JUDGMENT Mithan Lal, J. - This second appeal has been filed by the plaintiff whose suit for enforcement of a simple mortgage dated 12th November 1946 has been dismissed. The mortgage was for a consideration of Rs. 800 and the plaintiff prayed for a decree of Rs. 1220. The defence was that the mortgage-deed had been paid with interest by means of a receipt dated 28th October 1947. 2. Both the courts below relying upon the said receipt have dismissed the plaintiff's suit. 3. Sri K.C, Saxena, learned counsel for the appellant, has contended that the courts below were wrong in accepting the defence case of payment and that the receipt dated 28th October 1947, relied upon by the defendant, is inadmissible in evidence being unregistered because it purports to extinguish the mortgage. It is also his contention that no oral evidence could be given to prove such a payment. The learned counsel for the respondent has contended that the receipt was a mere receipt and did not require registration. 4. The only point which requires consideration is whether the alleged receipt is hit by the provisions of Sec. 17(1) (b) read with clause (xi) of sub-Sec. (2) and required registration because it purported to extinguish the mortgage security. 5. The receipt which has been relied upon by the defendant is on two stamp papers, one of annas twelve and the other of annas four and the relevant portions of the document which are material for the purposes of this case are as follows: 1. A sum of Rs. 800 principal is due on the mortgage deed dated the 12th November 1946 in which all interest has been paid and the property detailed at the foot of the document is mortgaged. 2. As the said mortgage deed has been lost and the debtor, Munshi Khuda Bakhsh, is paying me (Gaya Prasad, plaintiff-appellant) the amount of the said mortgage deed, therefore I (plaintiff) have received a sum of Rs. 800 in cash under this receipt. 3. This document is being executed agreeing that not a pie on the said mortgage deed has remained due in principal or interest. 4. The said mortgage deed shall be returned to Munshi Khuda Bakhsh as soon as it is found. 5. 800 in cash under this receipt. 3. This document is being executed agreeing that not a pie on the said mortgage deed has remained due in principal or interest. 4. The said mortgage deed shall be returned to Munshi Khuda Bakhsh as soon as it is found. 5. If after the execution of this receipt any suit is filed, the same shall be false and not maintainable and I (plaintiff) shall be liable for damages to the said Khuda Bakhsh defendant. 6. Therefore this document by way of an agreement is executed in favour of Munshi Khuda Bakhsh in respect of the mortgaged property of the said mortgage deed for the satisfaction of the said Khuda Bakhsh. 6. It will appear from the above terms that the so-called receipt was not a mere receipt. It was an agreement recording satisfaction of the mortgage deed in presenti and agreeing to return the mortgage deed whenever found and further agreeing that no amount has remained due on the mortgage and if any suit is filed on that basis it will be not maintainable. The details of the property which was mortgaged were also given. 7. Sub-Sec. (2) of Sec. 17 lays down the exceptions to Cls. (b) and (c) of sub-Sec. (1) and Cl. (xi) says: "Any endorsement on a mortgage deed acknowledging the payment of the whole or any part of the mortgage money and any other receipt for payment of money due under a mortgage when the receipt does not purport to extinguish the mortgage." The question is whether the receipt, the relevant terms of which have been reproduced above, is a receipt which does not purport to extinguish the mortgage so as not to require registration or it is a receipt which brings about certain changes in the terms of the mortgage deed or which does purport to extinguish the mortgage. 8. The earliest case which deals with the point is a Full Bench authority of Jiwan Ali Beg v. Basa Mal, I.L.R. 9 Alld. 108. That case related to certain endorsements made at the back of the mortgage deed, but they were confined to the words "paid on such and such date. Rs.........". 8. The earliest case which deals with the point is a Full Bench authority of Jiwan Ali Beg v. Basa Mal, I.L.R. 9 Alld. 108. That case related to certain endorsements made at the back of the mortgage deed, but they were confined to the words "paid on such and such date. Rs.........". While considering the terms of the endorsements the Full Bench laid down that an instrument will come under Sec. 17(b) of the Registration Act of 1877 if it purports or operates to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish some right, title or interest of the value of Rs. 100 and upwards. On the language of the endorsements it was held that they did not require registration. That case is of no help to us. 9. The next case is of Piare Lal v. Makhan, 10 A.L.J. 25 It has been relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent. But again that was a case where in the receipt the only words were "The bond is returned. No money remains due." It was held that such a receipt did not purport to extinguish the right in the mortgaged property, that it was a mere receipt for payment and so it did not require registration. 10. A contrary view was taken in the case of Gobardhan Sahi v. Jadunath Rai, 11 A.L.J. 253. In that case an agreement, under which a part of the principal and interest of the mortgage money was paid, was sought to be proved by an unregistered deed. It was held that it amounted to relinquishment of security and as such the agreement required registration. This was followed by a Division Bench case of Jawala Prasad v. Mohan Lal, A.I.R. 1926 Alld. 693 = 24 A.L.J. 839. In that case a receipt was given by a co-mortgagee acknowledging payment and also stating that the mortgage deed shall be returned when the co-mortgagee came back. It was held that this promise to return the mortgage deed purported to extinguish the mortgage. 11. There is also a Supreme Court case of Kashinath Bhaskar Datar v. Bhaskar Vishweshwar, A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 153, which the lower appellate court wrongly thought supported the defendant's case. It was held that this promise to return the mortgage deed purported to extinguish the mortgage. 11. There is also a Supreme Court case of Kashinath Bhaskar Datar v. Bhaskar Vishweshwar, A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 153, which the lower appellate court wrongly thought supported the defendant's case. There an agreement was executed which laid down certain terms and the Supreme Court while considering those terms laid down certain tests when a receipt would be a. mere receipt without affecting the security or without purporting to extinguish the security. It was observed by the Supreme Court in Para. 10 that the extinguishment or diminution of the liability should be effected by the agreement itself. If an agreement is in writing showing either extinguishment or diminution of liability under a mortgage deed, it will be hit by the provisions of Sec. 17 (1) (b) of the Registration Act because the writing would be limiting or extinguishing the liability under the mortgage. In para. 11 a test was laid down in the following words: "Whether the mortgagee can, in the face of the subsequent agreement, enforce the terms of his bond? If he cannot, then it is plain that the subsequent undertaking has effected a modification, and if that has the effect of limiting or extinguishing the mortgagee's interest it is at once hit either by Sec. 17(1) (b) or Sec. 92 proviso 4 of the Evidence Act." This test fully applies to the present case. The mortgagee, that is the appellant, is not only said to have agreed to return the bond but also to have agreed not to file a suit on the basis of the mortgage. The receipt further contains a description of the mortgaged property. The mortgagee therefore could not enforce the terms of the bond in face of the alleged receipt. 12. Having regard to the authorities of Jwala Prasad, A.I.R. 1926 Alld. 693 = 24 A.L.J. 839 and the Supreme Court (supra), the agreement which is in the form of a receipt does purport to extinguish the security and so it required registration and did not come within the exceptions. The courts below were wrong in thinking that it was a mere payment. No oral evidence could be given to prove the payment. 13. The courts below were wrong in thinking that it was a mere payment. No oral evidence could be given to prove the payment. 13. One other thing which appears from the judgments is that the defendant-respondent is either a stamp vendor or a scribe in the courts at Agra. Had it been a genuine transaction of payment of the mortgage by means of a receipt, the receipt would neither have been in the form of an agreement on stamp paper nor would it have contained such terms as have been described earlier. The receipt being inadmissible in evidence, the courts below were wrong in dismissing the suit. They were also wrong in taking into consideration the oral evidence in this behalf. The plaintiff was entitled to a decree. 14. This appeal therefore succeeds and the plaintiff's suit must be decreed for Rs. 1220 as claimed. 15. The appeal is allowed with costs and the judgments and decrees of the courts below are set aside. The plaintiff's suit is hereby decreed for enforcement of the mortgage in dispute for Rs. 1220 with costs throughout and pendent elite and future interest at 3 percent per annum. A decree under Or. 34, R. 4, C.P.C. shall be prepared.