "club")is situated in Tollygunge. Originally the area was within the jurisdiction of the Tollygunge Municipality. 2. The subject-matter of this case relates to the quinquennial assessment of the said club in respect of the said holding, commencing from the first quarter of 1952-53. On or about the 12th of July 1952 the Tollygunge Municipality was superseded and in exercise of power conferred by sec-554 of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1832 Government appointed Mr. P. N. Bose, as Administrator. Meanwhile what had happened was that the quinquennial assessment list was prepared and general notice was given on or about the 17th July, 1952. The club was assessed to an annual valuation of Rs. 1,00,000/ -. Special notice was also served upon the club inasmuch as the previous assessment of Rs. 40,000/-, had been increased to Rs. 1,00,000/ -. However even before the special notice was issued or served, the club preferred an objection under section 148 of the said Act. Section 148 provides that any person who was dissatisfied with the amount assessed upon him or with the valuation or assessment of any holding, may apply to the Commissioners to review the amount of assessment or valuation as the case may be. By virtue of this order of supersession, and in terms thereof, Mr. P. N. Bose was entitled to perform the duties of the Review Committee, appointed under section 149 of the said Act. By virtue of this order of supersession, and in terms thereof, Mr. P. N. Bose was entitled to perform the duties of the Review Committee, appointed under section 149 of the said Act. It is provided therein that the committee shall give notice to the applicant of the time and place by which the application of objection will be heard and after taking such evidence and making such enquiry as it may deem necessary, in the presence of the objector or his agent, pass such order as it thinks fit. In this particular case, notice was given by Mr. 3. Bose and the objection was heard. On the 23rd July 1952. Mr. Bose acting as the Review Committee passed an order reducing the valuation from Rs. 1,00,000/- to Rs. 75,000/- The wording of the order which appears to have been scribbled on a copy of the notice is as follows: "Mr. Banerjee appears for the objector. About 500 bighas of land by Golf Club heard. The neighbouring Jala lands are left out at Rs. 2/- per cottah p. m. I have found this golf land must be highly developed land and this is better land. After considering the largeness of the area it would be fair and quite reasonable to take the rent at Rs. 0/12/- annas per cottach and valuation of the, structures, valuation reduced to Rs. 75,000/ -. " Upon this the club objected and on the 23rd of March 1953 a suit was filed by the club against the said Mr. P. N. Bose as the Administrator or the authority appointed by the Government of West Bengal to administer the Tollygunge Municipality and the state of West Bengal. By notification published on the 31st March 1953 the Government of West Bengal, in exercise of power under section 594 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, included the Tollygunge Municipality within the jurisdiction of the Corporation of Calcutta. Thereafter, the plaint was amended by substituting the Corporation of Calcutta in the place of the defendants. In the plaint filed in the suit, the above facts were mentioned and the valuation of the said holding belonging to the club was challenged. In the prayer of the plaint the plaintiff asked for cancellation of the valuation and for a declaration that the pretended valuation was a nullity. In the plaint filed in the suit, the above facts were mentioned and the valuation of the said holding belonging to the club was challenged. In the prayer of the plaint the plaintiff asked for cancellation of the valuation and for a declaration that the pretended valuation was a nullity. There was a prayer appended to the plaint asking for a judgment and decree directing the refund of the entire amount collected under the pretext of taxes upon the basis of the said pretended annual value. I shall have something to say with regard to the last mentioned prayer presently. This suit came up for hearing before the 3rd Subordinate Judge at Alipore. The learned Subordinate Judge framed four issues. The main issue was of course whether the assessment and the annual valuation as made was valid and proper but incidentally the following issue was also raised. "is the plaintiff entitled to any refund of the taxes paid in excess, on the annual value assessed by the defendant compared with the taxes as would properly be payable on the lawful and proper annual value determined by the court ?" the learned Subordinate Judge was of the opinion that the assessment and the annual valuation had been properly made. The point was raised before him that the assessment and the annual valuation was not in accordance with the provisions of section 128 (1) or (2) of the Bengal Municipal Act. He, however, was of the opinion that it was in accordance with the said provisions, as well as in accordance with the principles of natural justice and he found no reason to disturb the assessment and valuation made by Mr. Bose, as aforesaid. The suit was accordingly dismissed with costs. Against this judgment and the decree passed thereon, the club preferred an appeal and this appeal came to be heard by the learned Additional District Judge, Alipore. On the point as to whether the assessment or the annual valuation has been correctly prepared by the municipal authorities, the learned District Judge differed with the trial court and held that it was not so done. The learned Judge went on to hold that the provisions contained in section 128 (1) or (2) had not been complied with, nor the rules that have been framed under the Bengal Municipal Act. The learned Judge went on to hold that the provisions contained in section 128 (1) or (2) had not been complied with, nor the rules that have been framed under the Bengal Municipal Act. He, therefore, allowed the appeal and the judgment and decree of the court below were set aside. A decree was passed declaring assessment of the annual value of the holding in question at Rs. 75,000/- to be illegal, ultra vires and without jurisdiction and the said valuation was cancelled and set aside. In addition to this, the learned District Judge passed a decree for the sum of Rs. 4813/- to be paid by the defendant to the plaintiff. Against this order this appeal has been preferred. 3. In this appeal three points have to be considered. The first point is as to whether a suit at all lies, regard being had to the provisions of section 150 of the Bengal Municipal Act. The provision of that section runs as follows: "no objection shall be taken to any assessment or valuation in any other manner than in this Act is provided and no valuation or assessment made under this Act and no order passed under sub section (4) of sub section (6) of section 149 or sub section (2) of section 149a shall be called in question in any court. " 4. The second point relates to the validity of the assessment and the valuation made by the assessor and reviewed by the review committee which in this case was constituted by Mr. P. N. Bose, the Administrator. In other words, the point to be decided is as to whether the figure of Rs. 75,000/- as found by Mr. Bose can be supported. The third and the last point taken is as to whether the first appellate court was entitled to pass a decree for a sum of Rs. 4813/- against the Corporation of Calcutta. With regard to the first point, it appears from the provisions of section 150, which have been set out above, that when an order is passed under section 149 it is not to be called in question in any court. From this it is argued that a special tribunal has been created by statute and that the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts had been taken away. From this it is argued that a special tribunal has been created by statute and that the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts had been taken away. This precise point came up for determination before a Division Bench of this High Court in the case of the Commissioner of the Municipality of Garden Reach and others v. M/s. Union Jute Company Ltd. and ors., (Appeal from Appellate Decree no. 571 of 1959, Judgment dated the 19th of September 1960. In that case, Mookerjee, J. relied on a decision of the Privy Council, Secretary of State v. Mask 67 I. A. 222, as also several other authorities, and held that the jurisdiction of the civil court was not taken away. In Mask's case (supra) the Judicial Committee laid down the law on the subject which has now become almost classical, in the following words. "the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, must either be explicitly expressed or clearly implied and not to be readily inferred. Even if jurisdiction is so excluded, the Civil Courts have jurisdiction to examine into cases where the provisions of the Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principle of judicial procedure. " V Under facts and circumstances, which were very similar to the instant case, the learned Judge held that inasmuch as the assessment and valuation were done in violation of the provisions of the Act and the rules, and in violation of the rules of natural justice, this" court would have jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. I respectfully agree with that conclusion. The position seems to be that if the authorities, constituted by the said Act, proceeded in accordance with the provisions contained in the Act and the rules framed thereunder, and were not guilty of any violations of the rules of natural justice, then the conclusion reached by them cannot be questioned in any court, but where such a special tribunal ignores the provisions laid down in the statute and the rules or is guilty of a violation of the rules of natural justice then in that case, the Civil Court would have jurisdiction to go into the matter and if necessary set aside the said finding. Reference has been made before us to another decision of the Judicial Committee The Ralheigh Investment Company Ltd. v. The Governor General in Council, 51 C. W. N. 762. That was a case under the Indian Income Tax Act. 5. The question was whether a suit lay in a Civil Court, questioning an assessment made under the said Act. Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee held that no such suit lies. They however, pointed out that the Income Tax act itself contains ample provisions for appeals and revisions and reference of legal points to the High Court. Therefore, a question of ultra vires should be determined by those tribunals which are constituted under the Income Tax Act, and a separate suit was excluded. They however indicated that had these provisions for appeals and revisions etc. not been present in the said Act then they would have seriously considered the question as to whether the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts was constitutional or not. So far as the Bengal Municipal Act is concerned, there is only one review from the assessment namely, to the Review Committee. There it stops. The Review Committee does not consist of people cognisant with the law, and there is no provision for reference to the courts of any point of law that may arise. Under such circumstances, if the court finds that the tribunal constituted under the Act has not acted in accordance with the terms of the statute or the rules framed thereunder, or that it has proceeded in violation of the rules of natural justice, then in that case it has ample jurisdiction to entertain a suit and the decision of the Privy Council in Mask's case (supra) would authorise the institution of a suit. This naturally brings us to the main point on the merits, namely, as to whether the assessment and valuation made by Mr. Bose was made in accordance with the provisions of the statute and also in accordance with the rules of natural justice. The complaint is as follows. I have already mentioned that under the Bengal Municipal Act the annual value of holdings has to be determined under the provisions of section 128 and the important provisions are sub-section (1) and (2) of section 128. The relevant part of section 128 may be set out hereunder. The complaint is as follows. I have already mentioned that under the Bengal Municipal Act the annual value of holdings has to be determined under the provisions of section 128 and the important provisions are sub-section (1) and (2) of section 128. The relevant part of section 128 may be set out hereunder. "128 (1) The annual value of a holding shall be deemed to be the gross annual rental at which the holding may reasonably be expected to let. (2) If such gross annual rental cannot, in the opinion of the assessor, be easily estimated or ascertained, the annual value of such holding shall be deemed to be an amount which may be equal to but may not exceed seven and half per centum on the value of the building or buildings on such holding at the time of such assessment plus a reasonable ground rent for the land comprised in the holding. " it is obvious that the annual valuation is to be made either under subsection (1) or under sub-section (2. Normally the annual valuation should be made under sub-section (1. This has reference to the reasonable letting value of the premises. It is only when the gross annual rental cannot, in the opinion of the assessor, be easily estimated or ascertained, then and then, only the annual value of such holding; shall be calculated in accordance with the procedure laid down in sub-section (2. In computing the annual value under sub-section (2) firstly, the value of the building or buildings at the time of the assessment will have to be calculated and the reasonable ground rent for the land will have to be either known or calculated. Such calculation will certainly be affected by the proviso but it is not necessary to discuss the matter in greater detail. So far as the annual valuation is concerned, as made by the Review Committee, namely, by Mr. Bose, all we have is the cryptic order dated the 23rd of July 1952 which has been quoted above. In order to test whether this kind of valuation complies with the provisions of the law or not we have to look also into the rules. The relevant rule is Rule 8 (a) and (b). The procedure to be adopted in ascertaining the gross annual rental at which a holding may reasonably be expected to let has been laid down. In order to test whether this kind of valuation complies with the provisions of the law or not we have to look also into the rules. The relevant rule is Rule 8 (a) and (b). The procedure to be adopted in ascertaining the gross annual rental at which a holding may reasonably be expected to let has been laid down. It is provided that comparison may be made with the rents of a similar holdings in the vicinity". It has also been provided that regard may also be had to the rent which might reasonably be expected in an average year or taking one year with another, and not in any particular year. The rental of the holding in the past or in the future is immaterial, and a hypothetical tenant shall be assumed to use the property in the same way as the actual occupier, and to have the same facility for deriving profit from it, no more or no less. In other words, what we have to do is firstly to find out whether there are comparable lands in the vicinity from which there can be a determination of the gross annual rental at which the holding may reasonably be expected to let. Rule 8 (a) makes it clear that the comparison must be made with 'similar' holdings in the vicinity. In this particular case, the Administrator compared the Golf Club with Jala land in the neighbourhood. Jala land means low level lands which are usually submerged in water and are suitable only for growing crops like paddy. These are certainly not comparable lands in the vicinity. Then again, he says that such lands are let out at Rs. 2/- per cottah per month. Nowhere is there any indication as to where this figure is derived from. Based on this hypothetical figure, he attempts to calculate what the annual rental, should be in respect of the highly developed land and structure belonging to the club. Then he considers the area of the club to be a large one and finally arrives at the figure of Rs. 0/12/- annas per cottah. Then he mentions the "valuation of the structure" without mentioning any figures at all. It is therefore, almost impossible to find out whether he is proceeding under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2). Then he considers the area of the club to be a large one and finally arrives at the figure of Rs. 0/12/- annas per cottah. Then he mentions the "valuation of the structure" without mentioning any figures at all. It is therefore, almost impossible to find out whether he is proceeding under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2). If he is proceeding under subsection (1), then he would have to consider the gross annual rental of similar structures in the vicinity. He has not done so. Nor is it a determination under sub-section (2) because, in that case, the value of the building or buildings, has to be carefully, calculated and then further calculations have to be made as indicated in the sub-section itself. The ground rent has to be considered. None of these factors were taken into account and no calculations were made on such footing and, therefore, it cannot be said that the Administrator went upon the footing of subsection (2. It is therefore, clear on the face of the order that the administrator did not follow either the provisions of the Act or the rules in calculating the annual value of the holding or the amount that has to be assessed thereon. 6. I am glad to say that so far as the appellant is concerned, Mr. Mookerjee has conceded that the order of Mr. Bose dated the 23rd of July 1952 cannot be supported and he does not seek to support it. That being so, it follows that the first point raised must be decided against the appellant. In other words, inasmuch as the administrator did not follow the provisions of the statute and the rules, the court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit. So far as the second point is concerned it must be held against the appellant for the reasons given above and also because the objection to it is not pressed. Now we come to the third point. As I have pointed out above, in the plaint filed there is a prayer to the effect that there should be directions for the refund of the entire amount calculated under the pretext of taxes based upon the annual value as determined. Now we come to the third point. As I have pointed out above, in the plaint filed there is a prayer to the effect that there should be directions for the refund of the entire amount calculated under the pretext of taxes based upon the annual value as determined. There is, however, no allegation in the body of the plaint that any amount has been paid or collected, or if so, what amount has been paid or collected in respect of which such a direction should be given. It is admitted also that there is no evidence on the point which has been adduced in any of the courts below. The lower appellate court arrived at the figure of Rs. 4813/ -. Simply because the suit was valued on the footing that the excess valuation made by the Municipality amounted to Rs. 4813/ -. There are certain endorsements on the plaint to that effect, but that is merely for the purpose of calculating the court fees and jurisdiction and forms no part of the body of the plaint. In fact, even in the endorsement, there is no statement made that any such amount has been paid or collected by the Tollygunge Municipality. That being so, we do not think that the lower appellate court was justified in passing a decree for that amount in favour of the plaintiff. I might mention here that a point has been taken by the appellant that the money was received by the Tollygunge Municipality and therefore, no such decree could be passed against the Corporation of Calcutta. That, however, is a disputed point because Mr. Banerjee has argued that by an order of State Government the Corporation of Calcutta has been vested with all the assets and liabilities of the Tollygunge Municipality, and as such it is liable to refund any sum which the Litter has received, but which were not due to it. We do not think it is necessary for us in the circumstances to decide any such point. There is neither a pleading with regard to this refund, nor any evidence. Therefore, in the suit as framed, no such decree can be passed. 7. The result is that this appeal is only partially successful and the judgment of the appellate court, in so far as it passed a decree for the sum of Rs. There is neither a pleading with regard to this refund, nor any evidence. Therefore, in the suit as framed, no such decree can be passed. 7. The result is that this appeal is only partially successful and the judgment of the appellate court, in so far as it passed a decree for the sum of Rs. 4813/ -, against the defendant is set aside. The rest of the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court is affirmed. The assessment proceedings for the ascertainment of the annual valuation and the rates and taxes to be paid by the respondent thereon, will now proceed in accordance with law. 8. It remains for me to deal with the cross objection preferred by the respondent. Two grounds have been taken therein. The facts of this case have already been dealt with above and need not be repeated again. So far as the ground no. 1 is concerned, we have already set aside the decree passed for payment of Rs. 4813/- by the defendant to the plaintiff and we have pointed out in our judgment that no foundation was made anywhere for claiming this sum. There were no facts pleaded in the body of the plaint, nor was there any evidence. So far as this ground is concerned, the cross objection fails, in the sense that the matter does not fall to be considered. So far as the other ground is concerned, it is pleaded that the respondent cross objector, was entitled to get back from the appellant a sum of Rs. 70840/- being the amount paid by or collected from the respondent Cross objector. Here again there is neither any pleading in the plaint to that effect, nor any evidence. For the reasons aforesaid, the cross objection seems to be misconceived and cannot succeed. The cross objection is accordingly dismissed. We make no order as to costs in the appeal or the cross objection.