Judgment :- 1. The landlord who is the respondent in these two Appeals, filed R. C. O. P. No. 207 of 1954 for eviction of the appellant-tenant under the Madras Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act, 1949, and continued it, after the enactment of the Kerala Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act, 1959, under the latter Act (which will be referred to hereinafter as the Act) as S.33 thereof directed all proceedings, commenced under the Madras Act and pending at its commencement, to be deemed to have been commenced under it and continued subject to its provisions. 2. Under the Act, no tenant is allowed to resist eviction by his landlord unless he be free of arrears of rent. 2. Under the Act, no tenant is allowed to resist eviction by his landlord unless he be free of arrears of rent. S.12 of the Act provides: "(1) No tenant against whom an application for eviction has been made by a landlord under S.11, shall be entitled to contest the application before the Rent Control Court under that section, or to prefer, any appeal under S.18 against any order made by the Rent Control Court on the application, unless he has paid or pays to the landlord, or deposits with the Rent Control Court or the appellate authority, as the case may be, all arrears of rent admitted by the tenant to be due in respect of the building up to the date of payment or deposit, and continues to pay or to deposit any rent which may subsequently become due in respect of the building, until the termination of the proceedings before the Rent Control Court or the appellate authority, as the case may be; (2) The deposit of rent under sub-section (1] shall be made within the time and in the manner prescribed and shall be accompanied by the fee prescribed for the service of the notice referred to in sub-section (4); (3) If any tenant fails to pay or to deposit the rent as aforesaid the Rent Control Court or the appellate authority as the case may be, shall, unless the tenant shows sufficient cause to the contrary, stop all further proceedings and make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building." This section was amended by Act 29 of 1961 which substituted for its subsection (2) the following: "(2) The deposit under sub-section (1) shall be made within such time as the court may fix and in such manner as may be prescribed and shall be accompanied by the fee prescribed for the service of notice referred to in sub-section (4): Provided that the time fixed by the court for the deposit of the arrears of rent shall not be less than four weeks from the date of the order and the time fixed for the deposit of rent which subsequently accrues due shall not be less than two weeks from the date on which the rent becomes due." 3. In view of the provisions of S.12 (1) of the Act, the appellant was asked to state the rent that was in arrear. The statement he filed on December 7,1959, in response thereto, showed Rs. 3327-70 nP as due by him after setting off the amounts alleged to have been spent by him for repairs of the building. As there was no rule fixing the time to be allowed to a tenant to clear off arrears, the court, on January 28, 1960 directed the appellant to deposit the admitted arrears in 15 days; and that order not having been complied with, surrender of the building to the landlord under S.12 (3) was ordered on February 12,1960. An appeal (C. M. A. No. 53 of 1960) preferred before the appellate authority (the Subordinate Judge), as also a revision (CRP. No. 328 of 1960) of the appellate order sought before the District Judge did not succeed. So he moved O. P. No. 1486 of 1961 in this court for a writ of certiorari to quash the aforesaid order of eviction. Meanwhile, on March 7,1960, the appellant deposited Rs. 3345-70 nP. being the admitted arrears (Rs. 3327-70) and interest thereon, but ignoring further rents that fell in arrears in the interval, and applied to have the order of eviction vacated under S.11 (2) (b) of the Act. The Rent Control Court dismissed it. C. M. A. No. 99 of 1960 preferred against that order came to be dismissed by the appellate authority; and CRP. No. 330 of 1960 moved before the District Judge was also dismissed, with an observation that "it is still open to the tenant to forgo his contentions and request the Rent Control Court to give him the benefit contemplated under Clause.2 (b) of S.11, if the deposit made represents the correct amount as required under the section." To quash that observation the landlord moved 0. P. No. 2381 of 1961 for a writ of certiorari from this court. During the pendency of the aforesaid writ petitions, the Amendment Act, 29 of 1961, came to be passed, substituting a new provision for sub-rule (2) of S.12 of the Act(as mentioned above) with effect from April 3,1959. Though that amendment was also pressed into service, Vaidialingam, J., by a common judgment dismissed O. P. No. 1486 and allowed O. P. No. 2381. These appeals by the tenant are against that judgment. Though that amendment was also pressed into service, Vaidialingam, J., by a common judgment dismissed O. P. No. 1486 and allowed O. P. No. 2381. These appeals by the tenant are against that judgment. 4. Counsel for the appellant contends that the Amendment Act, 29 of 1961, having been made retrospective and "deemed to have come into force on the 3rd day of April 1959" must govern the orders of the Rent Control Court, made on January 28, and February 12,1960, and that therefore the 15 days' time granted to the appellent to clear off arrears of rent fell short of the minimum prescribed by the Amendment Act and the eviction ordered as a penalty for non-deposit within that time was unwarranted and liable to be quashed by a writ of certiorari. One of the effects of the retrospective operation of the Amendment Act is to regard the proviso, introduced in sub-section (2) of S.12 by the Act of 1961, as been included in the Act on April 3,1959; and it must then follow that the order of eviction passed by the Rent Control Court on February 12,1960 was not warranted by law. But that court, being vested with exclusive jurisdiction in the matter, may decide the matter rightly or wrongly. An appeal by the party aggrieved by an order of the Rent Control Court is provided for in S.18 of the Act and a further revision under S.20. The appellant has availed of those proceedings, though not with success; and it is conceded that the proceedings in the Rent Control Court have become final by the disposal of the concerned C. R. P.s by the District Judge on March 30, 1961. It is freely conceded that non-observance of the provisions of the proviso has not been complained of by the appellant before the appellate authority or the revisional court. Counsel stated that the appellant could not make that complaint since the proviso itself came to be only in 1961 when the Amendment Act was passed. The appellant cannot be allowed to blow hot and cold at the same time. For one purpose he wants the provisions of the Amendment Act to have been in the Act on April 3,1959, and for another purpose the same to be regarded as enacted only on August 31, 1961. We. cannot accede to that. The appellant cannot be allowed to blow hot and cold at the same time. For one purpose he wants the provisions of the Amendment Act to have been in the Act on April 3,1959, and for another purpose the same to be regarded as enacted only on August 31, 1961. We. cannot accede to that. The retrospective effect of the amendment is for all legal purposes. It cannot be confined to find errors in the orders of the Rent Control Court, which were in accordance with the law existent at the time of their rendition; but must extend to find abandonment of the plea available thereunder by the appellant when he preferred appeals and sought revision of those orders. As observed by Lord Asquith in 1952 App. Cas. 109 & reiterated by the Supreme Court in M. K. Venkatachalam v. Bombay Dyeing and Manufacturing Co. Ltd., (AIR. 1958 SC. 875, 878): " If you are bidden to treat an imaginary state of affairs as real, you must surely, unless prohibited from doing so, also imagine as real the consequences and incidents which, if the putative state of affairs had in fact existed, must inevitably have flowed from or accompanied it.... The statute says that you must imagine a certain state of affairs; it does not say that having done so, you must cause or permit your imagination to boggle when it comes to the inevitable corollaries of that state of affairs." and that corollary here is that the appellant had not pressed into service the proviso to S.12 (2) of the Act when he took the matter in appeal and revision before the statutory authorities concerned. A plea not taken before the concerned statutory tribunals cannot ordinarily be made the foundation of the complaint in a writ proceeding. 5. Another line of reasoning also leads us to the same conclusion. Acts of legislature are not construed as affecting judgments become final before their enactment, unless the legislature has expressly said so. Eyre v. Wynn Mackenzie (1896-1 Ch. 135) concerned the effect of S.3 of the Mortgagees Legal Costs Act, 1895, sub-section (2) of which provided: "This section applies to mortgages made and business transacted and acts done either before or after the commencement of this Act." The plaintiff, who obtained judgment on a mortgage two years before the passing of the Act, claimed the benefit of the altered law. The Court of Appeal presided by Lindley L. J., Smith L. J., and Rigby L. J., refused it observing: "It is impossible for us to say that the judgment was wrong as the law stood at the time when it was given. It is obvious that the Act was not intended to interfere with judgments which had already been given by the Court." A similar question arose in Day v. Kelland (1900-2 Ch. 745). Lord Alvertstone C. J., with whom Vaughan Williams L. J., concurred, observed: "It is not necessary to express any opinion as to the effect of S.3 of the (Mortgagees Legal Costs) Act. In my opinion the rights of the parties were determined by the order of April, 1893. Everything which has since been done in the action has been done under that order. It is said that in working out that order the plaintiff ought to have the benefit of the change in the law which was made by the Act of 1895. But to allow that would, I think, be to alter rights which were ascertained before the passing of the Act." And, Rigby L. J. also, concurring with the Chief Justice observed: "Whatever rights were ascertained by the order of April 19, 1893, must be interpreted with reference to the law as it stood at that time. I understand that to be the principle of the decision of the Court of Appeal in Eyre v. Wynn Mackenzie, and, if I may venture to say so, agree with their view." In the present case also, Act, 29 of 1961, though enacted with retrospective effect, has not been made to operate 'notwithstanding any decree of court.' The Act cannot therefore be held intended to affect judgments become final and conclusive before its enactment. 6. In either view, a case for interference, under the extraordinary jurisdiction of this court under Art.226 or Art.227 of the Constitution, with the order for eviction made against the appellant is not indicated. The dismissal of O. P. No. 1486 of 1961 was in the circumstances justified; and W. A. No. 58 of 1963 must therefore fail. 7. Counsel contends that the opinion of the learned judge that orders for eviction passed under S.12 (3) of the Act cannot be vacated under S.11 (2) (b) requires reconsideration by us. S.11 and 12 of the Act are not dependent on each other. 7. Counsel contends that the opinion of the learned judge that orders for eviction passed under S.12 (3) of the Act cannot be vacated under S.11 (2) (b) requires reconsideration by us. S.11 and 12 of the Act are not dependent on each other. They provide for different contingencies though the consequence of the non-compliance of the mandates of either section is eviction. It must then follow that an order of eviction passed under S.12 (3) is not amenable to correction under S.11 (2) (b), which relates to orders of eviction passed under that sub-section [i. e., S.11 (2) ] only. We are thus in agreement with the view of the learned judge on the matter. W.A. No. 57 of 1963 also fails. In the result, the decisions of the learned judge are affirmed and these appeals dismissed, though without any order as to costs in the circumstances.