JAGAT NARAYAN, J.—These are two connected execution second appeals, by one of the judgments-debtors named Ghanshyam Das, arising out of the execution of a decree for money passed by the Sudder Adalat of the then State of Jaisalmer on 27.12.45. 2. No codified law was in force in that State but justice was administered in accordance with the principles underlying the laws which were in force in British India. Under notification No. 925/1554-G/46, dated 1st March, 1946, the Code of Civil Procedure and some other Acts in British India were adopted "with due adaptation to local conditions in regard to the constitution and power of the courts and such recognised customs or old practice as is not immoral or is opposed to public policy." One of the modes for executing a money decree which was in vogue in that State was that on the application of the decree-holder for execution, immovable property of the judgment-debtor was attached on the formers Nishan-dehi and the decree-holder was put into possession of it. He was entitled to retain possession till the judgment-debtor paid the decretal amount to him. This mode of execution of money decrees was not regarded as immoral or opposed to public policy and continued after the issue of the above notification. 3. The decree-sheet was drawn up on 11.9.47 and on 28.9.47 the first execution application was filed by the decree-holders. The prayer made in this application was that relief may be granted by executing the decree. On this execution application notices under O. 21, R. 22 were issued to all the judgment-debtors. Notice was sent to Ghanshyam Das appellant by registered post. He refused to accept it and the envelope containing the notice was received by the court with the endorsement of refusal made on it by the postal authorities. This was regarded as sufficient service by the executing court and this fact was recorded in the order-sheet dated 5.9.48. 4. On 5.9.43 the decree-holders made a further application in continuation of the application dated 28.9.47 praying that three houses belonging to the judgment-debtors may be attached on their nishan-dehi. On this application the executing court ordered the attachment of the houses on 8.9.48. Three houses were attached under this order. Thereafter on 12.9.48 the executing court issued a proclamation inviting objections against the attachment within a period of two months. No objection was received during this period. On this application the executing court ordered the attachment of the houses on 8.9.48. Three houses were attached under this order. Thereafter on 12.9.48 the executing court issued a proclamation inviting objections against the attachment within a period of two months. No objection was received during this period. On 11.12.48 one Haridas sent an objection by post to the court purporting to be under O. 21, R. 58 C.P.C. in which he claimed half share in one attached house and one-third share in another. This objection was rejected on the ground that it was not properly presented and was belated. 5. On 30.12.48 the decree-holders filed an application praying that possession over two of the attached houses may be delivered to them. It was stated by them that the third house belonging to Bithal Das, judgment-debtor, who had paid his one-sixth share of the decretal amount to them and it was prayed that his house may be released from attachment. On this application the executing court passed an order on the same day for the delivery of possession over two of the attached houses to the decree-holders. On 8.1.49 possession over these two houses was delivered to them. 6. On 13.3.49 Haridas filed a regular suit under O. 21, R. 63 C.P.C. in the Sudder Adalat claiming half share in one attached house and one-third in the other. Along with his plaint he filed an application for restoration of possession over the two houses to him on the ground that his movable property was kept in them. On 10.4.49 the presiding Judge of the court passed an order that possession over the two houses be delivered back to Haridas on furnishing security in the sum of Rs. 5000/- pending decision of the suit under O. 21, R. 63 C.P.C. This order was not executed and Haridas made an application to the court for executing the order. By then the previous presiding Judge had been transferred and the then Civil Judge, Jaisalmer, who had taken his place, refused to execute the order dated 10.4.49 on the ground that it was one without jurisdiction. This order was passed on 29.12.50. Haridas filed two revision applications in this Court against the orders dated 29.12.50 and 30.12.48 respectively (Civil Revision Nos. 42 and 43 of 1951 decided on 18.9.61). This order was passed on 29.12.50. Haridas filed two revision applications in this Court against the orders dated 29.12.50 and 30.12.48 respectively (Civil Revision Nos. 42 and 43 of 1951 decided on 18.9.61). These revision applications were heard by Nawal Kishore, J. All the judgment-debtors and all the decree-holders were parties to these revision applications. This Court upheld the order of the executing court dated 30.12.48 under which possession over the two houses was delivered to the decree-holders. It however set aside the order dated 29.12.50 passed by the Civil Judge, Jaisalmer on the technical ground that he could not refuse to execute the order of his predecessor. A perusal of the order shows that this Court refused to consider the legality of the order dated 10.4.49 on the ground that the decree-holders had not filed any revision] application against it. 7. The decree-holders then filed a revision application against the order dated 10.4.49 (civil revision No. 173/151 decided on 28.2.52). This came up for hearing before Bapna, J. who was of the opinion that the mode of execution resorted to by the executing court namely, putting the decree-holders into possession of the immovable properties of the judgment-debtors for as long as the decretal amount remained unpaid, was opposed to public policy and therefore ceased to be valid law in Jaisalmer with effect from 1.4.49. On behalf of the decree-holders the attention of the learned Judge was drawn to the fact that an application for restoration of possession could not be made in a suit under O. 21, R. 63 C.P.C. He overruled the objection on the ground that it was open to him to treat the revision application filed by decree-holders as one made in execution proceedings "as the decree-holders did not stand to lose in any way by the order which he was making". Possession over the two houses was restored to Harida son 19.7.52. 8. With regard to the execution proceedings the executing court passed an order on 31.10.49 for consigning the record on the ground that possession over the attached properties had already been delivered to the decree-holders and nothing more remained to be done. 9. On 20.12.51 the executing court suo moto reopened the execution proceedings. In the meantime the file had been requisitioned by this Court for the disposal of civil revision No. 173/1951 which has been referred to above. 9. On 20.12.51 the executing court suo moto reopened the execution proceedings. In the meantime the file had been requisitioned by this Court for the disposal of civil revision No. 173/1951 which has been referred to above. The file was received back by the executing court on 18.3.52. On that date an order was recorded in the order-sheet directing that the parties be informed and 8.4.52 was fixed as the next date for taking further proceedings. 8th April, 1952 was a holiday. The case was taken up on 9.4.52. The decree-holders were present but the judgment-debtors were absent. Their notices were not returned after service. 26th April, 1952 was then fixed. On that date it was found that the notices had not been returned after service on the judgment-debtors. 9th July, 1952 was then fixed. On that date further proceedings in execution were stayed on the ground that a suit under O. 21, R. 63 had been instituted by Haridas in respect of the attached properties. 10. The suit of Haridas was decreed on 9.12.53. It was held that he was the owner of one-half of Churapura house and one-third of Jethapara house. On 12.12.53 the execution case was again taken up. It was stated that as a result of the decision in the suit under O. 21, R. 63 half of Churapara house and one-third of Jethapara house were released from attachment and it was ordered that the remaining shares in these two houses be sold. On 14.12.53 the decree-holders filed two applications in continuation of the execution proceedings which were taking place. In these applications particulars required under O. 21, R. 11 were all mentioned. They were duly verified and signed in accordance with law. One was for the attachment and sale of some movable property. In the other it was stated that half share in Churapara house and two-thirds share in Jethapara house were under attachment and a prayer for selling them was made. The executing court ordered that notices under O. 21, R. 66 be issued for 18.1.54. On 18.1.54 it was found that Govindlal had been served personally, that Prabhulal had refused to accept service and notice was affixed to his house and that the other judgment-debtors had not been served. Notices were sent again for them for 28.8.55. The executing court ordered that notices under O. 21, R. 66 be issued for 18.1.54. On 18.1.54 it was found that Govindlal had been served personally, that Prabhulal had refused to accept service and notice was affixed to his house and that the other judgment-debtors had not been served. Notices were sent again for them for 28.8.55. On that latter date it was again found that Ghanshyam Das, Kanhaiya Lal and Raman Lal had not been served. On 17.5.55 on the prayer of the decree-holders it was ordered that these judgment-debtors may be served by publication in Nav Bharat. After service had been effected in this manner the sale of the two attached houses took place. Two-third of Jethapara house was sold to Bhanwar Lal for Rs. 800/- on 17.7.55 and half of Chaurapara house was sold to Himmatram decree-holder for Rs. 1300/- on 18.7.55. Both these sales were confirmed before 13.9.55 and sale certificates were issued in favour of the purchasers on 8.12.55. 11. On 19.3.55 the decree-holders made another execution application for attachment and sale of 2 other houses—a nohra with constructions inside it and a bada belonging to the judgment-debtors. They were attached on 4.4.55 and notices under O. 21, R. 66 were issued and were served by registered post. Ghanshyam Das judgment-debtor appeared in response to the notice on 27.8.55 and prayed for time to file objections. Objections were filed by him on 28.9.55. He objected to the attachment and sale of these two properties on the ground that the application dated 28.9.47 was not in accordance with O. 21, R. 11 C.P.C., that on that application a final order was passed on 31.10.49, that no application within the period of limitation prescribed under Art. 182(5) was filed after 31.10.49 and that consequently the execution proceedings were barred by limitation. The executing court upheld this objection under its order dated 4.4.56. The decree-holders filed civil appeal No. 41/59 against this order in the court of District Judge who allowed it. Ghanshyam Das has filed S. B. Civil Execution Second Appeal No. 4/61 against that order. 12. Himmatram decree-holder auction-purchaser applied for possession over one-half of Churapara house which was sold in his favour on 18.7.55 and the sale of which had been confirmed. This application was rejected by the executing court on the same ground on which its order dated 4.4.56 referred to above was based. 12. Himmatram decree-holder auction-purchaser applied for possession over one-half of Churapara house which was sold in his favour on 18.7.55 and the sale of which had been confirmed. This application was rejected by the executing court on the same ground on which its order dated 4.4.56 referred to above was based. The decree-holders preferred civil appeal No. 40/59 in the court of District Judge, Jodhpur against this order. This appeal was allowed. S. B. Civil Execution Second Appeal No. 5/61 has been preferred by Ghanshyam Das judgment-debtor against that order. 13. Taking appeal No. 5/61 first, it is clear that the order of the executing court is wholly erroneous. The judgment-debtors did not file any objection before the sale in favour of Himmatram decree-holder auction-purchaser was confirmed. After the confirmation of the sale the judgment-debtor can only succeed if he is able to show that order was without jurisdiction. The executing court got jurisdiction to execute the decree by the judgment of the Sudder Adalal dated 27.12.45. After the expiry of one year from the date of the decree, the executing court got jurisdiction to sell the property of the judgment-debtors in execution by issuing notices under O. 21 R. 22 C.P.C. The judgment-debtors were residing outside the State of Jaisalmer. Notices were sent to them by registered post as authorized by O. 5 R. 25 C.P.C. The court held that these notices had been duly served. The court had jurisdiction to decide whether or not they were served. The executing court was thus seized of jurisdiction to sell the property of the judgment-debtors in execution of the decree. Himmatram decree-holder duly obtained permission of the executing court to bid for the property at the auction under O. 21 R. 72(1). The sale in favour of Himmatram cannot therefore be regarded as a nullify and the executing court erred in refusing to deliver possession over the share of the.house purchased by him. S. B. Civil Execution Second Appal No. 5/61 is accordingly dismissed. 14. Coming now to S. B. Civil Execution Second Appeal No. 4 61, the first objection of the appellant is that the application dated 28.9.47 was not in accordance with law. Notices under O. 21 R. 22 C.P.C. were however issued on this application to the judgment-debtors. The notice of Ghanshyam Das was sent by registered post to him. 14. Coming now to S. B. Civil Execution Second Appeal No. 4 61, the first objection of the appellant is that the application dated 28.9.47 was not in accordance with law. Notices under O. 21 R. 22 C.P.C. were however issued on this application to the judgment-debtors. The notice of Ghanshyam Das was sent by registered post to him. It was returned with an endorsement by postal authorities that it was tendered but Ghanshyam Das refused to accept it. This was rightly taken to be sufficient service by the executing court. As Ghanshyam Das was residing outside the State of Jaisalmer the sending of notice by registered post was a duly authorised mode of service under O. 5 R. 25 C.P.C. He did not appear in response to the notice to file any objection. On 8.9.48 the executing court passed an order for the attachment of three houses belonging to the judgment-debtors on the application or the decree-holders dated 5.9.48. The order of the executing court dated 8.9.48 was an order under O. 21 R. 23(1) C.P.C. This order operates as constructive res judicata against the judgment-debtors as held by a Division Bench of this Court in Th. Amar Singh Vs. Gulab Chand (1) and estops them from pleading that the execution application was not in accordance with law. In the application of 28.9.47 the names of the decree-holders as well as judgment-debtors were given and the amount due against the judgment-debtors on that date was also given. It was prayed that three houses of the judgement-debtors which the decree-holders point out may be attached with a view to granting relief to the decree-holders. The number of the suit and the date of decree were not given in this application The omission to give these particulars does not however disable the court from proceeding with the execution of the decree and omission to give these particulars is therefore not enough to make the application defective. The particulars of the properties to be attached were also not specified in the application. It was stated that the houses will be pointed out on the spot. Nor was a prayer for the sale of the houses made. Only a prayer for their attachment was made. The particulars of the properties to be attached were also not specified in the application. It was stated that the houses will be pointed out on the spot. Nor was a prayer for the sale of the houses made. Only a prayer for their attachment was made. The reason was that it was the practice prevailing in the courts in Jaisalmer State to put the decree-holder into possession of the property of the judgment-debtor after attaching it on the Nishan-dehi of the decree-holder. It was for the judgment-debtor to pay the decretal amount to get back possession. However, as I have mentioned above, the judgment-debtors are estopped from challenging that the application was not in accordance with law. 15. The next objection of the appellant is that the order dated 31.10.49 was a final order within the meaning of Art. 182(5) of the Limitation Act and no application was made by the decree-holders for the execution of the decree within 3 years of that order. 16. As has been mentioned above the decree-holders filed an application on 30.12.48 praying that possession over two of the attached houses be given to them and the third may be released from attachment. On this application the court passed an order for the delivery of possession to the decree-holders over two of the houses. On 31.10.49 the executing court consigned the file to the record room without notice to the parties on the ground that possession had already been delivered to the decree-holders as prayed by them and nothing else remained to be done. 17. On behalf of the respondents it was contended that this was not a final order as it was passed without notice to them and was based on a wrong assumption. In Mahommed Taqi Vs. Rajaram(2) a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court laid down the test that where the court intends to dispose of the matter completely and no longer keeps it pending on its file and not merely suspend the execution or consign the record to the record room for the time being, the order must be deemed to be a final order which will give a fresh start for purposes of limitation. The order passed by the court on 31.10.49 fulfils the test and I am of the opinion that it should be regarded as a final order, so far as the executing court was concerned. The order passed by the court on 31.10.49 fulfils the test and I am of the opinion that it should be regarded as a final order, so far as the executing court was concerned. 18. The above order was passed under the impression that nothing further remained to be done in the execution proceedings as possession had already been delivered to the decree-holders by the order of the court dated 30.12.48. That order was however set aside by this Court in civil Revision No. 173/51 on 28.2.52 as has been mentioned above. The foundation upon which the order dated 31.10.49 rested thus disappeared. In these circumstances, I am of the opinion that it is the order passed by this Court on 28.2.52 which must be regarded as the final order from which the decree-holders get a fresh start of limitation under Art. 182(5). I am fortified in this view by the following decisions; Annamalia Chettier vs. Valliammi Aehi(3) Rameshwar Prasad vs. Rajendra Prasad(4) Lakshmanan vs. Malayandi(5) In Annamali Chettiars case(3) a decree-holder applied for execution of a decree and got certain property attached. The judgment-debtor then got the attachment raised, whereupon the decree-holder appealed against the order removing attachment. The decree-holders appeal was held by the Privy Council to be an application to take a step-in-aid of execution. It was accordingly held that the order of the appellate court dismissing the appeal would constitute a fresh starting point of limitation under Art. 182(5). It was also held by the Privy Council that the appellate courts order was also the final order" on the decree-holders application to execute the decree. 19. The above decision is equally applicable to an order passed on a revision application. In Art. 182(5) of the Limitation Act, limitation runs from the date of the final decree or Order of the appellate court or the withdrawal of the appeal. It was held in Nagendra Nath Dey Vs. Siresh Chandra Dey(6) by their Lordships of the Privy Council :— "There is no definition of appeal in the Civil Procedure Code, but their Lordships have no doubt that any application by a party to an appellate Court, asking it to set aside or revise a decision of a subordinate court, is an appeal with the ordinary acceptation of the term." In Rameshwar Prasad Vs. Rajendra Prasad (4) a decree was passed on 17.3.1939. Rajendra Prasad (4) a decree was passed on 17.3.1939. Some properties were attached in execution of this decree. One of the judgment-debtors filed on objection to the attachment. The objection was allowed whereupon the decree-holder went up in appeal. The appellate court remanded the case to the lower court. But in the meanwhile some other properties of the judgment-debtor were sold and the executing court passed an order on 28.1.1941 to the effect that the execution case be dismissed on part satisfaction. After the case was remanded, the lower court rejected the judgment-debtors objection. The judgment-debtor went up in appeal against this order. The appellate court dismissed the appeal for non-prosecution on 28.7.1944. Pending the above appeal, (against the order rejecting the judgment-debtors objection), some of the properties were sold. The sale was confirmed and on 18.11.1942, the executing court passed an order to the effect that the execution case be dismissed on part satisfaction. After the appellate order of 28.7.1944, the executing court on 9.11.1944 passed an order "No steps taken. Case disposed of." The decree-holder filed an application for execution on 18.7.1947. The lower court held that the execution case having been dismissed on part satisfaction on 28.1.1941, the application was barred by limitation as more than three years had elapsed after that date. It was held that the application was not barred by limitation. The final order in the prior execution case was the appellate order of 28.7.1944 and time ran from that date. It was this order which finally determined the question whether the property was liable to attachment and sale. Although the property had in the meantime been brought to sale, and the sale was confirmed by the lower court, the sale was all the time subject to the final decision of the appellate court. Hence the order of the executing court of 18.11.1942 was not the "final order" from which time would run. It was further held that though the order of executing Court dated 9.11.1944 was the last order in the execution case it was not the final order. 20. In Lakshmanan Vs. Malayandi(5) it was held that an appeal is the continuation of the proceedings in the original court and sets at large the finality attached to the decision of the subordinate court. 20. In Lakshmanan Vs. Malayandi(5) it was held that an appeal is the continuation of the proceedings in the original court and sets at large the finality attached to the decision of the subordinate court. Therefore, where an application has been made by the decree-holder to the proper court for execution of decree or for taking some step-in-aid and there is an appeal against the order made on that application, it is the ultimate decision of the appellate court that is the "final order" in the case, and an application filed within 3 years from the date of the appellate order is within time. The fact that the appeal was preferred by the judgment-debtor and not the decree-holder is not a reason for making a distinction. 21. In the present case, as has already been pointed out above, the decree-holders had filed a revision application against the order dated 10.4.49 passed in the suit under O. 21, R. 63 instituted by Hari Das (civil revision No. 173 of 1951). This was treated by Bapna, J. as a revision application made in execution proceedings and he set aside the order of the executing court dated 30.12.48 which had been passed in favour of the decree-holders. Bapna, J. will be deemed to have exercised the power under sec. 115 C.P.C. suo moto. In my opinion the principle laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Annamalai Chettiars case(3) is equally applicable in a case like the present one where a learned Judge interferes with an order of the executing court suo moto in exercise of the powers under sec. 115 C.P.C. If any other view is taken, it would result in grave injustice to one of the parties. By the order passed in civil revision No. 173/51 on 28.2.52 the very foundation of the order passed by the executing court consigning the proceedings on 31.10.49 was taken away. This order must in justice and equity be regarded as the final order in execution proceedings which gives a fresh starting point of limitation to the decree-holders under Art. 182(5). 22. Another decision that may be profitably referred to in this connection is that in Keshav Narayan Vs. Ghasiram(7). This order must in justice and equity be regarded as the final order in execution proceedings which gives a fresh starting point of limitation to the decree-holders under Art. 182(5). 22. Another decision that may be profitably referred to in this connection is that in Keshav Narayan Vs. Ghasiram(7). I think what the learned Judge meant, by saying in this decision that the parties should be relegated back to the same position, was that the order of the superior court should be treated as a final order within the meaning of Art. 182(5) so as to give the decree-holder a fresh starting point. 23. Two houses of the judgment-debtors had been attached by the order of the executing court dated 8.9.48 as has already been mentioned above. The order of the court dated 31.10.49 consigning the proceedings to the record room was passed under the impression that as possession had already been delivered to the decree-holders over the houses nothing more remained to be done. After that another order was passed by this Court in civil revision No. 173/51 setting aside the order of the executing court dated 30.12.48 delivering possession over the attached houses to the decree-holders. This a? I have held above is the final order in execution proceedings within the meaning of Art. 182(5). Neither of these order puts an end to the attachment within the meaning of O. 21, R. 57, which runs as follows— "Where any property has been attached in execution of a decree but by reason of the decree-holders default the Court is unable to proceed further with the application for execution, it shall either dismiss the application or for any sufficient reason adjourn the proceedings to a future date. Upon the dismissal of such application the attachment shall cease". Neither the order of the executing court dated 31.10.49 nor the order of this Court dated 28.2.52 were based on any default on the part of the decree-holders. The attachment of the two houses made on 8.9.48 therefore subsisted. 24. During the subsistence of this attachment two applications were made by the decree-holders on 14.12.53. In one application a prayer for attaching some movable property of the judgment-debtors was made (paper No. B. 21/1). In the other application a prayer for the sale of the two houses was made (paper No. B. 18/1). 24. During the subsistence of this attachment two applications were made by the decree-holders on 14.12.53. In one application a prayer for attaching some movable property of the judgment-debtors was made (paper No. B. 21/1). In the other application a prayer for the sale of the two houses was made (paper No. B. 18/1). These two applications which were filed simultaneously should be treated as one application. All the material particulars required in an application under O. 21, R. 11 are contained in these applications. In the latter application the prayer for the sale of the two houses has been made. The description of the houses, the number of the suit and the amount of the decree remaining unpaid are all given. These applications constitute in substance an application in accordance with law for the execution of the decree. This application dated 14.12.53 was filed within 3 years of the order of this Court dated 28.2.52, which I have held above to be the final order for purposes of limitation. 25. No fresh notice under O. 21, R. 22 was given. But notices u/O. 21, R. 66 were issued to the judgment-debtors before their properties were sold and they were duly served in accordance with law. The judgment-debtors thus had an opportunity of showing cause why the decree should not be executed against them by the sale of the houses. In this connection the decision of this Court in Mitha Lal vs. Kapoor Chand(8) may be referred to. The judgment-debtors did not appear in response to this notice to file any objection. The court thereupon ordered the sale of properties. The judgment-debtors are estopped by the principle of constructive res judicata from challenging the execution proceedings in which their houses (Jethapara and Churapara) were sold on any ground which they could have taken if they had appeared in response to the notice issued under O. 21, R. 66 C.P.C. and had filed an objection. 26. I now come to the application dated 19.3.55 for the attachment and sale of their immovable properties in respect of which Ghanshyam Das judgment-debtor has filed the present objection. These properties were attached on 4.4.55 and notices under O. 21, Rule 66 were issued. No notice under O. 21, Rule 22 was required as another execution proceeding in which two houses (Jethapara and Churapara) have been sold was already pending. These properties were attached on 4.4.55 and notices under O. 21, Rule 66 were issued. No notice under O. 21, Rule 22 was required as another execution proceeding in which two houses (Jethapara and Churapara) have been sold was already pending. Further no prejudice has been caused to the appellant by non-issue of a notice under Rule 22 and non-issue of it cannot be regarded as fatal defect in view of the decision in Mitha Lals case(8) referred to above. 27. I accordingly hold that the properties which were attached in consequence of the application dated 19.3.55 were rightly attached and are liable to be sold in execution of the decree. 28. Some other aspects of the matter were also canvassed on behalf of the contesting respondents but it is not necessary for me to deal with these arguments on account of the view which I have taken above. 29. In the result I dismiss S. B. Civil Execution Second Appeal No. 4/61 also. 30. In the circumstances of the case, I direct that parties shall bear their own costs of both these appeals.