Judgment:- In the Second Appeal the question is whether it is necessary, for valid exercise of the power of sale under section 69 of the Transfer of Property Act, that the first mortgagee, who invokes the power,should give notice of it to the second mortgagee and in the other appeal (Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 80 of 1962) the question is one of limitation. The property in question originally belonged to one Devalla Ramiah. On his death, his estate vested in the Administrator-General for administering the same on behalf of Ramiah’s minor sons. On 18th February, 1938, the Administrator-General sold the property to the father of the respondent in the Second Appeal. But the purchaser on the same date executed a mortgage to secure a part of the price not paid at the time. The respondent’s father was adjudged an insolvent in Insolvency Petition No. 46 of 1942, on the file of this Court and in the insolvency, the Official Assignee, Madras, sold the property to the insolvent’s son, the respondent, on 23rd May, 1955. It appears that the respondent’s father and mother had executed a second mortgage over this very property. I do not think it necessary to refer to the litigation on the second mortgage and its result. The last of the minors became a major on 25th March, 1945, on the completion of his twenty-first year. On the terms of the mortgage, in favour of the AdministratorGeneral, the amount due under it became payable on the date when the last of the minors became a major. The appellants, the quondam minors, invoked their power of sale under section 69 of the Transfer of Property Act and took steps to bring the property to auction through auctioneers on 27th April, 1957. But before the sale took place, the respondent brought the suit out of which this Second Appeal arises, for an injunction restraining the appellants from exercising their power of sale. There were a number of issues on which both the Courts below were agreed except in regard to one question, namely, whether the power of sale could not be exercised by the appellants for their failure to serve notice on the second mortgagee. On that question, the lower appellate Court, differing from the trial Court, considered that such a notice was required under the terms of section 69 read with section. 59-A of the Transfer of Property Act. On that question, the lower appellate Court, differing from the trial Court, considered that such a notice was required under the terms of section 69 read with section. 59-A of the Transfer of Property Act. It was on that view, the lower appellate Court reversed the trial Court’s decree and decreed the suit. The Second Appeal is directed against this appellate decree. The Civil Miscellaneous Appeal arises out of an order dismissing the appellants’ application for leave to sue in forma pauperis on the view that the cause of action was prima facie barred by limitation. This view was formed by the trial Judge on the ground that the suit should have been filed within twelve years of 24th March, 1947, that is to say on 24th March, 1959, the former date being the date when the last of the minors became a major and the amount due under the mortgage in favour of the Administrator-General became payable. He did not agree with the appellants that the documents relied on by them amounted to an acknowledgment of the debt to save time. On the question of notice, I think the lower appellate Court was clearly wrong. In my opinion, section 69 of the Transfer of Property Act does not require a notice to be served on the second mortgagee in order that the first mortgagee may validly exercise his power of sale. That section no doubt says that no such power shall be exercised unless and until notice in writing requiring payment of principal money has been served on the mortgagor or one of several mortgagors and default has been made in payment of the principal money or part of it for the specified time after service. But the term mortgagor in the section does not, in my opinion, cover a second mortgagee. It is true that section 59-A, which governs also section 69, lays down a rule of interpretation that unless otherwise expressly provided, references in the Chapter to mortgagors and mortgagees should be deemed to include references to persons deriving title from them respectively. In a sense, a second mortgagee may be regarded as a person deriving title from a mortgagor. It is not in that sense, as I think, should the section be understood. The section makes a difference between mortgagors and mortgagees and the persons deriving title from them respectively. In a sense, a second mortgagee may be regarded as a person deriving title from a mortgagor. It is not in that sense, as I think, should the section be understood. The section makes a difference between mortgagors and mortgagees and the persons deriving title from them respectively. It seems to me, therefore, that unless a person deriving title does so, not as a second mortgagee or the like, but for instance, as an assignee of the interest of the mortgagor qua mortgagor he will not be a mortgagor for purposes of the section 59-A. That is the view a Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Piarey Lal v. Dina Math1, was inclined to take with which I am in respectful agreement. The learned Judges opined: “Another argument was that a mortgagee would also derive title from a mortgagor and therefore section 59-A would also apply to mortgagees. We do not think that that is a correct interpretation of section 59-A because that section states in regard to mortgagors and mortgagees that references to them shall include ‘references to persons deriving title from them respectively’......A distinction is therefore drawn by section 59-A between the two categories of mortgagors and mortgagees and doubtless the intention is that the persons who derive title from them are to be persons who derive title as a mortgagor or as a mortgagee. That is, under the head ‘mortgagor’ would be included persons succeeding by inheritance or by will or by sale or by auction sale to the right of the equity of redemption held by a mortgagor and those words would not include persons who subsequently take a mortgage from the mortgagor." It follows, therefore, the view taken by the lower appellate Court to the contrary cannot be sustained. The result is, the Second Appeal is allowed. The application of the appellants to sue in forma pauperis was filed on 2nd January, 1961. A suit to enforce a mortgage brought on that date would certainly be barred by limitation unless time was saved by intermediate acknowledgments. On behalf of the appellants, two documents were relied on as acknowledgments. The first document is an affidavit, dated 15th December, 1954, sworn to by the respondent in support of an application for permission to purchase the suit property from the Official Assignee in the insolvency of his father. On behalf of the appellants, two documents were relied on as acknowledgments. The first document is an affidavit, dated 15th December, 1954, sworn to by the respondent in support of an application for permission to purchase the suit property from the Official Assignee in the insolvency of his father. This affidavit referred to the fact that his father had executed a mortgage in favour of the Administrator-General for a definite sum in 1938 and that a sum of rupees six thousand was due on that mortgage. The Court below held that this did not amount to an acknowledgment, as at the time the statement was made by the respondent, he had no subsisting liability to pay the debt. There is no doubt that this was the correct view to take. Before me, learned Counsel for the appellants relied on Krishnayya v. Venkatappayya2 and Fakirchand v. Narmadabai3, and contended that to constitute a valid acknowledgment under section 19 of the Limitation Act, it was not necessary that the acknowledgor should at the time of the acknowledgment be under an existing liability and that it was sufficient that, at the time of the enforcement of the debt, the acknowledgor had become liable to pay the debt. The cases relied on no doubt support the contention. But with due respect, I can find no justification for that view. The Bombay High Court itself in Fakirchand v. Narmadabai3, on appeal did not accept that view. So far as the Madras Judgment is concerned, I am relieved of the necessity of further examining it and other later cases, since a Full Bench of this Court in Nallathambi v. Ammal Nadachi4, has not accepted the principle of the decision in Krishnanayya v. Venkatappayya2, as good law. There the learned Judges held: ”Where the acknowledgment is in respect of a liability it implies that the person who acknowledges admits or owns the liability. There the learned Judges held: ”Where the acknowledgment is in respect of a liability it implies that the person who acknowledges admits or owns the liability. If a person who is a stranger to the liability makes a statement as to the subsistence of the liability, it cannot amount to an acknowledgment in law because he cannot own or admit the liability." Though the question did not directly arise before the Supreme Court, in Shapoor Freedom Mazda v. D.P. Chamaria5, it accepted as correct the view of Fry, L.J., in Green v. Humphreys6, as succinctly and tersely representing the substance of the provisions contained in section 19 of the Limitation Act. The English view was that an acknowledgment was an admission by the writer that there was a debt owing by him. The Full Bench of this Court has also made reference to this decision of the Supreme Court. It follows, therefore, that the view of the Court below, that the statement in the affidavit of the respondent did not amount to an acknowledgment, is correct. The next document relied on by the appellants before the Court below was a statement in the sale deed, dated 20th June, 1955, executed by the Official Assignee in favour of the respondent. That document contained a recital unto and to the use of the purchaser subject to all mortgages, litigations, etc. The Court below stated that the recital did not refer to the mortgage now in question as subsisting and that it would not be regarded as a specific acknowledgment of the same. It is not disputed, and indeed it cannot be, that the Official Assignee in whom the estate of the respondent’s father, who was the debtor, had vested, was competent to acknowledge the debt due under the first mortgage. It is nobody’s case that so far as the appellants were concerned, there was any other mortgage in their favour than the first mortgage here in question. The property was only subject to two mortgages one of them being in favour of the Administrator-General. I am unable to agree with the Court below that the recital did not refer to the suit mortgage as subsisting. No doubt, the recital did not in so many words say that the mortgage was subsisting on the date of the conveyance. The property was only subject to two mortgages one of them being in favour of the Administrator-General. I am unable to agree with the Court below that the recital did not refer to the suit mortgage as subsisting. No doubt, the recital did not in so many words say that the mortgage was subsisting on the date of the conveyance. But I think the recital in the context clearly indicated that there was the relationship of debtor and creditor under the mortgage. This in itself, in my opinion, saved time. The matter does not stand there. Before the execution of the sale deed by the Official Assignee, he gave a notice, dated 17th June, 1955, a few days before the sale to the Administrator-General, among others, notifying that he had sold the right, title and interest of the insolvent in the suit property subject to all mortgages, litigations and risks to the respondent. Clearly and unmistakably, this notice addressed to the Administrator-General referred to the mortgage executed by the respondent’s father in favour of the Administrator-General. Even if the recital in the sale deed contained any vagueness to regard it as an acknowledgment, this notice was specific enough and made it beyond doubt that the sale was subject to the mortgage in favour of the Administrator-General. In my opinion, that clearly was an acknowledgment by the Official Assignee of the debt due under the first mortgage. It is true that this document was not filed in the application for leave to sue in forma pauperis. But it was part of the record in the Second Appeal and I do not think it will be unjustifiable to refer to this document, when both the appeals are considered by me together. On my finding that the notice at least contained an acknowledgment the suit must be held to be within time. On that view, the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal also is allowed. In the course of the arguments in the appeals, on a suggestion from this Court that it would not be fair to allow the appellants to pursue two remedies simultaneously, their learned Counsel very properly after consulting his clients stated that they would not exercise the powers of sale and that they would pursue their suit to enforce the first mortgage. This is recorded. There will be no costs in either of the appeals in this Court. K.L.B. ------ Appeals allowed.