JUDGMENT 1. The question for decision before us is whether the S. C. C. Suit No. 209 of 1957, which was brought by Opp. Party No. 1 against the petitioners, the commissioners for the Port of Calcutta, for recovery of damages, for short delivery of a consignment of cocoanut oil, was barred by section 142 of the Calcutta Port Act of 1890, which is as follows: "no suit shall be brought against any person for anything done, or purporting or professing to be done, in pursuance of this Act, after the expiration of three months from the day on which the cause of action in such suit shall have arisen. " The contention of the petitioners that the suit is barred by the above provision has been rejected by the trial court as well as by a Bench of two Judges of the Court of Small Causes, Calcutta. Chatterjee, J. before whom the matter came in revision from the order of the Bench of Judges, dated 29. 6-60. has referred the matter to a Division Bench because his Lordship was unable to agree with two single Judge decisions of this court, namely, that of R. P. Mookerjee, J. in (1) Basanta Lal v. Commissioners for the Port of Calcutta, A. I. R. 1951 Cal. 460 and that of J. P. Mitter, J. in (2) C. R. No. 274/51, which were cited before him. It may be mentioned in this context that a view similar to that taken in the two decisions just cited, was taken by another single Judge of this Court, Sarkar, J, (as he then was) in (3) Prabhudas v. Governor-General of India-in-Council, I. L. R. (1951) 1 Cal, 443. 2. Under section 112 (1) of the Calcutta Port Act, the Commissioners are liable for the loss, destruction or deterioration of goods which are landed and remain in possession or under the control of the Commissioners, and the standard of liability is the same as that of a bailee under sections 151, 152 and 161 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. The question is whether section 142 of the Act would be attracted to a suit brought against the Commissioners, to enforce the liability laid down tin section 112 (1. According to the view taken in the decisions referred to earlier, section 142 would be attracted to such a suit. The question is whether section 142 of the Act would be attracted to a suit brought against the Commissioners, to enforce the liability laid down tin section 112 (1. According to the view taken in the decisions referred to earlier, section 142 would be attracted to such a suit. Chatterjee, J. however, has been unable to agree with that view for three reasons given by his Lordship in his order of reference. It would be convenient to refer to these three grounds separately. Firstly, it has been said that the Commissioners would not come within the meaning of the words "any person" in section 142 because separate provision in bar of action against the Commissioners had been made in section 135. His Lordship also thinks that because the word "the Commissioners" has been defined in sec. 3 (1) of the Act and the Act has referred to the Commissioners as such in other provisions of the Act they should not be included within the generic words "any person" used in sec. 142. With respect, we are unable to agree with this view inasmuch as the Commissioners are a body corporate, having a legal entity, by virtue of the express provisions in sec. 4 and there is little doubt that such a body of persons must be taken to be included within the ambit of the word "person", used in a Bengal Act by reason of the definition of that word in sec. 3 (32) of the Bengal General Causes Act, 1899. Of course, a contrary context in a particular statute may exclude that general interpretation. In the Act before us, the provision in sec, 135 is supposed to furnish such contrary indication. It is to be noted, however, that sec. 142 is not inconsistent with sec. 135 which deals with only a particular class of suits or proceedings for which the Commissioners might have been otherwise answerable. It gives complete immunity to the Commissioners for the acts or defaults of certain specified officers except where such action has taken place under the express order or sanction of the said Commissioners. Of course, where sec. 135 applies there is no scope for invoking sec. 142 because the Commissioners are not liable at all in such cases. But sec. 135 is not exhaustive of all cases of the liability of the Commissioners. Of course, where sec. 135 applies there is no scope for invoking sec. 142 because the Commissioners are not liable at all in such cases. But sec. 135 is not exhaustive of all cases of the liability of the Commissioners. The instant suit does not seek to make the Commissioners liable for any specific act or default of the officers specified in sec. 135 and is therefore outside the purview of sec. 135. The suit would, therefore, lie against the Commissioners in view of sec. 112 ; but though such suit would be maintainable under the substantive law, sec. 142 raises a bar against such action after the expiration of three months as specified in that section. We are, accordingly, unable to agree that the words "any person" in sec. 142 should be so interpreted as to exclude the Commissioners. 3. Another ground relied upon by Chatterjee, J. is that sec. 142 does not provide a period of limitation but extinguishes the cause of action after the lapse of three months and that the provision can be applied not to bar a suit. With great respect, we are unable to follow what is meant by the observations of Chatterjee, J. on this point. The opening words of this section are clear enough to bar a suit. It says that no suit shall be brought after the expiration of three months as specified in the section. It is quite clear that, where this section applies after the lapse of this period a suit shall not be entertained and it is not correct to hold that the section can be applied only after a hearing on the merits, for the purpose of dismissing the suit. The Other observation that sec. 142 will be available only in those cases where the wrongful act which provides the cause of action has been done "under the authority of the Calcutta Port Act", on the other hand, overlooks the words "purporting or professing to be done in pursuance of this Act" in the section. No question on the merits arises where sec. 142 is attracted. In the words of the Judicial Committee" their Lordships regard themselves as absolved from considering and determining the issue of negligence, inasmuch as they are satisfied that the appellants can successfully invoke the protection of sec. 142 of the Port of Calcutta Act. No question on the merits arises where sec. 142 is attracted. In the words of the Judicial Committee" their Lordships regard themselves as absolved from considering and determining the issue of negligence, inasmuch as they are satisfied that the appellants can successfully invoke the protection of sec. 142 of the Port of Calcutta Act. " (Vide (4) 41 C. W. N. 1317 P. C.. 4. His Lordship next expresses the view that non-delivery or short-delivery of the goods can on no account be said to be an act 'purporting or professing to be done in pursuance of this Act' inasmuch as "there is no provision in this Act whereby the Commissioners are directed to deliver the goods or not to deliver the goods". Here also we regret our inability to agree in view of the fact that by incorporating the provisions of the Contract Act relating to a bailee, see. 112 (1) of the Calcutta Port Act does, in fact, lay down a duty upon the Commissioners to deliver the landed goods to the consignee on whose behalf they are to act as a bailee. Section 151 of the Contract Act lays down the standard of care to be taken by a bailee. Who is a bailee and what are his duties and liabilities are to be found out from the definition clause in secs. 148 and 161 of the Contract Act. By such definition, after the purpose of the bailment is over, the bailee is obliged either to return the goods to the bailor or to dispose of such goods according to the directions of the bailor. That is how the obligation of the Commissioners to deliver the goods to the consignee or his representatives arises by virtue of the provisions of the Calcutta Port Act itself. It has, however, been argued by the learned Advocate for the Opposite party that short-deli very or failure to deliver at all cannot be said to be an act done in discharge of the duty to deliver and that is why such act could not be brought in within the words purporting or processing to be done, in pursuance of the Act. " In (1) Basanta Lal's case (A. I. R. 1951 Cal. 460) Mookerjee, J, suggested that the word "professing" had even a large connotathan the word "purporting''. " In (1) Basanta Lal's case (A. I. R. 1951 Cal. 460) Mookerjee, J, suggested that the word "professing" had even a large connotathan the word "purporting''. We do not, however, consider it necessary to determine the ambit of the word ''professing" in this case, because in our view, the act upon which the cause the action in the instant suit is founded is an act purporting to be done in pursuance of the Calcutta Port Act. It is unfortunate that the Privy Council decision in (4) Commissioners for the Port of Calcutta v. Corporation of Calcutta, (1937) 41 C. W. N, 1317 (P. C.), which is a direct decision on the question before us was not referred to in any of the judgments before us. In this case, the Judicial Committee pointed out that the words "purporting or professing" in sec. 142 of the Calcutta Port Act made the protection offered by it wider than that offered by the Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893 of England which also barred proceedings against public servants for acts done in pursuance of an Act of Parliament after the lapse of a specified time, but without using the words "purporting or professing". According to their Lordships, by reason of the words "purporting or professing," sec. 142 protects against a claim not only based on breach of a statutory duty but also based on omission to perform a statutory duty. If so, sec. 142 would plainly protect the Commissioners from an action where they have omitted to take the care which they were under a statutory duty to take in respect of the goods which had come into their custody as a bailee and by reason of which failure or omission the Opposite Party has suffered loss of a part of the goods consigned. It has, however, been contended by the learned Advocate for the Opposite Party that the decision of the Judicial Committee in (4) 41 C. W. N. 1317 is not applicable to the case before us inasmuch as the damage, in that case, arose out of alleged negligence in the construction of certain works which the Port Commissioners have been authorised to undertake by the statute itself (presumably by sec. 35 of the Act), but that the omission to deliver consigned goods would not, by any stretch of imagination be said to have been done in the exercise of a statutory power. 5. In order to deal with such contention we should refer to the interpretation given by Courts of the highest authority to the words "purporting to act" "or purporting to be done" in the execution or discharge of the official duty of a public servant which occur in the provisions of two statutes which are in pari materia with the Calcutta Port Act, namely, sec. 270 (1) of the Govt. of India Act, 1935 and sec. 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Both these provisions bar proceedings against a public servant in respect of an act done or purporting to be done in the execution of his duty, unless the sanction at the specified authority is taken for the institution of the legal proceeding. In (5) Gill v. The King, (1948) 52 C. W. N. 567 (574), the Privy Council, in holding that the act of accepting bribes could not be said to have been purported to be done in the execution of the official duty of a public servant, observed as follows: "a public servant can only be said to act or purport to act in the discharge of his official duty, if his act is such as to lie within the scope of his official duty. Thus a Judge neither acts nor purports to act as a Judge in receiving a bribe though the judgment which he delivers may be such an act: nor does a Government Medical Officer act or purport to act as a public servant in picking the pocket of a patient whom he is examining, though the examination itself may be such an act. The test may well be whether the public servant, if challenged, can reasonably claim that, what he dose, he does in virtue of his office. " 6. The above observations were reaffirmed and applied in (6) Albert West Meads v. The King, (1948) 52 C. W. N. 834 (839) to hold that the act of fraudulently misapplying money entrusted to his care as a public servant could not have been committed while purporting to act in discharge of his official duty. " 6. The above observations were reaffirmed and applied in (6) Albert West Meads v. The King, (1948) 52 C. W. N. 834 (839) to hold that the act of fraudulently misapplying money entrusted to his care as a public servant could not have been committed while purporting to act in discharge of his official duty. The best commentary on the word "reasonably" in the observations of the Privy Council in (5) Gill's case (1948) 52 C. W. N. 567, is to be found in the summing up of the previous decisions of the Supreme Court itself in the case of (7) Matajog v, Behari, (1955) 2 s. C. R. 925 (934)In (8) Ramayya v. State of Bombay, (1955) I S. C. R. 1177 (1188), Bose, J. observes as follows: 'now it is obvious that if sec. 197 of the Code of Criminal procedure is construed too narrowly, it can never be applied, for of course, it is no part of an official's duty to commit an offence and never can be. But it is not the duty we have to examine so much as the act, because an official act can be performed in the discharge of official duty as well as in dereliction of it. The question of previous sanction also arose in (9) Amrik Singh v. The State of Pepsu, (1955) 1 S. C. R. 1302 (1307. A fairly lengthy discussion of the authorities is followed up with this summary: 'if the acts complained of are so integrally connected with the duties attaching to the office as to be inseparable from them, then sanction under section 197 (1) would be necessary but if there was no necessary connection between them and the performance of those duties, the official status furnishing only the occasion or opportunity for the acts, then no sanction would be required. The result of the foregoing discussion is this: "there must be a reasonable connection between the act and the discharge of official duty; the act must bear such relation to the duty that the accused could lay a reasonable, but not a pretended or fanciful claim, that he did it in the course of the performance of his duly. " Reading the above decisions with the decision in 41 C. W. N, 1317, we may arrive at the following propositions; (a) In order to apply the bar under sec. " Reading the above decisions with the decision in 41 C. W. N, 1317, we may arrive at the following propositions; (a) In order to apply the bar under sec. 142 of the Calcutta Port Act, it is first to be determined whether the act which is complained of in the suit in question can be said to come within the scope of the official duty of the person or persons who are sought to be made liable. This question can be answered in the affirmative where there is a reasonable connection between the act and the discharge of the official duty. (b) Once the scope of the official duty is determined, sec. 142 will protect the defendants not only from a claim based on breach of the duty but also from a claim based upon an omission to perform such duty. (c) The protection of sec. 142 cannot be held to be confined to acts done in the exercise of a statutory power but also extends to acts done within the scope of an official duty. 7. In the case before us, the official duty of the Port Commissioners is to deliver the landed goods to the consignee and to take reasonable care of the goods till such delivery. The act complained of is a short-delivery or loss of a part of the goods owing to a failure to take reasonable care, and the failure to deliver that part accordingly. There is no doubt that such acts have a reasonable and not a fanciful connection with the duty. 8. There is no allegation in the present case that the Commissioners or their subordinates have misappropriated the goods or made a personal gain. The suit as framed is a usual one for damages for short-delivery without any further allegations. In the circumstances, there is little scope for doubt that sec. 143 would be attracted to this case. The cause of action, in the instant suit arose on 24.3.56 when the Commissioners gave a certificate of short-delivery to the Opposite Party. The suit was instituted on 14.1.57, i.e., beyond three months from the date of cause of action. It has, however, been contended on behalf of the Opposite Party that the cause of action in the suit arose not on 24.3.56 but on 29.12.56 on which the letter in Ex. The suit was instituted on 14.1.57, i.e., beyond three months from the date of cause of action. It has, however, been contended on behalf of the Opposite Party that the cause of action in the suit arose not on 24.3.56 but on 29.12.56 on which the letter in Ex. D was written by Defendant 1 to Defendant 2 denying its liability and a copy of that letter was sent by Defendant 1 to the plaintiffs for information, so that the period of three months referred to in section 142 should be computed from 29.12.56 and that accordingly the suit must be held to have been filed within time. This contention has little substance. The suit has been decreed against defendant No. 2 i.e., the Port Commissioners and a cause of action against them arose when they granted the certificate of short delivery. Any correspondence between defendant No. 1, the Shipping Co. and defendant No. 2, with respect to their liability inter se has little to do with the cause of action of the plaintiffs against defendant No. 2. 9. This Rule must, accordingly, be made absolute. The order of the Court of Small Causes be set aside and the Suit No. 209 of 1957 be dismissed. Parties should bear their own costs throughout. I agree with the order made by my Lord but desire to add a few words of my own. Messrs. Abdul Rahim Oosman and Co. (India) Private Ltd. (Opposite Party No. 1) instituted a suit, before the Small Causes Court, Calcutta, against the petitioners, the Commissioners for the Port of Calcutta and the Opposite Party No. 2, indo-China Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. claiming Rs. 1298/-, as compensation for short delivery of four drums of cocoa-nut oil including the price of the drums. The suit was filed, on January 14, 1957, and was numbered S. C. C. suit No. 209 of 1957. According to the plaintiffs (Opposite Party No. 1) they had caused importation of 263 drums of cocoanut oil front Penang through G. M. Khumree and Company. The carriage of the oil by sea was entrusted to the opposite party No. 2 and the Bill of Lading was endorsed by G. A. Khumree and Co. in favour of the plaintiffs. According to the plaintiffs (Opposite Party No. 1) they had caused importation of 263 drums of cocoanut oil front Penang through G. M. Khumree and Company. The carriage of the oil by sea was entrusted to the opposite party No. 2 and the Bill of Lading was endorsed by G. A. Khumree and Co. in favour of the plaintiffs. The consignment was landed at the Calcutta Port but the plaintiffs were given delivery of 259 drums only, that is to say, there was a short delivery of four drums. Since there was a dispute between the petitioners, Commissioners for the Port of Calcutta and the opposite party No. 2, Indo-China Steam Navigation Co., as to which of them was responsible for the short delivery to the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs obtained a short certificate from the Commissioners for the Port of Calcutta and sued both of them for damages. 10. The trial court decreed the suit in part against the Commissioners for the Port of Calcutta for a sum of Rs. 1218/-holding, inter alia, that there was no short landing by the carrier company and that the claim was not barred by limitation against the Commissioners, the petitioners herein. The Commissioners for the Port of Calcutta applied for a new trial, under the provisions of section 38 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act. So also did the plaintiffs opposite party against the portion of the claim dismissed by the trial Judge, At the new trial the decree of the trial Judge was affirmed and both the applications were dismissed. The Commissioners for the Pont of Calcutta moved this Court, under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, against the order made at the new trial and obtained this Rule. this Court, namely, (1) Basanta Lai v. Commissioners for the Port of Calcutta, (A. I. R. 1951 Cal 460per Rama Prasad Mookerjee, J.) and (2) the Commissioners for the Port of Calcutta v. Messrs. Jayshree Tea Gardens Ltd. (C. R. No. 274 of 1959per J. P. Mitter, J. unreported) that the claim against the Port Commissioners was barred by limitation, under section 142 of the Calcutta Port Act, (hereinafter referred to as the Act. Jayshree Tea Gardens Ltd. (C. R. No. 274 of 1959per J. P. Mitter, J. unreported) that the claim against the Port Commissioners was barred by limitation, under section 142 of the Calcutta Port Act, (hereinafter referred to as the Act. His Lordship was not prepared to agree with the above-mentioned decisions on a three-fold ground, namely, (i) the expression "any person" in section 142 of the Act does not include the Commissioners for the Port of Calcutta, (ii) a case of non-delivery does not fall within the mischief of section 142 of the Act and (iii) Section 142 of the Act does not make provision for a period of limitation for the filing of a suit against the Port Commissioners but merely provides for indemnity of persons who act under the authority of the Calcutta Port Act. His Lordship, therefore, referred the case to a Division Bench for hearing. This is how the matter has been placed before us. Section 142 of the Calcutta Port Act is couched in the following language: "no suit shall be brought against any person for anything done, or purporting or professing to be done, in pursuance of this Act, after the expiration of three months from the day on which the cause of action in such suit shall have arisen. " 11. Chatterjee, J. gave the following reasons why the words "any person" shall not be taken to include the Port Commissioners. He referred to section 3 (1) of the Act, defining the word "the Commissioners" and to section 3 (2) of the Act, defining the word "commissioner" and generally to the scheme of the Act and observed that under the scheme of the Act wherever ''commissioners for the Port" or "any Commissioner" were or was sought to be referred to that was done by expressly stating the same. Since section 142 of the Act did not do so, the words "any person" would not include the Commissioners. He examined, in the next place, section 4 of the Act providing that the provisions of the Act shall be carried out by a body of Commissioners, which shall be a body corporate and shall sue and the sued under the name of the Commissioners for the Port of Calcutta, and observed that there was nothing to indicate that such a suit shall be filed within three months of the accrual of the cause of action. He lastly examined the provisions of section 135 of the Act providing for indemnity to Commissioners for default of certain employees and observed that if the commissioners were protected under section 135, there was no reason to read further protection for them under section 142 of the Act. I am unable to agree with the observations of Chatterjee, J. Section 4 invests the duty of carrying out the provisions of the Calcutta Port Act in the Commissioners. Part VIII of the Act casts upon the Commissioners, inter alia, the duty to provide for landing and shipment of goods. Sections 90 and 91 in part VIII read as follows: "section 90. The Commissioners shall provide and keep and maintain sufficient servants and apparatus for the expeditious and convenient landing and shipment of goods from and upon all sea-going vessels brought to the docks, wharves, quays, stages, jetties or piers erected by them ; and shall, by their servants (or agents), land and ship all goods from and upon any such vessels so coming to such dock, wharf, quay, stage, jetty or pier, unless where there is a legal excuse for refusing to land or ship such goods, or such vessel is by reason of the breach or non-observance of any law or regulation, not entitled to have her goods shipped or discharged. " "Section 91. (1) Whenever any goods shall be landed by the Commissioners from any vessel under the powers by this Act conferred on them, they shall if thereunto required, give to the person in charge of such vessel a receipt in the form or to the effect prescribed in the (second) schedule ; and may, in any such receipt, include all goods landed from such vessel during one day. (2) No person to whom such receipt shall have been so given, nor the master nor owner of the vessel from which the goods in respect of which such receipt shall be given may have been landed, shall be liable for any loss or damage to such goods which may occur after they shall have been so landed. " 12. Section 112 provides for the responsibility of the Commissioners, inter alia, for loss, destruction and deterioration of landed goods in their custody in the following language: "112. " 12. Section 112 provides for the responsibility of the Commissioners, inter alia, for loss, destruction and deterioration of landed goods in their custody in the following language: "112. (1) The responsibility of the Commissioners for the loss, destruction or deterioration of animals or goods, whether landed for import or received for export or for carriage by railway, during such time as the same remain in the possession or under the control of the Commissioners, shall, subject to the other provisions of this Act, and, in the case of animals or goods received for carriage by railway subject also to the provisions of the Indian Railways Act, 1890, be that of a bailee under sections 151, 152 and 161 of the Indian Contact Act, 1872, omitting the words "in the absence of any special contract" in section 152 of the last [mentioned act. " Section 112, inter alia, attracts section 161 of the Indian Contract Act and makes the Commissioners liable as bailees. Section 161 of the Indian Contract, Act reads as follows: "if by default of the bailee the goods are not returned, delivered or rendered at the proper time, he is responsible to the bailor for any loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods from that time. " In the instant case, there was a short delivery of four drums of oil and the short delivery was found to have been caused by the Port Commissioners toy their default. The shortage was loss to the consignee. It was the responsibility of the Port Commissioners to compensate for the loss under section 161 of the Contract Act. If under the Act it was the duty of the Port Commissioners, as bailees, to deliver to the consignee the full quantity of the landed goods and therein they failed, then even if the shortage had been caused by default of any of their employees or anybody else, the Commissioners do not escape liability. The word "person" is wide enough to include the Port Commissioners and I do not think that the word, as used in section 142, excluded the Port Commissioners, whose statutory duty it was to carry out the provisions of the Act, including the provisions for delivery of goods as bailees. The word "person" is wide enough to include the Port Commissioners and I do not think that the word, as used in section 142, excluded the Port Commissioners, whose statutory duty it was to carry out the provisions of the Act, including the provisions for delivery of goods as bailees. The reason why the expression "any person" was used in section 142 instead of the expression "commissioners" was possibly because the legislation contemplated suits both against the Port Commissioners and their employees or agents for dereliction of duty or wrongful conversion. 13. The other reason given by his Lordship, namely, that section 4 does not attract section 142 of the Calcutta Port Act does not appeal to me. Section 4 deals with the incorporation of the Commissioners for the Port of Calcutta and invest certain duties in them. It was not necessary to provide in that very section within what time a suit of the nature as contemplated in section 142 should be brought against the Commissioners. Then again, section 135 of the Act reads as follows: "135. The Commissioners shall not be answerable for any act or default of any Conservator or Harbour Master of the Port, or of any deputy or Assistant of the said (employees), or of any person acting under the authority or directions of any such (employee) or assistant, heretofore or hereafter done within the limits of the Port; nor for any damage or injury heretofore or hereafter sustained by any vessel in consequence of any defect in any of the moorings, hawsers, or other thing belonging to the Commissioners within the Port which may be used by such vessel: provided that nothing in this section shall protect the said Commissioners from an action in respect of any act done by, or under the express order or sanction of the said Commissioners," 14. The scope of sections 135 and 142 are not identical. Section 135 provides for indemnity to the Port Commissioners against default of certain specified officials, charged with the harbouring of vessels. That indemnity is complete and has no limitation. In respect of other defaults there is no immunity within the time specified in section 142. The scope of sections 135 and 142 are not identical. Section 135 provides for indemnity to the Port Commissioners against default of certain specified officials, charged with the harbouring of vessels. That indemnity is complete and has no limitation. In respect of other defaults there is no immunity within the time specified in section 142. Therefore, the provisions of section 135 also does not support the views expressed by Chatterjee, J. Chatterjee, J, next expressed the view that there was no provision in the Act which directed the Commissioners to deliver the goods and, therefore, non-delivery would not amount to "purporting or professing to do anything under the Act. " as in section 142. I am of the opinion that section 4 and 112 of the Port Act read with section 161 of the Contract Act make it a duty of the Port Commissioners to deliver to the consignee all landed goods bailed with them and omission to perform such duty would attract section 142 of the Calcutta Port Act. In this view I am supported by the following observations of Lord Alness, in the case of (4) The Commissioners for the Port of Calcutta v. The Corporation of Calcutta, (41 C. W. N. 1317 P. O.), interpreting the provisions of section 142 of the Port Act in the following language: "reliance was placed by the respondents on the case of the Bradford Corporation v. Myers., (1916) A. C. 242. Now, inasmuch as that case related to the construction of the Public authorities Protection Act (1893), which contains language not to be found in the Indian statute, and which omits language to be found in the latter, manifestly the decision falls to be handled with care. In particular the English Act does not contain the words "purporting or professing to act in pursuance of the statute. " Their Lordships regard these words as of pivotal importance. Their presence in the statute appears to postulate that work which is not done in pursuance of the statute may nevertheless be accorded its protection, if the work professes or purports to be done in pursuance of the statute. " Their Lordships regard these words as of pivotal importance. Their presence in the statute appears to postulate that work which is not done in pursuance of the statute may nevertheless be accorded its protection, if the work professes or purports to be done in pursuance of the statute. The English Act was properly treated by the House in the Bradford case as one from which the words "professing or purporting" were omitted, and the observations of the House must, of course, be construed "secundum subjectam materiem" They have, in their Lordships' judgment, no application to this case. Their Lordships can find nothing in the Bradford case which forbids the interpretation which they propose to attach to the Indian Act. 15. Their Lordships were not referred to any decision on that Act, either by this Board or by any Court in India. It apparently therefore falls to be construed judicially for the first time. The respondents argued that the Indian statute fell to be strictly construed, and that, while it protects against a claim based on breach of statutory duty, it does not protect against an omission to perform a statutory duty. Their Lordships are unable to accept either argument. The argument is unsupported by authority, or from any other source. " 16. Chatterjee, J. lastly observed that section 142 was no law of limitation but a provision against maintainability of suits. Even if so, it is a provision against maintainability of suits en the ground of efflux of time. Since admittedly the suit, out of which this Revision case arises, was not filed within the time as in section 142, the suit ought to fail against the Port Commissioners. For the reasons aforesaid, I do not find any justification for differing from the views expressed in the two decisions of this court referred to by Chatterjee, J. namely, in (1) Basantalal's case (supra) and in the unreported decision in (2) Commissioners for the Port of Calcutta v. Jayshree Tea Gardens, (supra) and also in another decision of this Court not referred to by His Lordship, namely, (3) Prabhudayal Das Mulji v. Governor-General of India in Council, (I. L. R. (1951) 1 Cal. 443. I, therefore, agree with my Lord that this Rule must be made absolute and the suit must be dismissed.