JUDGMENT V.G. Oak, J. - I have read the judgment prepared by my learned brother Satish Chandra, J. I agreed with him that water-tax at Chandausi was validity imposed. 2. The main question for consideration in these appeal is whether the authorities were required to follow the procedure prescribed by Sections 131, 132, 133 and 134 of U.P. Municipalities Act (hereafter referred to as the Act). It is common ground that the Government notification dated 21.10.1957 (published on 26.10.1957) operated as a resolution passed by the Municipal Board of Chandausi. The question for consideration is whether the constructive resolution of the Board was under Section 131 or under Section 134 of the Act. 3. For deciding that point, we have to examine the plan of Chapter V of the Act. Chapter V provides for imposition and alteration of municipal taxes. Secs 131 of 135 contain the normal procedure for imposing a tax. Section 130-A contain a special provision for dealing with a case. Where a Municipal Board has failed to carry out directions of the State Government. The material words of Section 130-A (3) are: "the State Government may pass suitable order imposing or modifying the tax" Section 131 lays down that, when a Board desire to impose a tax, it shall, by a special resolution, frame proposals specifying the tax. Section 134 provides for a resolution of the Board directing imposition of tax. Section 134(2) states: "......the Board shall by a special resolution direct the imposition of the tax with effect from a date to be specified in the resolution." It will be seen that the resolutions contemplated by Sections 131 and 134 of the Act deal with different stages of the proceeding. Under Section 131, the Board merely puts forward a preliminary proposal for imposing a tax. On the other hand, under Section 134, the Board takes a firm decision that the tax will be imposed. Under Section 130-A(3), the State Government does not merely put forward a suggestion or preliminary proposal. The State Government passes a definite order imposing a tax. Such an order is of the nature of a resolution directing the imposition of a tax rather than a preliminary proposal under Section 131. So, an order passed by the State Government under Section 130-A(3) has the effect of a special resolution passed by the Board under Section 134(2) of the Act. Such an order is of the nature of a resolution directing the imposition of a tax rather than a preliminary proposal under Section 131. So, an order passed by the State Government under Section 130-A(3) has the effect of a special resolution passed by the Board under Section 134(2) of the Act. A resolution under Section 134(2) of the Act having constructively come into existence, there is no need to follow the various steps mentioned in Sections 131, 132, 133 and 134(1) of the Act. 4. Mr. S.C. Khare appearing for the respondents, did not seriously press the point that, the procedure violates Article 14 of the Constitution. It is true that ordinarily inhabitants of the locality get an opportunity to file objections under Section 132 of the Act, and that no such opportunity to file objections is given in a case falling under Section 130-A of the Act. But that is because Section 130-A provides for an extraordinary situation. The legislature might have thought that there was no need to permit inhabitants to file objections in a case, where the State Government has decided to taken the whole matter into its own hands. It was open to the legislature to provide a special procedure for dealing with extraordinary situations. Section 130-A does not involve infringement of Article 14 of the Constitution. 5. I agree with Mr. S.C. Khare that even in cases governed by Section 130-A of the Act, there must be a notification in the official Gazette under Section 135 of the Act. Annexure `B' to the writ petition is a copy of the Government notification dated 21-10-1957 published in the U.P. Gazette dated 16-10-1957. Annexure `B' makes no mention about Section 135 of the Act. The question remains whether it is possible to treat Annexure `B' as a notification under Section 135 of the Act. 6. A somewhat similar situation came up for consideration in Berar Swadeshi Vanaspati v. Shegoan Municipality, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 420. In that case the Supreme Court had to consider the validity of a proceeding under C.P. and Berar Municipalities Act. Sub-Section (7) of Section 67 of that Act provided for a notification directing the imposition of a tax. 6. A somewhat similar situation came up for consideration in Berar Swadeshi Vanaspati v. Shegoan Municipality, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 420. In that case the Supreme Court had to consider the validity of a proceeding under C.P. and Berar Municipalities Act. Sub-Section (7) of Section 67 of that Act provided for a notification directing the imposition of a tax. Sub-section (8) of Section 67 of that Act ran thus:- "A notification of the imposition of a tax under this section shall be conclusive evidence that the tax has been imposed in accordance with the provision of this Act." The notification issued by the State Government purported to be under Sub-Section (2) of Section 67 of that Act. The Court concluded that was mistake, and that the notification should have been issued under sub-Section (7) of Section 67 of that Act. It was further held that, notification was conclusive evidence of the tax having been imposed in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The tax could not be challenged on the ground that all the necessary steps had not been taken. 7. Section 135, U.P. Municipalities Act provides for imposition of tax. According to sub-Section (1) of Section 135 of the Act, a copy of the resolution passed under Section 134 shall be submitted to the State Government. Section 135(2) states: "Upon receipt of a copy of the resolution the State Government.... shall notify in the official Gazette the imposition of the tax from the appointed date....." Section 135 contains detailed provisions for dealing with a case, where the normal procedure for imposing a tax has been followed. Section 135 does not contain any special directions for dealing with a case governed by Section 130-A of the Act. It is, therefore, permissible to adopt Section 135 for meeting the special requirements of a case governed by Section 130-A. In such a case a Municipal Board does not actually pass a resolution under Section 134. There can, therefore, be no question of a copy of the resolution passed under Section 134 being submitted to the State Government. A notification having been issued under Section 130-A(3) of the Act. The State Government can proceed to notify such a decision in the official Gazette as required under Section 135(2) of the Act. The notification has to mention the imposition of the tax and the appointed date. A notification having been issued under Section 130-A(3) of the Act. The State Government can proceed to notify such a decision in the official Gazette as required under Section 135(2) of the Act. The notification has to mention the imposition of the tax and the appointed date. In Annexure `B' it was mentioned that, water-tax was being imposed at Chandausi with effect from 1-12-1957. There is, therefore, no difficulty in treating Annexure `B' as the notification prescribed by Section 135(2) of the Act. Section 135(3) of the Act states:- "A notification of the imposition of a tax under Sub-Section (2) shall be conclusive proof that the tax has been imposed in accordance with the provisions of this Act." The provisions of Section 135(3), U.P. Municipalities Act is similar to the provision of Section 67(8) C.P. and Berar Municipalities Act. So, the principle laid in Berar Swadeshi Vanaspati v. Shegaon Municipality, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 420, applies in the present case also. I have shown above that the notification (Annexure `B') was in substance a notification under Section 135(2) of the Act. According to Section 135(3) of the Act, the notification shall be imposed in accordance with the provisions of the Act. 8. Firstly, there was substantial compliance with Sections 130-A and 135 of the Act. Secondly, the notification dated 21-10-1957 published on 26-10-1957 has to be accepted as conclusive proof that the tax has been imposed in accordance with the provisions of the Act. For these reasons, it was not open to the respondents to challenge the validity of the water tax. 9. I agree that the two Special Appeals should be allowed; and the writ petition should be dismissed. Satish Chandra, J. - 10. Brother Dhavan acting under Article 226 of the Constitution has issued a writ of mandamus commanding the State of Uttar Pradesh and the Municipal Board of Chandausi not to demand water tax from the respondents. Feeling aggrieved the State of Uttar Pradesh has filed special appeal No. 363 of 1959 and the Municipal Board of Chandausi has filed special appeal no. 352 of 1959. These two special appeals rise a common question - whether the imposition of water tax in the instant case was valid. 11. In June 1954 the Municipal Board of Chandausi approached the State Government to grant a loan to enable it to construct water works. 352 of 1959. These two special appeals rise a common question - whether the imposition of water tax in the instant case was valid. 11. In June 1954 the Municipal Board of Chandausi approached the State Government to grant a loan to enable it to construct water works. On 17-8-1955 the Government agreed to grant a loan of Rs. 2,00,000/- to the Board to construct the water works and paid the said amount forthwith. The Municipal Board by a resolution dated 23-11-1955 framed proposals for the imposition of water tax and invited objections from the public thereto. Thereafter the Municipal Board seems to have gone back on its resolve to impose the water tax. In September and December 1956 it passed resolution to the effect that instead of water-tax it would levy a charge on the basis of the actual consumption of water from persons who took water connection for their houses. 12. On 29-1-1957 the State Government acting under Section 130(A)(1) U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) passed an order directing the Municipal Board, Chandausi to impose water tax @ 10% on the annual value of the land and buildings. The Municipal Board of Chandausi did not comply with this direction but on 18-5-1957 resolved that it does not propose to levy any water tax. 13. Acting under Section 130(A)(3) of the Act the State Government on 21-10-1957 passed an order directing the imposition of a water tax in respect of the Municipalities of Chandausi, with effect from 1-12-1957. The order provided that the water tax shall be @ 10% on the annual value of the lands and buildings within the Municipality. It also exempted certain classes of lands and buildings from the operation of the water tax. 14. Annexure `B' to the writ petition is an extract from the Uttar Pradesh Gazette dated 26-10-1957 publishing the State Government's order dated 21-10-1957. The State Government framed rules with respect to the assessment and realisation of the water tax. By another notification published in the U.P. Gazette dated 26-10-1957 these rules were published and it purported to invite objections to the rules from the public. Ultimately the State Government finalised the rules and by its notification dated 21-11-1957 published them in the U.P. Gazette dated 30-11-1957. In due course the Municipal Board, Chandausi, took proceedings for the assessment and realisation of the water tax. Ultimately the State Government finalised the rules and by its notification dated 21-11-1957 published them in the U.P. Gazette dated 30-11-1957. In due course the Municipal Board, Chandausi, took proceedings for the assessment and realisation of the water tax. It issued notices of demand against the respondents. 15. On receipt of the notices of demand, the respondents failed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution impugning the validity of the imposition of the aforesaid water tax. They prayed that the notification dated 21-10-1957 be quashed and that by a writ of mandamus the State of Uttar Pradesh and the Municipal Board of Chandausi by restrained from demanding any water tax from the respondents on the basis of the said notification. 16. The main contention raised in support of the petition, and which found favour with the learned Single Judge, was that the order dated 21-10-1957 under Section 130(A)(3) of the Act cannot of its own force impose a tax, but that it can only operate as a resolution of the Board under Section 131 of the Act, and the authorities not having carried out the procedure prescribed by Sections 131 to 134 of the Act, the impost was illegal. 17. When a Municipal Board wants to impose a Tax it has, under Section 131 of the Act, by a special resolution, to frame proposals specifying, inter alia, the kind of tax, the class of persons and the property to be made liable and the rate of tax leviable. The Board also makes draft rules. The proposals and the draft rules are published and objections invited. Section 132 of the Act provides that the Board shall, by special resolution, pass orders on the objections filed and after finalising the proposals and rules submit them for sanction to the Prescribed Authority or the State Government as the case may be. After sanction is received, the Board, says Section 134(2) of the Act, "shall, by special resolution, direct the imposition of the tax with effect from a date to be specified in the resolution." Section 135(2) requires that the State Government to notify in the gazette, the imposition of the tax. Section 130-A of the Act empowers the State Government to require a Board to impose a tax or to increase, modify or vary the rate or any tax. Section 130-A of the Act empowers the State Government to require a Board to impose a tax or to increase, modify or vary the rate or any tax. Its sub-Section (3) runs as follows:- "If the Board fails to carry out the order passed under sub-Sec, (1) or (2), the State Government may pass suitable order imposing, increasing, modifying or varying the tax, and thereupon the order of the State Government shall operate as if it had been a resolution duly passed by the Board." The power conferred on the State Government is to order imposition of a tax. Its order when passed will impose the tax. By the fiction introduces in Section 130-A(3) of the Act the State Government's order becomes a resolution of the Board. The nature, content or effect of the order is not changed, which continues to be what it initially was. The effect of the order namely to impose the tax will continue in the grab of a Board's resolution, if it is treated as a resolution under Section 134(2) of the Act directing the imposition of a tax. 18. The objet of Section 130-A of the Act appears to be to enable the State Government to effectively levy a tax within the local area of a recalcitrant Municipal Board. The purpose is achieved by treating its order as a Board resolution directing the imposition of tax. 19. There is no provision in the Act making Sections 131, 132 and 133 of the Act applicable to an order under Section 130(A)(3) of the Act. If the State Government's order was intended merely to be a resolution framing proposals under Section 131 of the Act, there ought to have been some provisions authorising the State Government to invite objections to its proposals, or to enable it to decide the objections. Learned Counsel relies on the words `suitable order' and contends that the power to pass suitable order would include the power to pass all the several necessary orders in the process of imposing a tax. The word suitable occurs in the phrase "may pass suitable order imposing, increasing, modifying or varying the tax." The word suitable seems referable to the various categories mentioned. It confers flexibility and would enable the Government to, for instance, fix a date when the imposition of tax will come in force. The word suitable occurs in the phrase "may pass suitable order imposing, increasing, modifying or varying the tax." The word suitable seems referable to the various categories mentioned. It confers flexibility and would enable the Government to, for instance, fix a date when the imposition of tax will come in force. It does not cast a liability on the State Government to make several orders different in nature and character. 20. Lastly it was urged that the fact that this new provision was added just before section 131 indicates that it was intended that the procedure prescribed by Sections 131 to 133 was also to be followed. If the provisions of Section 130-A are clear, merely its situation in the Act will not change its interpretation or effect. In my opinion the State Government's order dated 21-10-1957 has the effect of a resolution duly passed by the Municipal Board under Section 134(2) of the Act, and Sections 131 to 134(1) of the Act are not applicable. 21. The second submission of Sri Khare is that assuming that the State Government's order operates as a resolution under Section 134(2) it is still necessary for the State Government to notify it in the official Gazette under Se. 135(2) of the Act. It is contended that it is only after such notification that the imposition of the tax can take effect, So far the submission appears correct and acceptable. He further urges that there has been no notification under Section 135(2) of the Act and in view of the pleadings of the parties it is not open to the appellants to now contend the contrary. * * * 24. In this connection learned counsel relied upon the Supreme Court's decision in P. Balakotaiah v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1938 S.C. 292. Mr. Venkataraman Aiyar, speaking for the Court, did indicate that the criticism for the appellants that the judgment under appeal proceeds on a ground which was, not merely not in the contemplation of the authorities when they passed the orders in question, but was not even raised in the pleadings in Court, was not without substance; but ultimately at page 237 His Lordship stated that: "We do not however desire to express any final opinion on this question." 25. Learned counsel also referred to the following passage in the Full Bench case of our Court in U.P. State though the Secretary, Local Government, U.P. v. Murtaza Ali, 1961 A.L.J. 287 at page 290. "It was contended by the appellant's counsel that a rule purporting to have been made by an authority in exercise of a certain power will be sustained if it could have been made under another power and not under the power under which it purports to have been made. The correct law is that if a rule purports to have been made under one provision it cannot be sustained under another provision even though it could have been made under it See P. Balakotaiah v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1938 S.C. 292. An act of a delegate purporting to act under one authority cannot be sustained by reference to another authority." 26. An examination of the Supreme Court case of P. Balakotaiah, A.I.R. 1938 S.C. 292, does not bear out this proposition. The Supreme Court did not express any final opinion on the question. On the contrary in para 10 at page 236 the Supreme Court observed as follows:- "It is argued that when an authority passes an order which is within its competence, it cannot fail merely because it purports to be made under a wrong provision if it can be shown to be within its powers under any other rule, and that the validity of an order should be judged on a consideration of its substance and not its form. No exception can be taken to this proposition." 27. This principle was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in L. Hazari Mal Kuthiala v. Income-tax Officer, Special Circle, Ambala Cantt, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 200 at p. 202. It held as follows:- "The Commissioner, when he transferred this case, referred not to the Patiala Income-tax Act, but to the Indian Income-tax Act, and it is contended that if the Patiala Income tax Act was in force for purposes of reassessment, action should have been taken under that Act and not under the Indian Income Tax Act. This argument, however, loses point, because the exercise of a power will be referable to a jurisdiction which confers validity upon it and not to a jurisdiction under which it will be nugatory. This principle is well settled." 28. This argument, however, loses point, because the exercise of a power will be referable to a jurisdiction which confers validity upon it and not to a jurisdiction under which it will be nugatory. This principle is well settled." 28. Under Section 202 sub-clause (2) of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, the Chief Customs authority was empowered to make rules for the purpose of that section. Section 9 of that Act empowered the same authority to make rules generally to carry out the provisions of that Act. In the case of Chandrakant Krishnarao Pradhan v. Jasjit Singh, the Collector of Customs, Bombay, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 204, certain rules purporting to have been made under Section 202(2) were impugned on the ground that they went beyond the purposes of that Section. The Supreme Court held that "though the impugned rules are headed as framed under. Section 202 of the Sea Customs Act they cannot be questioned, if they carry out not only the special purposes of Section 202 but also certain other purposes of the Act, because the two powers will concur to sustain them." 29. In view of these pronouncements of the Supreme Court, it appears, that the view expressed by the Full Bench case relied on by the learned counsel does not hold the filed. In any event the Full Bench case is not an authority for a proposition that if a notification does not recite the power under which it has been made, but the statute confers a power under which it could have been made, the notification would none the less be bad. 30. The next point raised by Sri Khare is that the order of the State Government is invalid and premature as it was passed before the Rules had been finalised. The contention is that just as Board's resolution under Section 134(2) of the Act imposing the tax can be passed only after the rules have been made, so must be the case when the State Government acts. Section 130(A)(3) authorises the State Government to straightway pass an order imposing the tax. As I have already held the procedure prescribed by Sections 131 to 134 of the Act is meant only for the Municipal Boards and is not applicable to an order made under Section 130(A)(3). The position is not as if the provisions of Section 134(2) are as such applicable. As I have already held the procedure prescribed by Sections 131 to 134 of the Act is meant only for the Municipal Boards and is not applicable to an order made under Section 130(A)(3). The position is not as if the provisions of Section 134(2) are as such applicable. Section 130(A)(3) by a fiction makes the State Government's order operate as the resolution directing the imposition of the tax. Section 130(A)(3) says that the order of the State Government shall operate as if it had been a resolution "duly" passed by the Board. That would mean that it will be deemed that all that is required by the Municipalities Act to make the resolution valid in the eye of law has been done. 31. Lastly Mr. Khare argued that Section 130(A)(3) violates Article 14 of the Constitution. He stated that he reiterates the view taken by the learned single Judge on the point. The learned Single Judge has not expressed any definite opinion on this question. He interpreted Section 130(A)(3) of the Act in the manner suggested by the petitioners respondents and in support of his interpretation observed as follows:- "If it were to be interpreted in the manner suggested by both the learned counsel for the respondents, the section itself may be hit by Article 14 of the Constitution. The object of this provision is to prevent Municipal Boards from defying the Government. If the method of achieving this object is to destroy the statutory rights of the inhabitants, it will be difficult to find any reasonable connection between the provisions and the objects sought to be achieved. I cannot see how the short-circuiting of the rights of the inhabitants of the Municipality under section 132 can have the deterrent effect of including the Municipal Boards to carry out the whishes of the Government. The only result of such an interpretation is to make innocent persons suffer for the fault of a few delinquent members of the Board. The discrimination between inhabitants of a Municipality which has complied with the orders of the Government and those of a Municipality which has defined them, will not be based on any reasonable classification and may amount to unconstitutional discrimination." 32. Section 132 of the Act confers on the inhabitants of the Municipality right to file written objections to the proposals framed by the Municipal Board. Section 132 of the Act confers on the inhabitants of the Municipality right to file written objections to the proposals framed by the Municipal Board. Under Section 133 of the Prescribed Authority or the State Government has to take a final decision. It may or it may not sanction the proposals. When the prescribed Authority or the State Government decided that a tax be imposed, the inhabitants have not been given any right to file objections to their decision. Similarly when the State Government takes a decision under section 130-A (3) of the Act that a tax is to be imposed in a Municipality, the inhabitants have not been given any right to file objections. In both cases the statute treats the inhabitants similarly. 33. The right of objection is not an inherent of fundamental right of a person qua the State's power of taxation. The object sought not be achieved by Section 130-A(3) is not to punish recalcitrant Boards. The intention seems to be that once the State Government has taken a decision that a tax ought to be imposed in a municipal area, and it is faced with a non-cooperating Board, it should have the power to effectively and speedily impose it. If to achieve this, the minor right of objection has been eliminated, the differentia are intelligible. The Statute in treating the State in this situation differently, names a rational classification. In my opinion, there is, in Section 130-A(3) of the Act, no vice of discrimination. 34. The interpretation accepted by the learned Single Judge was influenced by the fact that innocent persons would suffer for the fault of a few delinquent members of the Board. In interpreting a taxing statute, equitable consideration are entirely out of place. Taxing statutes cannot be interpreted on such presumption or assumptions. See the Commissioner Sales Tax, U.P. v. Modi Sugar Mills Ltd, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1047. 35. In my opinion, these special appeals must succeed. They are allowed, the judgment of the learned Single Judge is set aside and the writ petition is dismissed with costs throughout. 36. By the Court - The two connected Special Appeals are allowed with costs. The writ petition is dismissed with costs (separate costs to the two opposite parties).