Judgment :- 1. This petition is filed against the order passed by the Executive First Class Magistrate of Chengannur under S.117 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure calling upon the petitioners to execute interim bonds pending the enquiry initiated against them under S.107 Crl. P. C. On a report received from the Sub-Inspector of Police Chengannur that the petitioners had criminally intimidated and caused hurt to witnesses Nos.1 and 2 in the police charge and are likely to do wrongful acts which might occasion a breach of the peace or disturb the public tranquillity, the learned Magistrate was satisfied that action should be taken under S.107 Cr. P. C. and he drew up proceedings under S.112 setting forth the substance of the information received, the amount of the bond to be executed, the term for which it is to be in force & the number of sureties required. The Sub-Inspector had also reported that immediate measures are necessary to prevent a breach of peace and had prayed for action under S.117 (3). On a perusal of the report filed by the Sub-Inspector the petitions and the endorsement thereon and after examining the Sub-Inspector the Magistrate was satisfied that immediate action was really required and ordered the petitioners to execute interim bonds. The present revision is preferred against that order directing the execution of the interim bonds. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioners argued the matter rather elaborately and contended that in this domestic quarrel between brothers and sisters the police ought not to have interfered at all, that the action taken is mala fide and the court ought not to have accepted the one-sided report of the police and initiated proceedings, that they are an abuse of the process of the court and therefore the entire proceedings should be quashed either under S.439 or 561A Cr. P. C. 3. There is no doubt that action taken under S.112 of the Code constitutes a judicial act and therefore the Magistrate should not act arbitrarily. There must be information of a nature which would convince the Magistrate that there is likelihood of a breach of the peace. But it is impossible to formulate any hard and fast rule with regard to the nature of the information on which the Magistrate may feel satisfied and act. There must be information of a nature which would convince the Magistrate that there is likelihood of a breach of the peace. But it is impossible to formulate any hard and fast rule with regard to the nature of the information on which the Magistrate may feel satisfied and act. What is reasonably sufficient to satisfy the Magistrate would depend on the peculiar facts of each case. Whether it is necessary in the interests of keeping the peace to take security from certain person or persons is a question which primarily concerns the Executive First Class Magistrate and the police. At this stage this court cannot go into the question whether the police were well advised or not in reporting to the Magistrate for action and whether their action is mala fide as contended by the petitioners. If this court were to interfere with the action of the police which action is in consonance with the powers conferred on them by law the safety of the community would be in peril. The High Court has undoubtedly power to quash proceedings either when the notice issued does not comply with the requirements of the section or when there is prima facie no materials to take action or to prevent the abuse of the process of the court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. But they must be cases where the petitioner can justly contend that on the face of the record the proceedings taken against him are illegal and unsustainable in law. Learned counsel has not been able to satisfy me that this is such a case. 4. In the case in In Be Swamikannu Padayachi (1952-2 M. L. J. 669), Ramaswamy J., observed: 'In regard to the taking of interim bonds, the Magistrate who is responsible for maintaining peace in his locality is the proper judge of what should be done in the exigencies and circumstances of the case rendering immediate measures necessary for preventing a breach of the peace, etc. and the High Court will not ordinarily interfere in revision unless it is shown that the order is manifestly perverse and that there were no grounds at all for passing such in order and that a failure of justice resulted (In re Muthuswami Chettiar 1940 (1) MLJ.11; In re Kavathan Patta Raju AIR. 1920 Mad. 1014." This cannot be stated to be the case here. 1920 Mad. 1014." This cannot be stated to be the case here. The learned Magistrate has directed his attention to the matter, had taken evidence to satisfy himself that action is necessary and has given reasons for the action taken and has not passed the impugned order merely on a matter of routine. 5. I cannot agree with the contention of the learned defence counsel that an assault on a private person in his own house would not amount to doing of a wrongful act which may occasion a breach of the peace or disturb the public tranquillity. What the learned counsel says is that the expression'breach of the peace' would imply some offence against the public. That is not so. It is not necessary that the public should be assaulted or that the hurt should be caused to any one of the public or that the offence should take place in public. The offence of assault itself is a breach of the peace whether it takes place in a private room or in an open street. A Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Naziruddin v. Emperor (AIR 1933 All. 609) had also taken this view. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioners also . submits that the fourth petitioner is a lecturer in the Government College at Ujjain and is residing permanently there and that the second petitioner is a student in the Mar Ivanios College and is staying in the Y. M. C. S. hostel at Trivandrum and that there is no likelihood of their committing any acts involving a breach of the peace and that in any case proceedings against them may be dropped. Learned Public Prosecutor, on the other hand, has drawn my attention to the affidavit filed by the Sub-Inspector giving a catalogue of further acts of violence committed by one or other of the petitioners and has argued that those overt acts are indicative of the continuance of the apprehension of the breach of the peace and that serious consequences might ensue if action is not taken against the petitioners. I will not be justified in going into the case against each one of the petitioners which must depend on the evidence that may be adduced by the prosecution. I will not be justified in going into the case against each one of the petitioners which must depend on the evidence that may be adduced by the prosecution. The Executive First Class Magistrate will certainly consider the case against each of the petitioners separately and he has the power of discharging all or any of the petitioners if no satisfactory evidence is adduced before him. It is for him to decide on the evidence as to what should be done. Before I close I would like to emphasise that in rejecting the petitioners' prayer for quashing the proceedings at this stage I am expressing no opinion one way or the other on the merits of the case. The learned Executive First Class Magistrate will take up the hearing of the main petition M. C. 6 of 1962 and dispose of the matter as expeditiously as possible. The revision petition is dismissed.