JUDGMENT V. Bhargava, C.J. - This appeal has been filed by the District Board of Muzaffarnagar (now described as the Antarim Zila Parishad, Muzaffarnagar), against an order of a learned single Judge of this Court granting a petition for issue of writs, directions or orders under Article 226 of the Constitution. 2. The appellant, under bye laws framed in exercise of the powers under Sec. 174(1) of the District Board Act, 1922, known as the Muzaffarnagar Kolhus and Karhais (pans) bye laws, insisted that the respondent should obtain a licence under those bye laws and gave a notice to the respondent that, if no licence was taken, the respondent would be prosecuted for the breach of the bye laws. The learned single Judge directed the appellant not to insist on the respondent calling out the licence and not to enforce the notice or to proceed with the prosecution of the respondent. This order was made by the learned single Judge on the view held by him that the respondent who had been letting out the kolhus and karhais to person using them in the rural area within the jurisdiction of the appellant, could not be held to be an 'owner' with regard to those kolhus and karhais within the definition of that word as given in the bye laws, so that there was no obligation on the respondent to take out a licence, nor had there been any breach by the respondent of any of the bye-laws. In this appeal, the contention raised on behalf of the appellant District Board is that the respondent was an `owner' within the definition of that word as contained in the bye laws so that the learned single Judge was not right in directing the appellant to refrain from asking the respondent to take a licence or to refrain from enforcing the notice or from proceeding with the prosecution of the respondent. 3. 3. Under the bye laws in question the word `owner' has been defined as follows :- "Owner" means the person of firms or company or society or corporation who owns or lets out on hire kolhus or karhais (pans) installed for the purpose of manufacturing or boiling or refining sugarcane juice and is responsible for their upkeep and repair and will include the agent, manager and supervisors on behalf of the "owner." The byelaws, after giving definition of `owner', lay down that no `owner' is to install or fix a kolhu or karhai or let them out for being installed or fixed in the rural area of the district unless and until he has been previously granted a licence on payment of the requisite fee. The next clause in the bye laws lays down what requirements have to be satisfied by an owner in respect of kolhus and karhais installed in the rural area of the district and in respect of which he is required to take out the licence. 4. The learned single Judge held that in this case, though it was admitted that the respondent did let out on hire kolhus and karhais for being installed within the jurisdiction of the appellant the respondent could not be held to that the owner in respect of those kolhus and karhais, because the respondent was not responsible for their upkeep and repairs. According to the learned single Judge, the responsibility for upkeep and repairs was on the lessee and not on the respondent who was the lessor. The learned single Judge, in this connection, took note of the various requirements with which, under the bye laws, the person taking out the licence had to comply, and held that those requirements could not be-applicable to the respondent who was merely hiring out the kolhus and karhais. According to him, the lessees of the kolhus and karhais were the persons responsible for the upkeep and repairs so that in respect of those kolhus and karhais the appellant could not be held to be the `owner' within the definition of that word as laid down in the bye laws. He was of the view that the lessees would be the owners. 5. We have found two difficulties in fully agreeing with the view expressed by the learned single Judge. He was of the view that the lessees would be the owners. 5. We have found two difficulties in fully agreeing with the view expressed by the learned single Judge. One difficulty is that on the language of the byelaws as they stand at present, it is impossible to hold that the lessees of kolhus and karhais can in any circumstances, be held to be their owners. The definition of "owner" only mentions two types of persons: the first are those who actually own them, and the others are those who let them out on hire. The subsequent provisions of the byelaws indicate that the first class of owners under the definition would be persons, who having the ownership of the kolhus and karhais vested in them, actually themselves not only instal those kolhus and karhais but also use them for the purpose of their industry. If they do not work the kolhus and karhais by themselves or through their agents or servants, then they would come under the second class of persons, who may have let them out or hire. There is no class of person described as "owner" who takes a kolhu or karhai on hire. The bye laws in fact make no mention of the person who takes them on hire or the person, who may be described as lessee. The learned single Judge's view that in the case of kolhus and karhais let out by a person to another, who works the kolhus and karhais, the latter would be an `owner' is, therefore, not warranted by the language used in the definition of the word "owners". 6. The second reason why we find it difficult to agree with the learned single Judge is that the learned single Judge has not mentioned in his judgment the material on the basis of which he accepted the fact that the responsibility for upkeep and repairs of the kolhus and karhais was not on the respondent but on his lessees. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the appellant it was stated in para. 9 that, under the agreement, the respondent was bound to look after the upkeep and repairs of the kolhus and karhais. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the appellant it was stated in para. 9 that, under the agreement, the respondent was bound to look after the upkeep and repairs of the kolhus and karhais. This assertion made in the counter affidavit was not admitted in the rejoinder affidavit, but there was no specific assertion in the rejoinder affidavit as to who was actually responsible for the upkeep and repairs. Before the learned single Judge, there was also i copy of the agreement which had been entered into between the parties. The terms of the agreement appear to indicate, though they do not clearly lay down, that atleast the responsibility for repairs of the kolhus and karhais did fall on the respondent. With regard to the responsibility for upkeep of the kolhus and karhais, there appears to be no mention in the written agreement, and there was no specific assertion before the learned single Judge on behalf of the respondent that the upkeep was not the responsibility of the respondent at all. In view of this situation we, during the course of the hearing of the appeal, gave an opportunity to the parties to put up facts before us. As a result, the respondent filed an affidavit, the appellant a counter-affidavit, and the respondent a rejoinder affidavit. In these affidavits, it is now the admitted case of both the parties that the responsibility for repairs of the kolhus and karhais was that of the respondent, but there is a dispute as to the responsibility for their upkeep. According to the respondent, he is not responsible for upkeep, while according to the appellant, he is. This has become a disputed question of fact and consequently we do not think that this is a fit case where we should decide this appeal on the basis that the respondent was not at all responsible for the upkeep or repairs of the kolhus and karhais. 7. It has, however, appeared to us that the relief, which has been granted to the respondent by the learned single Judge, must be maintained on a different ground, and that ground is that, to the extent that these bye laws have been made applicable to persons letting out kolhus and karhais, the byelaws have to be held to be void. It has, however, appeared to us that the relief, which has been granted to the respondent by the learned single Judge, must be maintained on a different ground, and that ground is that, to the extent that these bye laws have been made applicable to persons letting out kolhus and karhais, the byelaws have to be held to be void. As we have indicated earlier, the word `owner' as defined in the bye laws includes two classes of persons. One class of persons consists of those to whom the kolhus belong and who may not have let them out on hire. Such persons are required to take the licence and to comply with the restrictions laid down in the bye laws obviously on the basis that they would be running the kolhus and karhais themselves as their own industry either personally or through their agents or servants. Cl. 7 of the bye laws indicates how the byelaws serve the purpose for which they were made. There are several sub-clauses in that clause, which lay down what the owner of a kolhu is required to do: the first is that the premises of the kolhu have to be in clean surroundings and shall themselves be kept clean and healthy. The next two are that no child and no person suffering from any contagious or infectious disease will be allowed to work on the premises of kolhus and karhais. The fourth is that the kolhus, the karhais and the receptacles are to be kept clean and in proper repairs. Clearly enough, all those restrictions are placed with the object of promoting or ensuring the health, safety and convenience of the inhabitants of the area where the kolhus and karhais are being worked. The owner to whom a kolhu belongs and who runs it directly as his own industry can very reasonably be required to comply with these requirements. For the purpose of ensuring that the owner running the kolhus and karhais complies with these requirements it was also reasonable to impose the condition of his taking out a licence and to the extent that the bye laws have thus been made applicable to the owner to whom the kolhus and karhais belongs and who runs the kolhus and karhais the bye laws to be held to be valid. 8. 8. It, however, appears to us that, when these bye laws were framed, an error was committed in trying to include in the definition of the word `owner' those who let out on hire the kolhus and karhais. As we have indicated earlier, the bye laws are valid in the case of an owner because compliance with the restrictions laid down under the various sub-clauses of clause 7 of the bye laws are clearly meant for the purpose of promoting and maintaining the health, safety and convenience of the residents of the area, and the owners who run the industry can be reasonably expected to comply with those restrictions. Compliance with these requirements appears to be possible only for a person who is actually running the industry as his over and exercises affective control on it, so that he is in a position to keep the premises and the machinery in order and to ensure which persons are employed in the industry. An owner, who is running his own industry, will, therefore, be in a position to comply with those requirements. A person, who lets out kolhus or karhais on hire to be used in an industry run by the lessee of the same, on the other hand, cannot possibly exercise such control as to ensure that there is no breach of those restrictions. The person who can really exercise that control is the lessee who takes the kolhus and karhais on hire, and the bye laws in those circumstances should have laid down that it would be the lessee who would be required to comply with those restrictions, and to ensure that he does so, he may also be called upon to obtain a licence. So far as the person letting out the kolhus and karhais on hire is concerned, he cannot possibly ensure that the premises in which the kolhus are installed are kept clean and healthy all the time, nor can he ensure that those premises throughout remain in clean surroundings. He cannot regulate the employment of persons. working the kolhus or karhais and cannot, therefore, ensure that no child and no person suffering from any contagious or infectious disease is employed there. Similarly, he cannot arrange that the kolhus and karhais and the receptacles of the sugarcane juice are throughout kept clean. He cannot regulate the employment of persons. working the kolhus or karhais and cannot, therefore, ensure that no child and no person suffering from any contagious or infectious disease is employed there. Similarly, he cannot arrange that the kolhus and karhais and the receptacles of the sugarcane juice are throughout kept clean. Possibly, if under the contract the person letting out the kolhus and karhais on hire takes upon himself the responsibility for repairs, as it appears in the present case, the respondent did, he will be able to ensure that the kolhus and karhais are kept in proper respondents. It is, however, to be noted that clause (7) mentions the responsibility of keeping not only the kolhus and karhais in proper repairs, but even the receptacles of the sugarcane juice. Those receptacles would belong to the lessee of the kolhus and karhais working them, and the lessor, who may have let out the kolhus and karhais, would have no right or interest in these receptacles, so that it would be totally unreasonable to cast on him the responsibility for the receptacles being kept clean or in proper repairs. The inclusion of person, who let out on hire the kolhus and karhais, in the definition of "owner", therefore, has the effect that responsibility for complying with the requirements laid down in clause 7 of the bye laws is cast on persons who could not possibly discharge that responsibility and who could not reasonably be expected to undertake it. The responsibility cast on them under the fifth requirement of Cl. 7 of maintaining a register containing full details of kolhus and karhais let out by them is clearly incidental to the other four requirements mentioned by us above, because the maintenance of this register by itself cannot in any way promote or maintain the health, safety or convenience of the residents of the area. Maintenance of that register can only be of assistance in achieving that object, provided the person to whom the kolhus and karhais are let out is cast under some obligation by the byelaws or other laws to observe the conditions and restrictions mentioned in Cl. 7. Maintenance of that register can only be of assistance in achieving that object, provided the person to whom the kolhus and karhais are let out is cast under some obligation by the byelaws or other laws to observe the conditions and restrictions mentioned in Cl. 7. Since no such duty is cast upon the lessees of the kolhus and karhais, the mere maintenance of the register letting out the kolhus and karhais will have no connection with the object with which the bye laws were framed, or the purpose for which the power of framing the bye laws could be exercised under the District Board Act. In these circumstances it appears to us that the effect of the inclusion of persons letting out on hire the kolhus and karhais amongst `owners' has the result of making these bye laws partially invalid. We may take notice of the fact that, in the definition of the word `owner', there is one more requirement added and that is that the person letting out is to be deemed to be `owner' if he is also responsible for the upkeep and repairs of the kolhus and karhais. It seems to us that even a person responsible for upkeep and repairs of kolhus and karhais cannot be in a position to comply with the restrictions laid down in clause 7 of the bye laws and the mere addition in this behalf in the definition therefore, does not save these bye laws from being invalid in so far as they are sought to be applied to persons letting out kolhus and karhais on hire. The requirement that such persons, who let out kolhus and karhais on hire, should obtain licence before doing it is also, in these circumstances, unreasonable, because the mere requirement of taking a licence cannot in any way promote or ensure the health, safety or convenience of the inhabitants of that area. 9. The result of the view taken by us above is that the order made by the learned single Judge in this case has to be upheld because the action that has been restrained by that order is action being taken against the respondent, who had merely let out the kolhus and karhais on hire but was not actually running them as his own industry. 10. The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs.