Judgment :- 1. The short question for determination in this writ application is whether the District Collector has authority to pass an order under S.5 (2) of the Kerala Ryotwari Tenants' Protection Ordinance, 1962. The relationship of land-lord and tenant is disputed and has not been settled. 2. The petitioner claims to be the owner of the land, of which according to him, the first respondent is the tenant. The latter made an application within the time specified by the rules framed under the above Act to the District Collector. It is alleged in the affidavit in support of this writ application, and it has not been controverted by any counter affidavit either by the first respondent or by the State, that the first respondent is the tenant of the writ applicant. 3. On the above facts, Ext. P. 2 order has been passed by the District Collector. The relevant portion of that order reads as follows: "The applicant and the respondents were present. The respondents represented that the lands specified in the application are not their (Sic). From the evidence before me I am convinced that the entire crop grown on this land in the possession of the applicant has been damaged completely. I, therefore, hereby order that under S.5 (2) of the Kerala Ryotwari Tenants Protection Ordinance, 1962, the total annual rent due from the land in the possession of the applicant be remitted in full for this year." 4. Counsel for the petitioner contends that regarding the existence of the landlord-tenant relationship, no order could have been passed by the District Collector purporting to act under S.5 (2) of the above said Act. In fact, he went to the extent of urging that the District Collector has no jurisdiction to do so. In the alternative, it was urged that in case, this Court came to the conclusion that the District Collector had jurisdiction to deal with the application, it can only be on the basis that the District Collector should determine such a question. 5. It appears to me that the first of these contentions is supported by the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Nagili Pasamal v. Pandab Bissoi (AIR. 1962 SC. 547). 5. It appears to me that the first of these contentions is supported by the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Nagili Pasamal v. Pandab Bissoi (AIR. 1962 SC. 547). In dealing with S.7 (1) of the Orissa Tenants Protection Act, 1948, Their Lordships said: "In other words, S.7 (1) postulates the relationship of tenant and landlord between the parties and proceeds to provide for the exclusive jurisdiction of the Collector to try the five categories of disputes that may arise between the landlord and the tenant. The disputes which are the subject matter of S.7 (1) must be in regard to the five categories. That is the plain and obvious construction of the words 'any dispute as regards'. On this construction it would be unreasonable to hold that a dispute about the status of the tenant also falls within the purview of the said section. The scheme of S.7 (1) is unambiguous and clear. It refers to the tenant and landlord as such and it contemplates disputes of the specified character arising between them. Therefore, in our opinion, even on a liberal construction of S.7 (1) it would be difficult to uphold the argument that a dispute as regards the existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant falls to be determined by the Collector under S.7 (1). It 6. It appears to me that this decision can be applied to the facts of this case. S.5 of the Kerala Ryotwari Tenants Protection Ordinance is in these terms: "5. Remission of rent: (1) Where there has been a damage to, or a failure of, crops owing to causes beyond the control of the tenant in any holding, the tenant shall be entitled to a remission of the rent payable by him in proportion to the extent of such damage or failure. (2) The District Collector shall, on an application to him by the tenant, determine the extent of damages to, or failure of, crops under sub-section (1) and order such remission of rent as appears to him just and proper. The decision of the Collector shall be final and the tenant shall be entitled to get the benefit of the remission so ordered. (3) An application for remission of rent on any of the grounds specified in sub-sec. The decision of the Collector shall be final and the tenant shall be entitled to get the benefit of the remission so ordered. (3) An application for remission of rent on any of the grounds specified in sub-sec. (1) filed by a tenant on or after the 15th day of February, 1961, shall be deemed to have been filed under this section as if this section were in force on the date on which it was filed, and accordingly any order passed on any such application shall be deemed to have been validly made under this section." 7. This section also, I feel no doubt, postulates the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship. This section also refers to a tenant. A dispute regarding the question as to whether he is or is not a tenant, therefore, cannot fall within the purview of S.5. 8. Counsel for the first respondent has strongly urged that for the purpose of S.5, it is unnecessary that any jurisdiction should have been conferred on the Collector to determine the question as to whether the landlord-tenant relationship existed. He said that the ambit of S.5 (2) is limited. The controversy is specifically stated and it relates only to the question of remission and, therefore, that section, according to him, can apply in all oases where any person approaches the District Collector. The order of remission only takes away the liability of the petitioner who has approached the District Collector and does not resolve any further question. I am unable to accept these contentions. The wording of the section is simple and plain. The word 'tenant' is defined in the Act. It is only a tenant who can approach the District Collector and in all cases where the question whether the person who approached the Collector is a tenant or not shall be determined first. I therefore set aside Ext. P.2 order. The question whether the 1st respondent is a tenant must be resolved first in appropriate proceedings. 9. In the circumstances of the case, I make no order as to costs.