JUDGMENT G. Kumar, J. - This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for issue of a writ of certiorari quashing the order of the Superintendent of Police, Muzaffarnagar, dated 9-8-1958, whereby the applicant was dismissed from service, and those of the Deputy Inspector General of Police Meerut Range dated 22-5-59 and Inspector General of Police dated 15-4-60 maintaining the same. 2. Briefly stated the facts giving rise to this petition are that in September, 1957, the petitioner was posted as Head Constable at the Police Out Post Khalapar, Police Station Kotwali, District Muzaffarnagar. On 21-9-1957 the petitioner found one Suraj Prakash gambling and arrested him under Sec. 13 of the Gambling Act. He was later on released on bail by the Sub-Inspector of Police. After necessary investigation he was challaned and 5th of April, 1958 was fixed for the first hearing of the case before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Muzaffarnagar. In para 5 of his affidavit the petitioner has deposed to his personal knowledge, that on the said date the real culprit Suraj Prakash did not appear in court and in his place Mohammad Saddiq appeared in the dock as an accused. The latter admitted the guilt and was sentenced by the Magistrate to undergo one month's rigorous imprisonment. Accordingly, Mohammad Saddiq was sent to Jail to serve out his sentence. Annexure `G' to the supplementary affidavit of the petitioner shows that on 15-4-1958 Abdul Majid, father of Mohammad Saddiq aforesaid had sent an application to the District Magistrate, Muzaffarnagar saying that Suraj Prakash, a Satta Gambler, was arrested by the Police, who let him free after taking a handsome amount and wrongly arrested his son Mohammad Saddiq, who after being beaten and threatened, was made to impersonate the real accused Suraj Prakash. Mohammad Saddiq was accordingly sentenced to one month's imprisonment instead of the real accused Suraj Prakash. It was further stated that the Head Constable of Out Post Khalapar (meaning thereby the present petitioner) had gone to the house of Abdul Majid aforesaid on 7-4-1958 and gave him a sum of Rs. 50/- saying that his son Mohammad Saddiq had been sent out on service for a month with Kotwal Saheb. He ended his application with the remark that he lately came to know the aforesaid facts, hence he requested the District Magistrate to enquire and do justice in the matter. 3. 50/- saying that his son Mohammad Saddiq had been sent out on service for a month with Kotwal Saheb. He ended his application with the remark that he lately came to know the aforesaid facts, hence he requested the District Magistrate to enquire and do justice in the matter. 3. On 25th April, 1958, a charge sheet under Sec. 7 of the Police Act under the signature of the Deputy Superintendent of Police was served on the petitioner (Annexure `A'). The relevant portion of the charge levelled against the petitioner runs as follows :- "I, Harbans Singh, Deputy Superintendent of Police Muzaffarnagar do hereby charge you ..... for remissness and negligence in the discharge of your duty and unfitness for the same inasmuch as that while posted at O.P. Khalapar ..... . You on 5-4-1958 had fraudulently produced Mohd. Saddiq . . . . . . in the court of Sub-Divisional Magistrate Sadar, Muzaffarnagar as an accused person in case Crime no. 426 under section 13 Gambling Act instead of the real accused Sri Suraj Prakash Moham mad Saddiq was persuaded by you to pose as Suraj Prakash. He was consequently wrongly sentenced to imprisonment for one month and was sent to the local jail to undergo it. You also later made, the father of the said Mohd. Saddiq to understand that his son had been sent to Dehradun on employment and had paid him Rs. 50/- as advance wages." The Deputy Superintendent of Police, after conducting a thorough enquiry into the matter and, inter alia, examining Mohd. Saddiq, Suraj Prakash and Abdul Majid and after hearing the evidence of the witnesses produced by the petitioner in his defence, came to the conclusion that the charge had been established against the petitioner. Accordingly the Deputy Superintendent of Police proposed the punishment of dismissal from service. Thereupon the Superintendent of Police, Muzaffarnagar, served both show cause-notices on the petitioner, and after considering his explanation, came to the conclusion that the charge had been fully established against him. As such, the Superintendent of Police by his order dated 9-8-1958 directed the dismissal of the petitioner from Police force. The petitioner then filed an appeal to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, who dismissed the same on 22-5-1959. The revision of the petitioner was likewise dismissed by the Inspector General of Police by his order dated 15-4-1960; hence this writ petition. 4. The petitioner then filed an appeal to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, who dismissed the same on 22-5-1959. The revision of the petitioner was likewise dismissed by the Inspector General of Police by his order dated 15-4-1960; hence this writ petition. 4. Sri G.D. Srivastava, learned counsel for the petitioner has argued this case with considerable ability. His first contention is that the petitioner was really charged with cognizable offences, namely, bribery as envisaged by Sec. 161, I.P.C. and wrongful confinement of Mohd. Sadiq, as contemplated by Sec. 342, I.PC. The contention of the petitioner's counsel, therefore, is that the case should have been registered, investigated and sent up for trial as a cognizable offence under Chap. XIV of the Criminal Procedure Code, instead of being subjected to a departmental trial under the directions of the Superintendent of Police. In support of this contention reliance has been placed on para. 486(1) of the U.P. Police Regulations. 5. As already observed above, the matter had come to light on the receipt of an application, dated 15-4-1958 sent by Abdul Majid, father of Mohd. Saddiq, to the District Magistrate, Muzaffarnagar; SIC was later on forwarded to the Police for a probe into the matter. Thus in the present case the information had in the first instance been received by the District Magistrate, who, in his turn, had forwarded the complainant's application to the Police. So the provisions of para. 486(1) of the Police Regulations could not be attracted. Sub-para. (1) (i) of Para. 486 of the Police Regulations runs as follows :- "If the information is received, in the first instance, by a Magistrate and forwarded by the District Magistrate to the Police, no case will be registered by the Police." It is thus clear that the Police could not have registered the case under the first part of Para. 486. In such a case, however, the Police would follow the procedure laid down in sub-para. (3) of para. 486. 6. A close scrutiny of the facts of the present case shows that an offence either under Sec. 161 or 342 of the Indian Penal Code was not even prima facie made out against the petitioner. In the first place, the allegations in the complainant's application were not pointedly made against the petitioner, and it was only vaguely stated that the `Police' had acted illegally in the manner described. In the first place, the allegations in the complainant's application were not pointedly made against the petitioner, and it was only vaguely stated that the `Police' had acted illegally in the manner described. In the second place the allegations were admittedly based upon hearsay information received by the complainant. At the enquiry both Suraj Prakash (real accused) and Mohd. Saddiq (substituted accused) were examined by the Enquiry Officer. Suraj Prakash did not even suggest that he was let free on payment of any bribe to the petitioner or to any other Policeman. Likewise Mohammad Saddiq did not state that he was unlawfully arrested or detained by the petitioner or any other Policeman. He only stated that, under instruction of his employer Ali Sher contractor, he went with the petitioner to the court of the Magistrate on 5-4-58, where he was asked by the petitioner to pose as Suraj Prakash. On his refusal, he was threatened by the petitioner and at the latter's instance and instigation Mohammad Saddiq gave out his name as Suraj Prakash. when the court enquired the same. and he wrongly admitted the guilt due to the fear of the petitioner. Thus there is not an iota of evidence about bribery or wrongful confinement of Mohd. Saddiq by the petitioner. Therefore it cannot be said that there was even a prima facie evidence against the petitioner of a cognizable offence under Sec. 161 or 342 of the Indian Penal Code. The only offence prima facie made out against the petitioner was that he abetted and instigated Mohammad Saddiq to impersonate Suraj Prakash in the court of the Magistrate. This act on the part of the petitioner would certainly fall within the ambit of Sec. 205 read with Sec. 107, I. P. C., which is a non-cognizable offence. Therefore it cannot be said that the departmental enquiry against the petitioner could not have been launched without following the procedure prescribed by Chapter XIV of the Criminal Procedure Code. Hence the mandatory provisions of R. 1 of para. 486 of the U.P. Police Regulations have no application to the present case. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner to the contrary is without force. 7. Hence the mandatory provisions of R. 1 of para. 486 of the U.P. Police Regulations have no application to the present case. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner to the contrary is without force. 7. It was next contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that action under Sec. 7 of the Police Act against the petitioner could only be taken if the punishing authority considered the charged Police officer to be "remiss or negligent in the discharge of his duty or unfit for the same." The argument of the learned counsel is that the petitioner being admittedly a Head Constable, Incharge of an Out Post, his duties as such had been defined in para. 58 of the Police Regulations, which runs as follows :- "The head constable of an outpost is responsible for the orderly conduct and discipline of the constables under his charge. He shall inspect them at daybreak and at sunset every day; he shall tell them off for duty and see that they do their work properly. He shall be in constant communication with the officer-in-charge of the station, shall immediately report to him cognizable crimes and important occurrences, and shall make, at intervals fixed by the Superintendent, Periodical reports on the discipline of his subordinates and the performance of their duties. He may not make investigations, but may hold inquests when specially em-powered by the Superintendent of Police to do so." Mr. Srivastava, therefore, argued that the action of the petitioner in having instigated Mohammad Saddiq to impersonate Suraj Prakash in the court of the Magistrate did not fall under any of the duties prescribed in para. 58 of the Police Regulations, and he could only have been punished under Sec. 7 of the Police Act if he was found to be remiss or negligent in the discharge of his above quoted duties as Head Constable-in-charge of an Out Post or was unfit for the same. This has the appearance of a plausible argument but has no substance in reality. In support of his above contention Mr. Srivastava has placed reliance on the observations of a Division Bench of this Court in Purshottam Chandra v. State of U.P., (1957) A.L.J. 885 = AIR 1959 Allahabad 26. This has the appearance of a plausible argument but has no substance in reality. In support of his above contention Mr. Srivastava has placed reliance on the observations of a Division Bench of this Court in Purshottam Chandra v. State of U.P., (1957) A.L.J. 885 = AIR 1959 Allahabad 26. That was a case under the U.P. Municipalities Act and involved the interpretation of Sec. 40(3) of that Act which runs as follows :- "The State Government may re-move from the board a member who in its opinion has so flagrantly abused in any manner his position as a member of the board as to render his continuance as a member detrimental to the public interest." 8. A bare perusal of the above quoted-sub-section shows that it has made it a condition precedent that before a member could be removed by the Government he must have flagrantly abused his position as a member of the board and not in his private capacity. Therefore, the analogy of Sec. 40(3) of the U.P. Municipalities Act cannot possibly apply to a case under Sec. 7 of the Police Act, where the wordy and standards laid down for justifying an action against an erring police officer are entirely different. It was on account of the above quoted qualifying words used in Sec. 40(3) of the U.P. Municipalities Act itself that this Court had observed as follows in the case of Purshottam Chandra (supra) :- "In removing a member the conduct to which exception is taken must be conduct in his capacity as a member . . . . This is a condition precedent to the exercise by the State of its powers under the sub-section and it is only when this condition is fulfilled that the State Government is vested with the authority to remove the member if in its opinion his conduct constitutes such a flagrant abuse of his position as to render his continuance as a member detrimental to the public interest . . . . . . ." 9. The ruling in Purshattani Chandra's case has, therefore, no application to the instant case, where "any act of his own" may render a policeman liable for punishment under Sec. 7 of the Police Act. . . . . . ." 9. The ruling in Purshattani Chandra's case has, therefore, no application to the instant case, where "any act of his own" may render a policeman liable for punishment under Sec. 7 of the Police Act. Evidently Mr, Srivastava has omitted to consider the significance of the penultimate words "or unfit for the same" appearing in the first clause and the words "or, who by any act of his own shall render himself unfit for the discharge thereof" appearing in the second clause of Sec. 7 of the Police Act. The use of the words "or unfit for the same" and "any act of his own" has clear reference to the improper personal and private acts of a Police officer. The Police force is a disciplined body, whose main object is to uphold the law. Action under Sec. 7 of the Police Act is essentially a disciplinary action. If a Police officer himself breaks the law by setting up a person to falsely personate another man in a judicial proceeding before a Magistrate, it is a very serious matter, which is wholly inconsistent with his petition as a Policeman. The very nature of the employment and service of, a Police officer is such that any grave laches or misconduct on his part would render him unfit for proper discharge of his duties, in a disciplined organisation like the Police force, which would otherwise be brought into disrepute. If the interpretation sought to be put on the language of Sec. 7 by Mr. Srivastava were to be accepted, it would mean that a Police officer, even though a habitual Tier, a heavy drunkard, a desperate gambler or a debauch of the worst type in his personal life should not be deemed to be unfit for discharge of his duties and should continue to be retained in service in spite of the above vices being brought to the notice of his superiors. I am not prepared to lay down that such was the intention of the legislature, when it enacted Sec. 7 of the Police Act. I am not prepared to lay down that such was the intention of the legislature, when it enacted Sec. 7 of the Police Act. In my opinion, if a person belonging to the Police force is base or commits crimes or other acts of impropriety, he is certainly unsuited for discharging his duties as a Police Officer and he would render himself unfit for retention, in the Police force by his own improper act and conduct. I am fully supported in taking this view by a Division Bench of the. Bombay High Court in Madho Singh Daulatsingh v. State of Bombay through Secretary Home Department, AIR 1960 Bombay 285. Their Lordships while dealing with the rights and liabilities of a master and servant vis-a-vis a Police officer observed as follows :- "When a person accepts an employment, by necessary implications, he agrees to so conduct and behave himself as would not be inconsistent with the nature of his service. If he acts otherwise, that would affect or at any rate would be likely to affect the interests or good name of his employer. If and when it happens it is reasonable to hold that it would entitle the employer to take such disciplinary action against his employee as the nature and degree of misconduct would require . . . . It is not that interests or good name of an employer is likely to be adversely affected only by an act of an employee during the course of an employment. We do not find any provision either in the Police Act or Regulations to restrict recourse to taking disciplinary action against a police officer's action to acts done by him during the course of employment only .......... In order to enable a master to take disciplinary action against his servant it is not a condition precedent that the misconduct on the part of the servant must arise within his employment and not outside his employment. The test in each case will be whether the servant is conducting himself in a way inconsistent with the faithful discharge of his obligations undertaken by him either expressly or impliedly in accepting the service. The inconsistency may arise on account of any act of the servant, either in the course of his employment or outside it, which injures or has the tendency to injure his master's business or interests or reputation. The inconsistency may arise on account of any act of the servant, either in the course of his employment or outside it, which injures or has the tendency to injure his master's business or interests or reputation. There is no reason why this principle should not apply to public servants. There is, however, one very material difference between the two and that must be kept in view. In case of a private servant it is the master who in his own discretion decides the question of the disciplinary action to be taken against his servant. In the case of , a public servant it is not the master but certain officers of the same master who decide this question." With all respect to the learned Judges of the Bombay High Court, I am in full agreement with them. Therefore, the higher officers - belonging to the Police Department were fully justified in taking the requisite disciplinary action against the petitioner by dismissing him from Police force, when they found that the petitioner had committed a very serious misconduct and crime in setting up Mohd. Saddiq to falsely personate Suraj Prakash at the trial pending before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Muzaffarnagar. The petitioner's case had been thoroughly examined by the Police authorities concerned. The act and conduct of , the petitioner in being instrumental in putting up Mohd, Saddiq in place of Suraj Prakash as an accused in a case under Sec. 13 of the Gambling Act was a very serious matter. Even, according to his own showing, the petitioner was present in the court room of the Magistrate when Mohd. Saddiq impersonated Suraj Prakash in that court. The complaint of Abdul Majid (father of Mohd. Saddiq) and his statement before the Enquiring Officer further proved to the hilt that it was the petitioner who had paid Rs. 50/- to Abdul Majid on the false pretext that his son Mohd. Saddiq had been employed at some out station and the amount of Rs. 50/- represented his advance wages for a period of one month. This subsequent conduct of the petitioner was equally heinous and condemnable. In these circumstances, the findings of fact recorded by the Police authorities that the act and conduct of the petitioner rendered himself unfit for retention in the Police force were fully justified. 10. The petition has therefore no force and is dismissed with costs.