JUDGMENT : Narasimham, C.J. - This is a Plaintiff's second appeal against the judgment of the Additional Subordinate Judge of Berhampur, reversing the judgment of the Munsif of Berhampur and partially dismissing the Plaintiff's claim for recovery or possession of certain lands which formed part of the Carpenter's Service Inam in village Chamunda of Ghumsur taluk of Ganjam district. 2. The Plaintiff's father Lakhan Mohapatra was the previous carpenter inamdar of that village and was in possession of the inam lands. He died sometime in 1940, leaving the Plaintiff (then a minor boy aged 12 years). In the plaint it was alleged that after the death of Lakhan the Plaintiff was in possession of the inam lands of the village and also rendering inam service to the villagers. It was further alleged in paragraph 5 of the plaint that the Defendants obtained possession of the disputed property saying that they would cultivate the lands on bhag, but subsequently refused to give up possession and set up an independent title to the same. Hence the Plaintiff prayed for ejectment of the Defendants from the disputed properties which consist of 7-15 acres of land. He also prayed for an injunction against the Defendants in respect of the remaining carpenter inam lands on 7-15 acres which were said to be in his possession but in respect of which be was being frequently threatened with dispossession by the Defendants. 3. The trial court decreed the suit in full and directed recovery of possession of 7-15 acres alleged to have been trespassed into by the Defendants and also granted a permanent injunction in respect of apprehended threat of dispossession of the remaining 7-15 acres. The lower appellate court while affirming the judgment of the trial court on the question of permanent injunction refused to give recovery of possession of 7-15 acres solely on the ground of limitation. 4. The second appeal was first heard by Justice Barman before whom counsel for the Defendant-Respondents namely Shri R.N. Misra frankly conceded that- the lower appellate court's view on the question of limitation could not be supported. The sole point in controversy was as to whether the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the present suit in view of the bar imposed by Section 21 of the Madras Hereditary Village officers Act, 1895. The sole point in controversy was as to whether the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the present suit in view of the bar imposed by Section 21 of the Madras Hereditary Village officers Act, 1895. The second appeal was referred to a Division Bench by Barman J., and before us the only point canvassed by counsel for both sides is the question of jurisdiction. 5. It is well settled that in considering the question of jurisdiction the substance of the allegation in the plaint should be looked into- see 1956 Andhra Weekly Reporter 5691 and 1960(1) M.L.J. 4902. The summary of the plaint allegation given will show that the Plaintiff's case was a simple one for ejectment of the Defendants on the ground that they entered into possession of the disputed property under the pretext of cultivating the lands on paying bhag rent to the Plaintiff and that they subsequently refused to vacate the minds but; set up their own independent right to the same-see paragraph 5 of the plaint. It is true that while giving a narrative about the Plaintiff's title to the lands, the Plaintiff alleged that they formed part of the carpenter's in am lands of the village which were in the possession of his father and that after the latter's death the Plaintiff came into possession and remained in such possession for sometime only until dispossessed by the defendants under the aforesaid pretext. On these allegations the question for consideration is whether the Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain this suit or else whether by virtue of Section 21 read with Section 13 of the Hereditary Village officers Act the suit is cognizable in the Revenue Courts. 6. "Village carpenter" comes under Clause (4) of Section 3 of the aforesaid Act and by virtue of Section 12 of that Act succession to his office devolves in accordance with law and custom applicable thereto. Accordingly the Plaintiff succeeded to the office and to the inam lands on the death of his father, though the official recognition by the revenue authorities was made only by the order of appointment dated 1-12-1952 -see ext. 2. The trespass by the Defendants was alleged to have taken place prior to the date of recognition. Accordingly the Plaintiff succeeded to the office and to the inam lands on the death of his father, though the official recognition by the revenue authorities was made only by the order of appointment dated 1-12-1952 -see ext. 2. The trespass by the Defendants was alleged to have taken place prior to the date of recognition. Section 13 of the Act says that a suit may be filed before the Collector for recovery of the emoluments of the office of village carpenter on the ground that the person is entitled to them u/s 12 of that Act. Section 21 bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to decide any claim of the nature described in Section 13 of that Act. Hence, if the Plaintiff had brought the suit for recovery of the emoluments (which include lands also) on the ground that he had succeeded his father as village carpenter, the Revenue court alone would have jurisdiction and the Civil Court's jurisdiction would be clearly ousted. But the Plaintiff's suit is for eviction of a trespasser on the ground that the latter after entering into the lands under the pretext of cultivating them as bhag tenants of the Plaintiff subsequently set up an independent title. The mere fact that in the narrative portion of the plaint he referred to the lands being the carpenter inam lands and his succeeding to the same, on the death of his father, is not sufficient to show that the suit, in essence, is a suit for recovery of the emoluments of the office of village carpenter. 7. In the Madras and Andhra High Courts there are a series of decisions laying down the true test to be applied in deciding whether the civil court or the revenue court has jurisdiction to decide disputes of this nature. It is unnecessary to refer to them in detail. I may however refer to AIR 1955 Andhra 153, where the previous decisions were summarised in the following manner: A suit by a service-holder claiming the right to succeed, or in actual possession of the office, for the recovery of emoluments, is cognizable by a Revenue Court. Denial of the character of the property by the Defendant does not affect jurisdiction. Denial of the character of the property by the Defendant does not affect jurisdiction. But the essential requisite is that the Plaintiff shall allege and rely on the fact that the land is an emolument attached to the office and make that a foundation for the relief claimed. But if his cause of action and right to possession do not depend on his title to the emoluments as a service-holder but on a collateral fact, Section 21 is not a bar. If he is dispossessed by a trespass, if his lessee refuses to deliver possession after the expiry of the term, if a person holding a derivative title under him does not give him possession after the termination of the derivative title, either on the expiry of the term or otherwise in all these cases his cause of action and his right to relief do not depend on his title as service-holder to the emoluments only, but his right to possession. The same aspect was emphasised by Varadachariar, J., in AIR 1935 Madras 914 (917)4 as follows: Where the office-holder could get relief merely on the strength of his possession as for instance against a trespasser or against a lessee, the position may be different. But where he could get relief only by insisting on his title as office-holder and on the character of the lands, as emoluments, the principle of the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court would undoubtedly apply. There is also a Division Bench decision of this Court in Jema Pandiani v. Anand Sethi 21 C.L.T. 152, where it was observed that a suit against a trespasser simpliciter is not barred in the Civil Court, but in that case the true principle laid down in the aforesaid decisions of the Madras and Andhra High Courts has not been fully discussed. 8. In view of the aforesaid principles it is obvious that the suit was clearly cognizable in the Civil Court because it was a simple suit for the eviction of a trespasser on the ground that the trespasser obtained possession as a bhag tenant and then subsequently set up an independent title. It is not a suit for recovery of possession of the emoluments of the office of carpenter on the ground that the Plaintiff is an office-holder. The lower comes therefore rightly held against the Defendants on the question of jurisdiction. 9. It is not a suit for recovery of possession of the emoluments of the office of carpenter on the ground that the Plaintiff is an office-holder. The lower comes therefore rightly held against the Defendants on the question of jurisdiction. 9. But as the lower appellate court's reversal of the trial court's finding on other grounds has been quite properly not supported even by the counsel for the Defendants the judgment of the trial court must be restored. 10. The appeal is accordingly allowed, the judgement of the lower appellate court is set aside and the judgment of the trial court is restored, with costs throughout. Das J, 11. I agree. 12. Appeal allowed. Final Result : Allowed