Judgment Misra, J. 1. This is an appeal by the judgment-debtor, arising out of a proceeding under Ss. 144 and 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in Execution Case No. 212 of 1953 of the Court of third Munsif, Patna. The landlord-respondent, Bhagwan Das, obtained an order of the House Controller, Fatna, for eviction of the judgment-debtor from plot No. 893, holding No. 133, Circle No. 9, Ward No. II, the area being 26 cubits x 24 cubits, which is a part of this plot. The tenant-judgment-debtor filed an appeal before the Collector, Patna, which was rejected on the 21st of January, 1953. The revision against that order was also dismissed by the Commissioner, Patna Division, on the 4th May, 1953. The judgment-debtor-appellant, thereafter, filed Title suit No. 57 of 1953 for a declaration that the order of the Mouse Controller as affirmed by the Collector and the Commissioner was illegal and void. 2. On the 31st of January, 1955, this suit was dismissed. The plaintiff-judgment-debtor preferred an appeal from that decision on the 24th of February, 1955. The landlord-respondent, thereafter, obtained delivery of possession through Court on the 26th of March, 1955. The lower appellate Court allowed the appeal and decreed the suit by its judgment dated the 12th of August, 1955. Against that judgment, the respondent preferred Second Appeal No. 1408 of 1955 to this Court which, however, was dismissed on the 26th of August, 1958. 3. The tenant-appellant thereafter made an application for restitution of the land from which he was evicted under Ss. 144 and 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, on the 25th of April, 1955, before the Execution Munsif, Patna. The application was, however, rejected. The present application was filed on the 15th of September, 1955, and it gave rise to Miscellaneous case No. 364 of 1955. This miscellaneous case was allowed on the 18th of November, 1958, by which the tenant-appellant was allowed recovery of possession as well as damages at the rate of Rs. 105/- per month. Against that, the respondent-landlord filed Miscellaneous Appeal No. 171/10 of 1958, On the 13th of January, 1959, the Additional Subordinate Judge, Patna, allowed the appeal in part holding that damages should be at the rate of Rs. 7/-per month which was the rental for which the suit land was alleged to have been let out to the tenant-appellant. Against that, the respondent-landlord filed Miscellaneous Appeal No. 171/10 of 1958, On the 13th of January, 1959, the Additional Subordinate Judge, Patna, allowed the appeal in part holding that damages should be at the rate of Rs. 7/-per month which was the rental for which the suit land was alleged to have been let out to the tenant-appellant. As for recovery of possession, he ordered that it should be subject to the rights of the persons who were inducted on to the land by the landlord-respondent. The tenant-appellant has come up to this Court against the decision of the Court of appeal below. 4. Mr. K. B. N. Singh appearing for the appellant has urged that although it is open to him to raise two questions one, in regard to his clients claim for damages which was scaled down by the Court below to Rs. 7/- per month, as also in regard to the order of the Court of appeal below that the appellant should recover possession subject to the rights of the two persons, Sarju San and Rambrich Sah, inducted as tenants upon the land by the respondent, he would not press the first point, but he would be content to urge the second point, viz., that relating to the correctness of the order of the Court below allowing restitution subject to the rights of the two persons inducted upon the land by the respondent. It may be stated that the third parties, being the two tenants referred to above, inducted upon this land in the first week of April 1955, were Sarju Sah and Rambrichh Sah according to the appellant, but, according to the respondent-landlord, they were Rambrichh Sah and Ram-sarup Sah. Sri Singh has relied upon the decision in the case of Hurmat All V/s. Matlib Ali, AIR 1952 Assam 111 in sup-pert of the proposition that restitution can be given against the tenant subsequently inducted who is a mere representative of the landlord. The position is well-settled that resti-tution cannot be granted on the reversal of the decree against third persons who are neither parties to the decree nor their representatives, vide 46 Ind App 228 : AIR 1919 PC 55, Raj Raghubar Singh V/s. Jai Indra Bahadur Smgn, ILR 58 Cal 1970 : AIR 1932 Cal 29, Rajjabali Khan V/s. Faku Bibi and AIR 1932 Bom 326 Land Acquisition Officer, salsette V/s. Mulji Haridas. Sri Singh has, however, urged that persons who are inducted on to the land in course of the litigation must be held to be representatives of the landlord and, as such, they cannot be regarded as third persons. Sri Lal-narayan Sinha, however, for the respondent has contended that the judgment of the Court below is correct as, in this case, the two persons, Rambrichh and Ramsarup, were inducted as tenants before the appeal of the present appellant-judgment-debtor was allowed. Some support is derived for this proposition from the decision in the case of Parmanand V/s. Tharu Lal, AIR 1937 Lah 169 wherein stress was laid on the expression "as far as may be" in Sec.144 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In that case, after reversal of the decree, the attachment of certain money was removed and the judgment-debtor paid the money to A and subsequently there was a second decree after remand in tha decree-holders favour. It was held that, in those circumstances, A could not be made to restore the money paid to him. in the present case also, the two persons referred to above were inducted as tenants at a time when there was a decree in favour of the landlord and the suit of the tenant-judgment-debtor was dismissed and the order of the House Controller was held tc be valid by the Munsif who tried the suit. In the Assam case, however, restitution was ordered against the tenant who was subsequently inducted as he was held to be a mere representative of the landlord. The decision in the Lahore case referred to above may be distinguished inasmuch as in that case the money paid to 3 third person was an amount in respect of which there was originally an attachment, but after the reversal of the decree, the attachment was removed. Hence payment of that amount which was free from attachment could not be objected nor made to undergo the process of reversal by way of restitution. On the contrary, it is consonant with principle that when lis is still continuing, any action done in regard to the property so as to jeopardise or restrict the right of the successful party is bound to prolong litigation and defeat the object for which the suit is instituted. On the contrary, it is consonant with principle that when lis is still continuing, any action done in regard to the property so as to jeopardise or restrict the right of the successful party is bound to prolong litigation and defeat the object for which the suit is instituted. The view of the learned Additional Subordinate Judge that in this case the suit was only for a declaration that the order of the Controller was void and illegal and did not touch directly the land in dispute cannot be supported. 5. Mr. Lalnarayan Sinha for the respondent has urged in support of the judgment of the Court of appeal below that the question of restitution does not arise in a case like this where order was passed by the House Controller. Sec.144 of the Code of Civil Procedure applies to a case where the decree-holder has come in possession of some property by virtue of an order passed by the Court itself. In the pra-sent case, the suit of the appellant was only of a declaratory character in so far as he challenged the validity of the order of the House Controller affirmed on appeal by the Collector and in revision by the Commissioner of Patna Division. The landlord came in possession of the holding not by virtue of the order passed by the learned Munsif in the Civil Court but on account of an order passed in a proceeding extraneous to the suit itself. His contention is that the present suit was thus of a purely declaratory character and the relief claimed by the appellant was not properly consequential on the variation or reversal of the decree. The decree of the Subordinate Judge in the title suit was only of a declaratory nature; and such a relief, if any, should be granted to the judgment-debtor by way of a suit and not Dy way of an application under Sec.144 of the Code of Civil Procedure. That argument receives support from the toiiow-ing decisions; Arjun Singh V/s. Mt. Parbati, ILR 44 All 687 : (AIR 1922 All 465); Gopal Chunder Chucherbutty V/s. Oodoy Lan Dey 12 Suth WR 411; Govtndappa V/s. Hanumanthappa, ILR 38 Mad 36 : (AIR 1916 Mad 745) Badruddin Khan V/s. Manyar Khan, 1LR (1939) All 103 : (AIR 1939 All 66). That argument receives support from the toiiow-ing decisions; Arjun Singh V/s. Mt. Parbati, ILR 44 All 687 : (AIR 1922 All 465); Gopal Chunder Chucherbutty V/s. Oodoy Lan Dey 12 Suth WR 411; Govtndappa V/s. Hanumanthappa, ILR 38 Mad 36 : (AIR 1916 Mad 745) Badruddin Khan V/s. Manyar Khan, 1LR (1939) All 103 : (AIR 1939 All 66). In reply, Sri K. B. N. Singh has relied upon the case of Jagendra Nath Singh V/s. Hira Sahu, AIR 1948 All 252 (FB) which was followed in Magbool Alam Khan V/s. Mt. Khodaija Begum, AIR 1949 Pat 133 [FB] of this court. It has been ruled in these two cases that in order to apply the principle of restitution, it is not necessary that the reversal of the decree should be in course of the same suit, but it includes also a decree passed by another court. Ramaswami, J. (as he then was) has observed as follows on this point : "In my opinion the court has jurisdiction to order restitution under Section 144 even if the decree is modified or reversed by a court of co-ordinate jurisdiction in a separate suit." The facts of this case were that one Mosst. Khotteija was a judgment-debtor in Title Suit No. 127 of 1939 and there was decree against her, but in Title suit No. 126 of 1944 she was exempted from the operation of that decree, by vir-tue of a compromise effected in the High Court between the parties. . It was held that in the circumstances Mosstt. Khodaija could apply for restitution and she was to be put back in possession of the land of which she was dispossessed by virtue of the decree in Title suit No. 127 of 1939. Sri. K. B. N. Singh has urged that Sri Lalnarayan Sinhas argument that if it were the decree passed by another Civil Court, the decision of the Full Bench of this court would have governed the position, but since the order in question in this case was passed by the Controller who is not a Civil Court but a special tribunal, and exempt from the principle in the above case, is not valid. The argument appears to have force, inasmuch as although the order was not passed by a Civil Court of co-ordinate jurisdiction but in terms of Sec.17 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947, as it stood prior to the amendment of the Act in 1955, the order, acquired the force of decree. Sec.17 read as follows: "17. Every order of the Controller passed under this Act where no appeal against such order has been preferred under Sec.18, every order of the. appellate authority on appeal under Sec.18 and every order of the Commissioner passed in revision under Sec.18B shall be executed by tha Court having jurisdiction to entertain a suit for the recovery of arrears of rent in respect of the building in relation to which the order to be executed is passed, as if such order were a decree passed by such court." In view of the plain wording of the section, Mr. K. B. N. Singhs argument appears to be correct and it must be held that the order must be treated by a statutory direction as an order passed by the Munsif to whom It was sent for execution. In that view of the matter, the distinction Bet- ween the instant case and the decision in the above case of Maqbool Atem Khan, AIR 1949 Pat 133 (FB) has no real basis. It follows, therefore, that restitution can be ordered by the court in this case as well since the appellant was dispossessed from the disputed area of land by virtue of tha order passed by the Controller which was executed by the learned Munsif. 6. Mr. Raghunath Jha, who has followed Sri Lalnarayan Sinha, has further urged that, in the present instance, there is no equity in favour of the appellant, because he was inducted upon the land by a complete outsider who had nothing to do with the temple, namely, one Ramdas. Further, according to the case of the appellant himself, he had put up a structure of his own on this land, which he had removed. The suit was not for a declaration of right and recovery of possession of the vacant land, but for being put in possession of the land with a structure on it. In the circumstances, there are no equities in favour ol the appellant under Sec.144 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The suit was not for a declaration of right and recovery of possession of the vacant land, but for being put in possession of the land with a structure on it. In the circumstances, there are no equities in favour ol the appellant under Sec.144 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is open to the appellant to bring a suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession if so advised, but he cannot claim restitution under Sec.144 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This contention .also cannot he accepted. It is true that, according to the appellant, he took settlement of a vacant piece of land from Ramdas and on which he put up a Katra and that he also subsequently removed it when he was to be evicted. But, in my opinion, this does not make any differenca. He was evicted from the land by the Civil Court in execution of the order of the Controller which has been held to be illegal and void and but for this, he would have continued in possession. In the result, therefore, when that order is non est, the tenant must be put back in possession irrespective of whether he put up a structure on it subsequently which also he removed. 7. Mr. Jha has also urged that Ramdas having no title to the disputed land which belongs to the temple of which the respondent is a Pujari, the appellant cannot be restored to possession as he is a mere trespasser. It appears that the question of appellants right to the possession of the land as a settlee from Ramdas, the latter himself having no right, title or interest in the land, was raised before the learned Munsif in course of the trial, and by consent of parties it was left open. The learned Additional Subordinate Judge, who allowed the appeal and decreed the suit, also referred to this matter as follows : "It being admitted that the plaintiff was a tenant with respect to the land in question and the question of title, among the defendants having been left open, the point as to who actually made the settlement with the plaintiff loses much of its importance". Then, again, at the end of the judgment, he observed thus "But at the same time it has to be observed that the defendants will be at liberty to remove the plaintiff from the holding in question under the general law of the land if and when they would choose to do so in accordance with law", In this view of the matter, Mr. Jhas endeavour to defeat the prayer for restitution on this ground due to the nature of the title of the appellant cannot succeed. If, in a suit properly framed, it is established that Bhagwan Das alone had the right to deal with the temple property, and that the disputed land is temple property, and that Ramdas, the settler of the appellant, had no right to do so, Bhagwan Das may succeed in obtaining a decree evicting the appellant. 8 The appeal is accordingly allowed and it must be held that the appellant should be put in possession evicting the two settlees of Bhagwan Das who were inducted- upon the land after he was pui in possession in execution of the order of the Controller. The order of the court of appeal below is modified to this extent. The parties snail Dear their own costs throughout. S.P.Singh, J. 9 I agree.