JUDGMENT Gyanendra Kumar, J. - The petitioner was a constable attached to Manduadih outpost, Police Station Daswasmedh, Varanasi. A departmental enquiry under Section 7 of the Police Act was held by the Deputy Superintendent of Police (City) who found him guilty with the result that the Superintendent of Police, Varanasi, dismissed him by his order dated 22-8-1961. He then went up in appeal before the Deputy Inspector General of Police and in revision to the Inspector General of Police who both maintained the order of dismissal; hence this petition for the grant of a writ of certiorari quashing the orders of the Deputy Superintendent of Police, the Senior Superintendent of Police, the Deputy Inspector General of Police and the Inspector General of Police. 2. The allegations against the petitioner were that on the night of 2-4-1961 at about 11-30 P.M. he was lying in the verandah of a prostitute named Mst. Munni that there was some quarrel between her and another prostitute Mst. Zarina as to who should take betel leaves (Pan) first from Mithan Panwala, each trying to have preference over the other. On hearing the hue and cry over this affair, the petitioner is alleged to have descended from the verandah and after walking up to the shop of Mithan Panwala, rebuked and gave a beating to Mst. Zarina. The commotion and outcries attracted several persons of the locality including Kuber. One Abdul Ghaffar was passing that way and he is also alleged to have seen the occurrence. He later on sent a written report to the Senior Superintendent of Police, Varanasi, about the beating given by the petitioner to Mst. Zarina. Thereupon proceedings under Section 7 of the Police Act started against the petitioner and the enquiry was conducted by the Deputy Superintendent of Police (City) Varanasi. The Trying Officer after examining a number of prosecution and defence witnesses came to the conclusion that the charge against the petitioner had been established. At the end of her statement Mst. Zarina also made an allegation that during the course of the marpit the petitioner had also taken out a ring from her finger and had not returned the same to her in spite of several demands. At the end of her statement Mst. Zarina also made an allegation that during the course of the marpit the petitioner had also taken out a ring from her finger and had not returned the same to her in spite of several demands. In view of the previous good record of the petitioner, the Deputy Superintendent of Police recommended a lenient punishment viz., a reduction in his pay by 3 grades in the time scale of pay for a period of 2 years. However, the Senior Superintendent of Police did not agree with the recommendation of the Deputy Superintendent of Police. He was of the opinion that the conduct of the petitioner in keeping Mst. Munni as his prostitute and in taking the side of his `keep' and giving a beating to Mg. Zarina was an illegal and serious matter and rendered the petitioner unfit for the police service which was a disciplined force. He further found that the mere fact that the petitioner had a good record in the past could not be treated as an extenuating circumstance when the charge proved against him was so grave and serious. Therefore, the Senior Superintendent of Police was of the opinion that it was a fit case in which an enhanced punishment of dismissal should be inflicted. He therefore served a show-cause-notice upon the petitioner as to why he should not be dismissed from the police service for his gross misconduct and remissness in the discharge of his duties as also unfitness for the same. 3. On 13-8-61 the petitioner submitted his explanation which was found unsatisfactory by the Senior Superintendent of Police. In his explanation the petitioner had raised the plea that the Senior Superintendent of Police had no jurisdiction to enhance the punishment, which was turned down on the ground that the Deputy Superintendent of Police had not himself inflicted any punishment on the petitioner but had only recommended a punishment; as such there was no question of its enhancement by him (Senior Superintendent of Police). The latter was of the opinion that the petitioner had acted in a most irresponsible manner by giving a beating to Mst. Zarina, so he did not deserve to be retained in the disciplined police force. He accordingly dismissed the petitioner by his order dated 22-8-1961. 4. The latter was of the opinion that the petitioner had acted in a most irresponsible manner by giving a beating to Mst. Zarina, so he did not deserve to be retained in the disciplined police force. He accordingly dismissed the petitioner by his order dated 22-8-1961. 4. The petitioner then went up in appeal to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Varanasi Range, who dismissed the same by his order dated March 6, 1962. Dissatisfied with the order of the Deputy Inspector General of Police, the petitioner filed a revision before the Inspector General of Police who also dismissed the same by his order dated 19-2-1963; hence this writ petition to this Court as already stated above. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner has raised a variety of grounds in support of this petition. His first contention is that inasmuch as Mst. Zarina in her statement before the Trying Officer had disclosed that her ring was also taken away by the petitioner, his act amounted to robbery or at least theft which was a cognisable offence, with the result that in the first instance, proceedings by way of police investigation should have been taken and the departmental trial under Section 7 of the Police Act could not have commenced. 6. It is noteworthy that in the written report lodged by Abdul Ghafoor there was no allegation of removal of the ring by the petitioner. It only spoke of a beating having been given by the petitioner to Mst. Zarina. It was on the basis of that report that proceedings and trial under Section 7 of the Police Act had commenced against the petitioner. It was only towards the end of her statement at the departmental trial that Mst. Zarina made a sort of half-hearted mention that during the marpit the petitioner had also taken out her ring but voluntarily added that she had demanded it back on several occasions but he had not returned the same so far. 7. Robbery has been defined in Section 390, I.P.C. It can be of two types (1) robbery by theft and (2) robbery by extortion. 7. Robbery has been defined in Section 390, I.P.C. It can be of two types (1) robbery by theft and (2) robbery by extortion. Theft is `robbery' if in order to the committing of the theft, or in committing the theft, or in carrying away or attempting to carry away property obtained by the theft, the offender, for that end, voluntarily causes or attempts to cause to any person death or hurt or wrongful restraint, or fear of instant death, or of instant hurt, or of instant wrongful restraint." An examination of the statement of Mst. Zarina shows that, in fact, the petitioner had not given a beating to Mst. Zarina with the object of removing her ring. On the other hand, he had already started beating Mst. Zarina because of her quarrel with Mst. Munni and it was only during the marpit that he also took away the ring. Therefore, it could not possibly be a case of robbery by theft. 8. According to 2nd part of Section 390, I.P.C. extortion is "robbery" if the offender, at the time of committing the extortion, is in the presence of the person put in fear, and commits the extortion by putting that person in fear of instant death, or instant hurt, or of instant wrongful restraint to that person, or to some other person, and, by so putting in fear, induces the person so put in fear then and there so deliver up the thing extorted. 9. The case does not fall even in the above definition inasmuch as the petitioner is not alleged to have held out any threat of death or hurt or to have caused such a hurt and thereby induced Mst. Zarina to deliver up her ring to him. 10. The alleged facts could also not constitute theft as defined in Section 378 of the I.P.C., because no dishonesty on the part of the petitioner has been suggested in removing the ring of Mst. Zarina. Her evidence does not even show that it was taken out without her consent, because in the very same breath she herself alleged that she had demanded her ring several times from the petitioner but he had not returned it so far. This suggests that the petitioner had not removed the ring dishonestly but took it out on the understanding that it would be returned to her. This suggests that the petitioner had not removed the ring dishonestly but took it out on the understanding that it would be returned to her. Both the necessary ingredients being wanting, it cannot be said that the facts alleged by Mst. Zarina really constituted an offence of theft against the petitioner. 11. It is noteworthy that apart from the ipsi dixit of Mst. Zarina no other witness had supported this part of the case that the petitioner had also snatched away her ring. Under the circumstances, not even a prima facie case of robbery or theft or any cognisable offence was made out against the petitioner; hence the objection has no force. The proceedings under Section 7 of the Police Act were fully justified. 12. It was next contended that the act of misconduct alleged against the petitioner was not connected with the discharge of the duty of the petitioner but was a private or personal act of his, and hence punishment under Section 7 of the Act could not be imposed upon the petitioner inasmuch as he could have been punished only if the punishing authority thought the police constable to be remiss or negligent in the discharge of his duty or unfit for the same. The duties of a constable have been enumerated in Para 61 of the Police Regulations which runs as follows :- "Constables of the civil police will not be armed except on special occasions. Their principal duty is the prevention of crime. They must be courteous and considerate to the public whose servants they are. Every constable on duty, except when deputed on special detective work requiring disguise, shall wear the prescribed uniform." 13. From the above quoted para it would be evident that the principal duty of a police constable is the prevention of crime. It, therefore, follows that it is also his duty not to commit a crime himself. A police constable must also be courteous and considerate to the public. By giving a beating to Mst. Zarina in an outrageous manner at a public place was certainly not being courteous and considerate to the public. In this limited sense as well the petitioner had been remiss in the discharge of his duty as a police constable. But there is another aspect of the matter, inasmuch as Mr. By giving a beating to Mst. Zarina in an outrageous manner at a public place was certainly not being courteous and considerate to the public. In this limited sense as well the petitioner had been remiss in the discharge of his duty as a police constable. But there is another aspect of the matter, inasmuch as Mr. S. B. L. Bhatia, learned counsel for the petitioner has omitted to consider the real import and significance of the words "unfit for the same" which clearly mean that a police officer shall also render himself liable to punishment if he is otherwise found to be unfit for proper discharge of his duty. Likewise the words in the second part of Section 7 of the Police Act "by any act of his own" have special significance and have reference even to the personal acts of a police officer. The nature of the employment and service of a police officer is such that he should be constantly deemed to be on duty and any serious latches, dereliction or misconduct on his part would render him unfit for the proper discharge of his duties. If the interpretation sought to be put on the language of Section 7 by Mr. Bhatia were to be accepted, it would mean that a police officer even though a habitual liar, a heavy drunkard, a desperate gambler or a debauch of the worst type should not be deemed to be unfit for the discharge of his duty and should be continued to be retained in the police service in spite of the above vices being brought to the notice of his superiors. I am not prepared to lay down that such was the intention of the legislature by enacting Section 7 of the Police Act. In my opinion if a person belonging to the Police Force abets or commits a crime or other acts involving moral turpitude, he is certainly unfit for the discharge of his duty as a Police officer and would also render himself unfit for retention in the Police Force by virtue of his own vicious act and conduct. The second point, therefore, is also without any force and is rejected. 14. The second point, therefore, is also without any force and is rejected. 14. Relying upon the provisions of paras 479 (e) and (f), 490 (7), 491, 508 (1) (b) and 513 of the Police Regulations it was next contended that the Senior Superintendent of Police had no jurisdiction to enhance the punishment of the petitioner by converting it into the extreme penalty of dismissal, when the Deputy Superintendent of Police had only recommended the reduction in his pay by three grades for a period of two years. There is no manner of doubt that for the purposes of para 479(f) all permanent Assistant Superintendent of Police and Deputy Superintendent of Police who have crossed the first efficiency bar in the time scale of pay applicable to them, and other Assistant Superintendents of Police and Deputy Superintendents of Police specially authorised in this behalf by the Deputy Inspector General of Police may exercise all the powers of the Superintendent of Police. But in the instant case, the Deputy Superintendent of Police had not exercised that delegated power of awarding punishment to the derelict Police constable in question. He had only recommended a light punishment for him. It is true that a punishment could be enhanced only by an appellate or revisional authority under para 513 of the Police Regulations but in the instant case the Senior Superintendent of Police did not really enhance any punishment, inasmuch as the Deputy Superintendent of Police had only recommended a punishment and had not inflicted the same himself. In this case the punishment for the first time was awarded by the Senior Superintendent of Police, when he declined to accept the recommendation of the Deputy Superintendent of Police regarding the proposed quantum of punishment. Thus there was no question at all of any enhancement of punishment by the Senior Superintendent of Police, when none existed before he himself chose to award a suitable punishment. 15. It was also pointed out that before deciding upon the desirability of inflicting the extreme penalty of dismissal, the Senior Superintendent of Police did not take into consideration the character and the previous conduct of the petitioner. 15. It was also pointed out that before deciding upon the desirability of inflicting the extreme penalty of dismissal, the Senior Superintendent of Police did not take into consideration the character and the previous conduct of the petitioner. So far as this question is concerned, it is note-worthy that para 490(7) of the Police Regulations only requires that when a Trying Officer finds a charge proved against a Police officer he should "take into consideration the character and previous conduct of the officer charged before deciding what punishment, if any, is prima facie suitable". It is thus clear from the above quoted words that the character and previous conduct of the charged officer has to be taken into consideration before deciding what punishment is sought to be inflicted upon him i.e. at the stage of giving the second show cause notice and not when actually inflicting the punishment at the time of the final order. This requirement had been duly complied by the Senior Superintendent of Police at the time of giving the second show-cause-notice dated 3-8-1961. 16. It was further contended on behalf of the petitioner that in view of the fact that the Deputy Superintendent of Police had only recommended the reduction of the petitioner in pay by three grades for a period of two years, the Senior Superintendent of Police had no jurisdiction to inflict an independent and extreme penalty of dismissal on the petitioner in utter disregard of the recommendation made by the Deputy Superintendent of Police. In this connection it is necessary to consider the relevant provisions of para 491 of the Police Regulations, which runs as follows:- "The officers holding the posts enumerated in para 479(f) shall follow the procedure prescribed in para 490 when conducting departmental trials, and their orders shall, with the concurrence of the Superintendent of Police, have the same executive force in all cases as the orders of the Superintendent of Police except in cases in which the officer conducting the proceedings recommends the dismissal or removal of a constable or under-officer. In such cases, the Superintendent of Police shall (if this has not already been done) give the officer a copy of the finding of the enquiring officer and ask him to show cause within a reasonable time (which shall not be less than one week) why such punishment should not be imposed. In such cases, the Superintendent of Police shall (if this has not already been done) give the officer a copy of the finding of the enquiring officer and ask him to show cause within a reasonable time (which shall not be less than one week) why such punishment should not be imposed. All orders of dismissal or removal of an under-officer or constable must be passed by the Superintendent of Police himself ...." Reading the provisions of paras. 479(f), 490(7) and 491 together it becomes clear that a Deputy Superintendent of Police, who was enjoying delegated powers of the Superintendent of Police by virtue of para 479(f), had no jurisdiction to dismiss or remove from service even a constable belonging to the Police Force. In a case where he was conducting a departmental trial and wanted to inflict a punishment other than that of dismissal or removal from service, he could inflict any of the lesser punishments enumerated at the end of Section 7 of the Police Act. But even such minor punishments inflicted by a Deputy Superintendent of Police necessarily required the concurrence of the Superintendent of Police before they became operative orders of punishment. It is equally clear that where any of the officers mentioned in paragraph 479(f), such as a Deputy Superintendent of Police conducting the proceedings, recommended the dismissal or removal of a Constable, the Superintendent of Police had to give (if this had not already been done) the officer charged a copy of the findings of the enquiring officer and ask him to show cause within a reasonable time why such punishment of dismissal or removal should not be imposed upon him. The use of the words `in such cases' and `why such punishment should not be imposed' in para 491 above, clearly refer to those types of cases in which the officers like the Deputy Superintendent of Police etc. conducting the proceedings have recommended the dismissal or removal of a Constable. Likewise, the words `such punishment' have also direct reference to the punishment of dismissal or removal as proposed and recommended by the Trying Officer. It is true that all orders of dismissal or removal of Constables or under-Officers must necessarily be passed by the Superintendent of Police himself. conducting the proceedings have recommended the dismissal or removal of a Constable. Likewise, the words `such punishment' have also direct reference to the punishment of dismissal or removal as proposed and recommended by the Trying Officer. It is true that all orders of dismissal or removal of Constables or under-Officers must necessarily be passed by the Superintendent of Police himself. But he can only do so if the officer conducting the proceedings (like the Deputy Superintendent of Police in the instant case) has recommended the dismissal or removal of the erring Constable or under-officer. It is not open to the Superintendent of Police to act independently in the matter and in disregard of the recommendation of an officer conducting the proceedings to the contrary super-impose a punishment of dismissal or removal from service all by himself. In other words, it is only when the officer conducting the proceedings has recommended the dismissal or removal of a Constable or under-officer that the Superintendent of Police can record an order of dismissal or removal of the derelict Constable or under-officer concerned. He has no jurisdiction to impose such a punishment himself for the first time, when the officer conducting the proceedings has not recommended the removal or dismissal of a Constable or under-officer. The reason form making such strict and stringent provisions circumscribing the authority of the Superintendent of Police is not far to seek. The rights and interest of a Police officer even of the lowest rank have to be amply safeguarded and cannot be lightly dealt with. Even in a case where a minor punishment, such as fine or confinement to quarters etc., is actually imposed by the Deputy Superintendent of Police conducting the proceedings, the same has to be concurred by the Superintendent of Police. If the Superintendent of Police for some reason considers that the punishment inflicted by the officer conducting the proceedings is either too severe or too soft, he cannot substitute a punishment of his own choice in its place. What the Superintendent of Police has to do in such a contingency has not been specifically provided for either by the Police Act or the Police Regulations. What the Superintendent of Police has to do in such a contingency has not been specifically provided for either by the Police Act or the Police Regulations. However, to me it appears that in such a situation the Superintendent of Police must necessarily refer back the case to the officer conducting the proceedings along with his views in the matter and unless and until there is concurrence between the two officers, the punishment does not become final and operative. If in the case of even minor punishments imposed by the officer conducting the proceedings, it is necessary to have the concurrence of the Superintendent of Police, there is all the more reason why there should be such a concurrence or unity of decision in the case of severe punishments like removal or dismissal from service. If the officer conducting the proceedings has recommended one of those extreme penalties of removal or dismissal from service, it is open to the Superintendent of Police to accept the recommendation and then to inflict the punishment of removal or dismissal by his order. But if he disagrees with the recommendation of the officer conducting the proceedings, the only reasonable course for him appears to be to refer back the matter with his views to the officer conducting the proceedings, who, if he so considers proper, on second thought, change his views and agree to the lesser punishment which might have been suggested by the Superintendent of Police and make his final recommendation in the light thereof. In other words, the final order of the Superintendent of Police for removal or dismissal of a delinquent police man cannot be passed in contravention or disregard of the recommendation made by the officer conducting the proceedings. It is only when-there has been a complete concord and meeting of the minds that an order of extreme penalty like dismissal or removal from service can be passed by the Superintendent of Police. 17. It is only when-there has been a complete concord and meeting of the minds that an order of extreme penalty like dismissal or removal from service can be passed by the Superintendent of Police. 17. Applying the provisions of paragraph 491 and the principles involved therein to the facts of the present case, we find the officer conducting the enquiry, namely, the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Varanasi (City) had only recommended reduction of grade of the petitioner for a period of two years, therefore the Senior Superintendent of Police had no jurisdiction to impose the extreme penalty of dismissal of the petitioner, in utter disregard of the recommendation made by the Deputy Superintendent of Police. As already suggested above, the Superintendent of Police could have acquainted the Deputy Superintendent of Police about his views in the matter and should have then asked him to make a revised recommendation to him. If the Deputy Superintendent of Police had then agreed with the point of view of the Senior Superintendent of Police and had ultimately recommended that it was a fit case in which the petitioner should be dismissed from service, it was only then that the Senior Superintendent of Police could have passed an order of dismissal of the petitioner. 18. As already noted above, there appears to be no provision in para 491 of the Police Regulations for a case in which the officer conducting the proceedings does not himself recommend removal or dismissal, yet the Superintendent of Police wants to inflict the same. But this lacuna or omission in the said Regulations cannot be harnessed to the detriment of the erring policeman like the petitioner. 19. In view of the above discussion, this writ petition must succeed. I accordingly quash the order of dismissal dated 22-8-1961 passed by the Senior Superintendent of Police as well as the order of the Deputy Inspector General of Police dated 6-3-1963 dismissing the appeal of the petitioner and that of the Inspector General of Police dated 19-2-1963 dismissing his revision and maintaining the punishment of dismissal. 20. The petition is allowed with costs.