JUDGMENT 1. This Rule is directed against an order of the court below, striking out the petitioner's defence in the instant suit for ejectment under section 17 (3) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. The circumstances under which this Rule came to be issued are as follows: 2. The opposite parties, as landlords, instituted the present suit for ejectment against the petitioner tenant in respect of the suit premises No, 1531, Cotton Street, Calcutta. The tenancy ran according to the Bengali calendar month and carried a rental of Rs, 231/ - per month. The suit, which was numbered as Ejectment Suit No. 2068 of 1958, was instituted in the local City Civil Court on December 4, 1958. The notice of ejectment was stated to have been duly served and the ground, taken under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, for ejectment, was, inter alia, violation of Clauses (m), (o) and (p) of section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act. The landlord's allegation was that the tenant had pulled down and damaged the building and also erected permanent structures, thereby contravening the above provisions of the Transfer of Property Act and bringing the instant case within the mischief of section 13 (1) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. The notice of ejectment is dated 24th Pous, 1362 B.S. January 9, 1956, and its period expired with the expiry of Magh, 1362 B. S., corresponding to February 13, 1956. The summons of the suit appears to have been served on January 14, 1959, and, on the 30th next, the defendant entered appearance and he filed his written statement on February 21, 1959. The present application under section 17 (3) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, came to be filed by the landlords opposite parties on May 7, 1959, and, in it, the allegation was that, after the summons had been served, there was no deposit in court or payment to the landlords, as required by section 17 (1) of the above Act. To this application, the petitioner filed his first objection on June 23, 1959, and, on the date of hearing, namely, September 4, 1959, additional objections were filed by the petitioner. To this application, the petitioner filed his first objection on June 23, 1959, and, on the date of hearing, namely, September 4, 1959, additional objections were filed by the petitioner. It appears that the rents for the four months of Pous, Magh, Falgoon and Chaitra, 1365 B. S., were deposited by the petitioner with the Rent Controller on January 17, 1959, February 18, 1959, March 17, 1959, and April 20, 1959, respectively. The petitioner again deposited the rents for Magh, Falgoon and Chaitra, 1365 B. S. in court on April 28, 1959, with the permission of the court but at His risk. All subsequent rents appear to have been deposited in court, The application under sec. 17 (3) was heard on September 4, 1959, and it was allowed by the trial court's order, dated September 14, 1959, and the petitioner's written statement was struck out in terms of that order. Thereafter, on September 24 following, the present Rule was obtained by the petitioner. In the trial court, it appears, the point, that was considered in the order, allowing the landlords opposite parties' application under sec. 17 (3), was whether the deposits with the Rent Controller, after service of the summons of the suit, were good deposits or valid payments under sec. 17 (1) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. The learned trial Judge held that these deposits, however valid for other purposes, would not be valid or effective for the purpose of the above section and, accordingly, were ineffectual to prevent the striking out of the petitioner's written statement. The Rule, that was issued by this court, was expressly issued on two grounds, Grounds Nos. IV and V, of the petition, which were in these terms: "iv. For that the learned Judge failed to consider the deposits made in court as also the objections raised in the petition dated 4. 9. 59. V. For that the learned Judge should have taken into consideration the sum of 4201- which was in deposit with the plaintiffs. " 3. There can be no dispute that the deposits with the Rent Controller for the months of Pous, Magh, Falgoon and Chaitra, 1365 B. S. were after the service of the summons of the suit, which service, as we have said above, was made on January 14, 1959. " 3. There can be no dispute that the deposits with the Rent Controller for the months of Pous, Magh, Falgoon and Chaitra, 1365 B. S. were after the service of the summons of the suit, which service, as we have said above, was made on January 14, 1959. There can be no dispute also that this suit, having been instituted on December 4, 1958, would be governed by the original sec. 17 (12) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 (Vide in this connection (1) Sk. Fazluddin v. Sm. Zubeida Khanam, 66 C.W N. 489. That section as it stood before the amendment, was as follows: " (2) If in any suit or proceeding referred to in sub-section (1) there is any dispute as to the amount of rent payable by the tenant the court shall determine, having regard to the provisions of this Act, the amount to be deposited or paid to the landlord by the tenant in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (1. " 4. It has been held by this court in the cases of (2) Tarak Nath Gupta v. Lt. Col. Karuna Kumar Chatterjee and others, 62 C.W N. 830, and (3) Biswanath Roy v. Annapurna Roy, 65 C.W N. 149, that, where a case attracted the above original sub-section (2) of sec. 17, no order, striking out the written statement under section 17 (3), could be made without a previous order under the aforesaid sub-sec. (2) of sec. 17. It has also been held in this court (wide 62 C.W N. 830 and 65 C.W N. 149, supra, more particularly, 62 C.W N. 830 at p. 833) that dispute as to the amount of rent payable would cover not only dispute as to the rate of rent or the actual amount of arrears, but also a dispute as to the amount payable under sec. 17 (1) of the Act by the tenant concerned. Obviously, in that view, in the instant case, the order of the court below, striking out the written statement without passing an order under the aforesaid original sub-sec. (2) of sec. 17 would be without jurisdiction, if, on its terms, the said original sub-sec. (2) applies to this case. 17 (1) of the Act by the tenant concerned. Obviously, in that view, in the instant case, the order of the court below, striking out the written statement without passing an order under the aforesaid original sub-sec. (2) of sec. 17 would be without jurisdiction, if, on its terms, the said original sub-sec. (2) applies to this case. Patently, there was a dispute between the parties as to whether the deposits with the Rent Controller, made for the several months concerned, namely, Pous to Chaitra, 1365 B. S., would be valid deposits for purposes of sec. 17 (1. On the decision or determination of this question would obviously depend the amount to be paid or deposited by the tenant under the aforesaid section in the instant case, and, upon the validity or invalidity, or sufficiency or insufficiency of the said deposit would depend the fate of the plaintiffs' application under sec. 17 (3). There was thus a very pertinent dispute here as to the amount payable under sec. 17 (1). Clearly, therefore, the instant case attracted sec. 17 (2) and, accordingly, the present order, striking out the written statement, must be held to have been without jurisdiction, as, admittedly, there was no order, passed by the court,-and the matter was not considered,-under the aforesaid sub-sec. (2) of sec. 17. This position cannot be controverter, but Mr. Dev, arguing for the landlords opposite parties, has raised before us certain preliminary objections to the entertainment of the aforesaid objection or point of jurisdiction in this Rule. He has contended first that this point was never taken in the court below and, accordingly, he argues that this is not a point, open to this court as the revisional court under sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure for revising the order of the trial court. In the second place, he says that the Rule in the instant case was issued on the two limited grounds, which have been quoted above and those grounds would not cover a point of this description. Accordingly, Mr. Dev submits that, whatever might have been the position in law, so far as sec. 17 (2) was concerned, it is not open to this court to interfere with the order of the trial court in the instant case on the ground of absence of an order under sec. 17 (2. Accordingly, Mr. Dev submits that, whatever might have been the position in law, so far as sec. 17 (2) was concerned, it is not open to this court to interfere with the order of the trial court in the instant case on the ground of absence of an order under sec. 17 (2. We are unable to accept any of the above contentions of Mr. Dev. The point is one of jurisdiction, as we have said, in the light of the two decisions of this court, reported in (2) 62 C.W N. 830 and (3) 65 C.W N. 149, supra. It is hardly arguable that a point, which goes to the root of the court's jurisdiction, cannot be taken in a revision application if the said point has not been urged before the trial court. That will practically nullify the revisional powers of this court in very appropriate cases in many instances. If the trial court has passed an order, which it had no jurisdiction to make, or which was made in the irregular or illegal exercise of its jurisdiction, this court will be failing in its duty if it does not revise the same simply because the point of jurisdiction was not taken in the trial court. It is, of course, true that the exercise of the revisional powers of this court is a matter of discretion and this discretion should be exercised in favour of the petitioner only in appropriate cases. But it will be wholly inequitable and wholly against established principles, if the exercise of this discretion is to be refused merely on the ground that a point of jurisdiction, going to the root of the matter, cannot be entertained or allowed by this court, simply because it was not taken in the trial court. 5. In the next place, Mr. Dev argued that this particular point was not one, upon which the Rule was issued by this court. We do not think that this submission will be strictly correct. The two grounds, Grounds Nos. IV and V, as quoted above, refer expressly to the defendant's objections, filed on September 4, 1959. If we turn to. In the next place, Mr. Dev argued that this particular point was not one, upon which the Rule was issued by this court. We do not think that this submission will be strictly correct. The two grounds, Grounds Nos. IV and V, as quoted above, refer expressly to the defendant's objections, filed on September 4, 1959. If we turn to. these objections and, particularly, to the latter part thereof, that is, of the two grounds of objection A and B, it will be clear that the said objections specifically averred that 'in any event the court is to pass an order under sec. 17 (2) of the Act. " It is true that the point, now before us, was not very clearly and specifically taken or that the above objections could have been much better worded from this point of view. But, in any event, in a matter of this kind, where rights are intermingled with penalties and the statute prescribes a penal consequence, so drastic as the striking out of the defence and involving not merely the loss of the new right conferred but graver consequences, the substance and not merely the form should be considered. Even apart from that, it seems to us that, when the Rule comes up for final hearing before this court, it is open to this court, if it finds that the Rule should succeed on some ground, not initially taken,, or on a ground, which it was not issued, that is, on a ground other than the one, on which it was issued, to consider the same and allow the application after of course, giving the other party proper opportunities to meet the said objection. This court, it seems to us, is not so powerless and its powers are not so limited as to preclude it from doing; justice between the parties in the exercise of its revisional powers, merely because the Rule was not issued at the initial stage on the particular ground or grounds concerned. Indeed, in every Rule, issued by this court, we have the residuary clause,-"such other or further order as to this court may seem fit and proper". Indeed, in every Rule, issued by this court, we have the residuary clause,-"such other or further order as to this court may seem fit and proper". In our view, those words are comprehensive and wide enough to include all appropriate revisional grounds and to allow this court to in-fere in a proper case even on a ground, which was not taken at the time the Rule was issued, or, upon which, the Rule was not initially issued. In other words, such interference may well be made even on a ground other than the one, on which the Rule was issued. In short, in a matter of this kind, where a question of jurisdiction is involved, to deprive a party of suitable relief under the revisional powers of this court on the ground that the particular objection was not taken in the trial court, or that even if it was taken in the trial court, no Rule was issued on that ground, would be to defeat the ends of justice and, in any view, such a restricted interpretation of the scope of the revisional powers of this court would not be consistent either with law or with the principles of justice, or with precedents or authority. 6. We would, accordingly, hold that it is open to us to entertain this objection as to the trial court's jurisdiction in the present case to strike out the defence under section 17 (3) without passing an order under sec. 17 (2) of the above Act. In that view, we would make this Rule absolute, set aside the order, striking out the defence against ejectment and send back the case to the court below for a proper consideration of the position of the parties under sec. 17 (2) of the above Act in the light of the decisions of this court, referred to above, as explained by us hereinbefore, and pass appropriate order under it and to proceed with the suit thereafter in accordance with law. There will be no order as to costs of this Rule. Let the records go down as early as possible.