WANCHOO, C.J.—These are two connected applications by Charan Devi Dan (No. 89 of 1951) and Charan Ajit Dan (No. 126 of 1951) against the same order of the Board of Revenue, Rajasthan. They relate to the same matter. Two separate applications have been filed by these persons because it is said that there is some conflict between them. As the point raised is exactly the same in the two petitions, we shall decide them by one judgment. 2. The case of the applicants is that one Charan Achaldan who was a relation of theirs was a State grantee from the former State of Sirohi and held certain land as Muafi. On the 19th of March, 1938, the then |Chief Minister of Sirohi, purporting to act under a rule which laid down that no State grantee shall mortgage, or sell his land and in case he did so, the land would be resumed by the Government, ordered the resumption of the Muafi land belonging to Charan Achaldan. The applicants contend that the above rule did not have the force of law and further that Charan Achaldan had not mortgaged the Muafi land. These are questions, however which do not arise for consideration in the present applications and we express no opinion on them. The applicants go on to say that there was an appeal by Charan Achaldan against the order of the Chief Minister to His Highness the Ruler of Sirohi addressed to Mahkma Alia Khas Sirohi State. This appeal was taken into consideration by His Highness and further inquiry was ordered in the matter. It is not clear whether the report of further inquiry was received ; but whatever may be the position with respect to that, it appears that the appeal remained undecided till the merger of the former State of Sirohi with the present State of Rajasthan. When this merger took place, this appeal was transferred for disposal to the Special Board of Revenue constituted under the Rajasthan Appeals and Petitions (Discontinuance) Ordinance (No. XL of 1949). The Special Board dismissed the appeal on the 15th of March, 1951. Thereupon a review petition was presented by the present applicants in which they urged that the Special Board had no jurisdiction to decide the appeal. The Special Board dismissed the appeal on the 15th of March, 1951. Thereupon a review petition was presented by the present applicants in which they urged that the Special Board had no jurisdiction to decide the appeal. The review petition was also dismissed on the 7th of August, 1951 and thereupon the present applications were filed for the issue of a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ quashing the order of the Special Board. 3. The question whether the Special Board had jurisdiction to decide this appeal depends upon the interpretation of sec. 4 of Ordinance No. XL of 1949. The section reads as follows:— Section 4(1)—Where any appeals, revisions, references or petitions of the nature described in sec. 3 have been preferred, brought made, or presented before and are pending at, the commencement of this Ordinance, they shall be heard, determined and disposed of :— (a) if they relate to judicial matters, by a Special Court to be constituted by the Rajpramukh by notification in the Rajasthan Gazette; (b) if they relate to judicial revenue matters, by Special Board to be constituted by Rajpramukh by a like notification, and (c) in other cases, by the Government of the United State of Rajasthan. The Special Board would have jurisdiction to decide this appeal if the case comes within clause (b) of sec. 4(1) i.e., if the appeal related to judicial revenue matters. The contention on behalf of the applicants is that this was not a judicial revenue matter but an administrative matter decided by the Chief Minister of the former State of Sirohi. On the other hand, it is contended by the opposite that this is a judicial revenue matter. The words judicial revenue matters have nowhere been defined in Ordinance No. XL of 1949 and we have to give them their ordinary meaning according to the purpose for which this Ordinance was passed. It is clear that the Ordinance was passed with the object of stopping appeals in judicial matters whether civil, criminal or revenue and in administrative matters of all kinds which used to be made to the Rulers before the merger of the various covenanting States. Such pending cases were divided into three categories. One category related to judicial matters which is clause (a) of sec. 4 and these were to be decided by a Special Court to be constituted by the Rajpramukh. Such pending cases were divided into three categories. One category related to judicial matters which is clause (a) of sec. 4 and these were to be decided by a Special Court to be constituted by the Rajpramukh. Later, this provision was amended and the High Court of Rajasthan substituted in place of the Special Court. Clearly, clause (a) contemplated those cases pending before the Rulers which were criminal or civil in nature and in which appeals revisions, references or petitions had been made from the decisions of the courts of the former covenanting States doing criminal or civil work. 4. The second category related to Judicial revenue matters and was provided by clause (b) and in our opinion, it is clear that it relates to those appeals, revisions, references or petitions which were pending before the Rulers from the decisions revenue courts of the former covenanting States. The third category consisted of other cases, namely, cases which were not appeals etc. from the decisions of civil, criminal or revenue courts of the covenanting States. In these cases the jurisdiction to hear appeals etc. was given by the Ordinance to the Government of the United State of Rajas-than by clause (c). 5. The question then immediately arises whether this decision was a judicial revenue matter of the nature specified above. It was given by the Chief Minister of the former State of Sirohi and all that we have before us is a copy of that order. The copy does not show that the Chief Minister was acting as a revenue court. The order is headed "Chief Ministers Order No. 244 Jagiri of 19.3.38." If it was the order of a court we would have found the usual heading that one finds in the judgments of a court of law. It is clear., therefore, that this order of the Chief Minister was not as a court but only in his capacity as an executive authority. In this view of the matter, this order was not a judicial revenue matter in which the appeal could be heard by a Special Board. It is not necessary for us to indicate at this stage where the appeal in this case can be heard. But we may point out that there are two forms where appeals in administrative matters can be heard. One is provided in clause (c) of sec. It is not necessary for us to indicate at this stage where the appeal in this case can be heard. But we may point out that there are two forms where appeals in administrative matters can be heard. One is provided in clause (c) of sec. 4 (1) which we have already mentioned. The other is provided in clause 3 of Art. 7 of the Covenant forming the present State of Rajasthan. Which one of these will apply depends, upon whether this land is jagir or not. But whether Art. 7 Clause 3 of the Covenant applies or sec. 4 (1) (c) of the Ordinance No. XL of 1949 applies, it is clear that the Special Board had no jurisdiction to decide this appeal under sec. 4 (1) (b) of the Ordinance. 6. We, therefore, allow the applications and issue a writ of certiorari quashing the order of the Special Board. Considering the circumstances, we order parties to bear their own costs.