Judgment :- Ramachandra Ayyar, C.J. These two appeals which arise from the judgment of Veeraswami, J., have been heard together as they involve the determination of a common question of law relating to the scope and extent of S.33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. In Writ Appeal No. 84 of 1962, the appellant was originally entertained in the year 1954 in the machine shop department of the Lakshmi Mills, Ltd., Coimbatore. He was made permanent in that post on 1 January 1956. Being an unskilled worker he was put in the lowest category with a basic wage of Rs. 26 per month. Early in June 1956 the management was converting hand reels into power reels and the appellant was directed to work in the reeling section where conversion work was going on, being temporarily designated as a power reel fitter. After the process of conversion was over he was transferred back from 1 April 1957 to the mechanical shop department; his basic wages were increased to Rs. 32-8-0. The appellant continued to do work as an unskilled labourer in the lowest category till 3 October 1959. He then made a claim to the labour court at Coimbatore that he was a fitter and that appropriate wages to that category of workers under the industrial award should be paid to him. He therefore sought to recover from the management a sum of money representing the difference in wages between what he had received and what was due to him had he been designated as fitter. The management disputed the jurisdiction of the labour court to decide the question whether the appellant was a fitter or was merely an unskilled fitter helper. The labour court upheld the claim of the appellant and awarded a sum of Rs. 316-8-0 as the difference in wages due to him. In Writ Appeal No. 126 of 1962 the appellant was entertained in the year 1947, as a clerk in the Dhanalakshmi Mills, Ltd., Tirupur. On 16 February 1960 he filed an application before the labour court at Madarai claiming that although he was designated as clerk, the nature and character of the work done by him was that of cashier, and that he should have been placed in a grade which carried the salary fixed for the cashier under an agreement entered into between the management and the workers in May 1948. Accordingly he made a claim to recover a sum of Rs. 697.75 by way of difference in salary and also the dearness allowance due to him. The management contended that the duties of the cashier were being performed by a member of the firm of the managing agents, and that the appellant was nothing more than a clerk who was assisting the managing agent in that behalf. They further contested the jurisdiction of the labour court to adjudicate the question whether the appellant had been rightly placed as a clerk by the management. The labour court overruled the preliminary objection taken by the management as to its jurisdiction to decide the dispute and posted the case for further evidence.The managements in the two respective cases filed applications to this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution to quash the orders of the labour court as amounting to usurpation of jurisdiction. Veeraswami, J., allowed the writ petitions and quashed the order of the labour court. The learned Judge was of opinion that S.33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act could only refer to ascertainment of benefits derived under an industrial settlement or award or to matters coming under Chap. V-A of the Industrial Disputes Act and that as the claims in the instant case did not come under those categories specified in S. 33C (1), the labour court would have no jurisdiction to entertain the petitions. This view cannot now be supported as correct, having regard to a recent decision of the Supreme Court in Central Bank of India v. Rajagopalan where it has been held that S.33C (2) of the Act would comprehend claims even other than those based on settlement or award or made under the provisions of Chap. V-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. The learned Judge also expressed the opinion that the question whether the workman concerned occupied a particular position which would entitle him to the benefits relative thereto could not be decided under the aforesaid provision. It has been argued that, that conclusion also could no longer be supported, having regard to the judgment of the Supreme Court which held that it would be competent for the labour court to decide the case of workmen claiming benefits, the precise ground on which their claim was based even albeit such claims were to be disputed by their employer. We consider that the judgment of the learned Judge can be supported on another ground. It will be noticed that there is no dispute in the present case that the appellants were placed by their respective employers as unskilled workman and clerk respectively and that they were being paid salaries during all these years appropriate for such posts. The contention of the appellants is that the nature of the work done by them is such that they should have been placed on a higher category, in which case they would be entitled to draw salaries appropriate to that higher category. The dispute, therefore, is not about the actual posts which the workers occupied, but what they deserved by way of their salary and other emoluments for the duties claimed to have been performed by them. A claim of that kind cannot obviously come under that section which speaks of benefits to which the workman is entitled. The benefits or salary which the workmen in the present case were entitled to according to their designation had undoubtedly been given to them. The claim is that the actual classification of their posts or the grade in which they have been placed is incorrect. That is a matter in respect of which an industrial dispute can be raised if there were a substantial number of workers to sponsor the same. In Central Bank of India v. Rajagopalan (vide supra), the Supreme Court observed at p. 97 : "If an employee is dismissed or demoted and it is his case that the dismissal or demotion is wrongful, it would not be open to him to make a claim for the recovery of his salary or wages under S. 33C(2). His demotion or dismissal may give rise to an industrial dispute which may be appropriately tried, but once it is shown that the employer had dismissed or demoted him, a claim that the dismissal or demotion is unlawful and therefore, the employee continues to be the workman of the employer and is entitled to the benefits due to him under a pre-existing contract cannot be made under S. 33C(2)." * The claim in the instant case is almost similar. The appellants say that they have been wrongfully placed in a particular category or that they have been wrongfully designated as belonging to a particular category which is not appropriate to the work that they have been doing. That is a matter which cannot come within the scope of S. 33C(2). It is true that whenever a workman claims a benefit and his claim is disputed by his employer the labour court will have the jurisdiction to decide all questions incidental thereto, for example, the post he occupies and the emoluments attached thereto, etc. - see the decisions in Amibika Mills, Ltd. v. S. B. Bhatt and Central Bank of India v. Rajagopalan (vide supra). But that is different from a case where a workman claims that although he was designated by the employer as holding a particular post, e.g., as a clerk and had been treated by the management as such, he should properly be considered as holding a different post and be paid the salary appropriate to that position. Sri Lakshminarayana Reddi appearing for the appellants invited our attention to certain passages in the two cases cited above which according to him support the position that it would be competent for the labour court to decide whether a particular employee is an operative falling under a designated class or not. In the former case a question arose whether the employee was an operative coming within an award or one outside that category. The Supreme Court held that, that question could be decided by the labour court but that was essentially for the purpose of giving relief under the terms of an award to the employee. In the second of the decisions the case of the employee was that besides doing the routine duties as clerk, he had been operating the adding machine provided for use in the bank in which he was employed, and as such he was entitled to payment of extra allowance under the industrial award. In dealing with the claim, the Supreme Court held that it might be open to the employee to prove that he was doing the work which could properly be described as the work of comptist. There was no question in that case of the employee claiming that he was working in a higher category than the one designated and his claim being disputed by the management. There was no question in that case of the employee claiming that he was working in a higher category than the one designated and his claim being disputed by the management. What he claimed was that in the category in which he was placed, he was doing certain additional work for which an allowance was due under the industrial award. We are unable to see how that decision can support the case of the present appellants. We are, therefore, of opinion that it was not competent for the labour court to entertain either of the two cases which form the subject-matter of these appeals. The appeals fail and are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.