JUDGMENT Mithan Lal, J. - These four connected appeals filed by the defendants arise out of four connected suits filed by the plaintiff-respondent for a declaration that he was the bhumidhar of the land in dispute and also for recovery of possession. The allegations in the plaint were that the plaintiff was a cotenant of the plots in dispute along with one Qalandar, that he and Qalandar obtained joint sanads under the Agricultural Tenants (Acquisition of Privileges) Act and thereafter Qalandar transferred his interest in the land to the plaintiff on 15th February 1952 and in this way the plaintiff became entitled to the entire plots. It was stated that in the month of November 1951 Qalandar executed a patta in favour of the defendants. The patta was fictitious and Qalandar had no right to execute the patta and as defendants Nos. 1 and 2 were interfering in plaintiff's possession that led to the filing of the present suits. Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 contested the suits. Their plea was that Qalandar was the sole tenant of all the plots in dispute and the plaintiff was not a cotenant and so the plaintiff had no right to obtain a joint sanad along with Qalandar under Sec. 6 of Act X of 1949. The sanad was said to confer no right upon the plaintiff. Defendant No. 1 claimed to be exclusive subtenant of certain plots while defendants No. 2 claimed to be exclusive subtenant of some other plots as detailed in the written statements. It was also their case that though the patta was executed in November 1951 the defendants entered into possession from the beginning of 1359F, and thus became adhivasis by virtue of their cultivatory possession in that year. 2. These suits were originally filed in the revenue court prior to the abolition of Zamindari, but later on the plaints were returned and the suits were then filed in the court of the Munsif. The trial court held that defendants Nos. 1 and 2 had become sirdars with effect from 30th October 1954 and that the plaintiff had no right to obtain a declaration under Sec. 6 of Act X of 1949 as he was not a cotenant along with Qalandar and so he was not a bhunzidhar of the plots in dispute. The trial court held that defendants Nos. 1 and 2 had become sirdars with effect from 30th October 1954 and that the plaintiff had no right to obtain a declaration under Sec. 6 of Act X of 1949 as he was not a cotenant along with Qalandar and so he was not a bhunzidhar of the plots in dispute. Against these findings the plaintiff went in appeal and the lower appellate court came to the conclusion that even though the plaintiff was not a cotenant along with Qalandar in fact, yet the effect of making a joint application by Qalandar and the plaintiff was to admit the plaintiff as a cotenant and so the joint sanad which had been obtained by the plaintiff and Qalandar was valid and the plaintiff became a cotenant under Sec. 6 of Act X of 1949. On the question of possession that court held that defendants Nos, 1 and 2 got into possession with effect from the date of the patta, that is November 1951 and that as they were not in possession throughout the year 1359F, they did not acquire any adhivasi of sirdari rights. That court also came to the conclusion that the plaintiff having become a cotenant by statutory provision of Sec. 3-B and 3-C of Act X of 1949 Qalandar could not execute any valid sub-lease without the concurrence of the plaintiff and so all the four suits were decreed. It is how the defendants have come in these four second appeals. 3. Sri Shanti Bhushan, learned advocate for the appellants, has contended that it having been found that the plaintiff was not a cotenant in fact along with Qalandar no sanad could be jointly obtained by Qalandar and the plaintiff under Sec. 6 of Act X of 1949 and the purpose of Sec. 3-B is not to give an outsider a right to obtain such a sanad. According to him that section was meant to cover the cases of only those persons who were in fact tenants or co-tenants but whose names were not recorded in the papers. His second contention is that no rights could be created in favour of the plaintiff before the execution of the sale-deed on 15th February 1952 and that in November 1951 when Qalandat executed a patta in favour of defendants Nos. 1 and 2 he had every right to execute a patta. His second contention is that no rights could be created in favour of the plaintiff before the execution of the sale-deed on 15th February 1952 and that in November 1951 when Qalandat executed a patta in favour of defendants Nos. 1 and 2 he had every right to execute a patta. The defendants, therefore became sub-tenants on the basis of that patta and so became adhivasis under Sec. 20(a) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and thereafter sirdars. It is also his contention that even if the plaintiff became a cotenant by virtue of the sanad granted under Sec. 6 of the Act X of 1949 Qalandar had transferable right in half of the land and by virtue of Cl. (c) of Sec. 7 of the said Act he could transfer his half right by execution of a patta in favour of the defendants. The plaintiff could not be granted any decree and in no case on the whole of the land and if the plaintiff had any remedy it lay in a suit for partition. 4. Sri N. A. Kazmi, learned counsel for the respondent, has on the other hand contended that once Qalandar admitted that the plaintiff was a cotenant it is totally besides the point whether he was in fact a cotenant or not. His admission is sufficient to bind Qalandar and his transferees who are defendants Nos. 1 and 2. It is also his contention that under Sec. 3-B it is not necessary that a person should in fact be a cotenant. What is necessary is that he should claim to be entitled to be a cotenant. His second submission is that after a joint sanad was obtained in the name of Qalandar and the plaintiff, Qalandar had no right to execute any patta in favour of defendants Nos. 1 and 2 and if defendants Nos. 1 and 2 entered into possession as found by the courts below they were liable to ejectment and the plaintiff was entitled to a decree as a bhurnidhar. He has thus supported the judgment of the lower appellate court. 5. According to the findings of fact given in this case by the lower appellate court the plaintiff was not in reality a cotenant with Qalandar. He has thus supported the judgment of the lower appellate court. 5. According to the findings of fact given in this case by the lower appellate court the plaintiff was not in reality a cotenant with Qalandar. He and Qalandar however made a joint application on 30th December 1949 stating that both of them were joint tenants of the plots in dispute and that Mohd. Kasim was Bhanja of Qalandar and was joint in cultivation and that he was also the person who had paid the entire amount of ten times the rent. An order was passed on this application the same day granting a joint sanad in the name of the two. The question is whether on such an application the plaintiff could acquire the privilege. Before the amendment of the Agricultural Tenants (Acquisition of Privileges) Act, the application could only be made by the persons enumerated in Sec. 3 but after the amendment by Act VII of 1950 a person claiming to be entitled as a cotenant but whose name was not recorded in the record of rights was also given a right to make such an application under Sec. 3-B. The relevant portion of that section lays down: "Any person claiming to be entitled as cotenant of a holding along with the recorded tenants thereof but whose name is not recorded in the record of rights relating thereto may apply under Sec. 3 for a declaration in respect of the whole holding or his share therein." It has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that this section only envisages the making of an application by a person who in fact is a cotenant but whose name is not recorded in the record of rights. I, however, do not agree with this argument because according to the language used in this section any person claiming to be entitled as a cotenant is entitled to make an application. The section is not limited to a person entitled as a cotenant. The expression "claiming to be entitled as a cotenant" is quite distinct and different from the expression "en titled as a cotenant." Such an expression would cover the case even of a person who claims to be a cotenant but who in fact is not a cotenant. The section is not limited to a person entitled as a cotenant. The expression "claiming to be entitled as a cotenant" is quite distinct and different from the expression "en titled as a cotenant." Such an expression would cover the case even of a person who claims to be a cotenant but who in fact is not a cotenant. In this case a joint application having been made by Qalandar who was the recorded cotenant and the present plaintiff whose name was not recorded stating that both were co-tenants would make the plaintiff a person claiming to be entitled as a co-tenant. The lower appellate court, therefore, was right in placing such an interpretation, upon the section and holding that the case of the plaintiff would be covered by Sec. 3-B of the said Act. A sanad was also granted jointly in the name of the plaintiff and Qalandar and the effect of the sanad was that the non-transferable tenancy rights became transferable rights and any person who held the sanad, whether singly or jointly, became entitled not-withstanding anything contained in the U.P. Tenancy Act to make a transfer of his interest in the holding. This is clear from clause (c) of Sec. 7 which makes the interest in the holding or the share of the joint sanad-holder transferable, by means of will, sale, mortgage or gift. 6. The question is whether Qalandar could execute a sub-lease in Nov-ember 1951 and whether that lease or sub-lease was effective with respect to the entire property or only the share of Qalandar or none. The lower appellate court has not considered Cl. (c) of Sec. 7 of the Agricultural Tenants (Acquisition of Privileges) Act. That court thought that as Qalandar was a mere cotenant he could not admit any sub-tenant without the consent of all the co-tenants. This may have been the view under the old Tenancy Act, but under the Agricultural Tenants (Acquisition of Privileges) Act a tenant has acquired a transferable interest in his tenancy land not-withstanding anything in the U.P. Tenancy Act, and consequently the bar on transfer no more stands. It is true that Cl. (c) of Sec. 7 does not speak of a lease or sub-lease and only relates to transfer by will, gift, sale or mortgage, but if a person could sell his share or interest in land he could also execute a lease. It is true that Cl. (c) of Sec. 7 does not speak of a lease or sub-lease and only relates to transfer by will, gift, sale or mortgage, but if a person could sell his share or interest in land he could also execute a lease. Lessee rights are after all subordinate rights and consequently Qalandar could execute a lease but that lease could only relate to his share or interest in the land and not to the entire land. The lower appellate court was, therefore, not right to think that the lease could not be executed without the consent of the other-co-tenant even after the Agricultural Tenants (Acquisition of Privileges) Act which have made the tenancy rights transferable. In fact the lower appellate court completely forgot to see the provisions of Cl. (c) of Sec. 7 of the Agricultural Tenants (Acquisition of Privileges) Act. 7. One other thing which may be noted in this connection is that the defendants entered into possession on the basis of the lease and on the findings given by the court below, they acquired no rights by virtue of cultivatory possession in a part of the year 1359F, in the land. They, however, became sub-tenants of the share of Qalandar in the plots in dispute prior to the date of vesting and became adhivasis under Sec. 20(a) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and thereafter sirdars with respect to that share. The plaintiff, therefore, could not be granted a decree for possession of the entire land. He was entitled to a declaration of his bhumidhari rights in half of the land and also to possession to that extent. It may also be mentioned that the sale-deed in plaintiffs favour is subsequent to the execution of the lease and so that sale-deed could confer rights on the plaintiff subject to the adhivasi rights of the defendants in the land. Since the defendants had become sirdars with effect from 30th October 1954 under Chapter IX-A of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act the plaintiff's bhumidhari rights, which they purchased from Qalandar, would be extinguished. They would thus have bhumidhari rights only in half of the land and also a right of possession over that land. Since the defendants had become sirdars with effect from 30th October 1954 under Chapter IX-A of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act the plaintiff's bhumidhari rights, which they purchased from Qalandar, would be extinguished. They would thus have bhumidhari rights only in half of the land and also a right of possession over that land. In this case the plaintiff sought a decree for declaration of his rights in the entire land as well as a decree for possession, but he is entitled to a declaration only with respect to the half share. So far as possession goes, the plaintiff can get a decree only for joint possession. He will be entitled to obtain exclusive possession over half share by means of a partition suit. 8. In the result all the four appeals succeed in part. The appeals are partly allowed and the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court are modified to this extent that the plaintiff is declared to be a bhumidhar of half the share in all the plots in dispute. The plaintiff's suit for joint possession to the extent of half share is also decreed. In order to obtain separate possession the plaintiff should take appropriate proceedings. Costs of these appeals shall be borne by the parties.