NAYUDU, J. : This appeal and the connected cross objection are directed against the judgment and decree pt the Subordinate Judge's Court Upper Assam Dis­tricts at Silchar dated I7th February 1958. (2) The only point that arises for considera­tion in this appeal is whether the notice issued in this case satisfies the requirements of law. The facts briefly are that the plaintiff respondent is the consignee of certain bags of flour booked by M/s. Allahabad Milling Company from Allahabad to Silchar. The consignment was' consigned to the plaintiff who is the sole proprietor of the firm known as Chotelal Seth and Co. Silchar, on 5th March 1955. As the goods did not arrive at Silchar within two months of the date of booking, the plaintiff issued a notice to the railway ad­ministration under both Section 77 of the Indian Railways Act and Section 80 of the Civil Pro­cedure Code on the 7th May 1955, addressing the same to the Deputy Chief Commercial Superin­tendent, North Eastern Railway. This notice was received in due course and a reply thereto was also sent by the said Deputy Chief Commercial 'Superintendent on the 27th May, 1955. (3) It is unnecessary to go into the merits of the matter as the decree of the learned Subordinate Judge for Rs. 6,665/- as claimed in the plaint re­presenting the value of the goods not delivered is not in dispute in this appeal. The only point for consideration is whether the notice issued in the case satisfies the requirement of Section 77 of the Indian Railways Act and Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code. Section 77, Indian Railways Act, as it stood at the relevant time, runs as follows: "A person shall not be entitled to a refund of an overcharge in respect of animals or goods carried: by railway or to compensation for the loss, destruction or deterioration of animals or goods delivered to be so carried, unless his claim to the refund or compensation has been prefer­red 5n writing by him or on his behalf to the railway administration within six months from the date of the delivery of the animals or goods for carriage by railway." It is obvious that the notice in this case complies with Section 77 of the Indian Railways Act and. therefore, no serious argument had been advanced in respect of the validity of the notice under that section. therefore, no serious argument had been advanced in respect of the validity of the notice under that section. (4) The only point that was seriously pressed by Mr. Medhi, the learned counsel for the appellant, is that the notice in question did not comply with Section 80, Civil Procedure Code as the same? was not addressed to the General Manager of the Railway as required by the section and that this is particularly necessary in view of the fact that the notice has been sent by post. (5) The relevant portion of Section 80, Civil Procedure Code is as follows: "80. No suit shall be instituted against the-Government, or against a public officer in respect of any act purporting to be done by such public officer in his official capacity, until the expiration of two months next after notice in writing has been delivered to or left at the office of * * * * (b) in the case of a suit against the Central Government where it relates to a railway, the General Manager of that railway; * * * * and in the case of a public officer, delivered to him or left at his office, stating the cause of action, the name, description and place of resi­dence of the plaintiff and the relief which he claims; and the plaint shall contain a statement that such notice has been so delivered or left." It is seen from this section that all that is re­quired to be done is that the notice should either have been delivered to the General Manager or left at the office of the General Manager of the Railway. It is enough, therefore, that the notice in question should be left at the office of the General Manager. Personal delivery to him is not required as a condition precedent in this section. In the instant case the notice in question was addres­sed to the Deputy Chief Commercial Superinten­dent, a senior responsible officer of the Railway, working in the office of the General Manager, and as the notice had been sent by post and it is not disputed that it has been received by the Deputy Chief Commercial Superintendent concerned, it is obvious that the notice must be regarded in law as having been left at the office of the General Manager. The object of providing for the alterna­tive in the Section is obvious. The object of providing for the alterna­tive in the Section is obvious. The General Manager may or may not be available for receiving the notice at all times, inasmuch as, being the head of the Railway Administration concerned, he may have to keep moving about to various places in the course of the performance of his duties. It is for that reason that the Legislature advisably provided, when they amended the section, that it would be enough if it is delivered at the office of the General Manger. The office of the General Manager1 is a big one and if the notice is left at the office of the General Manager in the hands of a responsible senior official of the Office, both the letter and the spirit of the section must be deemed to have been complied with. We are satisfied that in the instant case the requirements of Sec­tion 80, Civil Procedure Code have been complied with. (6) Mr. Medhi places reliance on two decisions Sandhya Trading Co. v. Governor-General Dominion of India reported in AIR 1950 Cal 426 and Union of India representing the Central Railway Administration v. Jaichand Arjundas re­ported in AIR 1953 Nag 360. In the former case the notice was issued to the Secretary, Railway Board, who sits in Delhi and who is part of the office of the Ministry of Railways, and not to the General Manager or to his office. In the latter 'case it was delivered to the Secretary of the Cen­tral Government. These are, therefore, clear cases •where the notices have been delivered and left at the office 'of a person who is not indicated in Sec­tion 80, Civil Procedure Code and quite rightly the learned Judges decided that there has been no compliance with Section 80, Civil Procedure Code. These decisions, therefore, cannot have any application to the instant case. (7) It is further contended by Mr. Medhi that as the notice in this case was sent by post, it should have been addressed to the General Manager and not to any of her person. Here again we see no substance in' the contention. Even if it is address­ed to the General Manager, only someone authoris­ed or appointed by him will receive his mail in his absence. Medhi that as the notice in this case was sent by post, it should have been addressed to the General Manager and not to any of her person. Here again we see no substance in' the contention. Even if it is address­ed to the General Manager, only someone authoris­ed or appointed by him will receive his mail in his absence. It would not make any difference whatsoever whether the same is addressed to the, General Manager or to a senior responsible sub- I ordinate officer of the office of the General Manager. The mere fact that the notice is sent by j post, in our opinion, makes no difference so long as the notice was in fact delivered at the office of the General Manager, as required by the section. That the notice reached the General Manager's •office is beyond dispute and in fact a reply had also issued thereto by the Deputy Chief Commer­cial Superintendent on behalf of the Railway. In the circumstances, therefore, we are satisfied that the issue of the notice in this case is in compliance with both Section 77 of the Indian Railways Act as it stood at the time as well as Section 80, Civil Procedure' Code. (8) Ground No. 6 taken in the memorandum of appeal which is both vaguer and general, 19 not pressed by the learned counsel for the appel­lant. In the result this appeal fails and is dis­missed with costs. (9) As regards the cross-objection preferred by the respondent here, to the judgment and decree of the Court below, we find that it is based on the claim made in the plaint of 25% of the value of the goods as compensation. It is clear that there can be no question of awarding special dama­ges which alone could support the claim of this amount in this case. At the outset it may be pointed out that there is no privity of contract in the matter of the consignment, so far as the con­signee and the Railway are concerned. The con­signee under special provision became entitled to make a claim against the Railway if the goods are not delivered to him, as he is the person that would be entitled to it. So far as that claim is concerned, it had been fully decreed by the Court below. Mr. The con­signee under special provision became entitled to make a claim against the Railway if the goods are not delivered to him, as he is the person that would be entitled to it. So far as that claim is concerned, it had been fully decreed by the Court below. Mr. Dam, the learned counsel for the res­pondent pointed out that this 25% which he had claimed in the plaint represented the difference between the price of the bags of flour booked quoted by the consignor and the price in vogue at Silchar, the place where he had to take deli­very. But if that was the claim of the respondent, namely that the price of the flour delivered was Rs. 28/- per maund and not Rs. 21/81- per maund, it was open to him to have made that clear in the plaint itself. But what we find is that the value of the goods that were delivered to him was shown as Rs. 21/8/- per maund and that value had been accepted by the Court below and a decree was given to him on the basis of the claim. He could have, therefore, no cause for complaint so far as the value of the goods not delivered to him is concerned. Having taken the facts and circumsta­nces of the case into consideration, we are not satisfied that the respondent is entitled to any com­pensation at all in the matter. (10) Another point that is taken by Mr. Dam is that if compensation is not allowed as claimed by him, he should at least be allowed interest on the amount decreed. But that unfortunately had not been made a subject-matter of the claim in the plaint nor has that claim been included, assum­ing it could be included, in the cross-objection. In the circumstances it is not possible for us to entertain the claim by way of interest. In the result the cross-objection fails and is dismis­sed with costs. (11) S. K. DUTTA, J.: I agree. Appeal dismissed.