Judgement RAGHAVAN, J. :- In these writ appeals the questions involved are the same and the decision in one will cover the other too, therefore, we would state the facts in one of the appeals only. 2. W.A. No. 126 of 1962 arises out of an order dated 12th July 1961 passed by the industrial Tribunal, Ernakulam, in M.P. No. 77 of 1961. There was an industrial dispute between the management of the appellant-company and their workers and that dispute was registered as I.D. No. 68 of 1959. Pending that dispute the appellant company took disciplinary action against the 2nd respondent and she was dismissed from service on 7th May 1960. On 16th May the appellants applied under the proviso to Sec. 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act for approval of well action and that application was M.P. No. 88 of 1960. Pending that application on the award in I.D. No. 68 of 1959 was passed by the Tribunal, which was published in the Gazette on 12th July 1960, and it became enforceable on the expiry of 30 days thereafter, i.e., on 12th August. In the meantime, the 2nd respondent filed a complaint under Sec. 33-A of the Act on 20th October 1950 against the disciplinary action taken against her by the app and that dispute was registered as I.D. No. 42 of 1960. Ultimately, the 2nd respondent filed an application on 23rd May 1961 seeking permission to withdraw I.D. No. 42 of 1950 and that petition was allowed by the Tribunal on the next day without notice to the appellants. That award was published in the Gazette on 20th June 1961 and thereafter the appellants filed M.P. No. 77 of 1961 in M.P. No. 88 of 1960 on 22nd June 1961 questioning the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to proceed further with their application for approval under the proviso to Sec. 33(2)(b) of the Act, that application was dismissed by the Tribunal and against that the appellants filed a writ petition, before this Court, which was also dismissed by Vaidialingam, J. The appeal is directed against that order. 3. Two objections appear to nave bean raised before our learned brother and the same are reiterated before us. 3. Two objections appear to nave bean raised before our learned brother and the same are reiterated before us. We would straightaway dispose of one of them, namely, that the withdrawal of I.D. No. 42 of 1960 by the 2nd respondent amounts to an acceptance of the disciplinary action taken by the appellants. In other words, the contention is that if a proceeding, which is treated as an industrial dispute and in which larger and wider questions covering the action taken, by the appellants are involved, is withdrawn by the 2nd respondent, the result is that the action of the appellants must be deemed to have been accepted by the 2nd respondent, and there is therefore no further necessity to consider and approve that action in a more limited proceeding, in which the facie nature of the action need alone be contoured the Tribunal. We are not inclined to accept this contention. The 2nd respondent, under the law, had the right to request the Tribunal to adjudicate upon the validity of the action taken by the appellants and she might exercise that right or might that choose to do so. But, the approval that is required under the proviso to Sec. 33(2)(b) is independent of this right; and until the action of the appellants is approved by the Tribunal, the dismissal does not Become final (vide Straw Board Manufacturing Co., Ltd. v. Govind, AIR 1962 SC 1500 ). The withdrawal of the complaint or the 2nd respondent will not obviate the legal necessity the approval as contemplated by the proviso to Sec. 33(2)(b); nor will it amount to an acceptance by the 2nd respondent of the legality or the justifiability of the action taken by the appellants. It is thus clear that this argument, has no force. 4. The next contention is the more important one to the case. It is contended by the learned advocate of the appellants that 30 days after the publication of the award in I.D. No. 60 of 1959 the Tribunal became functus officio and therefore it has no more any jurisdiction to proceed with or pass any order on merits in M.P. No. 88 of 1960. In support of this contention, our attention is drawn to some passages in some decisions including two decisions of the Supreme Court and also to an unreported excision of the Madras High Court. In support of this contention, our attention is drawn to some passages in some decisions including two decisions of the Supreme Court and also to an unreported excision of the Madras High Court. The first of these cases is me Straw Board Manufacturing Co., Ltd. v. Gutta Mill WorkersUnion, AIR 1953 SC 95 . In that decision a passage occurs at page 97 of the reports that the State Government had no authority to extend the time for making an award after the time limit originally fixed there for expired and the adjudicator became functus officio on the expiry of the time specified in the original order of reference. In the next case referred to is Martin Burn Ltd. v. R.N. Banerjee, AIR 1958 SC 79 wherein also there is a passage at page 81 that the 5th industrial Tribunal of west Bengal Became functus officio on the expiry of 30 days from we publication of its award with the result that the application could not be disposed of and was accordingly struck off. Our attention is also drawn to a similar passage is the judgment of Rajagopala Ayyangar J. in Silk Cloth ProducersAssociation v. State of Madras, 1954-2 Lab LJ 410 (Mad). 5. In none of these cases does the nature of an application under the proviso to Sec. 33(2)(b) appear have been considered. Regarding the main dispute, I.D. No. 68 of 1359, it is apparent that the industrial manual has become functus officio and it has no further jurisdiction to pass any order relating to or touching that dispute. That is all what the passages hereinbefore referred to mean. 6. The position will be considerably clear if it is borne in mind that there is a distinction between Sub-Section 1 and Sub-Section 2 of Sec. 33 and also that prior to the amendment of the section in 1956 there was no such distinction. The old Sec. 33 recited that curing the pendency of any conciliation proceedings or proceedings before a Tribunal in respect of any industrial dispute, no employer should discharge or punish, whether by dismissal or otherwise, any workman concerned in such dispute, save with the express permission in writing of the conciliation officer, Board, or Tribunal. The old Sec. 33 recited that curing the pendency of any conciliation proceedings or proceedings before a Tribunal in respect of any industrial dispute, no employer should discharge or punish, whether by dismissal or otherwise, any workman concerned in such dispute, save with the express permission in writing of the conciliation officer, Board, or Tribunal. So that, under the old section if the workman was concerned in a pending industrial dispute, no employer could discharge or punish him by dismissal or otherwise, without the express permission in writing of the Tribunal. The present Sec. 33 is different, under Sub-Section 1 thereof the same provision as existed prior to the amendment is retained regarding discharge or punishment of any workman concerned in the dispute for any misconduct connected with the dispute. Sub-Section 2 has been newly added providing, inter alia, for discharge or punishment, by dismissal or otherwise, of a workman concerned in the dispute for any misconduct not connected with the dispute. In the second category, namely, of misconduct not connected with the dispute, the management may discharge or punish the workman concerned in the industrial dispute provided that the workman is paid wages for one month and an application has also been made by the employer to the authority before which the proceeding is pending for the approval of the action taken by the employer. Interpreting this provision the Supreme Court has held in the decision already referred to in AIR 1962 SC 1500 that the proviso to Sec. 33(2)(b) contemplates the three things mentioned therein, namely, (a) dismissal or discharge, (b) payment of wages, and (c) making an application for approval, to be simultaneous and to be part of the same transaction. So that, the employer when he takes action under this Sub-Section by dismissal or discharge, should immediately pay the employee wages for one month and should also make an application to the Tribunal for approval at the same time. Their Lordships have also pointed out, as already indicated, that the dismissal or discharge would be of no effect if the approval is not granted by the Tribunal, and the workman concerned would continue to be in service as if there was no dismissal or discharge. Their Lordships have also pointed out, as already indicated, that the dismissal or discharge would be of no effect if the approval is not granted by the Tribunal, and the workman concerned would continue to be in service as if there was no dismissal or discharge. It is thus clear that in the case of action taken under Sec. 33(1), the employer has to take express permission in writing of the concerned authority before he discharges or punishes the workman; but under Sub-Section 2 of the section the employer may discharge or punish the workman; but on so discharging or dismissing, the workman should be paid wages for one month and an application should also be made to the authority before which the industrial dispute is pending for approval of the action taken by the employer. 7. If this effect of the amendment is borne in mind, the observations of the Supreme Court in both the first Straw Board Manufacturing Co. case AIR 1962 SC 1500 and the Martin Burn Ltd. case, AIR 1958 SC 79 are easily explainable. In both those cases their Lordships were. considering the earlier Act, Sec. 33 of which resembled only Sub-Section 1 of the present Sec. 33 and not Sub-Section 2 thereof. The same applies to the observation of Rajagopala Ayyangar, J. in the Silk Cloth ProducersAssociation case, 1954-2 Lab LJ 410 also. 8. Another case cited before us is the decision of the Punjab High Court in Om Parkash Sharma v. Industrial Tribunal, 1962-2 Lab LJ 272 (Punj) in that case the learned Judge has considered the distinction between Sub-Sections 1 and 2 of Sec. 33 of the amended Act; and the learned Judge also observes that on the expiry of 30 days after the publication of the award the Tribunal becomes functus. officio and has no jurisdiction to deal with any matter arising out of or connected with the reference; but, the learned Judge continues, that will not put an end to an application under Sec. 33(2), because that application has no connection with We industrial dispute, nor does it arise out of that dispute. We are also inclined to think that the proceeding under Sec. 33(2) is an independent proceeding and is not merely in the nature of an interlocutory proceeding in the main dispute. 9. We are also inclined to think that the proceeding under Sec. 33(2) is an independent proceeding and is not merely in the nature of an interlocutory proceeding in the main dispute. 9. It is our further opinion that Sub-Section 5 of Sec. 53 will throw some light on the question. That Sub-Section lays-down that where an employer makes an application to a Tribunal or other authority under the proviso to Sub-Section 2 for approval of the action taken by him, the authority concerned, shall, without delay, hear such application and pass, as expeditiously as possible, such order in relations thereto as it deems fit. The recent decision of the supreme Court in the second Straw Ward case makes it clear that the application under the proviso to Sub-Section 2 should form part of the same transaction as the dismissal or discharge of the workman and payment of wages for one month. That means that the filing of the said application, should not be delayed. Sub-Section 5 makes it imperative that, when such an application is filed, the authority concerned shall hear such application and pass, as expeditiously as possible, such order as it deems fit. According to us, this provision indicates that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is not merely to entertain the application, but is also to pass orders thereon and dispose of it on merits. Also, if it gets jurisdiction to entertain the application, it does not lose the jurisdiction merely because it has become functus officio in relation to the main industrial dispute. Its jurisdiction can terminate only after it disposes of the application as contemplated by Sub-Section 5 of Sec. 33. 10. Now we would turn our attention to the unreported decision of the Madras High Court in The Management of Mettur Industries, Ltd. v. Sundara Naidu, W.P. No. 819 of 1958 (Mad) cited by the learned advocate of the appellants. In that case, pending an industrial dispute between the petitioner-Company and its workers, the Company dismissed one of the workers for misconduct and applied under S. 33(2)(b) for the approval of their action. Thereafter, while that application for approval was still pending, the award in the dispute was given and was published in the gazette. Thirty days also elapsed and the award became enforceable. Thereafter, while that application for approval was still pending, the award in the dispute was given and was published in the gazette. Thirty days also elapsed and the award became enforceable. ultimately, after the said thirty days, the Tribunal refused approval to the petitioner-Company of their application under Sec. 33(2)(b) and the Company questioned the correctness of that order by way of writ before the High court of Madras Ramachandra Iyer, J. accepted the contention of the Company that the Tribunal became functus officio with regard to the main industrial dispute and therefore it had no further jurisdiction to deal with the application under Sec. 33(2)(b) of the Act. According to the learned Judge, that application was only of an interlocutory nature, and since the main matter had already been disputed of the Tribunal had no further jurisdiction to deal with and dispose of the interlocutory matter. Ramachandra Iyer, J. relied on the observation of the Supreme Court we nave already referred to in the Martin Burn case in support of his decision. The learned counsel of the appellants , argues that this decision supports his contention. 11. It appears to be so. But, it also appears that the attention of the learned Judge was not drawn to Sub-Section (5) of S. 33 and also to the effect of the amendments made to S. 33 in 1956. With due respect to Ramachandra Iyer, J., we are not inclined to agree with the view that the application under the proviso to Sec. 33(2)(b) is a mere interlocutory application. As already indicated, it is in the nature of an independent application; and the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, at the time when it received the application, is not taken away by the mere fact that it has become functus officio with regard to the main dispute. 12. In the result, we confirm the decisions of Vaidialingam, J. in both the cases. We make it clear that in disposing of the applications, the Tribunal will be guided by the considerations pointed out by Vaidialingam, J. in paragraph 36 of his judgment. We also endorse the learned Judges view that the Tribunal should have issued notice to the appellants before leave was granted for the withdrawal of I.D. No. 42 of 1960. 13. The writ appeals are consequently dismisses with costs. Advocatesfee we fix at Rs. We also endorse the learned Judges view that the Tribunal should have issued notice to the appellants before leave was granted for the withdrawal of I.D. No. 42 of 1960. 13. The writ appeals are consequently dismisses with costs. Advocatesfee we fix at Rs. 150/- in each case, of which the 2nd respondent in each case will get Rs. 100/- and the 1st respondent will get Rs. 50/-. Appeal dismissed.