Judgment :- 1. The question arising for decision in this writ application depends on the interpretation to be placed on S.11 (17) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1959. That section is in these terms: 11 (17) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section a tenant who has been in continuous occupation of a building from Ist April, 1940 as a tenant, shall not be liable to be evicted for bona fide occupation of the landlord or of the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided that a landlord of a residential building shall be entitled to evict such a tenant of that building if the landlord has been living in a place outside the city, town or village in which the building is situated for a period of not less than five years before he makes an application to the Rent Control Court for being put in possession of building and requires the building bonafide for his own permanent residence or of the permanent residence of any member of his family or the landlord is in dire need of a place for residence and has none of his own. Explanation. In computing the period of continuous occupation from 1st April, 1940, the period, if any, during which the landlord was residing outside the city, town or village in which the building is situate shall be excluded." 2. The landlord, the petitioner before me, who was away in Africa for more than ten years, returned to this country and applied to the Rent Control Court for evicting the tenants, Respondents 1 and 2. These tenants were initiated into the property before the 1st of April, 1940 by the Karanavan of the petitioner's tarwad. The property belongs to the tarwad of the petitioner. When the petitioner returned to her native place, she obtained a Kuzhikanam lease from the karanavan of the tarwad and it was specifically proved in that lease deed that the petitioner may take steps to evict the tenants. It was pursuant to this document that the eviction proceedings commenced. 3. The Rent Control Court found that the petitioner and her children required the house for their bona fide need and notwithstanding S.11 (17) came to the conclusion that the petitioner is entitled to eviction of the tenants and ordered eviction. It was pursuant to this document that the eviction proceedings commenced. 3. The Rent Control Court found that the petitioner and her children required the house for their bona fide need and notwithstanding S.11 (17) came to the conclusion that the petitioner is entitled to eviction of the tenants and ordered eviction. In appeal the appellate authority, as well as the revisional authority in further revision, respondents 3 and 4 respectively, took the view that the petitioner was not the landlord at the time of the lease and that the petitioner though she had stayed outside the city, town or village for the requisite period cannot claim the benefit of the proviso to sub-section (17). Accordingly the eviction petition was dismissed. 4. Counsel for the petitioner raised several arguments. According to the petitioner, the tenants have not been in continuous possession of the building from the 1st of April 1940 since they surrendered the building in 1949 and took it back on the same day on a Rent Chit. Secondly he urged that it is unnecessary for the proviso to S.11 (17) to apply that his client, the petitioner before me should herself have been the 'landlord' at the time of her stay outside the city, town or village. Thirdly he submitted that in any view of the matter this is a case falling under the last clause of the proviso to sub-section (17) reading "or the landlord is in dire need of a place for residence and has none of his own." 5. I am in agreement with the views expressed by the appellate authority as well as the revisional authority in regard to the first two points urged by counsel for the petitioner. Since on the day on which the building is said to have been surrendered and almost simultaneously a Rent Chit has been executed, the surrender is only in name. In substance and in effect the tenants had been continuing in possession from the 1st of April 1940. I am also of the view that during the stay outside the town or village the person staying outside must also be the landlord. 6. However, as I understand S.11 (17) the words after the last'or' in the sub-section stand by themselves. In substance and in effect the tenants had been continuing in possession from the 1st of April 1940. I am also of the view that during the stay outside the town or village the person staying outside must also be the landlord. 6. However, as I understand S.11 (17) the words after the last'or' in the sub-section stand by themselves. The words used are: "the landlord is in dire need of a place for residence and has none of his own." The words used in this part of the section are not used any where in the earlier parts of S.11 (17) nor do I find the words used in any other part of S.11. It is significant that S.11 (17) starts by engrafting an exception to cases where a landlord is entitled to eviction when the building is required for bona fide occupation of the landlord or for the occupation of any member of his family dependent on him, and the proviso to that exception also uses the words "requires the building bona fide for his own permanent residence or of the permanent residence of any member of his family." If the tenant has been in possession continuously from the 1st of April 1940, this bona fide need is not sufficient because of the exception introduced by the first part of S.11 (17). Added to this bona fide need if there is the additional fact of the absence of the landlord for five years from the city, town or village, the exception is negatived by the proviso. It appears to me that this overriding of the exception is also achieved by the last part contained in the proviso that "the landlord is in dire need of a place for residence and has none of his own." This is the only meaning that I can attribute. If there is "dire need", the additional qualification of absence from the city, town or village is unnecessary. The object seems to be that a 'dire need' should enable the landlord to get eviction. I therefore set aside the orders, passed by the appellate authority and the revisional authority, Exts. P.1 and P. 2. If there is "dire need", the additional qualification of absence from the city, town or village is unnecessary. The object seems to be that a 'dire need' should enable the landlord to get eviction. I therefore set aside the orders, passed by the appellate authority and the revisional authority, Exts. P.1 and P. 2. These authorities have not considered the question as to whether on the facts and in the circumstances, the petitioner is entitled to say that she satisfies the last part of S.11 (17), viz., there is dire need for a place of residence. The appellate authority, the third respondent will deal with this aspect and pass appropriate orders in the light of what is stated above. 7. I make no order as to costs.