ORDER PANDEY, J. 1. By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioner, which is an existing operator on the Achalpur Bhainsdehi-Betul route, has called in question two separate orders, both dated 30 May 1962, where by the regional Transport Authority, Bhopal (respondent 1), extended the period of three months it had peremptorily fixed for providing a 1961-Model bus a, a precondition for the grant of two stage carriage permits, one in favour of Messrs Prabhat Transport Company (Private) Ltd.( respondent 2) for the Achalpur-Bhainsdehi-Betul Chicholi route and another in favour of the Balwant Regular Motor Service (respondent 3) for the Paratwada-Bhainsdehi-Bctul-Chicholi route. 2. On 20 January 1961, the Regional Transport Authority, Bhopal, invited by a notification in the State Gazette applications for stage carriage permits for several routes, including the two routes mentioned at the end of the opening paragraph. The petitioner did not apply for permit for and those two routes nor did it make, under section 57 (3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter called the Act), any representation against the various competing applications made for those routes, which had been duly published. Even so, the petitioner has now made a grievance that "It was never notified liar did it have any opportunity of objecting to the grant of the permits" for those routes. On 16 March 1962, a permit for the Achalpur-Bhainsdehi-Betul-Chicholi route was, in due course, granted to the respondent 2 on condition that unless it arranged to provide a 1961-Model bus within two months, the grant would stand automatically cancelled. On the same date, a like permit for the Paratwada-Bhainsdehi-Betul-Chicholi route was similarly granted to the rcsponden-3 on the same condition. The two respondents were intimated by communication dated 11 April 1962 that, in terms of the grants dated 16 March 1962, they had to fulfil the aforesaid condition within two months of the receipt of those communications. Instead of doing so, the respondent 2 challenged, by means of an appeal under section 64 (a) of the Act, that condition which was attached to the grant and also applied for stay. The State Transport Appellate Authority refused to stay the operation of the condition; but extended this period fixed for it, fulfilment up to 15 September 1967. Instead of doing so, the respondent 2 challenged, by means of an appeal under section 64 (a) of the Act, that condition which was attached to the grant and also applied for stay. The State Transport Appellate Authority refused to stay the operation of the condition; but extended this period fixed for it, fulfilment up to 15 September 1967. In the meantime, both the respondents had moved the Regional Transport Authority also in that matter, On 20 April 1962, the respondent 2 applied for relaxation of the condition. On 15 May 1962, it applied for extension of the period fixed for its fulfilment, On 28 April 1962, the respondent 3 also applied for relaxation of the condition. All these applications were heard on 30 May 1962, when each of the two respondents further made an oral application for extension of the period fixed for fulfilling the condition. By the two impugned orders dated 30 May 1961, the Regional Transport Authority extended the period up to 31 August 1962. 3. In support of this petition it is strongly urged that the Regional Transport Authority, Bhopal, had no jurisdiction to review its earlier order dated 16 March 1962 whereby it had peremptorily fixed two months time for providing 1961-Model buses for the two routes and that, since the orders dated 30 May 1962 are incompetent and illegal, the applications made by the respondents 2 and 3 automatically stood rejected for their failure to fulfil the pre-condition within two months. 4. We are of opinion that this petition must be dismissed for the reason that the petitioner was not candid, did not state the facts fairly and stated it in such a way that it was calculated to mislead the Court. This is that it stated in paragraph 2 of the petition: "Though the petitioner was vitally interested in opposing the grant of permits of the two respondents or any of them, it was never notified nor did it have any opportunity of objection to the grant of the permits to the two respondents". As we have shown, the applications made by the respondents 2 and 3 were duty published in the State Gazette and the petitioner could, but did not, make representations against them. As we have shown, the applications made by the respondents 2 and 3 were duty published in the State Gazette and the petitioner could, but did not, make representations against them. It is, therefore, not true that the applications were not notified or that the petitioner had no opportunity of objecting to the grant of the permits to the two respondents. The learned counsel for the petitioner endeavoured to explain that it (petitioner) was not given a special notice and, therefore, it could not oppose the grants made in favour of the respondents 2 and 3. When his attention was drawn to the fact that this was not done, he merely said that the petitioner had made an excessive claim. Having examined the matter with care and heard the counsel, we have reached the conclusion that the way in which the above-mentioned facts were stated in the petitioner misled the Court and induced it to pass an ex pane order staying the operation of the two orders dated 30 May 1962, pending the' decision of this petition. That being so, as held by this Court in Mohammad Vs. High Commissioner for India in Pakistan ILR 1951 Nagpur 523, Abdul Sadar Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh,960 JLJ 678 and Sardar Santsingh Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1961 JLJ-SN 70. this petition is liable to be dismissed without regard to the merits of the case. 5. Having heard the counsel at some length we have come to the conclusion that this petition must be dismissed even on merits. A condition had been attached to the grant made in favour of the respondent 2, who, being thereby aggrieved, was entitled to question it in an appeal under clause (a) of section 64 of the Act. As shown, the respondent 2 filed an appeal and also applied for stay of the operation of that condition, Instead of granting the stay asked for, the State Transport Appellate Authority extended the period upto 15 September 1962. There can be no question that, under section 134 (1) of the Act, the Appellate Authority was competent to vary the operation of the condition in the manner it did. By this order of the Appellate Authority, the time as originally fixed stood extended upto 15 September 1962, there by superseding the lesser extension given to the respondent 2 by tile impugned order dated 30 May 1962. By this order of the Appellate Authority, the time as originally fixed stood extended upto 15 September 1962, there by superseding the lesser extension given to the respondent 2 by tile impugned order dated 30 May 1962. Even apart from this, as we would show in the sequel, the Regional Transport, Authority was competent to extend the period it had fixed on 16 March 1962. 6. It is urged on the authority of Rajaram Vs. Rani Jamit Kunwar Devi 1961 JLJ 113, that, apart from correcting clerical mistakes or errors arising from an accidental slip or omission, there is no. inherent power to review a final decision given on merits inter partes. It is also contended that, since there is no provision in the Act conferring upon a Regional Transport Authority a power to review its own final order, the two orders dated 30 May 1962 cannot be sustained. For this view, reliance is placed upon Anandram Vs. Damodardas AIR 1956 Vindhya Pradesh 44, Ramnath Prasad Vs. State Transport Appellate Authority 2. AIR 1957 Patna 117 and Rameshwar Vs. State of Bihar AIR 1960 Patna 6. We think that this is not a case of review at all and that the Regional Transport Authority, Bhopal, merely enlarged the period it had originally fixed for the fulfilment of a condition. 7. Rule 52 of the Rules framed under the Act reads: "(a) Save in the case of a temporary permit, where the registration mark of the vehicle is to be entered on the permit and the applicant is not at the date of application in possession of the vehicle duly, registered, then the applicant shall within one month of the sanction of the application by the Regional Transport Authority, or such longer period as the Authority may specify, produce the certificate of registration of the vehicle before that Authority in order that particulars of the registration mark may be entered in the permit. (b) No permit shall be issued until the registration mark of the vehicle to which it relates has, if the form of permit so requires, been entered therein and in the even of any applicant failing to produce the certificate of registration within the prescribed period, the Regional Transport Authority may revoke its sanction of the application. (b) No permit shall be issued until the registration mark of the vehicle to which it relates has, if the form of permit so requires, been entered therein and in the even of any applicant failing to produce the certificate of registration within the prescribed period, the Regional Transport Authority may revoke its sanction of the application. " A bare reading of the Rule shows that the period fixed is not intended to be irrevocable and the Regional Transport Authority retains seisin over the matter. It is no doubt true that, in this case, the two orders dated 16 March 1962 were peremptory in nature but, until the period fixed had expired, the Regional Transport Authority continued to retain control over the matters. It is, however, urged that the Rule does not expressly empower the Regional Transport Authority to enlarge the period once fixed. In our view, the very fact that Authority has a discretion in the matter of revoking the sanction upon the non-fulfilment of the condition implies that the period fixed may be enlarged. In National Sewing Thread Co. Ltd•, Vs. M. James Chadwick and Pros. Ltd 1953 SCR 1028, the Supreme Court observed: "It is a well known rule of construction that when a power is conferred by a statute, that power may be exercised from time to time when occasion arises unless a contrary intention appears. This rule has been given statutory recognition in section 32 of the Interpretation Act." [Page 1035] The same view was taken in Express Newspapers (Private) Ltd. Vs. The Union of India, 1959 SCR 12 . This principle of construction has been expressly recognised section 14 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, which reads: "14 (1). Where, by any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, any power is conferred, then, unless a different intention appears, that power may be exercised from time to time as occasion requires. 2. This section applies a1so to all Central Acts and Regulations made on or after the fourteenth day of January, 1887" We are persuaded that the Regional Transport Authority, Bhopal, had power to extend the period it had originally fixed on 16 March 1962. 8. 2. This section applies a1so to all Central Acts and Regulations made on or after the fourteenth day of January, 1887" We are persuaded that the Regional Transport Authority, Bhopal, had power to extend the period it had originally fixed on 16 March 1962. 8. It is, however, urged that the two orders dated 16 March 1962 were peremptory in nature with the consequence that they finally disposed of the matters and the Regional Transport Authority, Bhopal, no longer had any seisin over the matters. In support of this view, the learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon several authorities construing the powers of the Court under section 143 of the Code of Civil Procedure. We do not consider it necessary to examine them because, in our view, they are distinguishable for two reasons. In the first place, the Regional Transport Authority retained seisin over the matters until the revocation of the two grants, whether by operation of the orders themselves or otherwise. Secondly, as shown, the periods were enlarged before the grants stood revoked. The being so the two orders dated 30 May 1962 are not assailable as incompetent. If any authority is required, we may refer to the principle accepted by the Supreme Court in Mahenth Ram Das Vs. Ganga Das, AIR 1961 SC 882 . 9. The respondents 2 and 3 urged that the Court should, in the exercise of its discretion decline to assist the petitioner because it is not a person aggrieved by the impugned orders, it did not avail of other remedies open to it and moved this Court after considerable delay. In the view we have taken of this case, we do not consider it necessary to examine these contentions. 10. The result is that the petition fails and is dismissed. The petitioner shall bear its own costs and pay those incurred by the respondents there will be one set of costs for each respondent and the security amount in deposit shall be appropriated towards payment of those costs. Hearing fee Rs. 100.