Ramanlal Chunnilal v. Transport Appellate Tribunal, Jaipur
1963-11-18
DAVE, TYAGI
body1963
DigiLaw.ai
DAVE, C.J.—This is a writ application by Messrs Ramanlal Chunnilal under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. 2. The facts giving rise to it are as follows : — Respondent No. 3 Shri Shyam Sunder Sharma obtained one non-temporary permit for plying a stage-carriage on Chechat-Jhalawar route on 15th May, 1953 from the Regional Transport Authority, Udaipur. This permit was subsequently extended upto Jhalrapatan, a township about four miles ahead of Jhalawar, and later on, it was extended to Raipur. On 19th October, 1957, the Collector, Jhalawar, granted further extension of the route upto Chavli which was about six miles ahead of Raipur. Thus respondeat No. 3 continued to ply his bus from Chechat to Chavli upto 31st December, 1960. The period of his permit, however, was to expire earlier and so he had presented an application for the renewal thereof. When his application for renewal of the permit came for consideration before the Regional Transport Authority, it was found that the extension given to him by the Collector from Raipur to Chavli was unauthorised and so the Regional Transport Authority rejected his application for renewal of the permit on the ground that there was no such route as Chechat to Chavli to the original permit. Against this order dated 29th July, 1960, respondent No. 3 went in appeal. The Transport Appellate Tribunal accepted the appeal partially and it was ordered that the stage carriage permit of respondent No. 3 be renewed for the route Chechat to Raipur for a period of three years from the date of its expiry. His application for extension of the route from Raipur to Chavli was not allowed at that time, but the Regional Transport Authority was directed to publish it and then to dispose it of in accordance with law. This order was passed on 20th April, 1961. 3. On 18th May, 1961, respondent No. 3 presented a fresh application before the Regional Transport Authority for extension of the route from Raipur to Chavli. It was published by the Regional Transport Authority on 27th July, 1961 and it was considered in the meeting on 30th June, 1962 along with other fresh applications and it was resolved that the State Transport Authority may be requested to give its concurrence for extension of the route.
It was published by the Regional Transport Authority on 27th July, 1961 and it was considered in the meeting on 30th June, 1962 along with other fresh applications and it was resolved that the State Transport Authority may be requested to give its concurrence for extension of the route. The concurrence of the State Transport Authority was considered necessary, because the route on which extension was sought, was A Class route and there was a ban for granting permit on that route. On 6th November, 1962, the State Transport Authority passed a resolution and the ban for grant of fresh stage-carriage permit was relaxed as a special case for Chechat-Chavli route. The application of respondent No. 3 then came for reconsideration before the Regional Transport Authority on 5th and 6th April, 1963. The said authority dismissed the application. Aggrieved by this order, respondent No. 3 presented an appeal before the Transport Appellate Tribunal. The Appellate Tribunal allowed the appeal. It came to the conclusion that the extension of the permit of respondent No. 3 was in the public interest and so the Regional Transport Authority was directed to grant extension of the route from Raipur to Chavli by its order dated 29th April, 1963. It is this order of the Appellate Tribunal which is sought to be challenged. 4. The first contention of the petitioners learned counsel is that the application of respondent No. 3 for extension of the route was nothing more but an application to vary the conditions of his existing permit, that when the Regional Transport Authority refused to vary the conditions, no appeal against its order lay before the Appellate Tribunal under sec. 64(a) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, (hereinafter referred to as the Act). It is urged that sec. 64(a) could come into play only if respondent No. 3 had presented a new application for the grant of a permit and if that application Were refused by the Regional Transport Authority. According to learned counsel, the provisions of sec. 64(a) were not attracted in the present case and, therefore, the Transport Appellate Tribunal had exceeded its jurisdiction, or, to put it more precisely, exercised the jurisdiction which was not vested in it, in entertaining the appeal of respondent No. 3 which was decided in his favour. 5. In reply, it is contended for respondent No. 3 that, according to sub-sec.(8) of sec.
5. In reply, it is contended for respondent No. 3 that, according to sub-sec.(8) of sec. 57 of the Act, an application to vary the conditions of a non-temporary permit by the inclusion of a new route or a new area could not but be treated as an application for the grant of a new permit, that his clients application for extension of the route was thus a fresh application in the eye of law and since the Regiona1 Transport Authority refused to grant him a permit for the extended route, he was aggrieved thereby and the appeal was competent under sec. 64(a) of the Act. 6. We have given due consideration to the arguments raised by learned counsel for both the parties. They have very frankly conceded that they have not been able to lay their hands on any authority having a direct bearing on the question involved in this writ application. 7. Now, the main ground put forward by the petitioners learned counsel is, that although sub-sec. (8) of sec. 57 of the Act lays down that an application to vary the conditions of a non-temporary permit by the inclusion of a new route or a new area should be treated as an application for the grant of a new permit, this change was made by the Legislature for the protection of the persons opposing the application and, therefore, the application should be treated as an application for grant of a new permit only for purposes of its publication and giving an opportunity to those who might like to oppose it. It is pointed out that the appeal lay under sec. 64(a) of the Act against the refusal of such application prior to the amendment which was made in 1956, that the corresponding change has been made by the Legislature in sec. 64(a) of the Act and, therefore, sub-sec. (8) of sec. 67 of the Act should be interpreted in the same manner as it was done before the amendment was introduced. 8. Learned counsel has referred to V. Krishnamurthy Vs. The Ceded District Auto Transport Co. Ltd., Kurnool (1). In that case the original condition of the permit was for a route from K to A. Another application was made to extend that route to V, but it was declined. It was held that clause (a) of sec.
8. Learned counsel has referred to V. Krishnamurthy Vs. The Ceded District Auto Transport Co. Ltd., Kurnool (1). In that case the original condition of the permit was for a route from K to A. Another application was made to extend that route to V, but it was declined. It was held that clause (a) of sec. 64 applied only to cases where by reason of the existence of a condition attached to a permit the grantee of the permit was aggrieved by that condition at the time of the grant of the permit. It did not apply to agreements which accrued or which arose subsequent to the grant of the permit. The view taken in this case was followed by this Court in Bundi Electric Supply Co. Ltd., Bundi Vs. The Appellate Tribunal (State Transport Authority), Jaipur(2). It may be observed that the view taken in the Madras case (1) was expressed prior to the amendment of sec. 57 of the Act. Sub-sec. (8) was inserted by Act No. 100 of 1956. This sub-section, as it stands at present, runs as follows — "Sec. 57.— (1) to (7) x x x (8) An application to vary the conditions of any permit, other than a temporary permit, by the inclusion of a new route or a new area or, in the case of a stage carriage permit, by increasing the number of services above the specified maximum, or in the case of a contract carriage permit or a public carriers permit, by increasing the number of vehicles covered by the permit, shall be treated as an application for the grant of a new permit— Provided that it shall not be necessary so to treat an application made by the holder of a stage carriage permit who provides the only service on any route or in any area to increase the frequency of the service so provided, with out any increase in the number of vehicles." A bare perusal of the said sub-section would show that it enjoins upon the authorities, who are empowered to grant permits, to treat an application for varying the conditions of a non-temporary permit by the inclusion of a new route or routes or a new area, as an application for grant of a new permit.
This means that all the formalities which have to be gone into in the case of an application for a new permit must be observed in an application for varying the conditions on the said ground. It follows that sub-sec. (7) of sec. 57 of the Act would equally apply to such an application. Sub-sec. (7) requires that when a Regional Transport Authority refuses an application for a permit, it shall give to the applicant in writing its reasons for the refusal. This makes it further clear that even in the case of an application for varying the condition of a non-temporary permit by the inclusion of a new route or routes or a new area, it is incumbent upon the Regional Transport Authority to give its reasons in writing, if it chooses to refuse such an application. Learned counsel for the petitioner is true to the extent that the provision of sub-sec. (8) helps those persons who might choose to oppose the application after its publication, but it cannot be urged at the same time that while introducing sub-sec. (8), the Legislature was unmindful of the interest of the applicant. We are inclined to believe that this amendment was made in the interest of both the applicant and the opponent and not for the sake of the opponent alone. It is not disputed before us that if an altogether fresh application is made for a non-temporary permit and if it is refused by the Regional Transport Authority, an appeal whould lie under sec. 64(a) of the Act. When by the new amendment the application for varying the conditions of a non-temporary permit by the inclusion of a new route or routes or a new area is equated with a fresh application for the grant of a new permit, we see no reason why sec. 64(a) of the Act should not come into play. The reasons, which guided the learned Judges in taking the view in the Madras case (1) would, not in our opinion, hold good after the introduction of sub-sec. (8) of sec. 57 of the Act. We, therefore, see no force in the objection raised by learned counsel for the petitioner and, in our opinion, the Appellate Tribunal was competent to entertain and decide the appeal filed by respondent No. 3. 9.
(8) of sec. 57 of the Act. We, therefore, see no force in the objection raised by learned counsel for the petitioner and, in our opinion, the Appellate Tribunal was competent to entertain and decide the appeal filed by respondent No. 3. 9. The next contention raised by learned counsel for the petitioner is, that the Appellate Tribunal had committed an error in allowing the application of respondent No. 3 without exploring the scope for extension of the permit on the extended route. In our opinion, there is little force in this contention, because from the facts, which have been narrated above, it would be clear that the Regional Transport Authority itself had earlier recommended to the State Transport Authority that it should consider the question of removing the ban against the extension of the route. If the State Transport Authority had not removed the ban, there would have been no scope for a valid extension of the route. The Appellate Tribunal has given its careful thought to the merits of the application of respondent No. 3 and we see no good reason to interfere in the matter, in our extraordinary jurisdiction. 10. The petitioners application, therefore fails and it is hereby dismissed. We leave the parties to bear their own costs.