JUDGMENT M.C. Desai, C.J. - This an appeal by a judgment-debtor whose objection against the attachment and sale of his house in execution of a decree obtained against him by the respondent has been dismissed by the courts below. In a previous execution proceeding the house in dispute had been attached in execution of the respondent's decree and the appellant had objected under Sec. 47, C.P.C. contending that he was an agriculturist and occupied the house as an agriculturist and that consequently it was exempt from attachment and sale in execution of the decree. The objection had been allowed and an appeal had been filed by the respondent. In that appeal a compromise had been arrived at between the parties on 18-12-1954, the gist of which was as follows :- The judgment-debtor will satisfy the decree in annual instalments of Rs. 200. If he failed to pay any instalment the whole decretal amount will become recoverable in one instalment and the house in dispute and other attached property will be auctioned. In that event the judgment-debtor's objection under Sec. 60, C.P.C. will be deemed to have been rejected and it will not be open to him to file another objection. So long as the whole decree was not satisfied the house and other attached property will remain attached. 2. The appeal had been decided in terms of the compromise. The judgment-debtor failed to carry out the terms of the compromise and the respondent applied for execution of the decree again and proceeded against the house. The judgment-debtor filed an objection again under Sec. 60, C.P.C. and it was resisted by the respondent decree-holder on the ground that it was barred by res judicata and estoppel. The lower appellate court rejected the judgment-debtor's objection and hence this second appeal by him. The appeal came up for hearing before one of us, who on account of a conflict between two decisions of this Court, Mahadeo Agrahari v. Dhaukal Mal, AIR 1946 Allahabad 432 and Ram Naresh v. Ganesh Misra, AIR 1932 Allahabad 680 = 1932 A.L.J. 624 referred the appeal to a larger bench. 3. Sec. 60(1) (c), C.P.C. lays down that "houses and other buildings . . . 3. Sec. 60(1) (c), C.P.C. lays down that "houses and other buildings . . . belonging to an agriculturist and occupied by him" are not "liable to attachment and sale in execution of a decree." Whether a person is an agriculturist or not and whether a house belongs to an agriculturist or I not and is occupied by him or not depend upon the evidence; by looking at a person one cannot say that he is or is not an agriculturist, and, similarly, by looking at a house one cannot say that it belongs to an agriculturist or that it is occupied by him. These are not matters which appear on the face of the person or the house. It follows that whether a house is liable to attachment and sale or not depends upon facts. Facts are to be proved in a court of law by means of evidence and evidence is to be produced by a party upon whom rests the onus of proving or disproving a fact in issue. A fact in issue arises when a material fact is asserted by a party and denied by the other. Consequently when a house exempt from attachment and sale under Sec. 60 is attached and sold a person must first claim that it belongs to an agriculturist and was occupied by him and then lead evidence, if his claim is resisted by the other party, and then the court will decide whether the house belongs to an agriculturist and was occupied by him or not, If it answers the question in the affirmative it will uphold the claim and release it from attachment. A house, therefore, though belonging to an agriculturist and occupied by him, may, in practice, be attached and sold in execution of a decree notwithstanding the bar imposed by Sec. 60. It may be attached and sold by a decree-holder, who denies that it belongs to an agriculturist and is occupied by him and, if the judgment-debtor does not file an objection against the attachment and sale, or does not produce sufficient and convincing evidence in support of the objection, the attachment and sale will be maintained by the executing court, though in reality it was exempt from attachment and sale. If a judgment-debtor is estopped by law from filing an objection against the attachment and sale of a house occupied by him as an agriculturist, the executing court will sell the property and confirm the sale. Similarly if there is a previous decision to the effect that a house does not belong to an agriculturist and is not occupied by him it will be attached and sold in execution of a decree even though in fact it belongs to and is occupied by an agriculturist if the decision operates as res fudicata and prevents the executing court from deciding whether it belongs to and is occupied by an agriculturist or not. In Uzir Biswas v. Haradeb Das, AIR 1920 Calcutta 424 Chatterjea and Panton, JJ. held that if a plaintiff and the defendant compromise a suit, the defendant agreeing that the decree passed in the plaintiff's favour would be realisable from a house occupied by him as an agriculturist, and a decree on the basis of the compromise is passed, the defendant is estopped from contending, when the decree-holder proceeds in execution of the decree against the house, that under Sec. 60, C.P.C. it is not liable to be attached and sold in execution of the decree. In Ganga Bishun Ram v. Jagmohan Ram, A.I.R. 1927 Pat., 233 a compromise entered into by a defendant agreeing to give the house occupied by him as an agriculturist as security for the amount of the compromise decree was held to estop him from contending in execution that it was not attachable and saleable. In the case of Mahadeo Agrahari (supra) Pathak, J. approved of these two decisions. The facts in that case were that in a proceeding under the Agriculturist's Relief Act the judgment-debtor made a statement agreeing to the continuance of the attachment of his house and to its sale in the event of default on his part to pay the decretal amount and the decree-holder made a statement admitting that the judgment-debtor was an agriculturist. Thereupon the Court made. Thereupon the Court made. an order under Sec. 5 of the Agriculturist's Relief Act granting instalments to the judgment-debtor and directing that the house would "remain attached and charged till realisation." The question arose whether the house could be sold in execution of that decree, notwithstanding the provisions of Sec, 60 (1) (c), and was the judgment-debtor estopped by his earlier agreement that it could be sold in execution of the decree. It was held that the judgment-debtor was bound by the consent order passed on the application under the Agriculturists's Relief Act and was also estopped from contending that the house was exempt from auction under Sec. 60(1) (c). Pathak, J. observed at page 434 :- "What is the chief sources of the livelihood of a judgment-debtor is essentially a question of fact and upon the solution of this question depends the answer to the question whether he is an agriculturist within the meaning of 60(1) Cl. (c) Civil P. C. or not. Therefore if a judgment-debtor enters into a compromise with the decree-holder upon the footing that the property in question is liable to be sold he is, in effect, making a representation that he is not an agriculturist and that the property is saleable and after the compromise it is not open to him to resile from that position and urge that the property in question is not saleable." 4. But the judgment-debtor pleads that there can be no estoppel against a statute. What he meant is that if he was an agriculturist and occupied the house as such it was under the laws exempt from attachment and sale and that he could not be estopped from saying so by the compromise entered into by him in 1954. There is no question here of there being no estoppel against a statute. When a person is estopped by his previous statement, what he is estopped from is contending that the previous statement is false or making a contrary statement. Therefore, what is meant by there being no estoppel against a statute is that a person is not estopped by a previous statement as to the existence of a statutory provision from contending that the converse is the statutory provision. Therefore, what is meant by there being no estoppel against a statute is that a person is not estopped by a previous statement as to the existence of a statutory provision from contending that the converse is the statutory provision. If a judgment-debtor makes a statement that a house belonging to and occupied by an agriculturist is liable to be attached and sold in execution of a decree passed against him he will not be estopped from objecting to the attachment of his house on the ground that it belongs to and is occupied by him as an agriculturist and Sec. 60(1) (c) will override his statement. In South Ottawa v. Perkins, 94 U.S. 260-277-24 L.E. 154 it was observed at page 157 by Bradley, J. - "There can be no estoppel in the way of ascertaining the existence of a law. That which purports to be a law of a State is a law or it is not a law, according as the truth of the fact may be, and not according to the shifting circumstances of parties . . . . whether it be a law, or not a law is a judicial question, to be settled and determined by the courts and judges. The doctrine of estoppel is totally inadmissible in the case." This is the meaning of there being no estoppel against a statute. It is a representation of law and not of fact which cannot found an estoppel; see Kai Ram v. Ma Kan Chand, 1956 (1) All.E.L.R. 783. The only rule to which estoppels are subject is that they cannot override the law of the land; see . St. Ann's Island Shooting and Fishing Club Ltd. v. The King, 1950 Ex.C.R. Canada 185. The question of a clash between the law of the land and an estoppel arises only when the statement on which the estoppel is founded is about the state of the law of the land, i.e. is a statement of law. St. Ann's Island Shooting and Fishing Club Ltd. v. The King, 1950 Ex.C.R. Canada 185. The question of a clash between the law of the land and an estoppel arises only when the statement on which the estoppel is founded is about the state of the law of the land, i.e. is a statement of law. A mixed statement of fact and law cannot be said to be contrary to the law because in a certain state of facts it may be correct according to the law of the land, If a judgment-debtor states that his house is liable to be attached and sold, it is not necessarily against Sec. 60 (1) (c) because if he is not an agriculturist and does not occupy it as such it is not exempt from attachment and sale. Even an erroneous statement of law was held to estop the maker in Fenderson v. Fenderson, 102 Atl. 69. referred to with approval in 31 H.L.R. page 665. It was observed in that case that is is generally stated that estoppel cannot be founded on a misrepresentation of law; the basis is that everyone is presumed to know the law or that a statement of law is only an opinion and not a statement of fact. This is what is meant when it is said that there can not be an estoppel against a statute. The statement of the judgment-debtor in the instant case was not a statement about law at all. It was, on the other hand, that the house was liable to be attached and sold and that it could remain attached so long as the decree was not satisfied. There was no admission by the decree-holder that he was an agriculturist and that he occupied the house as such. It could not be said that his statement amounted to saying that though he was an agriculturist and occupied the house as such it was liable to be attached and sold in execution of the decree. If a statement contains the facts and the law separately, it may be divided into two parts, one containing the law which may not estop him and the other containing facts which may, but when a statement does not mention the facts and the law separately it cannot be divided into two parts and it cannot be said that it does not estop the maker. If the judgment debtor had said that though he was an agriculturist and occupied the house as such it was liable to be sold in execution of the decree he could rely upon Sec. 60(1) (c) notwithstanding it but his statement is quite different and cannot be interpreted to include it. 5. The decree passed on the basis of the compromise in 1954 providing that the house would remain attached and was liable to be sold in execution of the decree binds the judgment-debtor even though it was based on a compromise. In the face of that decree it was not open to the courts below to hold that the house was not liable to be sold in execution of the decree. The doctrine of res-judicata applies in execution also and the dismissal of the judgment-debtor's objection against the attachment of the house in execution of the decree operates as res judicata and he cannot file another objection against the sale of the house in another proceeding for execution of the same decree. The cases of Uzir Biswas, AIR 1920 Calcutta 424, Ganga Bishun, A.I.R. 1927 Pat., 233 and Mahadeo Agrahar, AIR 1946 Allahabad 432 support the view that a compromise decree acts as res judicata. That even a consent decree can operate as res judicata was made clear by the Supreme Court in Shankar Sitaram v. Balkrishna Sitaram, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 352 at p. 355. 6. The provision in Sec, 60(1) (c) is for the individual benefit of an agriculturist judgment-debtor and is not based on any public policy. The law does not prohibit transfer of a house belonging to and occupied by an agriculturist. An agriculturist can mortgage, sell or give away his house occupied by him as such; it has been held by this Court in Bholanath v. Mst. Kishori, I.L.R. 34 All. 25 = 8 A.L.J. 1045 (F.B.) and Mubarak Husain v. Ahmad, AIR 1924 Allahabad 328 = 22 A.L.J. 321 (F.B.) that an agriculturist can make a valid mortgage of his house occupied by him as an agriculturist and that in execution of the mortgage decree it can be sold. The fact that the law allows an agriculturist to mortgage or sell his house which is occupied by him as an agriculturist proves that it is not public policy that is behind the provision of Sec. 60(1) (c). The fact that the law allows an agriculturist to mortgage or sell his house which is occupied by him as an agriculturist proves that it is not public policy that is behind the provision of Sec. 60(1) (c). Had public policy required that houses belonging to and occupied by, agriculturists should not be transferred by them it would have banned such transfers absolutely. The provision in Sec. 60 (1) (i) that the salary of a public servant up to a certain limit shall not be liable to attachment and the provision in Sec. 6(f), Transfer of Property Act that the salary of a public officer cannot be transferred were held to be prohibitions based on public policy in Postmaster-General, Bombay v. Chenmal Mayachand, AIR 1941 Bombay 389 and Subramaniam v. Satyanadham, AIR 1942 Madras 391 but it does not follow that the provision of Sec. 60(1) (c) also was based on public policy. If a house of an agriculturist and occupied by him as such is sold in execution of a decree and the sale is confirmed without an objection by the judgment-debtor the sale is binding upon him notwithstanding the bar imposed by Sec. 60(1) (c) and he is precluded from raising the question in a subsequent proceeding; see Rantantal v. Shantilal, AIR 1961 Allahabad 178. It is said in Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 8, 3rd Edition, paragraph 248 "Con-tracts" that "any person can enter into a binding contract to waive the benefits conferred upon him by an Act of Parliament, or, as it is said, can contract himself out of the Act, unless it can i be shown that such an agreement s in the circumstances of the particular case contrary to public policy." Any agreement which tends to be injurious to the public or against the public good is void as being contrary to public policy. Which agreements are contrary to public policy are mentioned in Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 8, 3rd Edition, "Contracts" paragraphs 225 etc. and there is no head under which the agreement entered into by the judgment-debtor in 1954 can fall. Which agreements are contrary to public policy are mentioned in Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 8, 3rd Edition, "Contracts" paragraphs 225 etc. and there is no head under which the agreement entered into by the judgment-debtor in 1954 can fall. "Every one has a right to waive and to agree to waive the advantage of a law or rule made absolutely for the benefit and protection of the individual in his private capacity, which may be dispensed with without infringing any public right or public policy." see Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Edition, page 376. In the cases of Ganga Bishun, A.I.R. 1927 Pat., 233 and Mahadeo Agrahar, AIR 1946 Allahabad 432 it was held that a judgment-debtor can waive the benefit of the provision of Sec, 60(1) (c). Malik, C. J. held in Sahabuddin v. Mohan Lal, AIR 1951 Allahabad 227 = 1951 A.L.J. 722 that a tenant can waive the benefit granted to tenants under the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act; in the same way a judgment-debtor can waive the benefit of the exemption granted by Sec. 60 (1) (c). 7. The decree-holder's position in this case is even stronger than if there were only a waiver by the judgment-debtor of the benefit conferred upon him by Sec. 60(1) (c). The agreement provided for the dismissal of the judgment debtor's objection in the event of his failing to pay the instalments on due dates. The objection had to be decided and the parties could agree to its being decided in a particular way. The dismissal of the objection operates as res judicata to prevent a fresh objection on the same lines at a later stage. 8. The facts in a case of Ram Naresh, AIR 1932 Allahabad 680 = 1932 A.L.J. 624 were these. A suit in which a house of the defendant was attached before judgment under Or. XXXVIII, C.P.C. was compromised and the parties agreed that a decree for a certain sum should be passed in the plaintiff's favour and that the house should continue to be attached so long as the decree was not satisfied. A decree was passed in terms of the compromise. The judgment-debtor did not satisfy it and the decree-holder applied for execution by sale of the house. A decree was passed in terms of the compromise. The judgment-debtor did not satisfy it and the decree-holder applied for execution by sale of the house. The judgment-debtor objected on the ground that he was an agriculturist and occupied the house as such and that consequently it was exempt from sale under Sec. 60 (1) (c). It was conceded by the decree-holder that the judgment-debtor was an agriculturist and occupied the house as such. The objection was overruled by the lower appellate court but was upheld by Brij Mohan Lall, J. in second appeal. The principal grounds on which he rested his judgment are that (1) the facts on which the objection was founded were admitted by the decree-holder and that no evidence was required, (2) the judgment-debtor only agreed in the compromise to the house remaining under attachment and not to its being sold in execution of the decree and the compromise decree also did not direct that it was liable to be sold in execution of the decree and (3) there can be no estoppel against a statute. On the particular facts of the case there , was no occasion for the learned Judge's saying anything about estoppel against a statute and his observation that even if the judgment-debtor had said expressly that the house could be sold in execution of the decree he could not be pinned down to the statement is nothing but an obiter dictum. On the other two points the facts of that case differ from those of the instant case. Here there has been no admission on behalf of the decree-holder that the judgment-debtor is an agriculturist and occupied the house as such. Further, there has been no finding by the lower appellate court about these facts. The trial court had certainly found that the judgment-debtor is an agriculturist and occupied the house as such, but the lower appellate court did not go into this matter and set aside the trial court's order on another ground. Therefore, the finding of the trial court on this matter vanished when its order was set aside and there has been no finding by the lower appellate court. Further, in the instant case there was an objection against the attachment of the house and it has been dismissed; so there is an order which operates as res judicata. Therefore, the finding of the trial court on this matter vanished when its order was set aside and there has been no finding by the lower appellate court. Further, in the instant case there was an objection against the attachment of the house and it has been dismissed; so there is an order which operates as res judicata. In Ram Naresh's case, AIR 1932 Allahabad 680 = 1932 A.L.J. 624 there was no such order operating as res judicata. Moreover, in the instant case there is an undertaking by the judgment-debtor that the house would be liable to be auctioned and it was the absence of this undertaking that was stressed by Brij Mohan Lall, J. in Ram Naresh's case, AIR 1932 Allahabad 680 = 1932 A.L.J. 624. Therefore, the decision in that case is not applicable to the facts of the instant case. Uttar Pradesh has amended Sec. 60 in 1948 by adding Explanation I-A to the effect that the property exempted under Sec. 60 (1) (c) is exempt from sale in execution of a decree in enforcement of a mortgage or charge thereon. So now a house belonging to an agriculturist and occupied by him cannot be sold in execution of a mortgage decree even though the mortgage was on the house itself. This amendment has, however, no relevancy in the instant case. 9. In the result I hold that the appellant was estopped from objecting to the sale of the house in execution of the decree and that the objection was also barred by res judicata. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed with costs.