JUDGMENT S.D. Khare, J. - This is application in revision against an order dated 5th July, 1962, passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Kanpur, affirming in revision an order passed by Dr. S.N. Shukla, Special Magistrate, first class, Kanpur discharging all the accused persons in a case under Secs. 403, 120B and 500, I.P.C. after summoning the accused persons but without recording any evidence for the prosecution. 2. The facts alleged in the complaint were that the complainant had paid a sum of Rs. 1,500/- to Banshidhar and Shiv Narain (Partners of firm Chunni Lal Shiv Narain) and the said amount was entered in their payment had been made at the instance of his employer Lal Behari, opposite party no. 1, who had given that much money to the complainant for payment to firm Chunni Lal Shiv Narain. However, subsequent his employer became displeased with him and all the three opposite parties colluded together and said that the sum of Rs. 1,500/- which his employer had paid to him for payment to firm Chunni Lal Shiv Narain had not been paid to Bansidhar and Shiv Narain, the partners of that firm. It was also mentioned in the complainant that a suit was filed by the complainant against his employer Lal Behari for declaration that he had paid the sum of Rs. 1,500/- to firm Chunni Lal Shiv Narain, but that suit was dismissed. It was also mentioned in the complaint that his employer Lal Behari opposite party No. 1 had obtained a decree against him for the recovery of Rs. 1,500/- and interest thereon. 3. Notices were issued to all the opposite parties, and they filed before the court copies of the judgments of the two civil suits. In the suit filed by Lal Behari against the present complainant for the recovery of Rs. 1,500/- and interest. Firm Chunni Lal Shiv Narain had also been made parties. 4. The Magistrate, after having considered the complaint and the judgments filed by the opposite parties, observed as follows :- "In this case I do not think it proper for the court to open a chapter which has been closed by the civil court. Under Sec. 210, I. P. C. when a decree is fraudulently obtained, no court can take cognizance except on the complaint in writing of such court. Under Sec. 210, I. P. C. when a decree is fraudulently obtained, no court can take cognizance except on the complaint in writing of such court. In this case the civil court must have been the only place to challenge the alleged fraudulent act of the decree-holder. It is well established law that to constitute the offence under Sec. 403, I.P.C., there must be misappropriation of moveable property with the intention of causing gain by unlawful means of property, to which the person gaining it is not legally entitled. This fact of title of the property has been decided by the Civil Court. This court is not a place to make observations on the judgments of civil court." 5. After giving the above mentioned grounds the Magistrate came to the conclusion that the charge was groundless, and acting under Sec. 253 (2), Cr. P. C. he discharged all the accused persons. 6. The only point that has been raised before me is that after the accused persons had been summoned the Magistrate had no option but to go through the procedure prescribed under sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 253, Cr. P. C. and that he could not at that stage dismiss the complaint under Sec. 253 (2), Cr. P. C. Sec. 253, Cr. P. C. reads as follows : "253 (I) If, upon taking all the evidence referred to in Sec. 252, and making such examination (if any) of the accused as the Magistrate thinks necessary, he finds that no case against the accused has been made out which, if unrebutted, would warrant his conviction, the Magistrate shall discharge him. (2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to prevent a Magistrate from discharging the accused at any previous stage of the case if, for reasons to be recorded by such Magistrate, he considers the charge to be groundless." 7. It is clear that sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 253, Cr. P. C. does not put any restriction on the stage at which the accused persons could be discharged. The provision is couched in very wide terms and the phrase at any previous stage can clearly mean at any stage either prior to the stage of Sec. 252(1), Cr. P. C. or even after part of the evidence has been recorded under sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 252. 8. The provision is couched in very wide terms and the phrase at any previous stage can clearly mean at any stage either prior to the stage of Sec. 252(1), Cr. P. C. or even after part of the evidence has been recorded under sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 252. 8. The learned counsel for the applicant has however placed reliance on the case of Muhammad Sherrif Sahib v. Abdul Karim Sahib, AIR 1928 Madras 129. That case is an authority for the proposition that where a complaint prima fade discloses an offence, a Magistrate cannot hold the charge to be groundless unless he ascertains from the complainant what is the sort of evidence that is going to be adduced to prove it. This case is not an authority for the proposition that once the accused persons have been summoned action could not be taken under sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 253, Cr. P. C. On the other hand, the following observations made in the case clearly show that such action could be taken even after calling the accused persons and before recording all the evidence which was to be led by the complainant. "He can only judicially come to such a conclusion when he has at least ascertained from the complainant what is the nature of evidence that the other witnesses are going to give. If he then finds that, even if that evidence was given, the charge would be ground-less, it is open to him to discharge the accused on that account." 9. The next case relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicant is Mehtab v. Nathu, AIR 1930 Lahore 461. It is based on the case of Muhammad Sherrif Sahib, AIR 1928 Madras 129 and the facts are similar to that of the Madras case. For the reasons given in the earlier paragraph this case also does not help the applicant's contention. 10. Reliance has also been placed on the case of Ganga Bux Singh v. The State, AIR 1954 Allahabad 22 = 1953 A.L.J. 604. It was held in that case that where the accused is summoned and claims discharge on the basis of certain facts alleged by him opportunity should be given to the complainant to admit or rebut the facts alleged by the accused in his application for discharge. It was held in that case that where the accused is summoned and claims discharge on the basis of certain facts alleged by him opportunity should be given to the complainant to admit or rebut the facts alleged by the accused in his application for discharge. The facts of this case will hardly apply to the facts of the present case for the simple reason that in the present case the accused persons do not rely on the facts alleged by them but they rely on the facts alleged by the complainant himself. The copies of judgments filed by the opposite parties were merely to explain the allegations already made in the complaint. 11. It is to be noted that it was observed in the case of Ganga Bux Singh that a Magistrate is entitled to discharge an accused at any stage of an enquiry or trial if it appears to the Magistrate that the charge brought against the accused was groundless. There is nothing in this case to suggest that the accused persons could not be discharged after they had been summoned otherwise than in accordance with Sec. 253 (1), Cr. P. C. Learned counsel for the accused opposite parties relied on the following cases :- Fazlar Rahman v. Emp., AIR 1930 Calcutta 515, Gopesh Chandra Pal v. Virmal Kumar Das Gupta, AIR 1950 Calcutta 57, Pandit Shiv Datta v. B. K. Sood, AIR 1940 Lahore 40, Kunj Behari Lal v. Emp., AIR 1926 Allahabad 461 = 24 A.L.J. 512 and Gaya Ahir v. Vishwanath Pandey, 1954 A.L.J. 186 in support of his contention that the phrase at any previous stage occurring in sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 253, Cr. P. C. does not fetter the discretion of the Magistrate and that the accused person can be discharged even after he has been summoned, and part of the complainant's evidence has been recorded. The cases relied upon fully support the contention raised by him and are in consonance with the plain language of sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 253, Cr. P. C. The case reported in Gaya Ahir v. Vishwanath Pandey, 1954 A.L.J. 186 is an authority for the proposition that sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 253, Cr.P.C. empowers the Magistrate to discharge the accused at any stage of the case if, for reasons to be recorded by him, such Magistrate considers the charge to be groundless. P. C. The case reported in Gaya Ahir v. Vishwanath Pandey, 1954 A.L.J. 186 is an authority for the proposition that sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 253, Cr.P.C. empowers the Magistrate to discharge the accused at any stage of the case if, for reasons to be recorded by him, such Magistrate considers the charge to be groundless. It was also held that this provision empowered the Magistrate to discharge the accused persons even before recording the evidence of the prosecution witnesses. 12. The Magistrate has given good reasons for holding that the charge made in the complaint is groundless. The decision of the civil court in the two cases referred to above made it clear that Rs. 1,500/- had not been paid by the complainant to firm Chunni Lal Shiv Narain, and those decisions took the bottom out of the complaint case. 13. There is no force in this revision application and it is accordingly dismissed.