JUDGMENT K.B. Asthana, J. - These are three revisions filed by defendants under Sec. 115 of the C. P. Code in which the same question of law is involved, hence they can be conveniently disposed of by a common judgment. These revisions are directed against an order of the learned District Judge of Banda by which he allowed the three connected appeals against the orders of the learned Civil Judge of Banda in the three suits and set aside the order of the learned Civil Judge in those suits directing the plaints to be returned for presentation to the revenue court. The learned Civil Judge had held that the suits were cognizable by revenue court and the civil court had no jurisdiction. The learned District Judge on appeal held that the suits were cognizable by the civil courts and not by the revenue court. 2. The allegations in the plaint in the three suits were similar. In each of the suit Gram Samaj Ainjhi was defendant No. 1 along with certain other persons who were also impleaded as defendants and in whose favour the Gram Samaj is alleged to have executed Pattas. The plaintiffs in each of the three suits had claimed a declaration and possession of the lands involved in the suit. The allegations were that in 1946 the land in suit was settled with the plaintiffs after 8th day of August, 1946; that they acquired hereditary rights in those lands under the U.P. Tenancy Act; that after the abolition of Zamindari under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act they acquired Sirdari rights and became Sirdars; that Gram Samaj of Ainjhi wrongly claiming the land in suit to be customary common pasture land filed application under Sec. 212-A of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and obtained an order on 31st March 1958 for ejectment from the land from the Assistant Collector, I Class; that in pursuance of that order the plaintiff was ejected; that after the ejectment the Gram Samaj Ainjhi executed Pattas in favour of certain persons which was illegal. The relief claimed in the suits were that (a) it may be declared that the land in suit was not a customary pasture land at the time or at any time before when the land was settled with the plaintiff after the eighth day of August 1946 and the plaintiff was not liable to be ejected in pursuance of the order under Sec. 212-A of U.P. Act I of 1951 and that the order of the Assistant Collector dated 31st March 1958 was illegal and ineffective; (b) that if it is found that the plaintiff has been dispossessed, then a decree for possession be passed and the plaintiff be restored to possession of the land in suit; (c) that the various Pattas executed by the Gram Samaj in favour of the defendants be cancelled; (d) that cost be awarded to the plaintiff and (e) that the plaintiff be granted such other further relief may be deemed fit. 3. On behalf of the defendants, inter aria, it was pleaded that the civil court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The learned Additional Civil Judge, in whose court the suits were filed, framed a preliminary issue in each of the suit to the effect whether the suit was cognizable by the court. By the consent of the parties the suits were consolidated for hearing en the preliminary issue. The learned Civil Judge held that the suits in effect were suits for declaration of Sirdari rights and for possession of Sirdari land and, therefore, were triable by a revenue court and not by a civil court. Accordingly the learned Civil Judge ordered the plaints to be returned for presentation to the proper court. Against the orders of the learned Civil Judge, separate appeals were preferred in each of the suit which appeals were consolidated and heard together by the learned District Judge who disagreeing with the learned Civil Judge held that the suits were suits which fell under Cl. 7 of Sec. 212-A of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and as there was no provision for the institution of such a suit under that sub-clause in schedule II of Z.A. and L.R. Act, the suits were cognizable by civil court. 7 of Sec. 212-A of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and as there was no provision for the institution of such a suit under that sub-clause in schedule II of Z.A. and L.R. Act, the suits were cognizable by civil court. The learned District Judge accordingly set aside the order of the learned Civil Judge and sent the suits back to the lower court for being tried an accordance with law. As already observed above, these three revisions have been filed against the orders of the learned District Judge passed in the three appeals. It is to be noted that the Gram Samaj Ainjhi, who was the main defendant in the three suits, has not filed the above revisions but some of the other defendants who were impleaded in each of the suits and in whose favour Gram Samaj had executed Pattas, have come up in revision before this Court. 4. Sri V.K.S. Chaudhary, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant applicant, has with his usual vehemence reiterated for my acceptance the argument which appealed to the learned Civil Judge and submitted that the suits in effect were for declaration of Sirdari rights and fell under Sec. 229-B of the Z.A.L.R. Act, or in the alternative, the suits were for ejectment of persons taking or retaining possession of the Sirdari land otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the law for the time being in force and fell under Sec. 209 of that Act and therefore in either view, the suits were not cognizable by the civil court. Sri H.C. Sharma, the learned counsel for the plaintiff opposite party, in his submission has countered the argument raised on behalf of the defendants applicants by contending that the suits contemplated under Cl. 7 of Sec. 212-A of the Z.A. and L.R. Act are a class by themselves and considering the cause of action of such suits, in their nature they are different and distinct from the classes of suits contemplated under Sec. 209 or 229-B of that Act. 5. The important question, there-fore, which falls for determination in these revisions is whether the cause of action for a suit contemplated under Cl. 5. The important question, there-fore, which falls for determination in these revisions is whether the cause of action for a suit contemplated under Cl. 7 of Sec. 212-A and the relief claim ed for such a suit for annulling the effect of an order in the proceedings under that section, makes it a suit, in its true nature, distinct and different from suits contemplated under Sec. 209 or 229-B of that Act. It is necessary, therefore, first to consider the scope of Sec. 212 and 212-A of the U.P.Z.A. and L. R. Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 6. Secs. 212 and 212-A occur in Chap. VIII of the Act dealing with tenure and fall under the sub-heading under that chapter dealing with ejectment. Sec. 129 of the Act provides for three classes of tenure viz., Bhumidhari, Sirdari and Asami. Sec. 199 onwards in chapter VIII of the Act deals with ejectment. Section 199 provides that no Bhumidhar shall be liable to. ejectment. As far as Sirdar or Asami is concerned, Sec. 200 provides that no Sirdar or Asami shall be ejected from his holding except as provided in this Act. Then follows Sec. 201 which lays down that a Sirdar shall be liable to ejectment from his holding on the suit of the Gram Samaj on any of the grounds mentioned in Secs. 167, 206 or 212. It is clear, therefore, that Sec. 212 is a provision which furnishes the grounds for the ejectment of a Sirdar. Sec. 212 in its terms deals with cases of persons who are in occupation of lands of public utility. One class of such land mentioned therein is a land which was recorded as or was customary common pasture land. It further provides that any person who, on or after the 8th day of August 1946, has been admitted as a tenure holder on a land which was re-corded as or was customary common pasture land, then on the suit of the Gaon Samaj such a person will be liable for ejectment from such land on payment of such compensation as may be prescribed. It may be noticed that even if a person is in occupation of such land legally as a Bhumidhar, Sirdar or Asami, notwithstanding his title to that land, is liable to ejectment if it is established that he was admitted to such land as tenure holder after the 8th day of August 1946. This is so is emphasised by the words "not-withstanding anything contained in Sec. 199" used in this section, for it will be seen that Sec. 199 of the Act confers upon a Bhumidhar an immunity from ejectment from his Bhumidhar lands. If that be the true content and scope of Sec. 212 of the Act, then it follows that no declaration by any court that a person is Bhumidhar, Sirdar or Asami of a land referred to in Sec. 212, will protect him from being ejected on the suit of the Gaon Samaj. A suit under Sec. 212 by the Gaon Samaj as given in the second schedule of the Rules framed under Sec. 331 of that Act, lies in the court of the Collector. The Collector, as defined in Sec. 3 of the Act, includes an Assistant Collector I class empowered by the State Government to discharge all or any of the functions and the Collector under the Act. Therefore, a suit under Sec. 212 of the Act may lie in the court of the Assistant Collector First Class also if he is so empowered by the State Government. 7. Now, in a suit under Sec. 212 the main issue which would fall for decision if there be a contest will be whether the land in question was recorded as or was a land of public utility as described in that section and whether the defendant was admitted as a tenure holder of that land on or after the eighth day of August 1946. If the defendant establishes that he was admitted as a tenure holder of such a land before the eighth day of August 1946, or that he was admitted to the land after the eighth day of August 1946, and at that time it was not recorded or was not a customary pasture land and so on, then the suit will fail. A suit under Sec. 212 of the Act, therefore, is not concerned with the nature of the right or title of the defendant; he may be occupying the land in any legal capacity whether as Bhumidhar, Sirdar or Asami. The decision in such a suit would turn on the findings whether on or after the 8th day of August 1946 the defendant was admitted as a tenure-holder to the land in question and whether on the day when the defendant was so admitted the land was recorded as or was customary common pasture land and so on. The right, therefore, which is claimed by the Gaon Samaj in such a suit is that the defendant is liable to ejectment as the land was recorded as or was customary common pasture land when the defendant was admitted as a tenure holder on or after the 8th day of August, 1946. While the right claimed by the defendant over the land involved in such a suit in case he has been admitted as a tenure holder on or after the eighth day of August 1946 will be that on the day when he was admitted as a tenure holder the land was not recorded as or was not customary common pasture land. That will be, so to say, the `res gestae' of the dispute. Sec. 212, therefore, is a provision which affords fullest opportunity to the Gaon Samaj and the person concerned to have the question of facts settled on a consideration of the evidence and material placed by each party. As the second schedule to the Act shows against the decision of the Collector in such a suit an appeal lies to the Court of the Commissioner and then a second appeal to the Board of Revenue. 8. It appears that it having been realised in practice that due to the lengthy procedure involved in the suits, and repeated appeals, the ejectment of persons from the lands referred to in Sec. 212 got delayed and the public interests suffered, therefore, Sec. 212-A was enacted by an amending Act providing for a summary procedure for ejectment from land of public utility. Instead of Gram Samaj filing a suit the Chairman, member, or secretary of the Land Management Committee could make an application to the Collector for ejectment of any person in possession of the land referred to in Sec. 212. Instead of Gram Samaj filing a suit the Chairman, member, or secretary of the Land Management Committee could make an application to the Collector for ejectment of any person in possession of the land referred to in Sec. 212. The procedure envisaged under Sec. 212-A is that first the Collector has to satisfy himself if there was a prima facie case before issuing notice to the person concerned. If there was no contest then the Collector could make an order of ejectment, but if a contest is raised by filing objections, then the parties are entitled to adduce evidence. The Collector then on a hearing is to satisfy himself that the person was admitted as a tenure holder or grove holder of land referred to in Sec. 212 on or after the eighth day of August 1946, then he would pass an order for ejectment of the person from the land on payment of such compensation as may be prescribed. It would he noticed that it is the same officer before whom a suit could be filed under Sec. 212 who is to decide the case under Sec. 212-A also. An Assistant Collector of First Class, if he were so empowered by the State Government, could also decide the case under Sec. 212-A. It would further be noticed that the questions of fact which fall for determination in sub-Sec. (6) of Sec. 212-A are the same which fall for determination in a regular suit under Sec. 212. The decision of the Collector or the Assistant Collector, as the case may be, under Sec. 212-A has the same sanctity as the decision recorded in a regular suit under Sec. 212. Though the marginal note to Sec. 212-A makes a mention of summary procedure for ejectment from land of public utility, that, to my mind, does not in any way make any difference as to the value and weight to be attached to the determination of the questions of fact by complying with the procedure under Sec. 212-A as would be attachable to the decision on the same questions of fact in the regular suit under Sec. 212. 9. It was sought to be argued on behalf of the defendants applicants that the decision under Sec. 212-A being based on a summary procedure and being subject to the results of a suit as provided for under Cl. 9. It was sought to be argued on behalf of the defendants applicants that the decision under Sec. 212-A being based on a summary procedure and being subject to the results of a suit as provided for under Cl. (7) of Sec. 212-A, will not stand on the same footing as the decision in the regular suit under Sec. 212. In other words, the contention was that in the regular suit the title of the Sirdar would extinguish when he is ejected in execution of the decree under that suit, but it will not extinguish when he is ejected, in pursuance of an order under Cl. (6) of Sec. 212-A. This contention, in my judgment, is unsound. Under Cl. (6) of Sec. 212-A, the determination of the questions of fact is based on the evidence on record as in the suit under Sec. 212. Merely because the marginal note to Sec. 212-A mentions summary procedure for ejectment from land of public utility, it would not mean that the determination on the questions of fact, being based on judicial consideration and the evidence on record, in its colour and character would not be the same as the determination to those questions in the regular suit. 10. It has not been disputed by the learned counsel for the applicant that the procedure under Sec. 212-A is judicial. It has not been further disputed by the learned counsel for the applicant that any determination on the questions of fact in the regular suit under Sec. 212 will have the effect of extinguishing the title of the Sirdar when he is ejected in the execution of a decree in that suit by virtue of Sec. 190(e) of the Act. It is, however, contended that ejectment of the Sirdar under orders passed under Cl. (6) of Sec. 212-A would result only in the deprivation of possession and would fall under Sec. 190(f) of the Act in case the Sirdar does not file a suit within the period of limitation to recover possession. This line of reasoning is not convincing. It is, however, contended that ejectment of the Sirdar under orders passed under Cl. (6) of Sec. 212-A would result only in the deprivation of possession and would fall under Sec. 190(f) of the Act in case the Sirdar does not file a suit within the period of limitation to recover possession. This line of reasoning is not convincing. Whether the ejectment takes place in due execution of a decree passed in a suit under Sec. 212 or in pursuance of an order passed under Sec. 212-A of the Act, both will stand on the same footing and the person who has been ejected will have been ejected in accordance with the provisions of the Act and will lose his Sirdari right. Any ejectment in pursuance of an order under Sec. 212-A Cl. (6) would be an ejectment in accordance with the provisions of the Act. I fail to appreciate how such an ejectment falls outside Cl. (e) of Sec. 190. Cl. (f) of Sec. 190 clearly contemplates a case of deprivation of possession, that is, losing of possession by an illegal act that is otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of law. In my opinion, therefore, ejectment of a Sirdar in pursuance of an order passed under Cl. (6) of Sec. 212-A after following the due procedure laid down in that section, extinguishes the Sirdari right. When Cl. 7 of Sec. 212-A provides that where an order of ejectment has been passed the party against whom it has been passed may institute a suit to establish the right claimed by it but subject to the result of such suit the order passed under sub-Cl. (6) shall be conclusive, it does not derogate from the validity or force to be attached to such an order and ejectment in pursuance thereof, but, on the other hand, reiterates the due validity and the enforceability of that order till the person who has been ejected establishes the right claimed by him by filing a suit. The consequence of such an order, therefore will only be destroyed when in a suit filed by the person ejected he establishes the right claimed by him as against the Gaon Samaj. The consequence of such an order, therefore will only be destroyed when in a suit filed by the person ejected he establishes the right claimed by him as against the Gaon Samaj. The contention of the learned counsel for the plaintiff opposite party appears to me to be sound that after an order has been passed under clause (6) of Sec. 212-A and the Sirdar is ejected in pursuance thereof, no question would arise for filing a suit for declaration of Sirdari rights as on the day when such a suit is filed the plaintiff would not legally be a Sirdar of the land as his Sirdari rights had become extinguished under Cl. (e) of S. 190 and it will not legally be in existence. A suit for a declaration of a right can only be maintainable when at the date of the filing of the suit the right claimed subsists. Sec. 229-B of the Act therefore is not attracted. 11. As observed above, the essential nature of the proceedings whether taken in a suit under Sec. 212 or taken on an application under Sec. 212-A, being the same and the right which is claimed by the defendant in Sec. 212 or by the objector under Sec. 212-A, being the same that he is not liable to be ejected as the land in question does not fall within the description contained in Sec. 212, the whole scope of the suit contemplated in clause (7) of Sec. 212-A would, therefore, be in respect of the claim of the plaintiff that the land in question did not fall within the description of the land mentioned in Sec. 212 of the Act and that will be the right - the `res gestae' of the dispute - which the plaintiff in such a suit will claim to be established. I have also noticed above that even though a person, may be a Bhumidhar or Sirdar he may be ejected under Sec. 212 or Sec. 212-A. Therefore, a mere suit for declaration of Sirdari right or Bhumidhari right if filed under clause (7) of Sec. 212A will be futile as such a suit will not establish the right claimed by a person ever the land in question from which he is ejected in the proceedings under Sec. 212-A of the Act. In this view of the matter also a suit for declaration of Sirdart right when a Sirdar is ejected in pursuance of an order under clause (6) of Sec. 212 of the Act, is not contemplated by clause (7) of that section. 12. The next question, therefore, that arises for consideration is when a Sirdar has been ejected from his Sirdari land in pursuance of an order duly passed under clause (6) of Sec. 212-A whether a suit filed by him for recovery of possession on establishing his claim to the land will be a suit covered by Sec. 209 of the Act. Sec. 209 deals with ejectment of persons occupying land without title and provides that a person taking or retaining possession of land otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the law for the time being in force shall be liable to ejectment on the suit . . . . of a Sirdar concerned. The question, therefore, is when the Gaon Samaj takes possession of the land in pursuance of an order of ejectment passed under clause (6) of Sec. 212-A and then lets it out to others, will the Gaon Samaj be regarded as having taken the land otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the law for the time being in force? The learned counsel for the applicant submitted that if the true nature of the land is not such as to be covered by Sec. 212 of the Act, then any order passed under clause (6) of Sec. 212-A will be an illegal order and any action taken in pursuance thereof being equally illegal and ineffective in the eye of law, the taking of possession or retaining of possession of land will be other wise than in accordance with the provisions of the law for the time being in force and a suit by the Sirdar to recover possession thereof by ejectment of the Gaon Samaj and the persons settled on that land by the Gaon Samaj would be covered by Sec. 209 of the Act. Reliance has been placed in support of this contention on the case of Bhinka and others v. Charan Singh, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. p. 960 and on the unreported decision of a Single Judge of this Court in Shyam Sunder v. Kalahey, S.A. No. 293 of 1960 decided on 21-12-1962. Reliance has been placed in support of this contention on the case of Bhinka and others v. Charan Singh, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. p. 960 and on the unreported decision of a Single Judge of this Court in Shyam Sunder v. Kalahey, S.A. No. 293 of 1960 decided on 21-12-1962. In the case of Bhinka and others in the Supreme Court their Lordships of the Supreme Court considered the scope of Sec. 180 of the U.P. Tenancy Act and the effect of an order passed under Sec. 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code on the applicability of Sec. 180 of the U.P. Tenancy Act. As the language of Sec. 180 of the U.P. Tenancy Act and Sec. 209 of the U.P.Z.A.L.R. Act is similar, the law laid down by the Supreme Court on the provisions of that section will be helpful in interpreting the provisions of Sec. 209 of the Act. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that the dichotomy between `taking' and `retaining' indicates that they are mutually exclusive and apply to two different situations. The word `taking' applies to a person taking possession of a land otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the law, while the word `retaining' to a person taking possession in accordance with the provisions of the law and subsequently retaining the same illegally. Their Lordships further held that the words `possession in accordance with the law for the time being in force' in the context could only mean possession with title and further observed that unless the person sought to be evicted has title or right to possession it cannot be said that his possession is in accordance with the provisions of the law for the time being in force. Learned counsel for the plaintiff opposite party does not at all contest the position that the same meaning be given to the relevant wards used in Sec. 209 of the Act as explained by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case cited. 13. Learned counsel for the plaintiff opposite party does not at all contest the position that the same meaning be given to the relevant wards used in Sec. 209 of the Act as explained by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case cited. 13. On behalf of the applicant it is urged that the taking of possession by the Gaon Samaj after ejectment of the Sirdar, in the circumstances of the present case, would at its inception be illegal inasmuch as the order passed under clause (6) of Sec. 212-A on the own allegations of the plaintiff that the land was not a customary common pasture land on the date or before the date when the plaintiff was admitted as a tenure holder being null and void, plaintiff's Sirdari right ensures throughout and the Gaon Samaj and the other defendants settled by it on the land would not be in possession of the land in accordance with the provisions of the law. The argument so made is attractive and sounds plausible but on a closer examination it will be found that it is fallacious and unsound. This argument of the learned counsel ignores that an order passed under clause (6) of Sec. 212-A after the Collector had recorded his satisfaction on the evidence on record on the questions of fact involved, is a legally enforcible order and the ejectment of the plaintiffs in pursuance thereof would equally be legal and taking of possession of the Gaon Samaj will be taking of possession in accordance with the provisions of law for the time being in force. The mere circumstances that it is open to the Sirdar who was ejected to establish the right claimed over the land, as indicated by me above by a suit, will not have the effect of not vesting a title in the Gaon Samaj to the land in question. The Gaon Samaj after the passing of such an order has a right to the land it having been found to be a customary common pasture land when the plaintiff was admitted to the same as a tenure holder after the eighth day of August 1946 on a judicial determination by an authority competent to decide that matter under the provisions of the law. I have already shown above that such an order has the same efficacy in the eye of law as a decree passed in a regular suit under Sec. 212 on the same matter. It has been conceded by the learned counsel for the applicant that if a Gaon Samaj takes possession by ejectment of the Sirdar under execution of a decree passed in a suit under Sec. 212, then the Gaon Samaj will take possession of the land under a title and it will have a right to possess the land. I see no reason why the same consequence should not follow an order duly passed under Cl. (6) of Sec. 212-A of the Act. 14. In my judgment, the defendant applicant cannot derive any assistance from the ratio of the case of Bhinka Singh decided by the Supreme Court as in that case it was pleaded that the defendants having obtained possession under an order of a competent court passed under Sec. 145, Cr. P. C. they took possession of the land in accordance with the provisions of law and a suit under Sec. 180 of U.P. Tenancy Act was not maintainable. Their Lordships rightly rejected the contention inasmuch as any party who is put in possession by an order of a court under Sec. 145, Cr. P. C. is not put in possession on the basis of determination of its title. The only question which is decided under Sec. 145, Cr. P. C. is one of possession. There can, therefore, be hardly any analogy between an order passed in proceedings under Sec. 145, Cr. P. C. and clause (6)-of Sec. 212-A of the Act. Likewise the ratio in the case of Shyam Sunder v. Kalahey, S.A. No. 293 of 1960 decided on 21-12-1962, mentioned above, cannot apply to the present case as the question which was being considered in that case was whether a party coming into possession on the basis of a decree in a suit under Sec. 9 of the Specific Relief Act could be said to have taken possession in accordance with the provisions of law. A suit under Sec. 9 of the Specific Relief Act does not concern itself with the title of the parties and a decree in that suit does not have the effect of putting a party in possession on the basis of title. A suit under Sec. 9 of the Specific Relief Act does not concern itself with the title of the parties and a decree in that suit does not have the effect of putting a party in possession on the basis of title. My conclusion, therefore, on this part of the case is that the Gaon Samaj took possession of the land in question in accordance with the provisions of law and its possession or the possession of the person settled by it on the land in question at no point of time subsequently became unlawful and therefore the present suit is not covered by section 209 of the Act. 15. It was next urged by the learned counsel, for the applicant that the plaint of the plaintiff in its true effect is a plaint in a suit for declaration of Sirdari right and possession of Sirdari lands and the reliefs claimed are a mere camouflage for the real reliefs for a declaration that the plaintiff is a Sirdar and entitled to the possession of the Sirdari land against trespassers. Reliance has been placed on the case of Ram Sewak v. Vashista, A.I.R. 1949 Alld. p. 419 and the case of Mst. Ram Kunwar v. lqbal Narain and another, A.I.R. 1947 Alld. p. 92 in support of this submission. This argument of the learned counsel need not detain me long. I have already shown above that a suit for declaration of a Sirdari right in the circumstances of the case after an ejectment had taken place in pursuance of a duly passed order under clause (6) of Sec. 212-A would be futile and that the Goan Samaj and the other defendants in the suit cannot be said to be in possession of the land in question otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the law for the time being in force. In this context then to apply the principles laid down in the two cases cited would be incongruous inasmuch as the plaintiff cannot be imputed with an intention that he wanted to have reliefs in the suit which would be futile and of no avail and which he could not get on the pleadings. In this context then to apply the principles laid down in the two cases cited would be incongruous inasmuch as the plaintiff cannot be imputed with an intention that he wanted to have reliefs in the suit which would be futile and of no avail and which he could not get on the pleadings. To my mind, as I read the plaint, it is a simple suit disclosing a cause of action based on an order having been passed under clause (6) of Sec. 212-A of the Act and on an ejectment in pursuance thereof. The narration by the plaintiff that he had become a hereditary tenant and had become Sirdar of the land is merely a narration of the history as to how became into possession of the land but it cannot be said on a correct interpretation of the plaint that it was pleaded as a part of the cause of action for the present suit inasmuch as the present suit is not and could not be based on the plaintiff's antecedent title to the land but is a special kind of suit permitted to be filed by the law to get over an order passed under clause (6) of Sec. 212-A of the Act. The cause of action for the suit would be the passing of that order and the ejectment in pursuance thereof. This submission of the learned counsel, therefore, fails. 16. Lastly the learned counsel for the applicant tried to urge that 'the plaintiff could not have intended to pray for a relief as is disclosed in the plaint under relief No. (a) mentioned above as such a relief for declaration would be barred under Sec. 42 of the Specific Relief Act. I am not concerned with the question whether in the form that relief is claimed the plaintiff can be granted such a declaratory relief in this suit or not. Such a question relates to the merits of the suit and will be decided by the court hearing the suit if raised. 17. The learned counsel for the plaintiff opposite parties put forth in the course of his argument a circumstance which supports the view taken by the learned District Judge that a suit under clause (7) of Sec. 212-A is a suit which is a distinct class of suit and is not intended to be decided by the revenue Court. 17. The learned counsel for the plaintiff opposite parties put forth in the course of his argument a circumstance which supports the view taken by the learned District Judge that a suit under clause (7) of Sec. 212-A is a suit which is a distinct class of suit and is not intended to be decided by the revenue Court. It would be noticed that a regular suit under Sec. 212 and a proceeding under Sec. 212-A both lie in the court of the Collector or the Assistant Collector if so empowered. That is, the questions of fact which are of a similar nature are to be decided by an officer or court having same power or status in either case. The learned counsel submits that an intention could not be imputed to the law makers that when they enacted clause (7) of Sec. 212-A that after the Collector had satisfied himself or even the Assistant Collector if so empowered had satisfied himself on the questions of fact, then a suit claiming the same kind of rights and involving the determination of the same questions of fact would lie in a revenue court as being treated as a suit under Sec. 209 or 229-B which lie in the courts of inferior jurisdiction. I think there is some force in this reasoning. When a Collector has determined a question of fact it is not easily possible to impute an intention to the legislature that an officer or a court of inferior jurisdiction would determine the same questions again on facts. That seems to be the reason that suits under Sec. 212-A have not been provided for in the second schedule. Under Sec. 331 of the Act the suits mentioned in the second schedule are cognizable by the revenue courts mentioned in that schedule. A suit under clause (7) of Sec. 212-A does not find a place in that schedule but in the appendix to the rules framed under the Act. A suit under Sec. 212-A clause (7) has a definite period of limitation mentioned and the court fee is in accordance with the Court fees Act. While in the suits under Secs. 209 and 229-B the court fee is provided for under the schedule to the Act. A suit under Sec. 212-A clause (7) has a definite period of limitation mentioned and the court fee is in accordance with the Court fees Act. While in the suits under Secs. 209 and 229-B the court fee is provided for under the schedule to the Act. The intention of the legislature, therefore, is clear that a suit under clause (7) of Sec. 212-A is regarded as a suit of a different class than the one mentioned in second schedule of the Act. I, therefore, have no hesitation in holding that clause (7) of Sec. 212-A contemplates a different class of suits which fall outside second schedule framed under Sec. 331 of the Act. 18. In the result, therefore, the revisions fail and are dismissed with costs. 19. The interim stay order dated 28-7-1961 in all the three revisions is discharged and the records shall be sent to court below forthwith.