Judgment :- 1. This is an appeal filed by the State against the judgment of the Industrial Tribunal and Special First Class Magistrate, Ernakulam acquitting the respondents who were charged for contravention of R.4 of the Kerala Factories Rules, 1957 prescribed under S.6 (1) (b) of the Factories Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 2. The two accused in the case are partners of the Suhara Rice and Oil Mill situated at Inchamudi in Trichur District. On 23 31962 pw.1 the Additional Inspector of Factories, Trichur visited the mill and found that three workers were employed there. They had failed to submit to the Chief Inspector of Factories an application in Form No. 2 for the registration of the factory and for the grant of licence as required under the Act and the Rules. On notice being issued to the accused they stated that they were employing only two workmen and that the Act does not apply. After obtaining sanction from the Chief Inspector of Factories a complaint was filed against the two accused. 3. Admittedly this mill is an establishment where power is being used and if the accused employs three or more workmen the mill would come within the purview of the Factories Act. Under the original notification issued by the State Government on 8111957 under S.85 of the Factories Act the number of employees was fixed at 5 or more. But this notification was subsequently amended on 22-5-1959 and the number of persons to be employed was reduced to three. So if three or more persons are employed as workmen the accused would have to apply for registration and licence. The learned Special Magistrate on the evidence found that only two of the workmen had been employed in the manufacturing process and as the prosecution had not led any evidence regarding the nature of the work done by the third workman Chathu who was seen working by the Inspector in the yard it cannot be presumed that he was doing some work connected with or incidental, with the manufacturing process and acquitted the accused, holding that it is not a factory requiring registration and licence. The conclusions reached by the learned Special Magistrate are challenged in this appeal. 4. The conclusions reached by the learned Special Magistrate are challenged in this appeal. 4. The first question that arises in this case is whether Chathu seen working in the yard of the factory could be taken as 'a worker' within the meaning of the term. In the Act worker is defined in S.2 (1) as follows: "'worker' means a person employed, directly or through any agency, whether for wages or not, in any manufacturing process, or in cleaning any part of the machinery or premises used for a manufacturing process or in any other kind of work incidental to or, connected with the manufacturing process, or the subject of the manufacturing process." The evidence of pw.1 shows that Chathu was working in the yard, but as stated by the learned Magistrate there is no specific evidence adduced as to the nature of the work that he was doing and whether it was incidental or connected with the manufacturing process. That is a matter which will depend on the evidence. But the learned Special Magistrate has omitted to notice the significance of S.103 of the Factories Act. That section deals with the presumption as to employment of a person found in the factory. That section reads: " If a person is found in a factory at any time, except during intervals for meals or rest, when work is going on or the machinery is in motion, he shall until the contrary is proved, be deemed for the purposes of this Act and the rules made thereunder to have been at that time employed in the factory." So prima facie any person found working in the factory can be taken as a person employed in the factory. 5. The further question that arises for decision is whether the yard in which the third worker Chathu was doing work could be considered to be 'a factory' within the meaning of the term factory. Factory is defined in S.2 (m). 5. The further question that arises for decision is whether the yard in which the third worker Chathu was doing work could be considered to be 'a factory' within the meaning of the term factory. Factory is defined in S.2 (m). It reads: " "Factory" means any premises including the precincts thereof (i) whereon ten or more workers are working or were working on any day of the preceding twelve months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on, or (ii) whereon twenty or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on without the aid of power or is ordinarily so carried on but does not include a mine subject to the operation of (the Mines Act 1952) or a railway running shed." The contention that is raised is that the expression 'premises' in the definition of the word 'factory' would take in only the building and that the yard in front of the factory is not covered by the definition. This contention cannot be accepted. The word premises has now come to refer to either land or building or to both depending on the context. Reference may be made to the decision in In re Ramanadham (52 MLJ. 207). In that case there was a building in which a ground-nut decorticating machine was being worked and about five or six yards from the wall of the building there was a drying yard where children were employed for drying and putting the ground-nuts into bags. Jackson, J., observed. "A factory as defined by S.2 (3) means any premises wherein, or within the precincts of which .... pausing here for a moment it may be observed that these terms 'premises' or 'precincts' are the most comprehensive that can be conceived. Premises means the main building and its appurtenances, and lest that should omit any part of the establishment, 'precincts' are added which mean any adjunct. Therefore, factory includes everything, machine, rooms, sheds, godowns, yards. If within these premises or precincts mechanical power is used in aid of any process for altering, for transport or sale of any article, then these premises or precincts are a factory. Therefore, factory includes everything, machine, rooms, sheds, godowns, yards. If within these premises or precincts mechanical power is used in aid of any process for altering, for transport or sale of any article, then these premises or precincts are a factory. The definition does not run, if in any part of such premises mechanical power is used then such part is a factory. The vital question would be, is mechanical power in aid of a manufacturing process used in the premises? If the answer is yes, in the decorticating room, then the whole premises, including the yard, are a factory, and not merely the decorticating room, as petitioner contends." The same question arose in the case in State v. A. H. Bhiwandiwala (AIR. 1956 Bom. 219). Vyas, J., delivering the judgment of the Bench has elaborately considered this question and held: "The word "premises" in cl (m) of S.2 means not only buildings, but includes lands as well. The words "and in any part of which" which occur in the latter part of sub-cl.(1) of cl (m) are not inconsistent with premises being inclusive of lands. They mean that a manufacturing process may be carried on in any part of the land upon which a factory may be situated." This decision was challenged before the Supreme Court in the case reported in A. H. Bhiwandiwala v. State of Bombay (AIR. 1962 SC. 29). Raghubar Dayal, J., delivering the judgment of the Bench after referring to the meaning of the word 'premises' in various law lexicons and dictionaries observed: "The word 'premises' is a generic term meaning open land or land with buildings or buildings alone. Expression 'premises including precincts' does not necessarily mean that the premises must always have precincts. Even buildings need not have any precincts. The word 'including' is not a term restricting the meaning of the word 'premises' but is a term which enlarges its scope. The use of the expression therefore does not indicate that the word 'premises' must be restricted to mean building and be not taken to cover open land as well. Even buildings need not have any precincts. The word 'including' is not a term restricting the meaning of the word 'premises' but is a term which enlarges its scope. The use of the expression therefore does not indicate that the word 'premises' must be restricted to mean building and be not taken to cover open land as well. Though some of the provisions of the Act cannot be applicable to salt works where the process of converting sea water into salt is carried on in the open there is nothing in the Act which makes it uniformly compulsory for every occupier of a factory to comply with every requirement of the Act. An occupier is to comply with such provisions of the Act which apply to the factory he is working. Hence such salt works would come within the meaning of the word 'premises' used in the definition in S.2 (m)." so if Chathu was engaged in the yard in any work incidental to or connected with the manufacturing process he would be a worker and having engaged three workmen the accused would be guilty of the offence charged. 6. Learned counsel for the respondents submits that as there is no evidence as to what Chathu was doing in the yard and as the presumption under S.103 is rebuttable the accused should be given a chance of adducing evidence to show that Chathu is not'a worker' within the meaning of the Act. The request seems to be reasonable and I feel that the respondents should be given a chance of adducing whatever evidence they deem fit. This is agreeable to the appellant also. I, therefore, reverse the judgment of the Special First Class Magistrate and order a retrial. The learned Magistrate will allow both parties to lead such further evidence as they may wish to produce and dispose of the case in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made in this judgment.