JUDGMENT C.A. Vaidialingam, J. 1. In all these writ petitions, the tenants, of the premises in question, challenge the order of the learned District Judge, Trivandrum, namely the revisional authority, functioning under the provisions of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1959, as amended by Act 29 of 1961, and hereinafter referred to as the Act. 2. It is seen that the contesting respondent in these writ petitions, namely the 2nd respondent, who is the landlord of the premises in question, filed applications under section 11 (4) (iv) of the Act for eviction of the three writ petitioners, on the ground that he requires the building for purposes of reconstructing the same. There were several other matters, no doubt, referred to in the said applications of the landlord. 3. This claim of the landlord was very strenuously challenged by the three writ petitioners, who were in possession and occupation of three different rooms, no doubt, comprised in the same building, as tenants of the landlord. The petitioner in O.P. 411/63, represented by his learned counsel Mr. V. K. K. Menon, was running a Medical Store in part of the building covered by T.C. 904. Similarly, the petitioner in O. P. 420/63,represented, again, by learned counsel Mr. K. V. Surianarayana Iyer, was running an automobile and spare-parts shop in a part of the building, taken in by T. C. 905. Again, the petitioner in O. P. 421/63, represented by learned counsel Mr. K. S. Paripoornan was an optician, having his business in another part of the same building, namely T. C. 903. It is also seen that T. C. 904 is the central block, T. C. 905 is the eastern block, and T. C. 903 the western block. 4. The claim of the landlord forgetting eviction under the provisions of section 11 (4) (iv) of the Act, as I mentioned earlier, was very strenuously controverted by the three writ petitioners. The landlord no doubt, has stated that the shop buildings in question are sheds converted into rooms, and no doubt separately let out to the various tenants. The landlord has also stated that the entire shed is in a very bad condition and that it is highly in need of demolition and reconstruction. The landlord has also referred to his having applied to the Municipal authorities and having obtained the necessary permission for reconstructing the building in question. The landlord has also stated that the entire shed is in a very bad condition and that it is highly in need of demolition and reconstruction. The landlord has also referred to his having applied to the Municipal authorities and having obtained the necessary permission for reconstructing the building in question. He has also relied upon the necessary plans that have been approved for such reconstruction, by the Municipal authorities. Quite naturally the landlord urged that he bona fide wants to reconstruct, and especially that he has the financial ability in that regard. The landlord, who was the petitioner in all the three applications before the Rent Control Court, is represented by learned counsel Mr. V. R. Krishna Iyer in all these writ petitions. 5. The tenants controverted the stand taken by the landlord. They also urged that the building is not in such a condition as to require reconstruction, as contemplated under section 11 (4) (iv) of the Act. Then again, various other grounds, which, according to them, will disentitle the landlord from asking their eviction, were also taken; for instance, that the applications have been filed by the landlord with intent to coerce them to pay excessive rents, that there are no bona fides in the applications filed by the landlord, and that the landlord is not in such a financial position as to meet the cost of the reconstruction proposed by him. But the more serious contention that appears to have been taken by the tenants related to the question, namely that the building is not in such a condition as to require reconstruction under section 11 (4) (iv) of the Act. 6. By common agreement, the evidence taken in one of these applications, was treated as evidence in all the other applications, and all the authorities have dealt with the matters by a common order. 7. The Rent Controller set five points as arising for decision, namely: (1) Whether the building is in such a condition that it needs reconstruction? (2) Whether the landlord requires bona fide to re-construct the same? (3) Whether the landlord has the plan and licence required and the ability to rebuild? (4) Whether the claim for eviction is bona fide? (5) Whether the claim is unsustainable for all or any of the reasons stated by the respondents ? 8. (2) Whether the landlord requires bona fide to re-construct the same? (3) Whether the landlord has the plan and licence required and the ability to rebuild? (4) Whether the claim for eviction is bona fide? (5) Whether the claim is unsustainable for all or any of the reasons stated by the respondents ? 8. The Rent Controller considers point No. 1, namely whether the building is in such a condition that it needs reconstruction. So far as that is concerned, the Rent Controller refers to the fact that the property in question consists of a non-residential building, located at the Statue Junction, touching the main road in front of the Secretariat buildings in Trivandrum. The Rent Controller gives a brief description of the property itself, as having been constructed in two steps on rubble foundation and basement, with tiled flooring, brick walls plastered and roofing covered with corrugated iron sheets. The age of the building is also stated to be about 30 years. After referring to the purchase of the property made by the landlord in 1959, as also to the other circumstance, namely of having put up another building adjacent to the building in question, the Rent Controller refers to the issue of a commission for the purpose of furnishing a report regarding the condition of the building. The report of the Commissioner is Ext. P-4, and it is seen that the Commissioner himself has been examined as C.P.W. 3. There is a reference again by the Rent Controller to the report of the Commissioner, and it is the view of the Rent Controller that a conclusion on this aspect will have to be arrived at more or less exclusively on the basis of the report of the Commissioner Ext. P-4, as well as on the oral evidence furnished by the Commissioner as C.P.W. 3. It is also seen that the said authority was not inclined to attach much importance to the other oral evidence adduced both by the landlord as well as the tenants. No doubt the Rent Controller refers to the oral evidence adduced by those parties but it is seen that the Rent Controller does not think it necessary to act upon that evidence. Therefore, the position was that a conclusion regarding the condition of the building had to be arrived at by the Rent Controller almost exclusively on the basis of the report Ext. Therefore, the position was that a conclusion regarding the condition of the building had to be arrived at by the Rent Controller almost exclusively on the basis of the report Ext. P-4 of the Commissioner, as well as the evidence of the Commissioner as C.P.W. 3. Ultimately the Rent Controller is of the view that the condition of the building has to be determined with reference to the oral evidence of the Commissioner and the report of the Commissioner, as also the other circumstances. 9. Evidently, in considering the other circumstances the Rent Controller takes into account the fact that the local authority, thereby meaning the Municipal authority have not so far taken any action on the basis that building is in a dangerous or dilapidated condition. It is also the view of the Rent Controller that the petitioner's case on this aspect is vague and inconsistent. Ultimately the view of the Rent Controller appears to be that the evidence of the Commissioner as C.P.W. 3, and his report Ext. P-4, only justify an inference that the existing structure is in need of renovation, replacement of certain parts, and proper maintenance; and therefore, there is no justification for the conclusion that demolition of the entire structure and reconstruction is an absolute necessity in view of the present condition of the building. Pausing here for a minute, the approach that appears to have been made by the Rent Controller, was to find out whether the building is in such a condition as to require reconstruction immediately, i.e., to put in other words, the view of the Rent Controller appears to be that unless the building is in such a dangerous or dilapidated condition, no demolition and reconstruction of the entire building is necessary at all, and therefore the landlord will not be entitled to ask for eviction. An insight into the working of the Rent Controller's mind in coming to such a conclusion will be clear when he refers to the fact that the Municipal authorities have not taken any action on the basis that the building is in a dangerous or dilapidated condition. No doubt, this approach that has been made by the Rent Controller and which has also found approval at the hands of the appellate authority at any rate has been commended before me by all the three counsel appearing for the respective petitioners in these writ petitions. No doubt, this approach that has been made by the Rent Controller and which has also found approval at the hands of the appellate authority at any rate has been commended before me by all the three counsel appearing for the respective petitioners in these writ petitions. 10. The Rent Controller considers another aspect, as to whether the landlord in this case bona fide requires vacant possession of the building for the purpose of reconstruction. So far as this is concerned, having already come to the conclusion that the landlord cannot ask for eviction on the ground of reconstruction, inasmuch as the building itself is not in such a dangerous or dilapidated condition, quite naturally applying that test the Rent Controller came to the conclusion that inasmuch as the landlord wants to rebuild the entire structure, when it was not absolutely necessary, it cannot be considered in this case that the claim of the landlord is bona fide. Here again it must be stated that it is not the view of the Rent Controller that the landlord requiring the building for reconstruction is mala fide, but because it is of the view that the landlord cannot ask for eviction under section 11 (4) (iv) of the Act, inasmuch as the building itself is not in such a dangerous or dilapidated condition as to require reconstruction, he comes to the conclusion that it is not bona fide. 11. Then the Rent Controller takes up point No. 3, namely whether the landlord has the plan and licence required and the ability to rebuild. There again, the finding has been recorded in favour of the landlord himself. It is seen that after a detailed consideration of the application made by the landlord for building permit to the Corporation and also his ability to meet the expenses that he proposes to incur in respect of such reconstruction, the Rent Controller is of the view that the ability of the landlord to reconstruct in the manner he desires, is made out in this case. It has also accepted the contention of the landlord that he has obtained the plans and other necessary permission from the Corporation authorities. 12. No doubt, the Rent Controller considers again together the points arising for decision under points 2 and 4. It has also accepted the contention of the landlord that he has obtained the plans and other necessary permission from the Corporation authorities. 12. No doubt, the Rent Controller considers again together the points arising for decision under points 2 and 4. Point 2, as I mentioned earlier, is whether the landlord requires bona fide to construct the building; and point 4 is whether the claim for eviction is bona fide. Both the points, set together, no doubt under different heads, are in my view more or less the same. Evidently in setting point No. 4, the Rent Controller must be having in mind the question as to whether it is proved in this case as to whether the proposal made by the landlord is or is not made as a pretext for eviction. So far as that is concerned the Rent Controller is of the view, having due regard to the other circumstances of the case, that the petitioner landlord honestly means to make the construction after demolition. No doubt, as to whether the landlord bona fide requires the building, the finding of the Rent Controller is against the landlord, in view of its earlier finding, as I have already indicated, that the landlord cannot ask for reconstruction, unless the building is in such a dangerous or dilapidated condition. Ultimately, notwithstanding the fact that the Rent Controller has found that the circumstance that he had made the necessary application to the Municipal authorities justifies in holding that the landlord honestly means to make the new construction, and notwithstanding the further findings recorded in favour of the landlord about his financial ability and his having obtained the plan and the licence, in view of the limited finding arrived at as against the landlord, by the Rent Controller that unless the building is in such a dangerous and dilapidated condition, the claim of the landlord for eviction cannot be considered to be bona fide, his application was rejected. 13. There were appeals taken by the landlord against the orders of the Rent Controller, before the appellate authority under the provisions of the Act itself. The appeals also were dealt with and disposed by a common judgment by the learned Subordinate Judge, who is the appellate authority. 13. There were appeals taken by the landlord against the orders of the Rent Controller, before the appellate authority under the provisions of the Act itself. The appeals also were dealt with and disposed by a common judgment by the learned Subordinate Judge, who is the appellate authority. The appellate authority, after tracing the history of the legislation in this particular aspect, is of the view that having due regard to the provisions of clause (iv) of sub-section (4) of section 11, it is clear that the necessity for reconstruction must arise from the condition of the building, and considerations like the question of investment made by the landlord, or the question of the locality where the building is situated, or the desirability of putting a much better building in the locality, etc., are not relevant in coming to a decision on the right of the landlord to get eviction according to the provisions of clause (iv). Then the appellate authority again refers to the topography of the building, as well as the nature of the building itself, namely that the walls are in brick and are plastered, and the roofing is covered with corrugated iron sheets. The appellate authority is also of the view that the question as to whether the condition of the building is such as to require reconstruction, must again be considered only in the light of the evidence of the Commissioner as C.P.W. 3 and his report Ext. P-4. In this context, the appellate authority refers to some portions of the Commissioner's report Ext. P-4. And he is of the view that inasmuch as the Rent Controller has considered this aspect in considerable detail and has accepted the report and has also come to the conclusion that the existing structure is in need of renovation, replacement of certain parts and proper maintenance, but not reconstruction the appellate authority ultimately agrees with the view of the Rent Controller that there is no justification for the view that demolition of the entire structure is an absolute necessity. On this ground, again, the appellate authority ultimately agrees with the conclusion arrived at by the Rent Controller that in the circumstances of the case what is required is only renovation or repairs to the building and replacement of certain minor parts, and that it cannot certainly be said that a reconstruction of the building is necessary in view of the present condition of the building. 14. Then the appellate authority considers the question as to whether the claim of the landlord is bona fide. Here again, the appellate authority adverts to the evidence of the landlord, and ultimately comes to the conclusion that the various matters mentioned by him in the petition give an indication that what has prompted the filing of these petitions, is not the absolute necessity of having the building reconstructed. There appears to have been a memorandum of objections filed by the tenants in respect of certain findings recorded in favour of the landlord and as against them by the Rent Controller. And the points arising for decision in the memorandum of objections do not appear to have been accepted by the appellate authority. Here again, it will be seen that the appellate authority has largely accepted the findings of the Rent Controller and dismissed the applications of the landlord, on the ground that it agrees with the view of the Rent Controller that the landlord cannot ask for eviction of the building under section 11 (4) (iv) of the Act inasmuch as he is not able to satisfy that the building is in such a dangerous or dilapidated condition as to require reconstruction. No doubt I am conscious of the fact that the appellate authority has not actually stated in its judgment that the landlord in question can ask for possession of the building under section 11 (4) (iv), only if he is able to satisfy that the building is in such a dangerous or dilapidated condition as to require reconstruction. That was a specific reason, given and such an approach was made by the Rent Controller as I have already indicated. But a reading of the appellate judgment also clearly shows that the appellate authority was fully satisfied that the approach made by the Rent Controller in this regard was perfectly correct; and the appellate authority has not indicated its dissent with this view, in the appellate order. But a reading of the appellate judgment also clearly shows that the appellate authority was fully satisfied that the approach made by the Rent Controller in this regard was perfectly correct; and the appellate authority has not indicated its dissent with this view, in the appellate order. That is why I am stating that the appellate authority also seems to be of the view that the landlord cannot claim eviction of the tenants under section 11 (4) (iv) of the Act, unless the building is in such a dangerous or dilapidated condition that it requires reconstruction. Ultimately the appellate authority agreed with all the other findings recorded by the Rent Controller in favour of the landlord regarding his having obtained the plans and licence and also about his financial ability to reconstruct. But ultimately, inasmuch as the appellate authority had agreed with the views of the Rent Controller that the landlord cannot ask for eviction of the tenants, the appeals filed by the landlord were all dismissed. 15. The landlord took the matter up in revision before the learned District Judge, who is the revisional authority again, under the statute. The revisional authority has considered this matter and is of the view that the approach made by both the lower authorities, namely, the Rent Controller and the appellate authority, is erroneous, having due regard to the scheme of section 11 (4) (iv) of the Act. According to the revisional authority, before the landlord can get possession he has to establish five conditions mentioned in the revisional order, namely (1) that the building is in such a condition that it needs reconstruction, (2) that the landlord requires bona fide to reconstruct the same, (3) that the landlord has satisfied the court that he has the plan and licence required for reconstruction, (4) that he has the ability to rebuild, and (5) that the landlord's proposal is not made as a pretext for eviction. The revisional authority has on the basis of certain decisions, come to the conclusion that its jurisdiction under section 20 of the Act, is far wider than the jurisdiction conferred on the revisional authorities under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The revisional authority has on the basis of certain decisions, come to the conclusion that its jurisdiction under section 20 of the Act, is far wider than the jurisdiction conferred on the revisional authorities under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In particular, the revisional authority refers to the decision rendered by me and reported in Ramankutty v. Ittiachan (1960) 2 K.L.R. 353, following the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in its decision reported in Moti Ram v. Suraj Bhan A.I.R. 1960 SC 655. After a consideration of these decisions, the revisional authority comes to the conclusion that it can go into materials on record to find out whether there has been a proper approach made by the two subordinate authorities in considering the claim of the landlord under section 11 (4) (iv) of the Act, as also into the other question whether the conclusions arrived at by both those authorities are proper in the circumstances of the case, having due regard to the materials available before the court. 16. Before I refer to the findings recorded on these aspects by the revisional authority, it is necessary to advert to one point, which has been no doubt very elaborately discussed by the revisional authority. That question is covered by the last point set by it for decision, namely as to whether the landlord's proposal is made as a pretext for eviction. In fact, the revisional authority seems to proceed on the basis that this aspect has not been adverted to either by the Rent Controller in the first instance, or by the appellate authority later; and therefore it embarks on a fairly lengthy inquiry on this aspect, and ultimately it comes to the conclusion that in this case it cannot be certainly stated that the claim of the landlord for eviction under section 11 (4) (iv) of the Act is made as a Pretext for getting eviction of the tenants. In fact it will be seen by reference to the order of the Rent Controller and I have already indicated it m the earlier part of this judgment that point No. 4 that it had set before it for decision, which is no doubt loosely worded was again as to whether the claim, of the landlord for eviction is bonafide, must certainly have reference to the last aspect montioned in section 11 (4) (iv) of the Act, namely as to whether the proposal is not made as a pretext for eviction. Because it will be seen that the Rent Controller had already set the point as to whether the landlord bona fide requires to reconstruct the buildings under point No. 2. Therefore, point No. 4 must have reference to this aspect. Whatever it is, the position ultimately as it now stands, is that when all the authorities, namely the Rent Controller, the appellate authority, and the revisional authority, have all concurrently found on this aspect that the proposal of the landlord for eviction of the tenants under section 11 (4) (iv) of the Act, is not made on the pretext of eviction and that he had made an honest claim, the question as to whether the landlord is entitled to get eviction under the section on other grounds is a totally different point. 17. The revisional authority then considers the question as to whether there has been a proper approach made by the subordinate authorities in considering the claim of the landlord under section 11(4) (iv) of the Act Again, on this aspect, it is the broad view of the revisional authority that the subordinate authorities have failed to arrive at a proper conclusion on the basis of the evidence and other circumstances on the question as to whether the landlord bona fide requires the building for reconstruction. That is one aspect that has been very elaborately dealt with by the revisional authority. And on this aspect the ultimate finding of the revisional authority is that the landlord has made out his bona fide requirement of reconstruction of the building in dispute. That is one aspect that has been very elaborately dealt with by the revisional authority. And on this aspect the ultimate finding of the revisional authority is that the landlord has made out his bona fide requirement of reconstruction of the building in dispute. It also adverts to the findings recorded in favour of the landlord by the Rent Controller and by the appellate authority that the landlord has got the requisite plan and also sufficient funds for the purpose of reconstructing the building and that all these circumstances fit in with the testimony of the landlord himself about his bona fide claim. When considering this aspect the revisional authority adverts to certain applications, namely I.A. Nos. 1133, 1134 and 1172 of 1962 filed before the Rent Controller by the landlord himself wherein he has made an offer to the tenants to make accommodation available to them in the new premises itself, on the same road, and sufficient for the tenants for their existing business. The revisional authority takes note of the fact that this offer made by the landlord was not accepted by the tenants. That again is an additional circumstance which has to be taken into account, according to the revisional authority, in coming to the conclusion on the landlord's bona fide intention to reconstruct the building even without causing any inconvenience to the tenants. Therefore, ultimately on this aspect the finding recorded by the revisional authority is in favour of the landlord. 18. The other question is also discussed in considerable detail by the revisional authority, namely the question as to whether the building in question is in such a condition that it needs reconstruction. So far as that is concerned, the revisional authority, after taking note of the nature of the building at present, adverts to the Commissioner's report Ext. P-4 and the evidence of the Commissioner as C.P.W. 3. No doubt the revisional authority adverts to the evidence on record of the parties themselves. But the ultimate view of the revisional authority also is that a conclusion on this aspect will have to be arrived at only on the basis of the Commissioner's report as well as the evidence of the Commissioner. No doubt the revisional authority adverts to the evidence on record of the parties themselves. But the ultimate view of the revisional authority also is that a conclusion on this aspect will have to be arrived at only on the basis of the Commissioner's report as well as the evidence of the Commissioner. Pausing here for a minute, there has been complete unanimity of opinion, so far as I could see, regarding the materials which should be taken into account on this very important aspect, namely the question as to whether the building in question is in such a condition that it needs reconstruction. As I have already pointed out, the Rent Controller has accepted the position that the other evidence on record is interested and cannot be accepted; and a consideration of this question will depend upon the view to be taken regarding the materials furnished by the Commissioner in his report Ext. P-4 as also the matters mentioned by him in his evidence as C.P.W. 3. That was the same approach made by the appellate authority also. And a similar approach has been made by the revisional authority also. That is why I said that there has been complete unanimity of opinion regarding the materials which have to be looked into by the authorities for coming to the conclusion no doubt one way or the other on this very important aspect of the case. 19. The revisional authority, after considering the nature of the building as also the condition in which the building appears to be at present, rather elaborately considers the relevant portions of the Commissioner's report Ext. P-4. And after adverting to very many of the matters mentioned in that report by the Commissioner, the revisional authority comes to the conclusion that the Commissioner has pointed out various defects in the building, which require immediate attention, and it is not necessary that the building should be in a dilapidated condition for the landlord to enter upon it and reconstruct the same. Then no doubt the revisional authority again adverts to certain decisions, because according to him, the principles laid down therein may have a bearing on this aspect. Then no doubt the revisional authority again adverts to certain decisions, because according to him, the principles laid down therein may have a bearing on this aspect. But ultimately on this aspect, the view of the revisional authority is that in view of what has been stated by the Commissioner and what has been accepted by him in this case, the requirement of the building by landlord for the purpose of reconstruction is amply justified and it categorically records a finding to the effect that on a consideration of the entire evidence and other material circumstances, the landlord has made out in this case that the building in dispute is in such a condition that it needs reconstruction. The revisional authority does not agree with the view expressed by the Rent Controller and the appellate authority that on the materials before them what is required is not reconstruction but renovation of the building, for which purpose it is not necessary to order the eviction of the tenants from the premises. 20. Incidentally I may state that it appears to have been argued before the revisional authority that the landlord is not justified in putting up a structure which is bigger in size than the structure which is now in existence on the disputed property. It is stated that the dimension of the building on which the three rooms at present stand, is only 100 ft. x 21 ft; and perhaps the reconstruction, according to the plan is likely to result in increasing the length of the building. Probably on the basis of this fact, the contention appears to have been raised that the landlord is not entitled to put up a far bigger building than the existing one. Here again, the revisional authority was not prepared to accept the contention and it is of the view that the landlord has made out a case for getting eviction under section 11 (4) (iv) of the Act. I have specifically adverted to this aspect, because Mr. V. K. K. Menon, learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner in O.P. 411/63, in particular, has taken up the position that in this case the claim of the landlord cannot certainly be stated to be for reconstruction. I will deal with that aspect when I consider the contentions raised by the learned counsel in these proceedings. V. K. K. Menon, learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner in O.P. 411/63, in particular, has taken up the position that in this case the claim of the landlord cannot certainly be stated to be for reconstruction. I will deal with that aspect when I consider the contentions raised by the learned counsel in these proceedings. Ultimately, the revisional authority, having differed from the conclusion arrived at on this material aspect by the Rent Controller as well as by the appellate authority, regarding the condition of the building, and inasmuch as he disagreed with the views expressed by both the subordinate authorities, reversed the orders of both the subordinate authorities and allowed the applications filed by the landlord and granted eviction accordingly. This order of the revisional authority is challenged by all the three learned counsel appearing for the respective petitioners in all these three writ petitions. 21. Two main grounds of attack have been raised, and which are common, for consideration in all these writ petitions. Apart from those two grounds, there is a special contention raised, as indicated by me earlier, by Mr. V. K. K. Menon, learned counsel for the petitioner in O.P. No. 411 of 1963, and that is that the claim of the landlord in this case cannot be considered for reconstruction of the building, which, according to the learned counsel, has got only very limited accommodation. After disposing of the major common contentions that have been urged by all the learned counsel I will advert to the special contention of Mr. V. K. K. Menon. 22. The two main contentions that have been urged by all the learned counsel for the petitioners in these proceedings are, firstly that the revisional authority functioning under section 20 of the Act has got a very limited jurisdiction. In entering very minutely and elaborately into the reasons given by the two subordinate authorities and the findings recorded by them; and in interfering with those findings of fact arrived at by those authorities, the revisional authority has far exceeded its jurisdiction and therefore the order of the revisional authority is absolutely illegal and erroneous. In entering very minutely and elaborately into the reasons given by the two subordinate authorities and the findings recorded by them; and in interfering with those findings of fact arrived at by those authorities, the revisional authority has far exceeded its jurisdiction and therefore the order of the revisional authority is absolutely illegal and erroneous. The second contention that has been urged by the learned counsel is that the revisional authority has not properly considered the various tests to be applied for finding out the requirement made by the landlord on the basis of the provisions contained in section 11 (4) (iv) of the Act. On the other hand, according to the learned counsel, the revisional authority has proceeded on the basis that when once the landlord is able to show that he intends to reconstruct a particular building, eviction can be granted under section 11 (4) (iv) of the Act. This according to the learned counsel, is not warranted by the provisions of the statute itself. 23. Quite naturally, the stand that is taken by the learned counsel for the petitioners on these two aspects, has been very strenuously controverted by Mr. V. R. Krishna Iyer, learned counsel appearing for the landlord, who is the contesting respondent in all these writ petitions. The learned counsel for the contesting respondent in particular referred me to the decision of the Supreme Court regarding the first aspect, namely the jurisdiction exercised by revisional authorities functioning under provisions analogous to section 20 of the Act. The learned counsel also referred me to the decision of the Supreme Court in Moti Ram v. Suraj Bhan A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 655 as well as to the decision rendered by me, following the said decision, of the Supreme Court, reported in Ramankutty v. Ittiachan (1960) 2 K.L.R. 353. The learned counsel also referred me to the decision of my learned brother Madhavan Nair, J., and reported in the same volume, namely Vital Das Rao v. Muthugopal (1960) 2 K.L.R. 711 . Learned counsel also drew my pointed attention to the recent decision of the Supreme Court reported in Neta Ram v. Jivan Lal A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 499, approving of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in its earlier decision in Moti Ram v. Suraj Bhan A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 655. Having due regard to all these decisions, Mr. Learned counsel also drew my pointed attention to the recent decision of the Supreme Court reported in Neta Ram v. Jivan Lal A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 499, approving of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in its earlier decision in Moti Ram v. Suraj Bhan A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 655. Having due regard to all these decisions, Mr. V. R. Krishna Iyer, learned counsel for the contesting respondent landlord urged that the jurisdiction exercised by the revisional authority under the Act, was perfectly in order and that it has not in any manner exceeded the jurisdiction that has been vested in it under section 20 of the Act. The second contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners, has also been met by Mr. V. R. Krishna Iyer learned counsel for the contesting respondent, on the ground that in this case the revisional authority was satisfied that the test laid down by the subordinate authorities to consider the claim made for eviction under section 11 (4) (iv) of the Act, is absolutely erroneous; and the revisional authority has also given good and proper reasons regarding the principles to be borne in mind in considering a claim arising under section 11 (4) (iv) of the Act. The learned counsel also pointed out that it is not as if that the revisional authority has merely considered the question from the point of view of the landlord requiring the Premises for reconstruction, but, on the other hand, the revisional authority has taken care to very elaborately consider the question as to whether the building in this case requires reconstruction or not; and it is after having due regard to the various matters dealt with by the Commissioner in his report Ext. P-4; that the revisional authority has chosen to take a view different from the one taken by both the subordinate authorities in this case, and has come to the conclusion that in this case the requirement of the landlord is for reconstruction, and not for renovation, of the building. 24. I will take up the first contention advanced before me by the learned counsel for the petitioners, first. 24. I will take up the first contention advanced before me by the learned counsel for the petitioners, first. That, as I have already indicated, is to the effect that the revisional authority, namely the learned District Judge, when he interfered with findings of fact recorded by the two subordinate authorities, exceeded the jurisdiction vested in him under section 20 of the Act. Section 20 of the Act is as follows: "20. Revision.-(1) In cases where the appellate authority empowered under section 18 is a Subordinate Judge, the District Court and in other cases the High Court, may, at any time, on the application of any party, call for and examine the records relating to any order passed or proceedings taken under this Act by such authority for the purpose of satisfying itself, as to the legality, regularity, or propriety of such order or proceedings, and may pass such order in reference thereto, as it thinks fit. (2) The costs of and incident to all proceedings before the High Court or District Court under sub-section (1) shall be in its discretion." In this case, it is the learned District Judge who exercised jurisdiction under this section. It will be seen that power is given to the courts mentioned in sub-section (1) of section 20, in order to satisfy itself about the legality, regularity or propriety of the orders passed by the subordinate authorities, as it may think fit, and to call for and examine the records relating to any order or proceedings taken under the Act by the subordinate authorities with reference thereto as it thinks fit. The question is whether in this case the revisional authority can be considered to have exceeded its jurisdiction. As to whether the conclusion arrived at by the revisional authority no doubt, different from the conclusion arrived at by both the subordinate authorities regarding the circumstances under which a landlord can invoke the provisions of section 11 (4) (iv) of the Act, is a totally different matter. As to whether the conclusion is correct or not, is an aspect which will have to be dealt with independently later on. As to whether the conclusion is correct or not, is an aspect which will have to be dealt with independently later on. But for the present I am concerned only with the limited question of jurisdiction of the revisional authority to consider the correctness or otherwise of the conclusion of the two subordinate authorities, no doubt, concurrently, on this very important aspect, as against the landlord, who was the petitioner before the Rent Controller. 25. It is not as if that a provision analogous to section 20 of the Act arises for consideration before the Courts for the first time. In fact, as I mentioned earlier a somewhat similar provision has been subject of consideration at the hands of the Supreme Court in the decision reported in Moti Ram v. Suraj Bhan A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 655. In that case the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the interference made by the High Court exercising its powers under section 15 (5) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act (Act III of 1949), as amended by Act (XXIX of 1956). The section itself has been extracted in the judgment of the Supreme Court. It is seen that the provisions of that section are almost identical with the provisions on hand, excepting that in the section which the Supreme Court had to consider jurisdiction was given to the High Court to examine a particular order for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of such order or proceedings. In that connection, a contention was raised before the Supreme Court that the High Court, in the exercise of the jurisdiction vested in it under the provisions of the section referred to above, had committed an error in coming to its own conclusion on fact as to whether the particular requirement of the landlord in that case has keen satisfied. The Supreme Court, in considering this contention, takes note of the fact that the finding of the Rent Controller, as well as that of the appellate authority, in that case, was that the claim made by the landlord that he required the shop for the purpose of reconstruction was not bonafide. The Supreme Court, in considering this contention, takes note of the fact that the finding of the Rent Controller, as well as that of the appellate authority, in that case, was that the claim made by the landlord that he required the shop for the purpose of reconstruction was not bonafide. No doubt that decision appears to have been arrived at on the basis of the new provisions contained in the statute in question, whereas the correct provision of law that should have been applied and considered, was the provision in the earlier statute, containing more or less similar provisions. The High Court in that case reversed the findings arrived at by both the Rent Controller and the appellate authority. And, as I mentioned earlier, challenge was made regarding the correctness or propriety or legality of the conclusion arrived at by the High Court. In dealing with that aspect, the Supreme Court refers to the fact that the revisional power conferred on the High Court under section 15 (5) of the Act in question, is wider than that conferred by section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court emphasise in particular that under section 15 (5) of the statute before them, the High Court has jurisdiction to examine the legality or propriety of the order under revision. And, that, according to Their Lordships of Supreme Court, clearly justifies the examination of the propriety or legality of the finding arrived at by the subordinate authorities in the said case about the requirement of the landlord being bonafide or not. 26. Mr. K. V. Surianarayana Iyer, learned counsel for the petitioner in O.P. No. 420/63, attempted to distinguish the judgment of the Supreme Court referred to above, on the ground that in that case the Supreme Court was satisfied that the subordinate authorities, namely the Rent Controller as well as the appellate authority, had in arriving at certain conclusions on facts applied the wrong provisions of the statute whereas the High Court applied the correct provisions and came to a particular conclusion; and that is why interference made by the High Court was accepted by the Supreme Court in that case. I am not inclined to accept this contention sought to be made out by the learned counsel. I am not inclined to accept this contention sought to be made out by the learned counsel. The principle which has been laid down by the Supreme Court on a provision analogous to section 20 of our Act and which the Supreme Court clearly recognises, is the examination of the propriety or legality of the order under attack, and for that purpose the revisional authority would be perfectly justified in examining the propriety or legality of a finding made by the subordinate authorities. If that result is to be achieved, I fail to see how that could be achieved unless the revisional authority is given jurisdiction to consider both the materials for coming to the particular conclusion, as well as the findings recorded by the subordinate authorities. These principles laid down by the Supreme Court, as I have already indicated, have been followed both by me in Ramankutty v. Ittiachan (1960) 2 K.L.R. 353as well as by my learned brother Madhavan Nair, J., in Vital Das Rao v. Muthugopal (I960) 2 K.L.R. 711 27. In my view, the position stands reaffirmed by the latest decision of the Supreme Court reported in Neta Ram v. Jivan Lal A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 499. There again, Their Lordships of the Supreme Court had to consider the revisional power conferred on the revisional authority earlier in Moti Ram v. Suraj Bhan A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 655. But this later decision in my view, assumes some considerable significance, because the Supreme Court clearly explains the scope of the interference on the ground of a decision being proper or otherwise of a particular decision rendered by the subordinate authorities. Mr. K. V. Surianarayana Iyer, learned counsel for one of the petitioners, urged that the Supreme Court in this case had clearly laid down that when concurrent findings of fact have been arrived at by the subordinate authorities, a court of revision should be slow to interfere with the decision thus reached. The learned counsel is perfectly well founded in that contention. But the point is that something more is said in the decision by the Supreme Court to which I will presently advert. 28. The learned counsel is perfectly well founded in that contention. But the point is that something more is said in the decision by the Supreme Court to which I will presently advert. 28. No doubt, in that case it is seen that findings of fact had been concurrently recorded, both by the Rent Controller in the first instance and also by the appellate authority; i.e., both the subordinate authorities were satisfied in that case that the requirement of the building by the landlord in question for eviction on the ground of re-erection, was not bonafide. The High Court, under the provisions of section 15 (5) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, referred to earlier, merely observing that the evidence on record establishes beyond doubt that the landlord required the particular building for purpose of rebuilding, set aside the findings arrived at by the two subordinate authorities against the landlord. This approach made by a learned Judge of the High Court, was challenged in appeal before the Supreme Court. 29.The learned Judges of the Supreme Court advert to the principles laid down in their earlier decision in Moti Ram v. Suraj Bhan A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 655 regarding the scope of section 15(5) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act. The Supreme Court emphasises that the revisional power given under section 15 (5) of the statute in question does not include the power to reverse concurrent findings, "without showing how those findings are erroneous". Therefore it will be seen that the view of the Supreme Court is not that the revisional authority has no power to consider the correctness or otherwise of findings of fact arrived at by the subordinate authorities; but, so far as I could see, if I may say so with respect, the view of the Supreme Court is that the revisional authority cannot ordinarily interfere with findings of fact, unless it is able to show clearly how those findings are erroneous. The learned Judges in that case advert to the finding recorded by the learned Judge of the High Court; and according to the Supreme Court, that finding has been arrived at without adverting to a single piece of evidence from which such a conclusion has been drawn. The learned Judges in that case advert to the finding recorded by the learned Judge of the High Court; and according to the Supreme Court, that finding has been arrived at without adverting to a single piece of evidence from which such a conclusion has been drawn. Therefore the Supreme Court holds that in the circumstances of that case it cannot be said that the High Court had examined the propriety or legality of the order sought to be revised, even under the provisions of the law he was administering, namely section 15 (5) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act. In the latter part of the judgment the Supreme Court again refers to the fact that the two tribunals specially appointed to consider the matters had gone into the matter very thoroughly and discussed the the same from a correct angle; and the view of the Supreme Court is that if those authorities had examined the facts after instructing themselves correctly about law the revisional authority, should be slow to interfere with the decision thus reached, "unless it demonstrates by its own decision, the impropriety of the order, which it seeks to revise". 30. This decision of the Supreme Court, in my view, establishes two things, namely that it is open to the revisional authority, functioning under provisions similar to section 20 of our Act, to disturb concurrent findings of fact; but the requirement is that the revisional authority must clearly show how exactly the findings of fact arrived at by the subordinate authorities are erroneous. Secondly, it is also clear that if the subordinate authorities have correctly approached the question, a court of revision should be ordinarily slow to interfere with the decision thus reached; but it will have jurisdiction to interfere with those findings, if it demonstrates by giving its own decision and reasons about the findings which in its view are improper in any manner. Therefore if those conditions are satisfied, in my view, there is ample jurisdiction in the revisional authority functioning under section 20 of the statute to interfere with findings of fact, though they may be concurrent, either in favour or against a particular party. As to whether the learned District Judge has given good reasons for interference in this case, is a matter which does not arise on this aspect. Here again, I must state that while according to Mr. As to whether the learned District Judge has given good reasons for interference in this case, is a matter which does not arise on this aspect. Here again, I must state that while according to Mr. K. V. Surianarayana Iyer, learned counsel for the petitioner in O.P. 420/63, there is no jurisdiction whatsoever in the revisional authority functioning under section 20 of the Act, to canvass findings on facts, Mr. V. K. K. Menon, learned counsel for the petitioner in O.P. 411/63, however took a slightly different stand. Mr. V. K. K. Menon, so far as I could see was not serious in attempting to sustain a contention as extreme as that of Mr. K. V. Surianarayana Iyer. On the other hand, according to Mr. V. K. K. Menon, assuming that there is jurisdiction in the revisional authority in a proper case to interfere with findings of fact arrived at by the subordinate authorities, the learned counsel asked, whether in the circumstances, it can be stated that the revisional authority has given proper reasons for interfering with those findings and whether it was also given good and proper reasons to come to a different conclusion. So far as that is concerned, this aspect, no doubt will have close relation to the second point urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners, namely that the revisional authority in this case has really considered the question not from the point of view whether the building requires reconstruction, but really from the point of view of the landlord requiring to reconstruct the building. Therefore, I will now advert immediately to that aspect. 31. But before I leave off this aspect, it is necessary to refer to another Supreme Court decision that has no doubt been referred to by Mr. K. V. Surianarayana Iyer, learned counsel, namely the decision reported in Hari Shankar v. Girdhari Lal A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 698. In my view, that decision will not assist any of the learned counsel for the petitioners in this case. This decision again is sought to be relied upon by the learned counsel in support of the contention that a right of appeal is distinct from a right of revision, and therefore the revisional court should not interfere with findings of fact arrived at by subordinate authorities. This decision again is sought to be relied upon by the learned counsel in support of the contention that a right of appeal is distinct from a right of revision, and therefore the revisional court should not interfere with findings of fact arrived at by subordinate authorities. That a right of appeal is something different from a right Judge, of revision, is a proposition which admits of no controversy. But the question is whether the decision of the Supreme Court referred to above and relied upon by the learned counsel has any bearing in this case. The Supreme Court, in that decision, had occasion to consider the scope of the powers conferred on the High Court under section 35 (1) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent (Control) Act (38 of 1952). That provision itself enables the High Court to call for the record of any case under the Act, for the purpose of satisfying itself that "a decision made therein is according to law and may pass such order in relation thereto as it thinks fit". In fact, the learned Judges of the Supreme Court consider the scope of the expression " according to law ' occurring in the section. The learned Judges quite naturally refer to the decision of the Bombay High Court in Bell & Co. Ltd. v. Waman Hemraj A.I.R. 1938 Bom. 223. The provisions contained in section 35(1) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent (Control) Act (38 of 1952) are almost identical with the provisions contained in section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act (1887) regarding which there is a lot of case law. Therefore, in my view, the decision of the Supreme Court referred to above, namely Hari Shankar v. Girdhari Lal A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 698 (5) does not at all help the learned counsel for the petitioners in the case before me, because the provision of the statute which this Court has now to deal with, is entirely different from the provision of section 35 (1) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent (Control) (Act,38 of 1952), which was the subject of consideration at the hands of the learned Judges of the Supreme Court. Therefore the 1st contention will have to be rejected. 32. Therefore the 1st contention will have to be rejected. 32. Coming to the second ground of attack that has been raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners, namely that there has been a very erroneous approach made by the revisional authority in coming to the conclusion that the claim of the landlord is sustainable under section 11 (4) (iv) of the Act. In this connection it is necessary, before I advert to the contentions that have been advanced in this regard, to refer to the scheme of the statute itself. The statute itself, namely the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1959 (as amended by Act 29 of 1961), there can be no controversy, was enacted to regulate the letting of buildings and to control the rent of such buildings and to prevent unreasonable eviction of tenants there from in the State of Kerala. The preamble itself makes it very clear that it was an Act to control the rents of buildings and to prevent unreasonable eviction of tenants from such buildings in the State. Therefore, it will be seen that the legislation itself is a wholesome provision in view of the shortage of accommodation that was facing the public; and therefore in order to prevent unnecessary harassment and eviction of tenants there has been a reasonable restriction, imposed, on the right of the landowner, both in the matter of eviction and also in the quantum of rent that can be claimed by landlords. Though ordinarily it may be open to the landlord to dictate his own terms, in several matters there has been a reasonable restriction placed as against his right by virtue of this enactment. This aspect, in my view, will have to be borne in mind in considering as to how far the rights, which vest in law in a landlord for reconstructing a building, must be considered to have been taken away or abridged by the provisions of section 11 (4) (iv) of the Act. 33. Section 11 (4) gives a right to the landlord to apply to the Rent Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building. 33. Section 11 (4) gives a right to the landlord to apply to the Rent Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building. Therefore, it will be seen that the Legislature itself contemplated that if the serveral circumstances indicated in the various clauses of sub-section (4) of section 11, exist the landlord will be entitled to ask for vacant possession of the property. That is, in my view, the Legislature proceeds on the basis that for the purposes mentioned First therein, the landlord will be entitled to have vacant possession of the building, and one of the purposes mentioned is the one provided under clause (iv) which is to the following effect: "(iv) if the building is in such a condition that it needs reconstruction and if the landlord requires bona fide to reconstruct the same and if he satisfies the Court that he has the plan and licence, if any, required, and the ability to rebuild, and if the proposal is not made as a pretext for eviction: Provided that the landlord who evicts a tenant and does not reconstruct completely the building within a time which may be fixed or extended by the Rent Control Court, shall on a petition before that Court, be liable to a fine of rupees five hundred, if it is proved that he has wilfully neglected to reconstruct completely the building within such time: Provided further that the Court shall have power at any time to issue direction regarding the reconstruction of the building and on failure of compliance by the landlord, to give effect to the order in any manner the court deems fit and in appropriate cases to put the tenant back in possession or award to the evicted tenant damages equal to the excess rent he has to pay for another building that he is occupying in consequence of such eviction: Provided further that the tenant who was evicted shall have the first option to have the reconstructed building allotted to him with liability to pay its fair rent;" It will be seen that this clause contains three provisos also. But it is not necessary to consider them at present II because I will have to refer to the clause and the provisos a little later. 34. But it is not necessary to consider them at present II because I will have to refer to the clause and the provisos a little later. 34. It will be seen that under section 11 (4) (a), the landlord can ask for vacant possession of the building, if (a) the building is in such a condition that it needs reconstruction, (b) if the landlord requires bonafides to reconstruct the same, (c) if he satisfies the court that he has the plan and licence, if any, required, (d) if he has got the ability to rebuild, and (e) if the proposal is not made as a pretext for eviction. If the above conditions are established, there can be no controversy that the landlord can ask for vacant possession of the building. No doubt First the right of the landlord in this regard is hedged in by the various provisions mentioned in the three provisos to the , clause. It will be seen that under the first of the three provisos, provision is made to the effect that it the landlord, who evicts a tenant and does not reconstruct completely the building within a time which may be fixed or extended by the Rent Control Court, shall be liable to a fine in the sum mentioned therein, if, it is proved, that he has wilfully neglected to reconstruct completely the building within the time provided. Under the second proviso power is given to the Rent Control Court at any time to issue suitable directions regarding the reconstruction of the building, and in appropriate cases if the landlord fails to comply with those directions, the Rent Control Court is given jurisdiction to put the tenant back in possession, or in the alternative, to award the tenant damages in the manner mentioned therein. Again, under the third proviso, provision is made to the effect that the tenant who was evicted is to have the first option to have the reconstructed building allotted to him with the liability to pay its fair rent. 35. Sub-section (5) of section 11 deals with another set of circumstances under which the landlord can ask for renovating the building. 35. Sub-section (5) of section 11 deals with another set of circumstances under which the landlord can ask for renovating the building. Under that sub-section it will be seen that a landlord who wants to renovate the building may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing the tenant to permit the landlord to enter upon and carry out the renovation within a time to be fixed by the Court, and the Court may issue such orders, as it deems fit and the tenant shall be bound to abide by the orders of the Court. 36. The only other provision that is to be noted in this context is what is contained in sub-section (2) of section 17 of the Act. Under that sub-section it is provided that the landlord shall be bound to attend to the periodical maintenance and necessary repairs to the building. It is also provided that if a landlord fails to attend to such maintenance or repairs to the building and amenities thereto, within a reasonable time after notice is given by the tenant, the Accommodation Controller can direct, on application by the tenant, that such maintenance and repairs may be attended to by the tenant and that the expenses incurred thereof may be deducted, with interest at 6 per cent per annum, from the rent which is payable by him. 37. Therefore, it will be seen that the statute itself contemplates the question of repairs being made by the landlord to the building; and that is provided by section 17 (2). In such circumstances, there is no question of the landlord asking for vacant possession of the building; and the repairs that are absolutely necessary to be done, is coupled with the safeguard of continuing the tenant in the building. But the Legislature also makes a distinction when it gives a larger right to the landlord in the case when he wants to renovate the building; and that is provided in section 11 (5) of the Act. But the Legislature also makes a distinction when it gives a larger right to the landlord in the case when he wants to renovate the building; and that is provided in section 11 (5) of the Act. The renovation of the building, which is necessary in the circumstances, as the sub-section contemplates, can only be such as could be done with the tenant continuing in possession of the building, and the only point to be noted is that a right is given to the landlord to enter and carry out the renovations .Therefore it will be seen that according to the Legislature the renovation of the building under section 11 (5) of the Act can be done by the landlord without asking for eviction of the tenant and the tenant continuing to occupy the premises. But when we come to section 11 (4) of the statute, it clearly shows that under these circumstances, the Legislature itself intends that the reconstruction that may be necessary of the building cannot be done with a tenant continuing in possession of the building. Now, the question in this case is whether the landlord is justified in asking for eviction of the tenants under section 11 (4) (iv) of the Act. 38. I have already indicated that the Rent Controller is of the view that unless the building is in such a dangerous and dilapidated condition, it was not open to the landlord First ct to ask for eviction. No doubt, Mr. K. V. Surianarayana Iyer, learned counsel for one of the writ petitioners, vehemently protested that this is not the view of the Rent Controller and that several other reasons have been given by the Rent Controller, for non-suiting the landlord. I am not inclined to accept this contention of the learned counsel, because it will be seen that the Rent Controller is of the view that the details furnished by the Commissioner in Ext. P-4 report will show that the building is in need of renovation and replacement of certain parts, and certainly not reconstruction of the whole structure. It is also to he seen that the Commissioner's report has been accepted by the Rent Controller. But the only controversy was regarding the inference that has to be drawn from the various matters mentioned in the report Ext. P-4. It is also to he seen that the Commissioner's report has been accepted by the Rent Controller. But the only controversy was regarding the inference that has to be drawn from the various matters mentioned in the report Ext. P-4. The Rent Controller further states that the condition of the building has to be determined with reference to the evidence of the Commissioner and his report. In this case it also takes note of the fact that the legal local authority has not so far taken any action on the basis that the building is in a dangerous or dilapidated condition. Therefore it will be seen that having posed this question before it, the Rent Controller ultimately comes to the conclusion that the report filed by the Commissioner, namely Ext. P-4, will only justify the inference being drawn that the existing structure is in need of renovation and not certainly reconstruction. Thus it will be seen that the view of the Rent Controller is that the landlord cannot ask for eviction, under this clause, unless the building is in such a dangerous or dilapidated condition. This is made clear by the latter part of the judgment of the Rent Controller, wherein it says that the only fact to be taken into account is the condition of the building with reference to its different parts and its existence, independent of the nature of the locality or the desire of the landlord. Ultimately the Rent Controller comes to the conclusion that having due regard to the fact that the building itself cannot be considered to be in such a condition as it needs reconstruction, the landlord is not entitled to ask for eviction. 39. More or less a similar approach has been made Narayanan N by the appellate authority, even in the earlier part of his First judgment. I have already adverted to the findings of the Trivandrum appellate authority. 39. More or less a similar approach has been made Narayanan N by the appellate authority, even in the earlier part of his First judgment. I have already adverted to the findings of the Trivandrum appellate authority. The appellate authority is also of the view that from the provisions of clause (iv) of sub-section (4) of section 11, it is clear that the necessity for reconstruction must arise from the condition of the building, and considerations like the question of investment made by the landlord, or the question of the locality where the building is situated, or the desirability of putting up a much better building in the locality, etc., are not relevant in coming to a decision on the right of the landlord to get eviction. This approach made by the appellate authority, has been very severely criticised by Mr. V. R. Krishna Iyer, learned counsel for the contesting respondent. It is again to be seen that the appellate authority, having before it what according to it are the aspects to be considered under the scheme of section 11 (4) (iv) of the Act, ultimately agrees with the view expressed by the Rent Controller. In fact, the appellate authority makes the position clear that it has come to the conclusion that there is absolutely no justification in the claim of the landlord that what is required is demolition of the existing structure. The appellate authority also agrees with the view of the Rent Controller that from the report of the Commissioner it is clear that what is required is only renovation and not reconstruction of the building. 40. The revisional authority, on the other hand, in my view, makes a correct and proper approach in considering the claim of the landlord, having due regard to the provisions of the statute itself. 40. The revisional authority, on the other hand, in my view, makes a correct and proper approach in considering the claim of the landlord, having due regard to the provisions of the statute itself. The revisional authority categorically states that it is not satisfied with the approach made by the two subordinate authorities i and it is the view of the revisional authority that in considering the claim made by a landlord under section 11 (4) (iv), the fact that the building is in a dangerous or dilapidated condition, is not the only aspect that has to be taken into account, but, on the other hand, it is the view of the revisional authority that several other aspects also will have to be considered and taken into account for consideration of such a claim. In fact, the revisional authority consider various aspects, depending upon an appreciation of the Commissioner's report Ext. P-4, and also proceeds to state that the nature of the reconstruction will depend upon the circumstances of each case. Ultimately the revisional authority is of the view that having due regard to what is mentioned in the report of the Commissioner, the claim made by the landlord for eviction in this case is fully justified. 41. The whole controversy now ultimately is as to what is the interpretation that has to be placed upon the expression "if the building is in such a condition that it needs reconstruction," occurring in section 11 (4) (iv) of the Act. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners, the only circumstance that should be taken into account for coming to a conclusion on this matter, is the physical condition of the building and building alone, and no other consideration should be taken into account for coming to a conclusion one way or the other. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners, the only circumstance that should be taken into account for coming to a conclusion on this matter, is the physical condition of the building and building alone, and no other consideration should be taken into account for coming to a conclusion one way or the other. On the other hand, the stand taken by the landlord is that a conclusion on the question as to whether a building is in such a condition that it needs reconstruction, is to be arrived at not merely on the basis of looking at the building alone or taking into account the actual physical condition of the building alone but having due regard to the various other circumstances, namely, the area where the building is situated, the nature of the developments that are taking place in that particular area, as well as the nature of construction that is taking place in an area, etc. In my view, the approach made by both the Rent Controller and the appellate authority that it is only when the building is in a dangerous or dilapidated condition that the landlord can ask for eviction under section 11 (4) (iv), is not at all warranted by the provisions of the statute itself. In my view it will be placing a very narrow interpretation upon the provisions concerned. On the other hand, I have already indicated the scheme of the statute itself; and in as much as there is no particular indication in the provisions of the statute, which are under consideration at the hands of this court, that the landlord's right in that regard has also bean restricted by the Legislature, in my view, ordinarily the right of the landlord to ask for eviction for the purpose of reconstruction will have to be considered. 42. Then the question is whether there is anything in the statute itself, in particular section 11 (4) (iv), to indicate that any further restriction has been placed upon the fight of the landlord. 42. Then the question is whether there is anything in the statute itself, in particular section 11 (4) (iv), to indicate that any further restriction has been placed upon the fight of the landlord. If the only consideration or the only criterion for filing an application under section 11 (4) (iv) is, as assumed by both the Rent Controller and the appellate authority, that the building must be in a dangerous or dilapidated condition, then in my view, the various other clauses referred to and emphasised in subsection (4) of section 11 will serve no purpose whatsoever For instance, the Rent Controller proceeds on the basis that in this case the Municipal authorities have not so far issued any notice to the effect that the building is in a dangerous or dilapidated condition. If there is such a notice and the landlord asks for eviction, in my view the bonafides of the landlord, the landlord having the required plan and licence and also the financial ability for reconstruction, have absolutely no bearing at all. All those circumstances will come into the picture only if the other matters are and can be taken into account in considering as to whether the building is in such a condition that it needs reconstruction. 43. I am not prepared to accept the contention advanced on behalf of the writ petitioners, that the essential requisite and the only essential point, on which the landlord will have to satisfy the authorities in seeking eviction under section 11 (4) (iv) of the Act, is that the building is in such a condition that it needs reconstruction with reference to its physical condition. The controversy is as to whether there are other circumstances which are to be taken into account to enable the court to come to a conclusion that the building in a particular case is or is not in such a condition as to need reconstruction. The controversy is as to whether there are other circumstances which are to be taken into account to enable the court to come to a conclusion that the building in a particular case is or is not in such a condition as to need reconstruction. In this case the revisional authority, in my view, was perfectly justified, having due regard to the scheme of the statute itself and inasmuch as there is no further restriction placed on the rights of the landlord under section 11 (4) (iv), in coming to the conclusion that when a claim under section 11 (4) (iv) is made the question as to whether the building in question is or is not in such a condition as to require reconstruction is to be considered not from a narrow point of view, namely as to whether the building is in a dangerous or dilapidated condition, but really having due regard to the location of the building, the age of the building, the physical condition of the building and also the developing nature and the nature of development of the area where the particular building itself is situated. The object of the statute is to see that there is no undue harassment or unreasonable eviction obtained at the hands of the authorities, by the landlords. That again is sufficiently safeguarded by the various restrictive provisions contained in the three provisos to section 11 (4) (iv) of the Act itself. It is only when regard is had to the various other circumstances indicated above in considering a claim made by a landlord under section 11 (4) (iv), that the various other aspects dealt with in the several clauses of sub-section (4) of section 11, namely the landlord requiring bonafide the building for reconstruction, his satisfying the court that he ha3 the plan and licence, if any, required, and his further satisfying the court that he has the ability to rebuild, will all come into the picture. Because if having due regard to a particular area, where there is a development of the building scheme, the landlord makes an application to the authority for having reconstruction of his building, in my view the authority must certainly consider as to whether the landlord requires bona fide to reconstruct the building and whether he has got the necessary plan and licence and also the financial ability to rebuild. Therefore, all these aspects will have to be taken into account in coming to a conclusion as to whether the claim by the landlord under section 11 (4) (iv) of the Act is to be accepted or not. 44. Then the question arises as to whether the revisional authority in this case has in any manner acted arbitrarily, in interfering with the findings recorded by the Rent Controller as well as by the appellate authority. That is a special contention raised, as indicated by me earlier, by Mr. V. K. K. Menon, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in O.P. 411/63. The learned counsel no doubt urged that the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the various decisions referred to above regarding the circumstances under which a revisional authority can interfere with findings of fact arrived at by subordinate authorities, have not been properly borne in mind by the revisional authority in this case. No doubt the criticism levelled by the learned counsel is that the revisional authority, except extracting the report of the Commissioner Ext. P-4, does not indicate that it has really applied its mind to the various matters mentioned therein, nor has it indicated as to why exactly it differs from the conclusions arrived at by the Rent Controller as well as by the appellate authority. On the other hand, Mr. V. R. Krishna Iyer, learned counsel appearing for the contesting respondent landlord has drawn my attention to the fact that the revisional authority poses the very important question for consideration, namely as to whether the premises is in such a condition that it needs reconstruction. In that connection the revisional authority considers the topography of the building, as well as the nature of the building as it now stands, the age of the building, and other material circumstances. It also adverts to the evidence that has been placed before it both by the land lord as well as by the tenants, and clearly says that it is not inclined to accept the interested testimony that has been adduced by the landlord and the tenants. In particular, the revisional authority adverts to the only other piece of evidence which can be accepted in the circumstances of the case, namely the report of the Commissioner Ext. P-4, as well the evidence of the Commissioner as C. P. W. 3. In particular, the revisional authority adverts to the only other piece of evidence which can be accepted in the circumstances of the case, namely the report of the Commissioner Ext. P-4, as well the evidence of the Commissioner as C. P. W. 3. I have already indicated that even the two authorities, namely the Rent Controller and the appellate authority, have accepted the position that an inference on the question as to whether the building requires reconstruction or renovation, is to be drawn exclusively from the various aspects dealt with by the Commissioner. Mr. V. R. Krishna Iyer, learned counsel for the landlord urged that that is what exactly the revisional authority has done in this case. The learned counsel also urged that it is not as if the revisional authority has merely extracted in to to the report Ext. P-4; whereas on the other hand according to the learned counsel it has only extracted that material part of the report wherein it will be clearly seen that the building requires reconstruction in the manner claimed by the landlord. And it is after a consideration of all these circumstances, according to the learned counsel for the contesting respondent landlord, that the revisional authority has ultimately chosen to differ from the conclusions arrived at by the two lower authorities, on the basis of the report of the Commissioner, 45. After having due regard to the various aspects that have been placed before me by Mr. V. K. K, Menon and Mr. V. R. Krishna Iyer, I am satisfied that in this case there is absolutely no ground to hold that any illegality is committed by the revisional authority when it differed from the conclusions arrived at by the Rent Controller as well as by the appellate authority and came to an independent conclusion of its own, no doubt, in favour of the landlord- I have already indicated that all the three aurhorities are unanimously agreed about one aspect namely that the oral evidence adduced by the landlord and the tenants will have to be straightaway rejected, as it is not worthy of acceptance. And all the authorities have also accepted the position that the question of the landlord requiring the building for reconstruction or otherwise, has to be considered and dealt with and a conclusion arrived at, only on the basis of the report of the Commissioner, Ext. And all the authorities have also accepted the position that the question of the landlord requiring the building for reconstruction or otherwise, has to be considered and dealt with and a conclusion arrived at, only on the basis of the report of the Commissioner, Ext. P-4 and the evidence of the Commissioner as C. P.W. 3. No doubt both the subordinate. authorities, namely the Rent Controller, and the appellate authority, have come to one particular conclusion based upon the report Ext. P-4 of the Commissioner, and the evidence of the Commissioner himself. The revisional authority, on the other hand, has taken considerable pains in extracting the material parts of the Commissioner's report Ext. P-4, which, according to him will clearly show that this is not a case of renovation, but that the building really requires reconstruction, as mentioned in section 11 (4) (iv) of the Act. The revisional authority also considers the question as to the nature of the reconstruction depending upon various other circumstances. And, after a fairly elaborate consideration of all these aspects, the revisional authority has ultimately also observed that if such an extensive work as mentioned in Ext. P-4 is to be carried out, it is not incumbent on the landlord to wait until the entire building falls down bit by bit. The view of the revisional authority is that each of the items of work mentioned in the Commissioner's report Ext. P-4 cannot be separated from the entire work, and the individual work has to be combined with the totality of the work pointed out in the Commissioner's report. No doubt the revisional authority refers to various decisions which may have some bearing on the question. But I do not think it necessary to advert to these decisions, because the judgment in this case will have to be given on the basis of the provisions of the statute, which this Court is now called upon to interpret. It is really after a consideration of all these aspects that the revisional authority has ultimately come to the conclusion that he is of the opinion that the landlord in this case has made out that his buildings in dispute are in such a condition that they need reconstruction. Therefore, the criticism levelled as against the order of the revisional authority by Mr. Therefore, the criticism levelled as against the order of the revisional authority by Mr. V. K. K. Menon, learned counsel for one of the writ petitioners, that the revisional authority has interfered with the findings of the subordinate authorities without adverting to the materials on record, and also the further criticism that the finding arrived at by the revisional authority itself is not proper, cannot certainly be accepted in the circumstances of this case. 46. Mr. K, V. Surianarayana Iyer, learned counsel for one of the writ petitioners, as I mentioned earlier, has no doubt urged that the revisional authority has considered the entire question from the standpoint of the landlord himself, and not from the point of view as is mandatory, namely, whether the building requires reconstruction. It will be seen that the revisional authority first takes up the question of the landlord requiring the building bona fide for reconstruction; and in that connection it deals with the various findings that have been recorded by the subordinate authorities, and ultimately records a finding in favour of the landlord. After elaborately considering all these aspects, the revisional authority takes up the question as to whether the building in this case requires reconstruction. It could have taken up this matter and discussed it in the earlier part of its order and recorded findings as it has done in considering the question as to whether the condition of the building is such that it requires reconstruction; and then probably have considered the question whether the landlord bona fide requires the building, whether he has got the necessary plans and licence and whether he has got the ability to rebuild. On the other hand, the revisional authority seems to have taken up those matters earlier and then dealt with the more important aspect which has been debated before it, namely the question whether there is need for reconstruction of the building or not. Ultimately the position is that when all the aspects have been dealt with under section 11 (4) (iv) of the Act, the finding of the revisional authority is entirely in favour of the landlord. Ultimately the position is that when all the aspects have been dealt with under section 11 (4) (iv) of the Act, the finding of the revisional authority is entirely in favour of the landlord. Therefore in my view the approach made by the revisional authority must certainly be considered to be justified, because it is in accordance with not only the scheme of the statute, but also with the provisions under which application was made by the landlord, namely section 11 (4) (iv) of the Act. 47. There is one other aspect which has to be dealt with, namely the contention raised by Mr. V.K.K.Menon, learned counsel for the writ petitioner in O.P. No.411/63. that contention is to the effect that in this case the claim made by the landlord cannot be considerd to be a claim for reconstruction. that is, I understood Mr.V.K.K. Menon to urge that it can be a question of reconstruction of the bulding, only if it is constructed on identically the same place where the original building stood and not when it is constructed on a different place. I am not inclined to accept the very large contention that has now been advanced by Mr. V. K. K. Menon refeered me to the decision of my learned brother joseph, J., reported in thresia v. ittop(6) where the learned judge had to considerthe scope of the expression 'rebuild' occurring in section 40(2) of the Kerala Agrarian Relation Act, 1961. In my view, that decision does not at all help the learned counsel in the interpretation that this court has to give regarding the expression ' reconstruction ' occurring in section 11(4) (iv) of the Act. The scheme of the Act, with which this court is now concerned, is entirely different from the scheme of the statute which the learned judge had to interpret in the decision referred to above. The scheme of the provision with which the learned judge was concerned in that case, itself indicated that the expression 'rebuild' occurring in section 40 (2) of the particular statute, cannot have a large cannotation than that mentioned in the particular provision itself. Therefore, in my view, the decision relied upon by Mr.V.K.K. Menon and referred to above, has no bearing on the point that this court has now to consider. Therefore, in my view, the decision relied upon by Mr.V.K.K. Menon and referred to above, has no bearing on the point that this court has now to consider. The expression 'rebuild' and 'reconstruct' occurring in section 11 (4) (iv) of the Act in the case, must bear the same meaning because in the earlier part of section 11 (4) (iv) the statute refers to the building being in such a condition as to require reconstruction, and in the latter part of that clause it again uses a different expression, indicating the same purpose, namely "ability of the landlord to rebuild". Therefore, the expressions 'rebuild' and 'reconstruct' occurring in section 11 (4) (iv) of the Act must be considered to have the same meaning. I am not inclined to accept the very large contention that has now been advanced by Mr.V.K.K. Menon that unless the new building is of the same dimensions or of the same perimeter as that of the old building, there can be no ' reconstruction '. If this contention is accepted the position will be that there will be no alteration or remodelled bigger houses for all time to come and there can be no progress in the State. The provisions of the statute do not certainly warrant this limited construction being placed upon section 11 (4) (iv) of the Act 48. Ultimately the position is that all the contentions that have been raised by all the learned counsel for the petitioners in all these writ petitions, will have to be rejected, and the result is that the writ petitions are all dismissed. The parties will bear their costs. 49. Each of the petitioners in all the writ petitions will have six weeks from today to give vacant possession of the premises to the landlord.