JUDGMENT 1. The appellant before us is the owner of the disputed premises. The suit in question IB a suit for ejectment. It was brought toy the appellant against the heirs of the deceased original tenant Bhupendra Nath Das, those heirs being defendants Nos. 1-5 of the suit, and an alleged subtenant (defendant No. 8) and the present respondent No. 7, who also was stated to be a sub-tenant in occupation. The suit premises is numbered in the municipal register as premises No. 11 A, Haralal Mitra Street. The plaintiff claims to have purchased the suit premises on July 19, 1957, for her own occupation. At that time, one Bhupendra Nath Das, predecessor-in-interest of the defendants Nos. 1-5 (respondents Nos. 1-5), was in occupation as a tenant. He duly attorned to the plaintiff. The rental, payable for this tenancy, was Rs. 75/- per month and the said tenancy ran according to the English calendar month. On February 20, 1959, a notice was served on the tenants, defendants Nos. 1-5, which notice was to expire with the end of March, 1959. In the notice, the ground of ejectment was stated to be requisite defaults in payment of rent, as required under sec. 13 (1) (i) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, and also reasonable requirement of the disputed premises by the plaintiff for her own occupation on account of the decree for ejectment, passed against her husband in respect of the premises, where the plaintiff with her husband and their family was residing at the time. 2. The suit was initially contested by defendants Nos. 1-5 and defendant No. 7. The validity of the notice under sec. 13 (6) was specifically challenged but the notice, as it appears in this case, is a good and valid notice under the said section. It is expressly a notice of suit, as it is stated therein that, in case of the tenant's non-compliance with the said notice, a suit for recovery of possession will be filed by the plaintiff. In the notice, the ground of ejectment is also specifically stated and there can be no doubt also that it is more than a month's notice, as required under the foresaid section. This notice, there fore, satisfies all the requirements of law under the aforesaid statutory provision and its validity and sufficiency cannot be questioned. In the notice, the ground of ejectment is also specifically stated and there can be no doubt also that it is more than a month's notice, as required under the foresaid section. This notice, there fore, satisfies all the requirements of law under the aforesaid statutory provision and its validity and sufficiency cannot be questioned. The point, then, is whether the plaintiff has been able to make out a case of reasonable requirement or a case of requisite defaults in payment of rent on the part of the tenant or tenants concerned to entitle her to a decree in the instant case. On the question of default, the position appears to be somewhat unsatisfactory, so far as the learned trial Judge's judgment is concerned. He did not go into this question as the tenants defendants (defendants Nos. 1-5), in the course of the suit, filed, on January 18, 1960, a compromise petition, wherein the plaintiff also joined and, under the terms of the said petition, the said defendants agreed to vacate the disputed premises within four months. In view of this, the suit, so far as the above defendants were concerned, was decreed on compromise and, in view of the same, the learned trial Judge did not deem it necessary to go into the question of default. That, however, does not seem to be quite satisfactory, particularly when a sub-tenant (Defendant No. 7) is also involved in this case and it would have been better if the relative Issue No. 3 had received greater attention from the parties and the court. 3. On the question of reasonable requirement, as the decree against the plaintiff's husband was subsisting at the date, when the trial Court's decree was passed, there was, practically, no contest and the only contest, which was raised by the contesting sub-tenant, was on the point of partial eviction. The learned trial Judge accepted the sub-tenant's case and allowed the plaintiff a decree for partial eviction. This decree was passed on April 5, 1960, and, against the same, the present appeal was filed by the plaintiff on June 1, 1960. The immediate point which thus arises for consideration in this appeal, is whether the above decree for partial eviction was rightly made. 4. Mr. Lala, appearing in support of this appeal, raised two questions against the said decree. The immediate point which thus arises for consideration in this appeal, is whether the above decree for partial eviction was rightly made. 4. Mr. Lala, appearing in support of this appeal, raised two questions against the said decree. In the first place, he argued that the plaintiff, on the evidence before the court, belonged to a conservative family and used to observe parda. In the suit premises, according to the finding of the learned trial Judge, there was only one water tap, one privy and one bath-room. It is true that the tenants and the contesting sub-tenant were using the same, that is, the said single water-tap, privy and bath-room, jointly and the same were in common use between them. But Mr. Lala contended that the plaintiff, particularly, having regard to the above parda custom, which her family observed, could not be compelled to have common bath, privy and water tap with strangers. In the view, we are taking, it is not necessary for us to consider the above question as, obviously, the case will have to be remanded on other grounds and, accordingly, we would leave this matter of parda custom and its effect on the present suit for consideration by the trial court. 5. As we have said above, the plaintiff's case of reasonable requirement on the facts, as they stood at the date of the trial Court's decree, was not and could not be questioned by the defendants inasmuch as the decree for ejectment, obtained by the landlord of the plaintiff's husband in respect of their rented premises, was subsisting on that dale. The position, however, has changed and has changed materially, as, by our judgment, delivered in F. A. No. 449 of 1962 [since reported in 67 C. W. N.-Ed. ], we have set aside that decree. No case of reasonable requirement, therefore, can now be maintained on the plea that there is a decree for ejectment against the plaintiff's husband. So far as this aspect of the matter is concerned, the plaintiff's case of reasonable requirement must, accordingly, fail. That, however, should not, in the circumstances of this case, put the plaintiff out of court. 6. As we have said above, in view of the subsistence of the above decree, the plea of reasonable requirement was not contested by the defendants and the only defence that was urged was the defence of partial eviction. That, however, should not, in the circumstances of this case, put the plaintiff out of court. 6. As we have said above, in view of the subsistence of the above decree, the plea of reasonable requirement was not contested by the defendants and the only defence that was urged was the defence of partial eviction. It appears also that, in the evidence, some indication was given,-although that cannot, be accepted as final,-that the plaintiff's accommodation in the rented premises, which she is now occupying, was not sufficient. This, indeed, was brought out in the cross-examination of the contesting sub-tenant. It is true that no specific averment in this respect is to be found in the plaint but, in. the circumstances of this case, we would give the plaintiff an opportunity to have the plaint amended and include therein, if she is so advised, a case of reasonable requirement on account of inadequacy of accommodation in her present premises. For the above purpose, and for due consideration of the question of the plaintiff's reasonable requirement of the suit premises for her own occupation in all its aspects and of the connected question of partial eviction, if any, in the light of the observation made hereinbefore, the suit will have to go back to the learned trial Judge, although his present decree on the ground of the plaintiff's reason-able requirement of the suit premises for her own occupation on account of a subsisting ejectment decree against the plaintiff's husband must be set aside as the said decree is no longer existing. We would, accordingly, allow this appeal, set aside the entire decree, passed by the learned trial Judge, and send the case back on remand to him for consideration of the two points of reasonable requirement and partial eviction, if any, as also the point of default (Issue No. 3), if pressed by either party, in the light of the observations, hereinbefore made. It will be open to the learned trial Judge, if he eventually finds in favour of the plaintiff on the question of reasonable requirement, to consider afresh the plea of partial eviction, as raised by defendant No. 7, bearing, particularly, in mind the existence of a single tap, a single privy and a single bathroom, as found by him, on the question of the Parda custom, which question, if raised by the plaintiff before him, will be duly considered by him in accordance with law. The learned trial Judge will also similarly consider the question of default (vide Issue No. 3), as pressed by either party, and its effect upon the rights of the parties before him. Needless to say, that, if the plaintiff amends her plaint, the contesting defendant will be entitled to file an additional written statement and the learned trial Judge will dispose of the suit on remand in accordance with law after allowing the parties opportunities to adduce further evidence in support of their respective cases on all the above-points and after giving due consideration to the evidence, already on record, and such further evidence, as aforesaid, as may be adduced by the parties in the case. 7. There will be no order for costs up till this stage. Further costs will be in the discretion of the learned trial Judge.