JUDGMENT 1. This is a claim presented by Tormal Harmukh Rai against the Jagdish Sugar Mills Limited (in liquidation) for payment of Rs. 400 by way of dividend for the year 1944. The claim has been disallowed by the official liquidator mainly on the ground that it is time barred. 2. The first point to be noted in connection with the applicant's claim is that it was never proved before the liquidator in accordance with rules 94 and 95 of Chapter XXVIII of the Rules of Court. No specific sum was mentioned by the applicant in the claim sent to the liquidator, and no affidavit was filed in proof of the claim. 3. It is possible to argue on behalf of the applicant, however, that in a case where dividend is being claimed the proof lies in the books of the company itself, which are already in the custody of the liquidator, and no formal affidavit is necessary. Regarding the failure to specify the amount, learned counsel for the applicant states that his client did not know precisely what dividend had been declared and left it to the liquidator to determine the amount after referring to the company's books. 4. Even if the defect occasioned by non-compliance with rule 95, however, is overlooked, the claim for the dividend relating to the year 1944 is clearly time-barred. Learned counsel for the applicant has attempted to argue that the directors of a company (or, in the case of a company that is being wound up, the liquidator) must be deemed to occupy the position of a trustee in respect of dividends which have been declared but not disbursed, and that consequently no period of limitation can be imposed on a claim for the payment of such dividends. This argument is presumably based on section 10 of the Limitation Act; but it is to be noted that section only applies to cases where the property claimed has become vested in trust for a specific purpose in the person against whom the claim is made. As pointed out in V. Narasimha lyengar v. Official Assignee of Madras, (1931) A.I.R 1931 Mad 58 (Mad). directors of companies are not persons in whom property can be said to have become vested in trust for any specific purpose; and section 10 of the Limitation Act, therefore, has no applicability. As pointed out in V. Narasimha lyengar v. Official Assignee of Madras, (1931) A.I.R 1931 Mad 58 (Mad). directors of companies are not persons in whom property can be said to have become vested in trust for any specific purpose; and section 10 of the Limitation Act, therefore, has no applicability. The view expressed by the Calcutta High Court in Sri Hariseswar Idols v. Khorooriah Mejojill Zemindary Syndicate Ltd, (1944) 48 CWN 693. is that: "When declared, a dividend is a debt arising out of a contract payable by the company to a shareholder." 5. And in the same ruling it has been held that articles 116 and 120 of the First Schedule of the Limitation Act apply to claims for dividend. In the present case, article 120, under which the prescribed period of limitation is 6 years, has been relied upon by the official liquidator; and applying this, I agree with him holding that the applicant's claim is time-barred. 6. The claim is accordingly dismissed with costs.