P. N. MOOKERJEE, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is by the defendant and it arises out of a suit for eviction, brought by the respondent landlord on the ground of reasonable requirement of the disputed premises for his own occupation, as contemplated under Section 13 (1) (f) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. ( 2 ) THE suit was brought on 28th February 1959, and, admittedly, it was governed by the above Act. There was the usual notice, purporting to be in compliance with Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and also of Section 13 (6) of the above West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. The suit was decreed by the learned trial Judge upon the finding that the notice was valid and, further that the case of reasonable requirement of the disputed premises for the plaintiff's own occupation had been amply made out. These findings were affirmed by the lower appellate Court which dismissed the defendant's appeal. Thereafter, the present second appeal was taken to this Court by the unsuccessful defendant. ( 3 ) THE two points, which have been urged by Mr. Das Gupta in support of this appeal, are (1) that, however, valid the notice may be under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, it is not in compliance with Section 13 (6) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, as, according to Mr. Das Gupta, it is not a notice of suit, either expressly or by necessary implication; and 92) that, on the evidence before the Court and on the materials on record, no case of reasonable requirement, as contemplated in Section 13 (1) (f) of the above Act, has been made out by the plaintiff. ( 4 ) WE are unable to accept either of the above two contentions. The notice ends with words, "intimating to the tenant that if, after the expiry of its period, he continues to occupy the suit premises, he will do so as a trespasser, liable to pay damages or mesne profits," "till evicted in due course of law". In our view, the above expression "till evicted in due course of law" carries with it the necessary implication of the landlord's intention to file an ejectment suit in case of non-compliance on the tenant's part with the above notice. In our view, the above expression "till evicted in due course of law" carries with it the necessary implication of the landlord's intention to file an ejectment suit in case of non-compliance on the tenant's part with the above notice. In the context of the ground of "reasonable requirement", which is specifically stated in the notice, this expression "till you are evicted in due course of law" can have no other meaning except that the landlord intends eventually to file a suit for ejectment on the said ground. It thus contains, within it, at least, by necessary implication, sufficient indication of the landlord's intention to file a suit for ejectment as contemplated under Section 13 (6) of the above Act. We hold, therefore, that the notice fully complies with the requirements of the above section and no objection to its validity or sufficiency can be upheld. ( 5 ) ON the other question, namely, of reasonable requirement of the disputed premises by the plaintiff, the position, apart from the concurrent findings of the two Courts below on this point in favour of the plaintiff, appears to be almost beyond dispute. The plaintiff's family, order the evidence, which cannot be disputed and which has been accepted by the two Court below, consists of nine members, the plaintiff, his wife, his three daughters, of whom, one is married, although she is living with the plaintiff, his daughter-in-law and a cook and a servant. Even on the minimum computation, this family would reasonably require, even assuming that, for this purpose, the married daughter may be excluded from the plaintiff's family, at least, three bed rooms and having regard to its status, the family would also certainly require a drawing room. The present accommodation in its occupation in its (plaintiff's) rented premises comprises only three bed rooms and there is no additional drawing room there. Obviously, then, this accommodation, is insufficient for the plaintiff's family. The suit premises is more commodious. It has four bed-rooms ad a hall. It will certainly be sufficient for the plaintiff's family. At the same time, on this accommodation no questioning of partial eviction also can arise because at the most the defendant can be left only with one room. That, Mr. Das Gupta concedes would not be sufficient for the defendant and would not be acceptable by it. It will certainly be sufficient for the plaintiff's family. At the same time, on this accommodation no questioning of partial eviction also can arise because at the most the defendant can be left only with one room. That, Mr. Das Gupta concedes would not be sufficient for the defendant and would not be acceptable by it. In such circumstances, the case of reasonable requirement of the disputed premises for his occupation, as sought to be made out by the plaintiff, must be accepted and the concurrent findings of the two Courts, below must be affirmed. ( 6 ) IN the above view, we overrule the appellant's contentions in this appeal. ( 7 ) THE appeal must, accordingly, fail but, having regard to the paucity of accommodation in the city and the circumstances, now prevailing in regard to such accommodation, we are inclined to give the defendant time till the end of December, 1963, subject to this that, if, within a fortnight from this date, the defendants, namely, the partners of the defendant firm, or any two of them give an undertaking to this Court to quit and vacate the disputed premises and deliver up full, vacant and peaceful possession thereof to the plaintiff within the month of April next, the above grace period will be extended till the end of the said month of April, 1964, provided that, in either case, the defendant goes on depositing, in the trial Court, to the credit of the decree-holder opposite party, a sum of Rs. 175/- (Rupees one hundred and seventy-five) per month, month by month, regularly, according to the English calendar, within the 15th of the next succeeding month, according to the same calendar, on account of mesne profits, in default of any two of such deposits, this decree for ejectment will become executable forthwith and the above provision for time or grace period will automatically lapse in that circumstances. Subject, as above, this appeal is dismissed. There will be no order for costs in this Court. Appeal dismissed