JUDGMENT M. Madhavan Nair, J. 1. This is an appeal by the 2nd defendant against an order refusing immunity from eviction under the decree in the suit. 2. The admitted facts relevant for the disposal of this appeal are thus: On Medam 11, 1122, the plaintiff had let the suit property, being a compound with two buildings, for 6 years to the 1st defendant. The same day, another agreement was also entered into under which the 1st defendant undertook to put up two other buildings on the property in three months' time with funds to be supplied by the plaintiff. The rents fixed under the lease were Rs. 10/- p. m. for the compound and Rs. 75/- p. m. for 3 months and thereafter Rs. 250/- p. m. for the buildings. The 1st defendant put up one building and the ground floor of another, but not the upper floor of the latter; He paid rents as stipulated for some months ; and on Karkatakam 1, 1124, assigned his interest under the lease to the appellant 2nd defendant, even though there was a covenant, against assignment in the lease deed. Based on the breach of covenant, the plaintiff instituted this suit for eviction of the defendants from the buildings and the compound and other reliefs. It was decreed allowing eviction and recovery of arrears of rent at Rs. 260/- a month from Meenam 1124 from the defendants. The 2nd defendant's appeal, A. S. No. 741 of 1958 in this Court, ended in a compromise with plaintiff in the following terms: "(1) The appellant and the respondent agree that the rent for the building in the suit property be fixed at Rs. 175/- per mensem from 1-12-1124. (2) The appellant agrees that the amount paid prior to 1-12-1124 towards rent for the buildings at the rate of Rs. 250/- per mensem need not be refunded to him by the respondent. (3) The appellant and the respondent agree that the parties shall suffer their costs in this court. (4) Except to the above extent it is agreed that the decree of the court below be confirmed." The compromise was accepted by Court and decree passed on July 31, 1961. Thereafter the decree holder moved an execution petition which happened to be dismissed for default. (4) Except to the above extent it is agreed that the decree of the court below be confirmed." The compromise was accepted by Court and decree passed on July 31, 1961. Thereafter the decree holder moved an execution petition which happened to be dismissed for default. On January 7, 1963, he filed Execution Petition No. 14 of 1963, when the 2nd defendant claimed immunity from eviction under S.11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, XVI of 1959. The court below, on an appreciation of the terms of the compromise and the definition of a tenant in the Rent Control Act, held him not a tenant, and allowed execution to proceed. It is against that order that this appeal has been preferred. 3. The simple question here is whether the appellant is a tenant within the meaning of the Kerala Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act, XVI of 1959. That Act, as well as its predecessor, the T. C, Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Order, 1950, defined a tenant not to include an assignee of his interests. Under the law of property, a covenant not to assign the lease is lawful and binding on the lessee (Vide: S.10 and 108 of the Transfer of Property Act). It then follows that by the assignment of the lease executed by the 1st defendant, the 2nd defendant did not become a tenant in law. Admittedly the Trial Court's decree did not recognise him as a tenant. 4. The question then is whether he became a tenant by virtue of the compromise in A. S. No. 741 of 1958. Counsel for the appellant contended that the 2nd defendant having been in exclusive possession of the property as assignee of the undisputed lessee, the 1st defendant, and the plaintiff having entered an agreement with him in the compromise in regard to the rent of the property the 2nd defendant had become a pucca lessee of the buildings and the land. That contention, though attractive, bears little merit in our view. That contention, though attractive, bears little merit in our view. As observed by Denning L. J. in Errington v. Errington (1952 (1) KB 290), "although a person who is let into exclusive possession is, prima facie, to be considered to be a tenant, nevertheless he will not be held to be so if the circumstances negative any intention to create a tenancy." The circumstances in which the compromise came to be, the absence of any term therein for the continuance of the 2nd defendant on the premises and the affirmance of the decree for eviction of the 2nd defendant indicate a total lack of intention in the parties to create a tenancy thereunder. The fact that the 'rent' decreed by the court below has been reduced from Rs. 250/- to Rs. 175/- by itself does not make a material change in the relation between the parties. When the Trial Court, in finding the defendants not entitled to continue on the property and thereon decreeing their eviction, has awarded 'rent' till delivery of the property, that word really connotes the mesne profits of the property allowed to be collected by the plaintiff; and it is such 'rent' that has been reduced by the compromise. Insistence on the right of immediate eviction under the decree of the court below clearly negatives any intention to confer any right to continue in possession. The compromise does not therefore spell out a tenancy in the 2nd defendant which he had not before it. 5. Counsel for the plaintiff brought to our notice that, in another proceeding regarding eviction of these defendants from the identical buildings, the decision wherein is reported in Gopala Pillai v. State ( 1955 KLT 593 ), the 2nd defendant had undertaken in court not to urge any objection to his eviction under the Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) laws. Though that concession was long before the aforesaid compromise, in view of the prohibition to eviction of tenants of buildings enacted in S.9 of the T. C. Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Order, 1950, it tantamounts almost to an admission on the part of the 2nd defendant of his not being a real tenant. Though we are not acting on that concession to deny the 2nd defendant's claim here, we feel fortified in our finding on the status of the 2nd defendant by his prior conduct implied in that concession. 6. Though we are not acting on that concession to deny the 2nd defendant's claim here, we feel fortified in our finding on the status of the 2nd defendant by his prior conduct implied in that concession. 6. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.