Judgement JUDGMENT :- The point for determination in this civil miscellaneous appeal is whether the direction of the learned Subordinate Judge to deposit the sale price into Court after having confirmed the sale is legally sustainable. 2. The facts leading to this order can shortly be stated : In O. S. No. 5 or 1954 on the file Subordinate Judge of Devakottai, the appellant Chettiar obtained a money decree against the first respondent Viswanathan Chettiar, since deceased. In Execution of the said decree, he attached and brought to sale certain immoveable properties of the first respondent and purchased them himself after obtaining courts permission to bid and set off. This sale was on. 20-6-1955. The first respondent was in arrears of income-tax to the extent of over Rs. 21000 and the revenue authorities had taken steps against him under the Revenue Recovery Act to realise the said arrears. But as his property had been attached and sold in court auction, the union of India represented by the income-tax officer, Karaikudi, filed E. A. 497 of 1955 in E. A. 427 of 1955 - the application filed by the first respondent to set aside the sale - to implead therein the Union of India, as the second respondent. This application was dismissed by the learned Subordinate Judge by his order dated 5-7-1956 for the reason, among others that it was barred by time. He also appears to have dismissed E. A. 427 of 1955 on 31-7-1956 and passed the order, now under appeal in E. P. No. 233 of 1954. This order is a brief one and reads : "E. A. No. 427 of 1955 is dismissed today. (2) Sale confirmed. Plaintiff to deposit the sale price into court, after which sale certificate will be issued. Sale amount to be paid into court on or before 10-8-1956. 3. Satisfaction will be recorded later on. Execution petition terminated". It is the propriety of this order that is challenged by the appellant and his contention is that, once the sale is confirmed and becomes absolute, a sale certificate has necessarily to be issued as required under Order XXI rule 94 C.P.C. and the court has no jurisdiction to postpone the matter with a direction to deposit the entire sale price into court, permission to bid and set off having been, granted under Or. XXI rule 72 C.P.C. It has been held by this court in Murugappa Chettiar v. Ramaswami Chettiar ILR 59 Mad 342 : (AIR 1935 Mad 893) that where an application under S. 73 C.P.C. intervenes, when the purchase price is either equal to or less than, the decree amount the right of the decree-holder (purchasing with permission) to set off is controlled only to this extent, namely, that he is bound to bring into court such sums alone as are due to those decree-holders whose applications for execution are pending on the date of the sale in order that the same might be rateably distributed to them under S. 73 of the Code, and that the persons who filed their applications after the date of sale are not entitled to rateable distribution. In Bindeswari Narain Singh v. Kirtyanand Singh, ILR 10 Pat 830 : (AIR 1931 Pat 350) the Patna High Court held that since an order for set off under Or. XXI rule 72(2) of the Code in favour of the decree-holder is subject to the provisions for rateable distribution contained in Section 73, the amount bid by a decree-holder at an execution sale forms assets held by the court within the meaning of S. 73, C.P.C. The same High court held in Firm Ganga Ram Guiraj Ram v. Muktiram Marwari, ILR 11 Pat 250 : (AIR 1931 Pat 405) that, if the court permits a decree-holder to bid at the sale and allows him to set off the purchase money towards the decree, it is open to the court afterwards, on a good case being made out, to withdraw that order and call upon the decree-holder to deposit the purchase money in cash for rateable distribution, the principle reiterated being that the purchase money is an asset in the power and at the disposal of the court with in the meaning of S. 73 of the Code. 3. Where more than one decree-holder against the same judgment-debtor apply for execution and the application is a proper one under S. 73 C.P.C., they are entitled to rateable distribution of the proceeds of the sale even in cases where the decree-holder who brought the property to sale has been allowed to bid and set off. 3. Where more than one decree-holder against the same judgment-debtor apply for execution and the application is a proper one under S. 73 C.P.C., they are entitled to rateable distribution of the proceeds of the sale even in cases where the decree-holder who brought the property to sale has been allowed to bid and set off. Under such circumstances, as pointed out in Bijoy Kumar v. Ramanath Barman, 43 Ind Cas 715 : (AIR 1918 Cal 490) it is open to the executing court to direct the purchasing decree-holder to pay money into court and in that view, the amount is in the power and at the disposal of the court and it is held by the Calcutta High court within the meaning or S. 73. 4. But, in Charanjit Singh. v. Sardar Mohammad, AIR 1935 Lah 690 a case under the Insolvency Act, the Lahore High Court held that decretal amount is set on against the purchase price automatically by operation or law and no order of the court is necessary in order that the respective amounts may be set off against each other. The view expressed in this case is that, the court executing the decree has only to enter up satisfaction of the decree in whole or in part after the setting off has taken place. Hence when a decree-holder has been given permission to bid and set off, and when the amount of the successful bid is less than the decretal amount, the whole of the set off must be deemed as made on the date of the sale and the whole of the amount must be deemed to have been received or realised eo instanti the sale is made. 5. The question before the Lahore High court was whether when a decree-holder bought the property or a judgment-debtor the sale proceeds could not be said to be set off immediately against the decretal amount or whether it was set off only after the sale was confirmed. It appears to have been argued that it could not be set on immediately until opportunity had been given to other persons to lodge objections against the sale until the time for lodging objections had passed. It appears to have been argued that it could not be set on immediately until opportunity had been given to other persons to lodge objections against the sale until the time for lodging objections had passed. Abdul Rashid, J. who decided the case overruled this proposition and relying on a Bench decision of this court reported in Punnamchand Chatraban v. V. Satyanandam, AIR 1933 Mad 804 laid down the rule already set out above, namely, that when a decree-holder has been given permission to bid and set off, and when the amount of the successful bid is less than the decretal amount the whole of the set off must be deemed as made on the date of sale, and that the whole or the amount must be deemed to have been received or realised eo instanti the sale is made. The learned Judge, however, had not to consider the question with reference to S. 73 C.P.C. or the claim of other parties like the Government who has priority right over unsecured creditors. 6. A Full Bench of this court has held in Manickam Chettiar v. Income-tax Officer, ILR (1938) Mad 744 : ( AIR 1938 Mad 360 ) that the execution court has power to order payment out of the amount due to Government on mere application as the Crown is entitled to prior payment over all unsecured creditors. The law however is well settled that, where the executing court allows a claim for rateable distribution by a decree-holder and all that remains to be done is the ascertainment of the exact amount which each decree-holder is entitled to and payment of the same, the money in the hands of the court can no longer be considered in law to be the judgment-debtors money. It was, therefore, held by the Calcutta High Court in Basanta Kumar v. Panchu Gopal, (S) AIR 1956 Cal 23 , that if subsequent to such order a letter of attachment in respect of a public demand due from the judgment-debtor is received by the executing court, the latter cannot take any action on such letter on the basis that it is still the judgment-debtors money. This case has further pointed out that the executing court having once declared that it is decree-holders money would be clearly wrong in complying with the letter of request of the certificate officer to remit the, sale proceeds to him. This case has further pointed out that the executing court having once declared that it is decree-holders money would be clearly wrong in complying with the letter of request of the certificate officer to remit the, sale proceeds to him. In such a case the question of priority of States claim does not arise. 7. In Collector of Tiruchrapalli v. Trinity Bank Ltd. 1962-44 I. T. R. 189 : ( AIR 1962 Mad 59 ) (FB), in a suit by a mortgagee against the mortgagor, the mortgagee obtained a preliminary decree and on his application the court appointed a receiver to collect the rents and profits from the mortgaged property. The Collector to whom a certificate of arrears was forwarded in regard to income-tax assessed on and due from the mortgagor, applied to the court for payment of the arrears out of the amounts collected by the receiver and deposited to the credit of the suit. The assignee of the decree opposed the collectors application. On these facts a full Bench of this court held that the decree-holder had no preferential right over the amounts collected by the receiver and the Collector was entitled to be paid the arrears of tax out of the amounts collected by the receiver. The principle of the decision is that, in respect of the rents and profits paid into court, there cannot be a charging order in favour of the mortgagee and that a simple mortgagee or an equitable mortgagee or a charge-holder has no security over the rents and profits accruing over the property. Whatever disabilities the mortgagor may suffer by the Receiver taking possession of the hypotheca at the hand of the court, no special rights are conferred in favour of the mortgagee by reason only of such appointment. 8. In the present case, permission had been granted to the decree-holder to bid and set off and the records placed before me go to show that, there had been no application as such by the Union of India for payment out claiming a preferential right in respect of the bid amount. 8. In the present case, permission had been granted to the decree-holder to bid and set off and the records placed before me go to show that, there had been no application as such by the Union of India for payment out claiming a preferential right in respect of the bid amount. Therefore quite apart from the question whether the union of India is entitled to a preferential claim in respect of the bid amount, this appears to be a case where such claim not having been specifically made need not be considered and in the absence of such application the appellant need not have been directed to deposit the entire bid amount. Actually there was no amount in deposit against which the Union of India could enforce its claim and it is a question whether it could, at all, have made a claim for payment in the absence of deposit. In the peculiar circumstances, the appellant decree-holder is entitled to succeed. 9. This appeal, is, therefore, allowed and the order of the learned Subordinate Judge directing the appellant to deposit the bid amount is set aside. I however make no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.