JUDGMENT S.N. Katju, J. - These are appeals preferred by the defendants in suits brought by the Gram Sabha Pirkhir, pargana Bhuili, Tehsil Chunar, District Mirzapur. The respondent had instituted seven suits for possession of different portions of plot No. 1 of village Pirkhir. All the aforesaid suits were connected and tried together and disposed of by a common judgment by the courts below. It was alleged that the said plot No. 1 was a tank and had been recorded as such, that the appellants were the zamindars of the plots in suit before the date of vesting and they had taken possession over different parts of the said plot without any right and were thus liable to ejectment in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 212 of Act I of 1951. 2. The defendant-appellants contended that the land in suits had not vested in the respondent and plot No. 1 was neither a tank nor it was recorded as such The appellants had been in possession since before 1346F. and were thus not liable to ejectment and the suits brought by the respondent were bared by limitation. The appellants also aimed compensation. 3. The trial court decreed the suits on payment of one year's rent computed at the hereditary rate as compensation. On appeal the court below affirmed the decision of the trial court but expressed the view that Sec. 212 of the Act was not applicable and the suits lay under Sec. 209 of the Act and the respondent was entitled to a decree as claimed by it. In this view of the matter the court below set aside the decree with regard to compensation. Aggrieved from the aforesaid decision of the courts below the appellants have now come in appeal in this Court. 4. The questions raised in the appeal are, firstly, whether the suits were maintainable under Sec. 209 of the Act and, secondly, if the suits did not lie under Sec. 212 of the Act relief could be given to the respondent under Sec. 209 of the Act. 5. It was contended on behalf of the appellants that Sec. 212, as it stood prior to the amendment in 1956, mentioned only "tank" and the land in suit was a `pond' and, therefore, Sec. 212 of the Act did not apply and consequently the suits were not maintainable. 5. It was contended on behalf of the appellants that Sec. 212, as it stood prior to the amendment in 1956, mentioned only "tank" and the land in suit was a `pond' and, therefore, Sec. 212 of the Act did not apply and consequently the suits were not maintainable. It was alleged that even though the khasra entries indicated that the aforesaid plot No. 1 was a "Talab", the entry in the Bandobast register showed that the plot was a "Tal" i.e. a pond. The court below expressed the view that the entry of `Talab' was a mistake and the plot in suit was not a Talab but a `Tal', i.e. a pond, and thus held that the plot in suit had been properly recorded in the Bandobast register as a `Tal'. In this view of the matter the court below held that the suits did not lie under Sec. 212 of the Act. Learned counsel for the respondent contended that the expression "Tanks" used in Sec. 212 of the Act was wide enough to include ponds as well and, in any case, what was material was the recorded entry with respect to the plot. It was contended that since the plot in suit had been entered as a `Tank' in the Khasra and Khataunis, therefore, there was a properly recorded entry of the plot as a `tank' and that was sufficient to attract the provisions of Sec. 212 of the Act. It was contended that once the recorded entry showed that the plot in suit was a tank, it was immaterial whether it was a tank or a pond. There is no substance in this contention. The court below has recorded a categorical finding that the plot in suit was erroneously entered as a tank in the Khasra and the Khataunis and it was properly recorded as a "Tal" in the bandobast register. The court below, therefore, came to a proper conclusion in holding that Sec. 212 of the Act did not apply to the cases as set up by the respondent. 6. It was further contended by the learned counsel for the respondent that the amendment in 1956 did not introduce any new feature and it only clarified the provision as it stood in Sec. 212 of the Act. There is no force in this contention. 6. It was further contended by the learned counsel for the respondent that the amendment in 1956 did not introduce any new feature and it only clarified the provision as it stood in Sec. 212 of the Act. There is no force in this contention. The amendment of 1956 provided for the addition of the word "pond" in Sec. 212 and the amending Act further stated that the amendment was not retrospective. The court below was, therefore, right in holding that the amendment of Sec. 212 by the amending Act of 1956 could not help the respondent and the suits as they were instituted in 1954 were not maintainable under Sec. 212 of the Act. 7. The second question is whether the court below was justified in treating the suits as under 209 of the Act. The plaints in the suits definitely stated that the suits had been brought under Sec. 212 of the Act. There was absolutely no reference to Sec. 209 nor there was any pointed reference to the ingredients necessary under Sec. 209 of the Act. Furthermore, it would appear that Sec. 209 would not apply to the suits in appeal. 8. The provisions of the unamended Sec. 212 runs thus :- "212(1) Any person who, on of after the eighth day of August 1946, has been admitted as a tenure or grove-holder of, or being an intermediary has brought under his own cultivation or has planted a grove upon, and land which was recorded as or was customary common pastureland, cremation or burial ground, tank, pathway or Khalian, shall be liable, notwithstanding, contained in Sec. 199, on the suit of the Gaon Samaj to ejectment from the land, on payment of such compensation as may be prescribed." There is specific provision under the section for ejectment from land if it belongs to one of the categories of land enumerated in the aforesaid section which include a "tank". Furthermore, Sec. 212 provides for compensation on ejectment from the kind of land mentioned in Sec. 212. There is no such provision with regard to compensation in Sec. 209. Furthermore, Sec. 212 provides for compensation on ejectment from the kind of land mentioned in Sec. 212. There is no such provision with regard to compensation in Sec. 209. It would, therefore, follow that if ejectment is sought under Sec. 209 even from the kind of land mentioned in Sec. 212, then the person sought to be ejected would not be entitled to any compensation to which he could be entitled to if an action under Sec. 212 is brought against him. It appears that the legislature made a special provision for ejectment from the kind of land which is enumerated in Sec. 212 and where ejectment from such land is sought the only remedy is by way of a suit under Sec. 212 and not by an action under Sec. 209 of the Act. If it was left to the plaintiff to make a choice and bring an action either under Sec. 209 or under Sec. 212 of the Act for ejectment from land mentioned in the latter section then it would imply that the right to be compensated in a case of ejectment is left completely in the hands of the plaintiff who seeks ejectment. Furthermore, if land which is covered by a tank has been brought under cultivation and if such land is held as `khudkasht' on the date preceding the date of vesting, then under Sec. 18, the intermediary in possession thereof would be entitled to take or retain it as a bhumidhar thereof. In the present suits, the appellants contended seem suits, the appellants contended that they were in possession and the court below has also found that they were in possession since 1950. 9. Learned counsel for the respondent contended that under Sec. 117 of the Act, land covered by a tank would vest in the Gaon Samaj. So far as Sec. 18 is concerned there does not appear to be any indication in its provisions that where land which was included in a tank is brought under the khudkasht of the intermediary then that land also would pass on to the Gaon Samaj under Sec. 117 of the Act. For covering such cases the provisions of Sec. 212 of the Act are directly applicable because the aforesaid provisions say that where such land is brought under cultivation after 1946 the land would vest in the Gaon Samaj. For covering such cases the provisions of Sec. 212 of the Act are directly applicable because the aforesaid provisions say that where such land is brought under cultivation after 1946 the land would vest in the Gaon Samaj. Thus, it would appear the only section under which the action against the appellants could lie was Sec. 212 and not 209. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the court below was in error in holding that suits lay under Sec. 209 of the act and relief could be given to the respondent under the aforesaid sections. 10. A. reference may also be made to Gaon Sabha Pirkhir v. Sobh Nath Singh, S.A. No. 2831 of 1959 decided on 22.1.1963, decided by Mr. Justice Mithan Lal. The aforesaid case related to a portion of the land covered by the same tank which is the subject matter of dispute in the present appeals, viz, plot No. 1 in village Pirkhir. The Gram Sabha had instituted the suit in the defendant landlord on the ground that the land was a portion of the tank and it had vested in the plaintiff on the enforcement of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. The suit had been brought under Sec. 212 of the Act. It was sought to convert it into a suit under Sec. 209 or under Sec. 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Mr. Justice Mithan Lal dismissing the appeal observed as follows :- "The first contention of the learned counsel for the appellant cannot be accepted because the suit was based on Sec. 212 of Z.A. and L.R. Act, not only that heading of the suit was given in the plaint under Sec. 212 of Z.A. and L.R. Act but certain specific allegations were made in the body of the plaint stating that the defendant occupied the tank as a zamindari. In view of all this the plaintiff cannot be allowed to argue that the suit should be treated to be one against a trespasser either under Sec. 209 of Z.A. and L.R. Act or a title suit under Sec. 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In view of all this the plaintiff cannot be allowed to argue that the suit should be treated to be one against a trespasser either under Sec. 209 of Z.A. and L.R. Act or a title suit under Sec. 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The suit remained unmaintainable and the finding of the lower appellate court on this point cannot be set aside." I am, therefore, of the opinion that the suits were not maintainable either under Sec. 209 or under Sec. 212 of the Act and should be dismissed. 11. The appeals are allowed with costs throughout.