JUDGMENT 1. This appeal by a tenant, the sole defendant in an action in ejectment, from an appellate judgment and decree of reversal has been opened on three points : First: the judgment under appeal is not a proper judgment of reversal. Second: payment by the appellant and acceptance by the respondent (landlord) of rent from October, 1955 to January, 1956 constitutes waiver of the notice dated August 11, 1955, to quit, no less of the technical default for 8 months from September 1954 to April 1955, affording no foundation for the suit instituted on March 1, 1956, on the foot of the second notice dated February 9, 1956, to quit, and resting on the same technical default for 8 months. Third: though this litigation is governed by the West Bengal Premises Rent control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 17 of 1950, the appellant is entitled to the benefit of section 24 of the Premises tenancy Act, 12 of 1956, providing that acceptance of the rent in default, when no proceeding pends in court, shall operate as waiver of such default. Section 24 ibid laying down a rule of evidence is not prospective, but retrospective. 2. Mr. Sen Gupta, the learned advocate for the appellant, addresses me on no other point. For a proper apprehension of the first point, it is necessary to recall in brief certain facts. The tenancy started in 1944 or thereabouts on a rent of Rs. 130/- a month. In or about April, 1949, the respondent prayed the appropriate forum for standardization of rent at Rs. 261/- odd a month. In September, following, the rent was standardized but at Rs. 105/ - odd a month, some Rs. 25/- less than the original rent. The landlord, the respondent before me, appealed, On or about February 20, 1951, the rent was standardized by the appellate forum at Rs. 120/- odd, still some Rs. 10/- less than the original rent. During the continuance of the proceedings for standardization, deposits were made of the rent with the rent controller. After this "fight" for standardization was over, say, after February 1951, the landlord and the tenant verbally agreed that the landlord's sarkar would call on the tenant and collect rent and that whenever the sarkar would call would be the due date of payment, as Mr. Sen Gupta puts it in his opening. After this "fight" for standardization was over, say, after February 1951, the landlord and the tenant verbally agreed that the landlord's sarkar would call on the tenant and collect rent and that whenever the sarkar would call would be the due date of payment, as Mr. Sen Gupta puts it in his opening. The averment in the fifth paragraph of the written statement puts this part of the agreement: ". . . . . . . . on the definite understanding that he would never raise any question or plea of default in payment of rent technically due to laches of his collecting sarkar in collections. " 3. From September 1954 to April, 1955 occurred one default after another, eight in all and technical defaults all. Technical, because payments of rent were there. But they were late payments all beyond the due dates. The landlord was not as good as his word. And on August 11, 1955, he determined the tenancy by a notice to quite. The tenant, the appellant before me, approached the landlord, the respondent to this appeal. And on or about October 3, 1955, another agreement, also parole, was come to. By virtue thereof, the notice dated August 11, 1955, to quit was waived, the landlord having agreed not to take any action on that. More, rent for October 1955 to January, 1956 was accepted. This agreement also came to shipwreck soon enough. Only on February 9, 1956, the respondent determined the tenancy over again by another notice to quit and raised the present action on March 1, 1956. 4. The judge of the first instance believes both the parole agreements the appellant asks the court to. The appellate judge does not. This disagreement fosters the contention that the judgment under appeal is not a proper judgment of reversal. The reasons which lead the trial judge to believe the first agreement are inrregular collections of rent, admission of a collecting sarkar, Sambhu (p. w. 2), that he had called on to collect rent on the 22nd day of a month and even beyond, and the respondent's evidence that the appellant paid rents as soon as the sarkar had called. The appellate judge misses ny "convincing evidence" upon which he can find as a fact that it was the duty of the sarkar to call on the appellant for collecting rent. The appellate judge misses ny "convincing evidence" upon which he can find as a fact that it was the duty of the sarkar to call on the appellant for collecting rent. The fact that he did call is another matter proving no such duty. Incidentally, who seeks whom ? The tenant seeks the landlord not vice versa, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary. And the judge finds himself unable to accept "practically the only evidence on the point"-"the uncorroborated testimony" of the appellant himself. 5. If the last court of facts finds so, although it might have condescended to say a little more, it is not for me to interfere with what he finds ; all the more so, when I find on a perusal of the respondent's evidence that the first oral agreement he now sets up was, according to him, the initial agreement he had had right in 1944 and that he "began to pay rent according to the previous agreement" after the disposal of the appeal for standardization of rent. True it is that the learned appellate judge does not even refer to the reasons the first judge adduces, as Mr. Sen Gupta submits. But in all cases he need not. He is not bound to dispose of seriatim all the reasons given by the first court if he gave special reasons of his own for an opposite conclusion (1) (Jatra mohan v. Pitambar, 19 C. L. J. 385. Here the evidence is such, about an oral agreement heavily loaded in favour of the tenant springing up after a none too pleasant litigation for standardization of rent in which the landlord is worsted and humiliated too, that no prudent man can bring himself to believe it. The learned appellate judge finds just that, though in a much too laconic manner. The first judge cannot, and the appellate judge can, see the wood for trees. So, on the first agreement, it cannot be said of the judgment under appeal that it is not a proper judgment of reversal. I hold, it is. 6. On the second agreement, the first judge sees a lot in the conduct of the respondent in accepting rent from October 1955 to January 1956 and sees to in the evidence of the appellant and his nephew an agreement to waive default for 8 months from September, 1954 to April 1955. I hold, it is. 6. On the second agreement, the first judge sees a lot in the conduct of the respondent in accepting rent from October 1955 to January 1956 and sees to in the evidence of the appellant and his nephew an agreement to waive default for 8 months from September, 1954 to April 1955. The appellate judge, on the other hand, sees in such evidence of the uncle and the nephew a revival of the old tenancy on old terms by waiver of the notice to quit, and no waiver of default, a disability which has then come to be attached to the appellant and his tenancy. More, nothing else can be seen even if the evidence on behalf of the appellant is accepted in full, as the learned appellate judge finds. To say: 'i shall not take any action on the notice dated August 11, 1955, to quit (a statement which the uncle and the nephew attribute to the respondent who, of course, denies it) is not to say: 'i waive your default and condone the disability'. And the inherent improbability of still another parole agreement after all that has happened is there always. So, on the second agreement also, the judgment under appeal cannot go down as not a proper judgment of reversal. The first point urged upon me by Mr. Sen Gupta, therefore, fails. On the second point, waiver of the first notice to quit is found by the learned appellate judge and conceded by Mr. Guha, the learned advocate for the respondent. That is not in dispute. What is in dispute is about the effect of waiver of the first notice to quit, independently of the agreement which the learned appellate judge, the last court of facts, disbelieves without falling into an error of law. And disbelieving such an agreement means damaging the appellant's case beyond repair. The expression 'waiver of notice' means what it says: waiver of notice. The position is as if there has been no notice, as Mr. Guha rightly contends. The accent is no notice which is being waived: not anything else, certainly not default with which the appellant's tenancy has got imprest by then. The concept of waiver of default is a "fresher" in the realm of law introduced for the first time by section 24 of the Premises Tenancy Act, 12 of 1956. Guha rightly contends. The accent is no notice which is being waived: not anything else, certainly not default with which the appellant's tenancy has got imprest by then. The concept of waiver of default is a "fresher" in the realm of law introduced for the first time by section 24 of the Premises Tenancy Act, 12 of 1956. When the facts giving rise to this litigation are taking shape, it is not a concept that law knows of. The only concept that law knows of then is waiver of the notice to quit (see section 113 of the Transfer of Property Act. Be that as it may, Mr. Sen Gupta will not allow me to treat the expression 'waiver of notice' in keeping with its plain meaning. He sees in it-acceptance of rent going with waiver of notice-acceptance of a new tenancy on old terms. I see in it-so does Mr. Guha-revival of the old tenancy on old terms with all its virtue and vice, with all its strength and weakness. The vice too prominent to be missed is the default for 8 months. And therein lies its weakness. (More of which hereafter. A notice to quit does no more than express the intention of the notice-giver, the landlord, to terminate the tenancy. Waiving the notice, therefore, means abandoning that intention. The intention being abandoned, what remains ? that which was before, to wit, the old tenancy. 7. Here the question is not if payment and acceptance of rent after determination of the tenancy to quit revive the contractual tenancy, as in (2) Panchanan Ghosh v. Haridas Banerjee, 58 C. W. N. 438, or in (3) Pulin Behari Shaw v. Lila Dey, A. I. R. 1947 Cal. 627,-cases which lay down that without some evidence aliunde that cannot be found. Here, I start with waiver of the first notice to quit followed by the revival of the contractual tenancy, the dead tenancy coming back to life. Indeed, that must be so. The ordinary meaning of the word "waiver" shows as much. Waiving what ? Waiving the intention to terminate the tenancy which means that the same tenancy continues. The conception of a new tenancy in English law following waiver is no doubt there. But the incongruity between this conception and the use of the word "waiver" in England is there too. In any event, it cannot avail the appellant here. Waiving what ? Waiving the intention to terminate the tenancy which means that the same tenancy continues. The conception of a new tenancy in English law following waiver is no doubt there. But the incongruity between this conception and the use of the word "waiver" in England is there too. In any event, it cannot avail the appellant here. "the difference is only in conception-a new tenancy under the old terms as under the english law and the old or dead tenancy being revived or getting into life again under section 113 of the Transfer of property Act",-as P. N. Mookherjee, J. observes in (4) Usharani Debi v. Charusila Dasi, 59 C. W. N. 572. Even so, what the appellant gets back here is the old tenancy 'effecting in effect the notice to quirt"-a tenancy which continues "without break". So Mr. Sen Gupta's contention about a new tenancy on old terms must fail. 8. Therefore, the old tenancy is revived. And with it is imprest the default for 8 months, in order to constitute default, it is not necessary that the amount in default should remain outstanding when the suit is instituted (5) (Dwarkin and Sons Ltd. v. Hari Singh, 58 C. W. N. 1012. Under the 1950 Act, once a default, always a default, no matter that the default is wiped out later. The only way of escape for the appellant was to pay under section 14 (4) ibid. But that way was barred against him. Because he made default for eight months, more than three occasions of two months' rent, within a period of eighteen months. So section 14 (4) was not for him in terms of the proviso to sub-section (3) thereof. The apparent incongruity of the respondent accepting rents after default and yet suing on the same default merits two answers. First: the ploicy of the "1950 Act" is that: 'be punctual in payment and stay; be unpunctual and get out. ' Second: the cause of action is not default. Default, as is to be seen here, only deprives the appellant of the special cloak of protection the "1950 act" throws around him. [see the observations of Chakravarti, C. J. in the case of Dwarkin and Sons ante at page 1020]., 9. I, therefore, answer Mr. ' Second: the cause of action is not default. Default, as is to be seen here, only deprives the appellant of the special cloak of protection the "1950 act" throws around him. [see the observations of Chakravarti, C. J. in the case of Dwarkin and Sons ante at page 1020]., 9. I, therefore, answer Mr. Sen Gupta's second point thus: the notice dated August 11, 1955, to quit is waived; but the 8 months' default is not. So, the suit out of which this appeal arises, rests on a solid foundation, the appellant himself by his manifest default removing the barrier the "1950 Act" places between him and his eviction. 10. The third and last point on which the appeal has been opened is a hold one. But the boldness cannot hide its obvious weakness. Indeed, it is the weakest of the three points on which Mr. Sen Gupta addresses me. Here is a suit instituted on March 1, 1956, governed by the "1950 Act". The date of the "1956 Act" coming into force is march 31, 1956. Still, I am asked to apply section 24 of the "1956 Act" to a litigation governed by the "1950 Act". The institution of the suit necessarily carries with it the implication that the right of waiver then in force is preserved to the parties thereto till, the rest of the career of the suit. The appeal I am seized of is but a continuation of the suit. But it is said that section 24 embodies no more than a rule of evidence which is procedural law and, therefore, retrospective. It, does not, however, appear to be right to read in section 24 a procedural law only. Turning my mind back to October 1955 and thereabouts, I find the respondent accepting the rents after default and continuing to accept it up to January 1956 in full knowledge of the then law that thereby he cannot be held to have waived default. So his becomes a vested right which nothing in the "1956 Act" can touch, unless it takes away that right expressly or by necessary intendment, which, of course, it does not. So his becomes a vested right which nothing in the "1956 Act" can touch, unless it takes away that right expressly or by necessary intendment, which, of course, it does not. Just as the Calcutta Rent ordinance of 1946 and the "1948 Rent act" cannot govern a litigation instituted on April 23, 1945, when the Calcutta House Control Order, 1945, was in operation, as held in a Bench decision: (6) Monomohan Maitra v. Go binda Das Chowdhury, 55 C. W. N. . . (a case Mr. Guha cites), so also the "1956 Act" cannot govern a litigation (as here)instituted on March 1, 1956, when the "1950 Act" was in force, a litigation which was pending too on March 31, 1956, when the "1956 Act" became the law. 11. The minority view in (7) Izar Ahmad Khan and others v. Union of India, A. I. R. 1962 S.C. 1052, upon which Mr. Guha relies, no doubt, is that where a rule seeks to extinguish a right, it is a rule of substantive law and that when it concerns itself with the adjective function of reaching a conclusion as to what has taken place under the substantive law, it is a rule of evidence. To give effect to Mr. Sen Gupta's contention is to extinguish the right of the respondent. But the majority view is that if fact A is inherently relevant in proving the existence of fact B, then a rule laying down that existence of fact a shall be conclusive proof of the existence of fact B is a rule of evidence, and that if fact A is not inherently relevant in proving the existence of fact b, then the rule made for a presumption is a rule of substantive law. But the question there is if rule 3 in schedule III of the Citizenship Rules under the Citizenship Act, 57 of 1955, is ultra vires section 9 (2) empowering the Central Government to prescribe rules of evidence. Rule 3 provides that the fact that a person has obtained a passport from the Government of any other country shall be conclusive proof of his having voluntarily acquired the citizenship of that country. The majority view is that such a rule is a rule of evidence, not a rule of substantive law and, therefore, not beyond the powers of the rule-making authority. The majority view is that such a rule is a rule of evidence, not a rule of substantive law and, therefore, not beyond the powers of the rule-making authority. This has little to do with the question before me: whether or no a litigation which pends when the "1956" Act comes into force, a litigation which is governed by the "1950" Act, can attract a proviso of the "1956" Act. It cannot. I have stated why. For an analogous matter dealing with a right of appeal, reference may be made to (8) Garikapati veeraya v. N Subbia Chaudhury, A. I. R. 1957 S. C. 540. 12. The cases Mr. Sen Gupta cites in support of his bold contention can lead the appellant nowhere. (9) Anant Gopal Sheorey v. State of Bombay, A. I. R. 1958 S. C. 915, shows the right of the accused in a case pending from 1954 to examine themselves under section 342a of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a new section effective from January 1, 1956, for the obvious reason that section 116 of the amending Act made this new provision applicable to a pending trial. From (10) Attorney-General v. Vernazza, [1960] 3 All, E. R. 97, two things emerge. One, "no man, let alone a vexatious litigant, has a vested right to bring or continue proceedings which are an abuse of the process of the court. " Surely, this cannot be said of the respondent before me. Two, "there are clear words in this Act [the supreme Court of Judicature (Amendment) Act, 1959] which show that Parliament intended it to be retrospective"-a feature that can never be said of the "1956 Act. " These quotations are from the speech of Lord denning at page 101. In (11) Tika Sao and others v. Harilal and others, A. I. R. 1940 Pat. 385 (F. B.), the majority of the judges hold that section 92 of the transfer of Property Act, 4 of 1882, as inserted by the Amending Act, 20 of 1929, has no retrospective effect on actions pending on April 1. 1930 (when the amending Act received effect. This is only destructive of Mr, Sen Gupta's contention. First and last, to engraft section 24 of the "1956 Act" in the "1950 Act"-that is what Mr. Sen Gupta's argument comes to in the final analysis-involves an acrobatic feat of the mind I am not capable of. 1930 (when the amending Act received effect. This is only destructive of Mr, Sen Gupta's contention. First and last, to engraft section 24 of the "1956 Act" in the "1950 Act"-that is what Mr. Sen Gupta's argument comes to in the final analysis-involves an acrobatic feat of the mind I am not capable of. The third point, therefore, fails. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. 13. In these days of house famine, it is 'but fair that the appellant should have a reasonable time to fend for himself. therefore, direct that the decree following the judgment I record now shall not be executable earlier than January 1, 1964, provided that (i) the appellant do deposit in the court of first instance by September 10, 1963, all costs the respondent is entitled to so far plus all arrears of "rent", if any. (ii) the appellant do continue to deposit in the same forum the money equivalent of rent month by month by the 21st day of each succeeding month starting from this month, the month of August, 1963. Should he herein fail, the decree will be executable immediately on default of any one of the directives above. 14. Leave to appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent has been asked for. Leave cannot be had for the mere asking. Were that so, every judgment of this nature would have been appealable as a matter of course. There are certain principles to go by. Usually leave can be given when any one of the following four conditions is satisfied: (i) a question of general importance; (ii) a question of very frequent occurrence ; (ii) cases in which existing authorities are obscure and conflicting; and (iv) reasonable doubt in the mind of the judge as to the correctness of his own decision. The first two conditions do not exist. The judgment I have just rendered will show that I have governed myself by the existing authorities which are so clear. I am not vain enough to think that all the Judgments I pronounce are immaculate. But, here, at any rate, I have no manner of doubt in my mind about the correctness of my decision ; all the more so, as I have before me existing authorities as my guide. Hence I regret my inability to grant the leave prayed for. The prayer is refused.