JUDGMENT : Wanchoo, J. 1. These two appeals by special leave against the judgment of the Madras High Court arise out of two criminal proceedings against the appellant but will be dealt with together as they are connected. The appellant had gone to the United States of America along with his wife on July 28, 1951 as a Director of the Express Newspapers Limited. A sum of 1800 dollars of foreign exchange was granted to him for his expenses in the United States. His wife also accompanied him but no foreign exchange was granted for her and it was expected that certain friends in the United States would meet her actual expenses. The appellant and his wife remained in the United States from July 28 to September 14, 1951 when they left for India. It appears that while the appellant was in the United States, he decided to purchase a Splicer Roll Winder from an American company for the use of his company in India for 9000 dollars. The American company however insisted upon cash payment or letter of credit and therefore the appellant cabled to India and asked for a letter of credit for that amount. There was some delay in the despatch of the letter of credit. As the American company was insisting that atleast 50 per cent of the price should be deposited as earnest money, the appellant was in difficulties in that connection. The case of the appellant was that one Mr Tom Beck who was a multimillionaire and the host of the appellant and his wife, agreed to help him with 4000 dollars which the appellant passed on to the American company until the letter of credit was received. The appellant's case further was that the sum of 4000 dollars was really given by Mr Beck to him as a gift to meet the expenses of his wife, the understanding being that the appellant would return whatever was left unspent, recognising a moral obligation to return the unspent balance. Actually, however, the evidence shows that this amount was deposited with the American company as an advance towards the price of the machine to be purchased from that company for 9000 dollars. It may be added that there is no charge with respect to this amount. 2. Actually, however, the evidence shows that this amount was deposited with the American company as an advance towards the price of the machine to be purchased from that company for 9000 dollars. It may be added that there is no charge with respect to this amount. 2. It is said that in the meantime one Mr Gupta in India learnt that the appellant was in need of 4000 dollars for the purchase of the machine and advised one Mr Lee Clark in the United States to advance this sum to the appellant. Thereupon Mr Lee Clark who it is said was not known to the appellant himself advanced 4000 dollars to the appellant who deposited it in the joint names of himself and his wife in the National City Bank of New York. The appellant's case was that he actually used this amount to replace the hospitality gift of 4000 dollars given to him by Mr Beck. The evidence shows that several cheques were issued on this amount and the money spent by the appellant on himself or his wife. Subsequently the letter of credit for 9000 dollars was received from India and the appellant then repaid Mr Lee Clark and also paid the balance to the American company from which the machine was to be purchased. The prosecution case in one of the cases is based on this transaction with Mr Lee Clark. The prosecution contends that the sum of 4000 dollars was borrowed from Mr Lee Clark by the appellant and that the appellant used part of that borrowed money for his and his wife's expenses and was therefore guilty under Section 4(1) read with Section 23 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, No. 7 of 1947 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") and also under Section 9 and the notification issued thereunder by the Central Government read with Section 23. 3. The second case against the appellant related to the sum of 1800 dollars which had been allowed to him as foreign exchange when he left for the United States. This sum was taken by him in the shape of travellers' cheques issued by Thomas Cook and Sons. Out of these travellers' cheques it appears that the appellant utilised 1300 dollars worth of them but did not utilise the remaining cheques valued at 500 dollars. This sum was taken by him in the shape of travellers' cheques issued by Thomas Cook and Sons. Out of these travellers' cheques it appears that the appellant utilised 1300 dollars worth of them but did not utilise the remaining cheques valued at 500 dollars. Therefore when he left the United States he had these travellers' cheques worth 500 dollars with him as the unspent balance of 1800 dollars allowed to him when he left India. The appellant returned to India via Switzerland on October 17. While he was in Switzerland he arranged for the deposit of these cheques for 500 dollars with the National City Bank of New York where he had already an account on the basis of 4000 dollars given to him by Mr Lee Clark. This amount was received by the said Bank on October 17. Therefore the appellant was charged under Section 4(3) read with Section 23 of the Act. 4. The appellant's defence was that it was known to the authorities in India that his wife's expenses would be met by his friends in the United States. That is why Mr Beck gave him a gift of 4000 dollars, out of which he spent 1700 dollars on his wife. However as he had in the beginning used that gift for the purpose of depositing the advance to the American company from which he was to purchase a machine, what he did was to use part of the sum of 4000 dollars given to him by Mr Lee Clark for his wife's expenses. When the letter of credit for the total price of the machine arrived from India, he paid back Mr Lee Clark and deposited the balance with the American Company to make up the full price of the machine. The appellant also contended that he had not borrowed any amount from Mr Lee Clark and that Mr Lee Clark whom he did not know at all gave him the amount at the instance, of Mr Gupta who had written to him from India. As to the amount of 500 dollars, the appellant's defence was that in fact he had spent 3500 dollars on himself and his wife while in the United States. As to the amount of 500 dollars, the appellant's defence was that in fact he had spent 3500 dollars on himself and his wife while in the United States. Of this sum, 1800 dollars came from the foreign exchange allowed to him when he left India and 1700 dollars were spent out of the gift made to him by Mr Beck. However, by accident he had not cashed travellers' cheques worth 500 dollars out of those which he had taken with him when he left India. Therefore when he reached Switzerland, he sent this amount back to New York so that it may be credited to his account and thereafter the sum of 2300 dollars which had remained unspent out of the gift of 4000 dollars by Mr Beck was to be returned to him. He therefore contended that nothing was left unspent out of 1800 dollars which had been allowed to him for his trip to the United States and therefore he was not guilty of an offence under Section 4(3) read with Section 23 of the Act. 5. Besides this defence on the facts, the appellant also contended that he had been compelled to be a witness against himself and therefore all the evidence which was thus procured by compelling him under the provisions of Section 19 of the Act, which gives power to the Central Government to call for any information a to foreign exchange, was inadmissible. If that evidence is excluded, appellant submitted, there would be no evidence left to prove the case against him with respect to either the sum of 4000 dollars or the sum of 500 dollars. 6. The Magistrate before whom the two cases were tried came to the conclusion that the appellant had borrowed 4000 dollars from Mr Lee Clark without getting any permission from the Reserve Bank of India and had therefore contravened Section 4(l) read with Section 23 of the Act and also Section 9 and the notification thereunder read with Section 23. There were two charges with respect to this sum of 4000 dollars and the Magistrate sentenced him to a fine of Rs. 1000 on each charge and in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months on each charge. There were two charges with respect to this sum of 4000 dollars and the Magistrate sentenced him to a fine of Rs. 1000 on each charge and in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months on each charge. Magistrate also found that 500 dollars, out of the sum of 1800 dollars allowed to him when he left for the United States were not spent by him in the United States and therefore he was sentenced to a fine of Rs. 1000 and in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months under Section 4(3) of the Act read with Section 23. The appellant went in appeal to the High Court. The High Court rejected his contention that certain evidence was inadmissible in view of Article 20(3) of the Constitution. Further on the facts, the High Court agreed with the Magistrate and dismissed the appeals. The appellant then applied for certificates which were refused. He then obtained special leave from this Court; and that is how the two appeals have come up before us. 7. We shall first deal with the contention under Article 20(3). We shall assume for the purpose of these appeals that the provisions for Section 19 amount to compelling such person against whom they are used to disclose information, to be a witness against himself. But before the appellant can take advantage of the protection under Article 20 (3) it must be shown that he was accused of an offence at the time when he was compelled to disclose the information required under Section 19 of the Act. Now it appears that Reserve Bank asked for information under Section 19 of the Act from the appellant on September 19, 1952 and May 14, 1953. The accusations however were made for the first time on July 4, 1955 in both the cases and he was asked to explain why he should not be prosecuted for contravention of the various provisions of the Act with respect to these two sums of 500 dollars and 4000 dollars. It is not the case of the appellant that any information was collected from him after July 4, 1955 under Section 19. It is well settled that information extracted from a person would not be admissible under Article 20(3) only where a formal accusation had already been made against the person concerned. It is not the case of the appellant that any information was collected from him after July 4, 1955 under Section 19. It is well settled that information extracted from a person would not be admissible under Article 20(3) only where a formal accusation had already been made against the person concerned. In M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra, District Magistrate, (1954) SCR 1077 this Court observed at p. 1088 that the protection of Article 20(3) was "available therefore to a person against whom a formal accusation relating to the commission of an offence has been levelled which in the normal course may result in prosecution". In Raja Narayanlal Bansilal v. Maneck Phiroz Mistry, (1961) 1 SCR 417 when dealing with somewhat similar provisions of the Companies Act, this Court held that "for invoking the constitutional right, against testimonial compulsion guaranteed under Article 20(3) there must be at the relevant stage a formal accusation against the party pleading the guarantee relating to the commission of an offence which may result in a prosecution ". Finally in the State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad, (1962) 3 SCR 10 it was held that to avail of the protection of Article 20(3) the person must have stood in the character of an accused person at the time he made the statement. It is quite clear that the appellant was formally accused for the first time on July 4, 1955 and it is not his case that he was compelled to give any information after that date under Section 19. Therefore, on the facts of this case he cannot claim the protection of Article 20(3) with respect to any information which he might have been compelled to disclose before July 4, 1955. The information collected under Section 19 is for the purpose of seeing whether a prosecution should be launched or not. At that stage when information is being collected there is no accusation against the person from whom information is being collected. It may be that after the information has been collected the Central Government or Reserve Bank may come to the conclusion that there is no case for prosecution and the person concerned may never be accused. It cannot therefore be predicated that the person from whom information is being collected under Section 19 is necessarily in the position of an accused. It cannot therefore be predicated that the person from whom information is being collected under Section 19 is necessarily in the position of an accused. The question whether he should be made an accused is generally decided after the information is collected and it is when a show cause notice is issued as, was done in this case on July 4, 1955, that it can be said that a formal accusation has been made against the person concerned. We are therefore of the opinion that the appellant is not entitled to the protection of Article 20 (3) with respect to the information that might have been collected from him under Section 19 before July 4, 1955. 8. Let us now turn to the facts relating to the sum of 500 dollars. The appellant was admittedly granted 1800 dollars for his expenses in the United States. This sum he took with him in the shape of travellers' cheques. It is not disputed that when he left the United States on September 14 he had 500 dollars worth of travellers' cheques out of 1800 dollars worth of such cheques which he had taken with him when he left India. The identity therefore of this sum of 500 dollars, out of the sum of 1800 dollars which the appellant had taken with him in the shape of travellers' cheques is clearly established and there can be no doubt that out of these travellers' cheques worth 1800 dollars, he had not spent cheques worth 500 dollars while he was in the United States. It is true that he had spent a total sum of 3500 dollars while in the United States; but it is clear on the evidence that out of this total expenditure, a sum of 1300 dollars were spent by him out of the travellers' cheques worth 1800 dollars which he had taken with him when he left India and 2200 dollars were spent by him out of the amount of 4000 dollars which he got from Mr Lee Clark. It was therefore his duty under Section 4(3) of the Act when he had not used this specific sum of 500 dollars out of 1800 dollars worth of travellers, cheques in the United States, to sell without delay this foreign exchange to an authorised dealer. It was therefore his duty under Section 4(3) of the Act when he had not used this specific sum of 500 dollars out of 1800 dollars worth of travellers, cheques in the United States, to sell without delay this foreign exchange to an authorised dealer. The identity of this sum of 500 dollars being established as out of 1800 dollars worth of travellers' cheques which the appellant had taken with him when he left India, the appellant is clearly guilty under Section 4(3) of the Act read with Section 13. His defence that he had in fact spent much more than 1800 dollars while in the United States cannot avail him in the circumstances when the identity of the foreign exchange is established. We are therefore of opinion that his conviction with respect to this sum of 500 dollars is correct. We see no reason to interfere with the sentence passed in this connection. 9. Turning now to the case with respect to 4000 dollars, the appellant contends that he had not borrowed this amount from Mr Lee Clark. This contention in our opinion is futile. It may be that Mr Lee Clark advanced this sum of money at the instance of Mr Gupta who wrote to him from India; even so the fact remains that it was the appellant to whom the money was advanced and who took advantage of it and not Mr Gupta. The appellant's case in this respect seems to be that though the amount was given to him as a loan there was no obligation on him to repay it to Mr Lee Clark. He seems to contend that it was Mr Gupta who had to repay it. But the evidence shows that it was the appellant himself who repaid the amount to Mr Lee Clark when he got the letter of credit for 9000 dollars. We are therefore satisfied that the appellant borrowed this sum, of 4000 dollars from Mr Lee Clark. Section 4(1) lays down that no person resident in India other than an authorised dealer shall, outside India buy or borrow from any person not being an authorised dealer any foreign exchange. The appellant would thus be clearly guilty of the contravention of Section 4(1) when he borrowed this sum from Mr Lee Clark. Section 4(1) lays down that no person resident in India other than an authorised dealer shall, outside India buy or borrow from any person not being an authorised dealer any foreign exchange. The appellant would thus be clearly guilty of the contravention of Section 4(1) when he borrowed this sum from Mr Lee Clark. His defence, as we have already indicated was that in reality what had happened was that Mr Beck had given him 4000 dollars as a gift for the expenses of his wife and that he was under a moral obligation to return the unspent balance, which was 2300 dollars. What he did was to use this 4000 dollars gifted to him by Mr Beck as a deposit with the American company from whom he was intending to purchase a machine. So when he took 4000 dollars from Mr Lee Clark he took it to be a substitute for the gift of 4000 dollars by Mr Beck, which he had already deposited with the American company for the purchase of the machine. Therefore there was really no borrowing from Mr Lee Clark by him. We are of opinion that there is no force in this contention either, because the fact remains that he borrowed this sum of 4000 dollars from Mr Lee Clark, however he may have finally adjusted it. The evidence also is that out of this sum of 4000 dollars which he had borrowed from Mr Lee Clark he spent about 2200 dollars on himself or his wife. It is however said that the appellant was under a moral obligation to return the unspent balance to Mr Beck and he took steps immediately after leaving the United States to do so and this shows his bona fides. We are however not satisfied that he really took any steps to return the balance to Mr Beck even if this defence is open to him. It is not in dispute that he sent no cheque made out in the name of Mr Beck. The case of the appellant is that he sent a cheque for 2300 dollars to his brother-in-law Shashi Chand Jain who was then in the United States with a direction to him to pay the amount to Mr Beck. It is not in dispute that he sent no cheque made out in the name of Mr Beck. The case of the appellant is that he sent a cheque for 2300 dollars to his brother-in-law Shashi Chand Jain who was then in the United States with a direction to him to pay the amount to Mr Beck. This cheque is also not produced but the account of the National City Bank of New York shows that a cheque of 2300 dollars was paid on March 3, 1952, presumably to Shashi Chand Jain. All the evidence that the appellant has produced in this connection is a letter from Shashi Chand Jain to Reserve Bank dated February 12, 1954. In this letter Jain states that in October 1951, a cheque for 2300 dollars was sent to him by the appellant to be handed over to Mr Beck. By the time however Jain came in possession of the cheque, Mr Beck had died and it took him two or three months before he could find the heirs of Mr Beck to whom the amount had to be paid. But even in this letter Jain does not say that the money was actually paid to the heirs of Mr Beck. Further Jain was not examined as a witness in the case even though he was in India. In any case the defence based on moral obligation to repay the money to Mr Beck has not been made out, for there is no evidence to prove that the money was paid to Mr Beck or his heirs. We are therefore of opinion that the High Court was right in holding that the appellant had borrowed this amount of 4000 dollars from Mr Lee Clark and was therefore guilty of both the charges framed against him. In the circumstances we see no reason to interfere with the sentence. 10. The appeals therefore fail and are hereby dismissed.