JUDGMENT K.B. Asthana, J. - This is a plaintiff's appeal against a decree of the learned Additional Civil Judge of Moradabad dismissing her appeal directed against the decree of the learned Munsif of Moradabad dismissing her suit as far as the relief for ejectment of the defendant from the house in dispute was concerned. 2. On the arguments raised by the learned counsel for the appellant only one question has to be considered and that is, whether the notice sent by the plaintiff to the defendant terminating the tenancy and asking him to vacate was a valid notice. It is not necessary, therefore, to set out all the facts. A notice dated 1-6-1960 was sent by the plaintiff which was received by the defendant on 7-6-1960. By this notice the plaintiff intimated the defendant that his tenancy stood terminated and he should vacate the premises within a period of one month from the date of the receipt of the notice. The defendant did not vacate the premises within the period specified in the notice, hence the suit. One of the defence pleas raised was that the tenancy being from year to year the notice dated 1-6-1960 did not, in law; terminate the tenancy as for terminating the tenancy in question six month's notice was required. The two courts below gave a concurrent finding that the tenancy in question was from year to year and the notice dated 1-6-1960 was invalid and ineffective. 3. The short question in this appeal is whether the notice dated 1-6-1960 was a valid and effective notice. It would be necessary, therefore, to determine whether the tenancy in question was a yearly tenancy. There is no document in writing evidencing the contract of tenancy or its terms. The two courts below have relied upon a decree which was passed in favour of the plaintiff landlord in a suit under Sec. 5 sub-Sec. 4 of the U.P. Rent Control and. Eviction Act. This decree shows that the annual rent at Rs. 100/- was fixed which the landlord could realise at the rate of Rs. 8/4/- per month. The view taken by the court below is that this decree though by itself did not create the tenancy but it proved that the tenancy between the parties was a yearly tenancy. Eviction Act. This decree shows that the annual rent at Rs. 100/- was fixed which the landlord could realise at the rate of Rs. 8/4/- per month. The view taken by the court below is that this decree though by itself did not create the tenancy but it proved that the tenancy between the parties was a yearly tenancy. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that a tenancy from year to year could in law only be created by a document in writing duly registered and the court below is in error in relying upon the decree in the suit under Sec. 5(4) of the Rent Control and Eviction Act in spelling out a yearly tenancy. I think this submission of the learned counsel has some force. Firstly, the terms of the decree by themselves do not conclusively show that the lease in regard to which the rent was being fixed was a lease from year to year. It provides that the rent would be payable at the rate of Rs. 8/4/- per month, though in its earlier part it provides for the yearly rate of rent. In the case of Chinti Kaharin v. Kripashankar Warrah, AIR 1941 Patna p. 488 it has been observed that a tenancy will be a monthly tenancy though the rent may be mentioned as so much per year. Moreover, the decree by itself cannot be made a foundation for the purpose of finding out the terms and conditions of the tenancy. Sec. 107 of the Transfer of Property Act lays down that a lease of immoveable property from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year, or reserving a yearly rent, can only be made by a registered instrument. In the case of Sahu Ananda Sarup v. S. Hasan, AIR 1943 Allahabad 279 it has been held that it is not open to a court to infer a lease from the circumstances of the case on some terms other than those which can be inferred from the agreement to the lease because a lease can be created only in the manner set forth in the provisions of the T. P. Act. 4. 4. The learned Judge of the lower appellate court in coming to a conclusion that the lease in question was a lease from year to year, besides relying upon the above said decree in the suit under Sec. 5(4) of the Rent Control and Eviction Act observed that judging the circumstances of the case, the conduct of the parties and the preponderance of the probabilities, he had no option but to hold that the tenancy was a annual one. The learned Judge has not discussed at all in his judgment as to what were the circumstances and the probabilities which led him to hold that the lease was a annual one. To me it appears to be a conjectural inference. I doubt whether the law permits him to take into consideration any circumstance or the probabilities of the case to hold that the tenancy was from year to year or a annual tenancy. A tenancy from year to year of immovable property as enjoined by Sec. 107 of the Transfer of Property Act must be created by a registered document. In the absence of a registered lease deed the only inference which could legitimately be arrived at was that the lease was a monthly lease. 5. The learned counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that the finding that the lease was a lease from year to year was a finding of fact and could not be interfered with in second appeal. I do not agree; whether a lease is a monthly lease or a lease from year to year would depend on the terms of the lease which are to be proved. What would be the legal relationship between the parties on the basis of proved facts would always raise a question of law and not a question of fact. Further even if it be assumed for the sake of argument that a finding as to the nature of tenancy is a question of fact even then any finding arrived at in disregard of the law would not be binding in a second appeal. The court below has entirely missed the effect of Sec. 107 of the Transfer of Property Act. It was then urged by the learned counsel for the respondent that for the purpose of deciding the validity of the notice the applicability of Sec. 107 of the Transfer of Property Act is not material. The court below has entirely missed the effect of Sec. 107 of the Transfer of Property Act. It was then urged by the learned counsel for the respondent that for the purpose of deciding the validity of the notice the applicability of Sec. 107 of the Transfer of Property Act is not material. Reliance was placed by the learned counsel oil the case of Krishnadas Nandy v. Bidhan Chandra Roy, AIR 1959 Calcutta 181. In the case cited the Division Bench of Calcutta High Court were considering a case in which the lease was for manufacturing purposes and the learned Judges held that Sec. 107 does not control Sec. 106 and notwithstanding the former section the latter will apply to a manufacturing lease whether registered or unregistered so as to make a lease from year to year for purposes of that section terminable with a six months' notice to quit. I do not think the learned counsel can draw any assistance for the purposes of the present case from the case cited by him. In the instant case the lease was not for manufacturing purposes but was a simple lease of a premises which were used as a shop-cum-residence. Ordinarily such leases are from month to month. There is intrinsic evidence on record that in pursuance of the decree in the suit under Sec. 5(4) of the Rent Control and Eviction Act the tenant paid the rent on the monthly basis though after three month's interval each time. The learned Judge of the court below has drawn an unwarranted inference from this in holding that it appears that there was a private arrangement between the parties to pay the annual rent in quarterly instalment. The learned counsel for the respondent has not been able to show me any material on record from which such an inference could be drawn. I, therefore, hold that the tenancy between the plaintiff and the defendant was from month to month and not from year to year as held by the court below. It, therefore, follows that the notice terminating the tenancy and to quit dated 1-6-1960 was a valid notice. 6. The result is that this appeal is allowed. The decree of the court below is set aside and the plaintiff is granted a decree for ejectment of the defendant from the shop in question. It, therefore, follows that the notice terminating the tenancy and to quit dated 1-6-1960 was a valid notice. 6. The result is that this appeal is allowed. The decree of the court below is set aside and the plaintiff is granted a decree for ejectment of the defendant from the shop in question. I, however, grant four month's time to the defendant to vacate the premises from the date of this order. The plaintiff appellant would be entitled to her costs of this appeal.