ORDER T.C. Raghavan, J. 1. The Civil Revision Petition is against an order refusing to admit some documents in evidence by the Subordinate Judge, Kottayam, and the Civil Miscellaneous Petition is for transfer of the suit from his file to the file of any other competent court. Since the matters arise out of the same suit they are disposed of together. 2. Several grounds are alleged in the affidavit in support of the petition for transfer and I shall refer to them. The first ground is that the learned Subordinate Judge already expressed his opinion against the plaintiff-petitioners in C. M. A. Nos. 1, 2 and 3 of 1962, which were already disposed of by him. It is also alleged that during the course of the trial of the suit the learned Judge expressed the same opinion. 3. The second ground is this. In the course of the cross examination of dw. 2 he spoke about two instances of electing a successor to the Malankara Metropolitan during the life-time of the then incumbent. In his re-examination a question was put whether there were other instances also and this question was objected to by the counsel of the plaintiff-petitioners. The objection was overruled on the ground that the point covered was "a matter of history and there is nothing in the witness being able to remember more than those he has already mentioned." After the re-examination closed, the plaintiffs' counsel asked for an opportunity to cross examine the witness on this new material brought in re-examination. The learned Judge directed the counsel to file a petition asking for such permission, which was also done. Ultimately, that petition was dismissed. 4. The next ground is regarding the dropping of Issue No. 1 on 5th July 1962 and an incident that followed on the next day. The first issue related to the competency of the plaintiffs to bring the suit in the present form as members of the Church or as representatives of the Malankara Jacobite Syrian Church. On 5th July 1962 the advocate of the 1st defendant agreed not to press this issue and endorsement to that effect was also made by the counsel on both sides. On 5th July 1962 the advocate of the 1st defendant agreed not to press this issue and endorsement to that effect was also made by the counsel on both sides. On the next day the learned Subordinate Judge is alleged to have told the counsel of the 1st defendant that he "committed a blunder in withdrawing the contention", because, according to the learned Judge, the suit could have been disposed of on that point. 5. Yet another ground alleged for transfer is the refusal of the learned Judge to admit certain documents, which question is the subject matter of the revision petition. The relevancy of this order for the purpose of the transfer application is only this. The documents sought to be admitted were actually filed on 10th August 1962 and the learned Judge passed an order receiving them. Thereafter the 1st defendant filed an application objecting to the receipt of those documents and that application was also dismissed on 16th August 1962 on the ground that the petition was already allowed on the 10th. Ultimately, the plaintiffs requested the court by a petition to mark these documents and receive them in evidence. The learned Judge dismissed the petition on 6th September 1962 directing the plaintiff-petitioners to pay costs to the defendants. 6. The last of the grounds alleged for transfer is the refusal to mark the deposition of the 1st defendant in a previous suit as evidence in the present case. The 1st defendant himself refused to enter the box in spite of a demand made by the plaintiffs for examining him. It was after that the petition was filed for receiving his deposition in the previous case as evidence, which prayer was refused. 7. These allegations are denied in the counter affidavit filed by the respondent - defendants. I do not propose to refer in detail to the allegations in the counter affidavit excepting to one of them. Regarding the incident alleged to have taken place on 6th July 1962 paragraph 6 of the counter affidavit avers that the withdrawal of the first issue is admitted, but the statement alleged "to have been made by the learned Judge was never made by him. A reading of this allegation in the counter affidavit leaves the impression that the deponent to the affidavit denies such an incident ever having taken place on 6th July 1962. A reading of this allegation in the counter affidavit leaves the impression that the deponent to the affidavit denies such an incident ever having taken place on 6th July 1962. But it appears from the remarks submitted by the learned Judge himself that some incident took place on that day. Therefore, the allegation in the counter affidavit denying the incident must obviously be false. 8. An objection is raised before me on behalf of the respondents that the transfer petition should have been filed before the District Court and not before this Court. It appears that a petition for transfer was actually filed before the learned District Judge (Mr. T. R. Balakrishna Iyer) and the learned District Judge expressed embarrassment, since he had something to do with the previous litigation which ended in the Supreme Court decision, and he suggested that it would be better that some other court was moved for transfer. It was only after that this Court was moved; and after this petition for transfer was filed, the petition before the learned E District Judge was allowed to be dismissed. In the aforesaid circumstances, this objection has no substance, even if this Court would have normally left the District Court to have considered the question of transfer. 9. I put a straight question to Sri K. V. Surianarayana Iyer, the learned counsel of the petitioners, whether any of the grounds alleged by the petitioners by itself would be a sufficient ground for transfer; and the learned counsel conceded before me that any one of the grounds by itself may not be sufficient for this Court to transfer the suit to another Court. But he contended that the cumulative effect of all the grounds together was to create a reasonable apprehension in the minds of the petitioners that they would not get a fair trial of the case before the Subordinate Judge and for that reason the suit might be transferred from that court. I would not have agreed even with this contention of Mr. Surianarayana Iyer, but for one or two observations found in the remarks submitted by the learned Subordinate Judge. I would not have agreed even with this contention of Mr. Surianarayana Iyer, but for one or two observations found in the remarks submitted by the learned Subordinate Judge. The learned Subordinate Judge observes: "To take a casual remark of the Court out of its context, distort it as above and express a sense of injustice on that account so late in the day is indeed a travesty." The learned Judge again observes in another part of his remarks: "To this extent I would humbly submit that the plaintiffs' pretended sense of injustice is an abuse of the rights under S.24 of the C. P. C." These observations of the learned Subordinate judge, to say the least, are a little unhappy and they leave an impression in my mind that at least to make justice appear to be done the suit should be heard by another court. I am fully aware that the High Court should hesitate to ascribe any lack of judicial detachment to a subordinate judicial officer, because the officer has no opportunity to reply such observations. At the same time, in considering such matters this Court should put itself in the arm-chair of the party seeking the transfer and consider whether the grounds alleged by him are sufficient to create a reasonable apprehension in his mind that he will not get a fair trial before the particular judge. In this connection I would refer to two decisions of the Patna High Court and an observation of the Supreme Court. In Ram Prasad Mandel v. The king (AIR 1949 Patna 435) a Division Bench of the Patna High Court held that in considering a transfer application, the question whether there was bias on the part of the Judge was not alone material and that it was equally material to consider whether anything happened which might create in the mind of the party an impression that the court was not wholly impartial and disinterested. In the next case Lalita Rajya Lakshmi v. State of Bihar (AIR 1957 Patna 198) the learned Judge observed: "Therefore, if there are circumstances in a case, which raise a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the person applying for transfer that he would not receive fair dealings at his trial, or, in other words, that he may not have a fair and impartial trial, and may not get justice in the court, where the suit is pending, the case should be transferred. In such a case, in order to decide whether the facts and circumstances are sufficient to raise such a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the party applying for transfer, the court should put himself in such a party's arm chair; and then alone the court is at liberty to place himself in the position of, and the same situation in which, the party himself stood, with the knowledge of all the facts with which the party was acquainted, and, then only the court can see and judge for himself how these facts would have affected the party's mind, and, if they are reasonable and sufficient to raise the reasonable apprehension complained of in the mind of even a reasonable person." In Manak Lal v. Dr. Prem Chand Singhyi ( AIR 1957 SC 425 ) their Lordships dealing with the question of bias observed: "In such cases the test is not whether in fact a bias has affected the judgment; the lest always is and must be whether a litigant could reasonably apprehend that a bias attributable to a member of the tribunal might have operated against him in the final decision of the tribunal. It is in this sense that it is often said that justice must not only be done but must also appear to be done." Therefore, if the circumstances warrant my holding that the petitioners could have a reasonable apprehension that they would not get a fair trial before the learned Subordinate Judge, the case must be transferred to another court. It is in this sense that it is often said that justice must not only be done but must also appear to be done." Therefore, if the circumstances warrant my holding that the petitioners could have a reasonable apprehension that they would not get a fair trial before the learned Subordinate Judge, the case must be transferred to another court. Though I am not fully satisfied that the grounds alleged for transfer are singly or even cumulatively quite sufficient for the transfer, they, when considered in the light of the observations made by the learned Subordinate Judge in his remarks, make me feel that the apprehension of the petitioners that they are not likely to get a fair trial before him is not completely devoid of merit. It may be that such a situation was brought about by the action of the petitioners themselves; but that is no reason for refusing transfer if the apprehension is reasonable. I may also observe that the observations of the learned Judge in his remarks reveal that he has forgotten that he was only submitting his remarks to a superior court and not disposing of the transfer petition himself. 10. The Civil Revision Petition relates to the refusal to mark certain documents in evidence. One of the documents is a small booklet by name 'Jeevanikshepam' which has been allowed to be used by the lower court as a text book about the practices pertaining to the Church. I do not think that this booklet is of such a nature as to be treated as a text book of history or referred to as such. It is better that it is marked and referred to as an exhibit. 11. The other documents sought to be marked are three notices: two of them are alleged to have been issued in the year 1082 and the other in 1071. The 1st defendant was called upon to produce them and he filed an affidavit in reply that they were not in his possession. Thereafter, according to the petitioners, they made enquiries and got these documents, and therefore, the delay in their production, if any, should not stand in the way of marking them as exhibits. In fact, they were already received by the learned Judge; still they were not marked. Thereafter, according to the petitioners, they made enquiries and got these documents, and therefore, the delay in their production, if any, should not stand in the way of marking them as exhibits. In fact, they were already received by the learned Judge; still they were not marked. The reasons given by the learned Judge are not sufficient for refusing to mark them and therefore they will also be marked as exhibits. 12. One more document which was sought to be marked is the deposition of the 1st defendant in an earlier litigation. The objection to the marking of this is that the earlier litigation did not involve the same question as the one involved in the present suit; and the whole of that deposition which runs to several pages should not be marked in its entirety. In other words, the contention is that the portions in the deposition which are relevant should be pointed out and those portions alone should be marked. Therefore, the deposition with the marked portions, which alone will be used in evidence and which will be pointed out by the petitioners within a week of the receipt of records by the lower court, will be marked as an exhibit in the case. It is once again make clear that only such marked portions in the deposition will be used as evidence in the case; and whether those portions are relevant or admissible in evidence will be decided by the lower court at the relevant time. 13. The Civil Revision Petition is therefore allowed and the documents sought to be marked are allowed to be marked. Formal or necessary evidence to prove the documents may also be taken. Regarding the three notices, if any evidence contra is necessary for the defendants, they may produce such evidence also. 14. The suit is transferred to the file of the Additional District Judge, Kottayam and the learned Judge is directed to dispose of the matter as expeditiously as possible. 15. In the Civil Revision Petition the respondents will pay the costs of the petitioners in this Court and the parties will bear their respective costs in the lower court. 16. The records will be sent back without delay.