THOMAS A. NINAN v. KRISHNA PILLAI KARTHIKEYAN NAIR
1963-07-26
ANNA CHANDY, P.GOVINDA MENON
body1963
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment :- 1. The Executive Authority of the Chengannur Panchayat has filed this appeal against the order of the Second Class Magistrate of Chengannur acquitting the accused who had been prosecuted for contravention of bye-law 79 [b] of the Chengannur Panchayat. It is admitted in this case that the accused is conducting a printing press by name M. S. Press in his house No. 375 in ward No. 4 of the Panchayat from 1-4-61 and that he has not taken out a licence. According to him under the Panchayats Act and rules no licence is necessary for running a press. 2. S.80 of the Panchayats Act - Act 2 of 1950 - authorises a Panchayat with the previous approval of the Director to notify that no place within the limits of the Panchayat area shall be used for any of the purposes specified in the rules made in this behalf being purposes which in the opinion of Government are likely to be offensive or dangerous to human life or health or property without a licence from the executive authority. It is also provided that such a notification shall not take effect unless 60 days have elapsed from the date of the publication. In exercise of the powers conferred by S.56(c), 80 and 97 of the Act the Government in notification No. LA. 8.13305/56/L & LAD dated 3-1-1958 have made rules, the same having been previously published as required by sub-S. (2) of S.98 of the said Act. R.1 says: "For purposes of S.80 of the Travancore-Cochin Panchayats Act, 1950 the purposes specified in column (2) of the Schedule below shall be the purposes which in the opinion of the Government are likely to be offensive or dangerous to human life or health or property, and the rates specified in column (2) shall be the maximum rate of licence fee which any panchayat may impose." 3. The Panchayat has with the approval of the director made bye-laws for the purposes mentioned in S.99. Clause (7) of S.99 says that the bye-law might provide for the sanitary control and supervision of places used for any of the purposes notified under S.80 and of any trade or manufacture carried on there. Ext. P1 is the bye-law of the Panchayat.
Clause (7) of S.99 says that the bye-law might provide for the sanitary control and supervision of places used for any of the purposes notified under S.80 and of any trade or manufacture carried on there. Ext. P1 is the bye-law of the Panchayat. S.100 of the Act provides that in making a bye-law the Panchayat may provide that a breach thereof shall be punishable with fine, which may extend to Rs.15/-and in cases of a continuing breach, with fine which may extend to five rupees for every day during which the breach continues after conviction for the first breach. Bye-law 8 of Ext. P1 is in conformity with these provisions. Item No. 79 provides the fee for machinery. It reads: The contention of the accused is that using a printing press is not an industry. That a printing press is a machinery is not disputed but the contention of the accused is that working a printing press would not amount to using for any industrial purpose. It is the correctness of this view, that is challenged in this appeal. 4. It is true that the Act has not defined the term 'Industry' and so we have to see in what sense the term is used in other enactments. The principles that should guide the court in deciding whether an activity could be considered as an industry under S.2 0) of the Industrial Disputes Act had come up for consideration in various decisions of the Supreme Court. In the case in State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha (AIR 1960 SC 610), his Lordship Gajendragadkar, no doubt, expressed a caution by saying: "It is clear, however, that though S.20) uses words of very wide denotation, a line would have to be drawn in a fair and just manner so as to exclude some callings, services or undertakings. If all the words used are given their widest meaning, all services and all callings would come within the purview of the definition; even service rendered by a servant purely in a personal or domestic matter or even in a casual way would fall within the definition. It is not and cannot be suggested that in its wide sweep the word 'service' is intended to include service howsoever rendered in whatsoever capacity, and for whatsoever reason.
It is not and cannot be suggested that in its wide sweep the word 'service' is intended to include service howsoever rendered in whatsoever capacity, and for whatsoever reason. We must, therefore, consider where the line should be drawn and what limitations can and should be reasonably implied in interpreting the wide words used in S.20); and that no doubt is a somewhat difficult problem to decide". but has laid down the attributes the presence of which, will make an activity an undertaking under S.20) of the Act. At page 616 the learned judge has stated: ... as a working principle it may be stated that an activity systematically or habitually undertaken for the production or distribution of goods or for the rendering of material service to the community at large or a part of such community with the help of employees is an undertaking. Such an activity generally involves the co-operation of the employer and the employees; and its object is the satisfaction of material human needs. It must be organised or arranged in a manner in which trade or business is generally organised or arranged. It must not be casual nor must it be for oneself nor for pleasure. Thus the manner in which the activity in question is organised or arranged, the condition of the co-operation between employer and the employee necessary for its success and its object to render material service to the community can be regarded as some of the features which are distinctive of activities to which S.20) applies.' From the principles laid down by the learned judge it will follow broadly that an activity systematically or habitually undertaken for the production or distribution of goods or for the rendering of material service to the community at large or a part of such community with the help of employees will be an undertaking. More or less similar principles have been laid down by the Supreme Court in the later decisions, Nagpur Corporation v. Its employees (AIR 1960 SC 675); A. T. I. Research Association v. State of Bombay (AIR 1961 SC 484) and N. U. C. Employees v. Industrial Tribunal (AIR 1962 SC 1080). These decisions have been followed in a recent decision of this court in Travancore Devaswom Board v. State of Kerala (1963 KLJ 439). 5.
These decisions have been followed in a recent decision of this court in Travancore Devaswom Board v. State of Kerala (1963 KLJ 439). 5. In the light of the principles laid down in these decisions there can be no doubt that working a printing press would certainly come within the meaning of the term'Industry' and as such licence was necessary for conducting the printing press. The view taken by the Magistrate that working a printing press cannot be taken to be an industrial activity and does not require a licence is, therefore, clearly wrong and the order of acquittal based on that wrong view cannot stand. The order of acquittal is, therefore, set aside. The accused is found guilty under bye-law 8 of the bye-laws framed by the Panchayat for failure to take out a licence and he is sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 15/- in default to undergo simple imprisonment for one week. Time for payment of fine two weeks from this date.