JUDGMENT B.D. Gupta, J. - This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution has come up before us in pursuance of an order of reference passed by a learned single Judge on the ground that the view taken in Smt. Tasidiqui v. State, Civ. Misc. Writ No. 3195 of 1959. Decided on 13.1.1960. decided by this Court that rule 106 of the rules under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act was ultra vires, required reconsideration. 2. It appears, that during proceedings under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, hereinafter referred as the Act, the petitioner filed an objection under Section 12 of the Act which was forwarded to the Civil Judge for reference to an arbitrator on the view that it involved a question of title. Considerably long thereafter, on the 24th January, 1959, the Civil Judge took the view that the reference was bad on the ground, that no question of title was involved, and sent the matter back to the Consolidation Officer. Meanwhile, proceedings before the Consolidation authorities had reached an advanced stage, and statement of proposals, under Section 19 of the Act, had also been published. In Clause (2) of Section 20 of the Act it is provided that any person likely to be affected by the proposals may file his objections within 15 days from the date of the publication of the proposals under Section 19. The order of the learned Civil Judge dated the 24th January, 1959, appears to have been passed long after expiry of the 15 days period provided by Clause (2) of Section 20, and the petitioner had not filed any objections to the statement of proposals under Section 19 because the controversy raised by him had been forwarded to the Civil Judge for reference to an arbitrator and was, therefore, pending in that court. After the reference to the civil Judge had been received back by the Consolidation authorities, the petitioner filed objections under Clause (2) of Section 20 of the Act. These objections were accompanied with an application praying for condonation of the delay that had taken place. This application was founded on Rule 106 of the Rules framed by the Local Government in exercise of its powers under Section 54 of the Act. These objections were accompanied with an application praying for condonation of the delay that had taken place. This application was founded on Rule 106 of the Rules framed by the Local Government in exercise of its powers under Section 54 of the Act. This rule had been added, to a large number of rules already framed, by notification dated the 3rd December, 1957, and ran as follows:- "The provision of Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, shall apply to applications, appeals and proceedings under the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953." By an order dated the 18th of January, 1960, the Consolidation Officer condoned the delay and directed the objections to be sent to the Assistant Consolidation Officer for report. Against this order opposite-party No. 2 filed an appeal before the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, who, by order dated the 10th February, 1960, took the view that, though the order of the Consolidation Officer condoning delay appeared to be just, no appeal lay against such an order, and dismissed the appeal. Thereafter opposite-party No. 2 went up to the Deputy Director, Consolidation, by way of revision under Section 48 of the Act. Reliance was placed before the Deputy Director on the decision of a learned single Judge of this Court, in Srimati Tasidiqui v. State, Civ. Misc. Writ No. 3195 of 1959. Decided on 13.1.1960 wherein it was held that Rule 106 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act was ultra vires on the ground that the State Government had no power, under Section 54 of the Act, to make any rule applying the provisions of the Limitation Act to proceedings under the Consolidation of Holdings Act. The Deputy Director followed the decision of this Court in Smt. Tasidiqui v. State, Civ. Misc. Writ No. 3195 of 1959. Decided on 13.1.1960 and held that the Consolidation Officer had no jurisdiction to condone the delay. Without going into any other question the Deputy Director allowed the revision and set aside the order of the Consolidation Officer on the ground that objection under Clause (2) of Section 20 were barred by time and must, therefore, be rejected. The petitioner thereafter filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. Learned counsel for the petitioner has urged before us that the decision of this Court in the case of Smt. Tasidiqui v. State, Civ. Misc. Writ No. 3195 of 1959. The petitioner thereafter filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. Learned counsel for the petitioner has urged before us that the decision of this Court in the case of Smt. Tasidiqui v. State, Civ. Misc. Writ No. 3195 of 1959. Decided on 13.1.1960 is incorrect. He has relied on sub-clause (z) of Clause (2) of Section 54 of the Act which lays down what the rules may provide for. Sub-Clause (z) runs as follows:- "The application of the provision of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, to applications, appeals and proceedings under this act." He has contended that this provision makes it amply clear that the Legislature itself invested the State Government with the specific power of framing a rule or rules providing for the application of the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act to application, appeals and proceedings under the Act. Learned counsel contended that the attention of the learned Judge, who decided the case of Smt. Tasidiqui v. State, Civ. Misc. Writ No. 3195 of 1959. Decided on 13.1.1960 does not seem to have been invited to the aforesaid provision. We find force in this contention. 3. Sub-Clause (z) of Clause (2) of Section 54 was incorporated in the Act as originally framed, but was deleted by an Amending Act (U.P. Act XXXVIII of 1958) which came into force on the 27th of November, 1958. By this Amending Act Section 53-B, which substantially reproduced the provisions contained in Rule 106, was brought on the Statute book. Rule 106 was deleted by a notification of the U.P. Government dated April, 16, 1959, but there is no controversy that, in respect of the proceedings giving rise to this petition which had already commenced and were pending on the date on which the Amending Act XXXVIII of 1958 came into force, Rule 106 continued to be alive and available by virtue of Rule 112 (which was added by the same notification which deleted rule 106) read with Clause (ii) of Section 49 of the Amending Act XXXVIII of 1958. 4. In view of the unequivocal language of the statute itself where by the State Government was invested with authority to frame a rule like the one in question, viz., R. 106, it appears to us obvious that the decision of the learned single Judge in the case of Srimati Tasidiqui v. State, Civ. Misc. Writ No. 3195 of 1959. 4. In view of the unequivocal language of the statute itself where by the State Government was invested with authority to frame a rule like the one in question, viz., R. 106, it appears to us obvious that the decision of the learned single Judge in the case of Srimati Tasidiqui v. State, Civ. Misc. Writ No. 3195 of 1959. Decided on 13.1.1960 is incorrect. The notification whereby the aforesaid rule was brought in was a notification dated 3rd December, 1957, published in the Gazette dated 7th December, 1957. We find no reason to hold that the aforesaid rule was ultra wires the powers of the State Government. The result is that the very foundation for the decision of the Deputy Director disappears. In this view of the matter the order of the Deputy Director dated 23rd January, 1961, whereby he allowed the revision of opposite party No. 2, deserves to be quashed. 5. Learned counsel for the opposite party, however, sought to support the decision of the Deputy Director on another ground. His contention was that the statement of proposals under Section 20 of the Act having been published on the 28th Aug. 1957, objection under Clause (2) of that section had to be filed within 15 days from that date, that is to say, by the 12th of September, 1957. Learned counsel urged that, since rule 106 was not in existence on or about the 12th of September, 1957, but was brought in quite a few months later, it was not open to the petitioner to claim any benefit under the rule. Clause (2) of Section 20 of the Act provides for filing of an objection thereunder within 15 days of the publication of the statement of proposals under Section 19 of the Act, but there is no provision in the Act, or the rules framed thereunder, which might indicate the result of failure to file such objection within 15 days. Clause (2) of Section 20 of the Act provides for filing of an objection thereunder within 15 days of the publication of the statement of proposals under Section 19 of the Act, but there is no provision in the Act, or the rules framed thereunder, which might indicate the result of failure to file such objection within 15 days. Reference was made to the language of Section 3 of the Limitation Act which runs as follows:- "Subject to the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 25 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made, after the period of limitation prescribed therefor by the First Schedule shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence." It was urged that the Limitation Act imposed a duty to dismiss a suit, appeal or application which is filed after the period of limitation prescribed by that Act, subject only to the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 25, and the contention of the petitioner's counsel was that, in the absence of any similar provision in the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, though the petitioner had lost his right to file objections, it did not divest the Consolidation Officer of jurisdiction, in the exercise of his inherent powers, to entertain those objections if he felt satisfied about the explanation offered for the delay that had taken place. In view of the Clause (2) of Section 29 of the Limitation Act, this line of reasoning does not seem to be free from difficulty and we do not propose to express any opinion about it as, in our opinion, this petition can be decided on a simpler ground. 6. We are unable to accept the contention of learned counsel for the opposite-parties that the benefit of Rule 106 was not available to the petitioner by reason merely of the fact that the 15 days' period provided by the statute had expired before the aforesaid rule came into force, because the adoption of such a construction would involve a narrow interpretation of a remedial provision. It would, in fact, result in our adding to rule 106, by implication, a proviso to the effect that the benefit of that rule would not be available to persons whose right to make an application, file an appeal, or take proceedings under the Act had expired before the coming into force of that rule. It would, in fact, result in our adding to rule 106, by implication, a proviso to the effect that the benefit of that rule would not be available to persons whose right to make an application, file an appeal, or take proceedings under the Act had expired before the coming into force of that rule. We are not prepared to adopt such a course. Except as otherwise provided, e.g., by Section 28 of the Limitation Act, the result of the expiry of the period of limitation provided by a statute merely is that the remedy becomes barred, but the right itself is not extinguished. That being so, we are unable to find any principle upon which, in the absence of any express provision to the contrary, it can be held that a remedy which had been lost by failure to take action within limitation cannot, thereafter, be made available by investing the court or authority concerned with the power to afford that remedy if the court or authority concerned was satisfied that circumstances existed in which the delay that had taken place was fit to be condoned. In our opinion, therefore, there is no substance in the contention that the benefit of Rule 106 could not be made available to the petitioner. 7. We would also like to observe that, in adjudicating upon the petitioner's prayer for entertaining, and deciding upon the merits of the objections filed by the petitioner, it was also open to the Consolidation Officer to consider the matter in the light of the principles contained in Section 14 of the Indian Limitation Act, keeping in view the fact that the reference to the learned Civil Judge kept pending before that court, or the arbitrator appointed by that court, for a long time. 8. For all these reasons we are of the view that the order of the Deputy Director must be quashed. 9. We accordingly allow this petition and quash the order of the Deputy Director dated the 23rd January, 1961. In the circumstances of the case we direct the parties to bear their own costs of this petition.