JUDGMENT V. Bhargava, J. - By this Special appeal, the appellant challenges the judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court dismissing a petition filed by the appellant under Article 226 of the Constitution by which the appellant had prayed for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash resolution no. 38 passed by the Regional Transport Authority, Meerut in a meeting held on 29th, 30th and 31st of January, 1963 and for the issue of a writ of mandamus commanding the Regional Transport Authority, Meerut not to give effect to the impugned resolution. It appears that in the district of Bulandshahr at one time there were three set of operators operating stage carriages on three routes. One set of operators was running their stage carriages from Bulandshahr to Narora via Anupshahr, Debai Duraha, Ram Ghat and Rajghat. Another set of operators was running their stage carriages from Bulandshahr to Shikarpur and a third set from Shikarpur to Ram Ghat via Debai Duraha. The Transport Authority at one time decided to amalgamate the routes from Bulandshahr to Shikarpur and Shikarpur to Ram Ghat. As a result of that decision, there came to be two sets of operators: one running their stage carriages from Bulandshahr to Narora via Anupshahr, Debai Duraha, Ram Ghat and Raj Ghat and the other running their stage carriages from Bulandshahr to Ram Ghat via Shikarpur and Debai Duraha. Thus, the portion of the route between Debai. Duraha and Ram Ghat became common to the two sets of operators besides the starting point Bulandshahr. The operators running their stage carriages via Anupshahr felt aggrieved and made applications that they might also be given the option of running their stage carriages via Shikarpur. It appears that the 44 respondents apart from the Regional Transport Authority, who is respondent no. 1 in this special appeal, made applications of this nature. These applications were dealt with under Sec. 57 (8) of the Motor Vehicles Act and the procedure applicable to the issue of new permits was adopted. After complying with that provision the Regional Transport Authority considered those applications in the meeting held between 29th, 30th and 31st of January, 1963. 1 in this special appeal, made applications of this nature. These applications were dealt with under Sec. 57 (8) of the Motor Vehicles Act and the procedure applicable to the issue of new permits was adopted. After complying with that provision the Regional Transport Authority considered those applications in the meeting held between 29th, 30th and 31st of January, 1963. The Transport Authority took into account the public interest and came to the conclusion that it was in the public interest to allow the operators, who hold permits to run their stage carriages via Anupshahr, the option of running their stage carriages via Shikarpur. Consequently, the route via Shikarpur-Debai-Duraha was also by this resolution included in the permits of the stage carriages held by those operators. It is this resolution that was challenged by the appellant. It may be mentioned that by the same resolution the Regional Transport Authority indicated that those operators who were running their stage carriages via Shikarpur between Bulandshahr and Ram Ghat could also apply to have the route via Anupshahr included in their permits and the Regional Transport Authority would be inclined to grant such a request in the interest of fair-play and equity. The writ petition by which this resolution was challenged was dismissed by the learned Single Judge holding that there were no grounds for quashing it. 2. The first point that has struck us in this case is that the appellant has come up to invoke the equitable jurisdiction of this Court for a relief which would be totally unfair to others and would give undue advantage to the appellant. The appellant originally held a permit up to Shikarpur only. Her permit was extended to Ram Ghat under Sec. 57 (8) of the Motor Vehicles Act. It was in exercise of the same power under Sec. 57 (8) of the Motor Vehicles Act that the respondents to this appeal were granted that privilege of inclusion of the route via Shikarpur in their permits. The need for this prayer arose simply because of the earlier order made in favour of the appellant and other operators of the route on which the appellant has been operating, permitting their stage carriages to run from Bulandshahr through Shikarpur to Ram Ghat. This having become a shorter route, the operators on the longer route via Anupshahr found that they could no longer run their stage carriages economically. This having become a shorter route, the operators on the longer route via Anupshahr found that they could no longer run their stage carriages economically. The appellant wants to continue to take advantage of the order made in her favour under Sec. 57 (8) of the Motor Vehicles Act extending her route, while she has come up to challenge the order by which a more equitable arrangement has been brought into existence so as to do away with the hardship that the operators on the Anupshahr route are suffering as a result of the order earlier made favouring the appellant and her co-operators. It is clear that the appellant wants to continue to take advantage of whatever orders have been made in her favour, while she wants that an equitable arrangement by which the hardship caused to others is mitigated, should be quashed. She has thus come to ask for a relief from this Court for the purpose of obtaining unfair advantage and has tried to invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court which is only meant to be exercised in the interest of equity and justice. This ground by itself would, in our opinion, be sufficient to throw out this writ petition. 3. The prayer made on behalf of the appellant is based on the ground that a variation of routes in the permit of a stage carriage is not permissible under Sec. 57 (8) of the Motor Vehicles Act. The argument on behalf of the appellant is that the variations that can be made under Sec. 57 (8) of the Motor Vehicles Act are only in the conditions of a permit and those conditions must be held to be only the conditions mentioned in Sec. 48 (3) and 59 (3) of the Motor Vehicles Act. The first point to be noticed is that though the appellant has come forward with such a plea in this Court in this writ petition in order to challenge the relief that has been granted to the respondents, she is doing so principally with the object of continuing to reap the benefit of a similar order made under Sec. 57 (8) of the Motor Vehicles Act which happened to be in her favour. As we have mentioned before, the appellant's route was only between Bulandshahr and Shikarpur and if it had not been extended up to Ram Ghat, there would have been no grievance of the respondents against the appellant; nor would they have ever prayed that they be allowed to operate their stage carriages via Shikarpur. If we were to accept the submission made on behalf of the appellant that the prescription of route for stage carriages under a permit is not a condition of the permit at all, the necessary conclusion that has to be drawn is that even the extension of the permit of the appellant from Shikarpur to Ram Ghat was illegal. If this submission were to be accepted and the Court were to exercise its equitable jurisdiction in the interest of justice, the only order that the Court could have made was to quash the earlier resolution extending the permit of the appellant beyond Shikarpur up to Ram Ghat, while quashing resolution no. 38 altering the route of the 44 respondents. We find that no occasion arises in this case for the exercise of this power of ours; because, in our opinion, the resolution no. 38 as well as the earlier resolution by which the appellant's route was extended are both within the scope of the powers of the Regional Transport Authority under Sec. 57 (8) of the Motor Vehicles Act. 4. There is no doubt, as urged by the learned counsel, that certain conditions are mentioned as conditions of a permit or to be conditions included in the permit under Secs. 48 (3) and 59 (3) of the Motor Vehicles Act. We cannot, however, accept the submission that other terms of the permit, besides those mentioned in Sec. 48 (3) and 59 (3), will not be conditions of the permit or will cease to be conditions of the permit simply because some special conditions are mentioned in those two sections. Sec. 46 of the Motor Vehicles Act lays down what are to be the requirements of an application for grant of a stage carriage permit, and Sec. 48 lays down the orders that have to be made on such applications. Sec. 48 (2) specifically mentions that every stage carriage permit shall be expressed to be valid only for a specific route or routes or for a specified area. Sec. 48 (2) specifically mentions that every stage carriage permit shall be expressed to be valid only for a specific route or routes or for a specified area. An express mention that a permit is valid only for a specified route would clearly be a condition of the permit. It may of course not be one of the conditions mentioned in Secs. 48 (3) or 59 (3), but it is a condition because of the provisions contained in Sec. 46-A and Sec. 48 (2) of the Motor Vehicles Act. Learned counsel arguing the case before us tried to make some point of the fact that at one time before the amendment of the Motor Vehicles Act by the Amending Act No. 100 of 1956, there was a clause in Sec. 48 (3) itself mentioning that the Transport Authority may, after consideration of matters set forth in sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 48 (2) attach to a stage carriage permit, any one or more of the conditions enumerated therein, including the condition that the stage carriage or stage carriages shall be used only on specified routes or in a specified area. At that time when this provision was contained in Sec. 48, it was not sub-divided into sub-secs. (1), (2) and (3). There were only several clauses in that section. It seems that when Sec. 48 was amended in 1956 the condition relating to the use of a stage carriage only on a specified route or in a specified area was given even more importance than all other conditions and was, therefore, put as a separate condition under sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 48 instead of being made one of those conditions which are enumerated under sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 48. Sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 48 contains only those conditions in respect of which the Transport Authority has an option either to lay down conditions or not to lay them down, and it seems that before the amendment of 1956 even in respect of prescribing routes on which the stage carriages were to be run there was an option in the Transport Authority to include this condition in the permit or not to do so. The result of taking away this condition out of the list of amended conditions contained in Sec. 48 (3) and incorporating it as a separate condition in Sec. 48 (2) was that the Transport Authority was no longer given the option to impose the condition about the route in every permit but he had compulsorily to impose such a condition in the permit. A comparison of the new law with the old law, therefore, in no way supports the view that the prescription of routes for a stage carriage has ceased to be a condition of the permit. On the other hand a comparison of the unamended law with the amended law leads to the opposite conclusion that a condition which could previously be imposed optionally by the Transport Authority, has now to be imposed in every case. Of course it was to be expected that, even before the Act was amended, a condition prescribing route or routes on which the stage carriage was to be used would necessarily be included in every permit and that this was the usual course which was to be adopted is indicated by the circumstance that even at that time persons making their applications were required under Sec. 46 to mention the route or routes on which the stage carriages were intended to be used and the permits were to be issued only in respect of the routes mentioned in the applications. We can, therefore, see no force at all in the submission made by the learned counsel that the Regional Transport Authority had no power to pass the resolution no. 38 which was impugned in this writ petition and there is, therefore, no ground pit all for quashing it. 5. Another point which was raised by the learned counsel was that by this resolution no. 38 the Regional Transport Authority has increased the number of stage carriage permits on the route of the appellant to 68, as mentioned in the last sentence of the resolution. We have looked at the resolution and we find that there is actually no resolution increasing the number of stage carriages on any route as such. What has been done is to include a part of a route in another route which was permissible under Sec. 57 (8) of the Motor Vehicles Act. We have looked at the resolution and we find that there is actually no resolution increasing the number of stage carriages on any route as such. What has been done is to include a part of a route in another route which was permissible under Sec. 57 (8) of the Motor Vehicles Act. The effect of course may be that now the 48 operators running their stage a carriages via Anupshahr have got the right to run their stage carriages even via Shikarpur along which route 20 operators were running their stage carriages. We presume that this is how the figure of 68 has been worked out. This mention of the number 68 is not a part of the resolution increasing the number of permits to be issued. It only mentioned what would be the effect of operators on each route being allowed to run their stage carriages on the alternative route also and the mere fact of such a mention would not invalidate the main resolution which was within the scope of the powers of the Transport Authority under Sec. 57 (8) of the Motor Vehicles Act. 6. Lastly, learned counsel urged before us, that only 44 operators had made applications under Sec. 57 (8) of the Motor Vehicles Act but the resolution no. 38 impugned in the writ petition has granted identical rights to all the 48 operators who held permits for stage carriages on the Bulandshahr Anupshahr Debai Duraha Ram Ghat-Rajghat-Narora route and consequently, he urged that a writ should at least issue directing the Regional Transport Authority not to give effect to this resolution in the case of the remaining four operators who had not made such applications. It was urged that an order under Sec. 57 (8) of the Motor Vehicles Act could only be made in favour of an operator who presents an application for that purpose. There might have been some ground for consideration of this prayer if the appellant had impleaded those four operators as parties to the writ petition and to the special appeal. There might have been some ground for consideration of this prayer if the appellant had impleaded those four operators as parties to the writ petition and to the special appeal. It appears that only 44 operators were impleaded as parties to the writ petition and on being questioned by us the learned counsel for the appellant admitted that these 44 operators are those persons who had actually filed applications under Sec. 57 (8) of the Motor Vehicles Act and whose applications were published in the Gazette from which the appellant learnt their names. According to him the remaining four operators could not be made parties to the petition because the appellant did not know their names. If the appellant wanted any relief from this Court against them, it was for him to inquire their names, and implead them as parties. The appellant cannot expect that a relief will be granted to him to the prejudice of those four operators without impleading them as parties and without giving them an opportunity of being heard. Even in this special appeal those four operators have not been impleaded as parties and clearly, therefore, this Court, even when deciding this appeal, cannot issue any writ which would prejudice the rights of those four operators. 7. The result is that this appeal has no force and is dismissed with costs. Since in this case there were 44 operators who were impleaded as respondents, but they were represented by the same counsel, we direct that the fee of the learned counsel for all these 44 operators shall be taxed at the fixed amount of Rs. 200/-. The fee of the Standing Counsel representing respondent no. 1 shall be taxed in accordance with the rules separately.