JUDGMENT I. This appeal arises out of execution proceedings and involves the question as to limitation. The executing Court before whom the question of limitation was raised by the judgment debtors overruled the same and held the petition not barred. On appeal the appellate Court came to contrary conclusion on the ground that the first execution petition, after the final decree, was not filed within three years in accordance with law. The execution petition was held to be incompetent. The appeal was accordingly allowed and the execution petition was dismissed. This appeal is directed against that decision. 2. Material facts necessary for consideration of the present appeal are as follows : In Civil Suit No. 70/1931 a preliminary decree for accounts was passed on 30-6-1932. Proceedings for final decree went on in Misc. Case No. 09/1932 and final decree for Rs. 499-5-3 and pro-tanto costs was passed on 9-10-1941. An appeal was preferred against this in Civil Regular Appeal No. 150/1941 This appeal was dismissed on 3-12-1942 and the final decree already passed was affirmed with costs. The decree-holders then applied for execution of the decree on 1-12-1945 in Execution Case No. 121/1945. In this application, as it was initially filed, details as to the amount for which the execution was sought and lacked prayer for the kind, of assistance or relief which the decree holders sought. An application was submitted on behalf of the decree-holders along with this execution application stating that they, could not obtain the copy of the decree and could not fill in some of the details and asking for time to make good the deficiency. The Court granted time by its order dated 6-12-1945 for filing the copy of the decree. There were further adjournments for one reason or another till 6-3-1946 when the decree-holders filed a copy of the decree and along with it submitted an execution-petition which continued details which were lacking in the petition initially filed. This amended petition was accepted by the Court and directed it to be checked. It was accordingly checked but was still found defective. The decree-holders took further time and ultimately on 11-7-1946 execution-petition was duly corrected presumably with the permission of the Court. It was then noticed that the judgment-debtor Bapusa and the decree-holder Damodar were dead and their legal representatives were not named in the decree. The executing Court directed this to be done. The decree-holders took further time and ultimately on 11-7-1946 execution-petition was duly corrected presumably with the permission of the Court. It was then noticed that the judgment-debtor Bapusa and the decree-holder Damodar were dead and their legal representatives were not named in the decree. The executing Court directed this to be done. The decree-holders took steps accordingly, At this stage the decree-holders represented that a compromise was in sight with the judgment debtors "and that consequently they did not wish to proceed with the execution petition which might be dismissed reserving their claim to costs. This was accordingly done on 3-9-1946. 3. This was followed by another execution petition No. 192/1948 filed on 3-12-1948. This was checked and found defective as regards column No. 7 which was reported by the office not to mention what sum had been awarded to the decree-holders the decree including future interest. Interest claimed was found to be incorrect as also the column No. 3 regarding the date of the decree. The decree-holders were granted time to make the necessary corrections upto 17-12-1948. The decree-holders failed to make correction. The execution petition was then dismissed on decree-holders prayer without reserving costs on 17-12-1948. 4. Present execution-petition No. 524/1951 is now filed on 28-11-1951. On notice to the judgment debtors they raised objections including that regarding limitation with reference to both the above mentioned execution applications No. 121 of 1945 and Execution Case No. 192 of 1948 The executing Court overruled these objections and held that the claim of the decree-holders was not barred by limitation, The reason suggested by it for taking this view was that the first execution application No. 121/1945 though imperfect to begin with had been permitted to be put in a corrected form and had consequently become one in accordance with law. As regards the second execution petition No. 192/1948 the executing Court was of the view that the defects therein though not removed by correction until it had been dismissed were not material so as to render it not one in accordance with law. At any rate it was held that the said application constituted sufficient step-in-aid of execution to keep the right to execute the decree alive. The last execution application No. 524 of 1951 was consequently held to be not barred. Reliance was placed by the execution Court upon the decision reported in Sadaya Chandra Vs. At any rate it was held that the said application constituted sufficient step-in-aid of execution to keep the right to execute the decree alive. The last execution application No. 524 of 1951 was consequently held to be not barred. Reliance was placed by the execution Court upon the decision reported in Sadaya Chandra Vs. Pares Nath AIR 1922 Cal. 44 = 64 Indian Cases 571. 5. The appellate Court on the other hand held that the first execution application No. 121/1945 was not an execution-application at all in the eye of law as columns Nos. 7 and 8 did not show the amount of money allowed to the decree-holders nor did column No. 10 show what assistance of the Court was needed for executing the decree or in other words what was the relief which the decree-holders sought. When the second execution application was submitted which ultimately was brought to correction the claim in execution had become barred by limitation as more than three years had elapsed by then. It distinguished the case in A.I.R. 1912 Calcutta 44 on the ground that in that case the decree-holder had mentioned the relief which he sought and that was the relief which it was competent for the Court to grant. The learned Judge relied upon the decisions reported in Bhupendra Vs. Janeswar AIR 1926 Patna 533. Bhanpal Singh Vs. Siya Ram AIR 1942 Allahabad 442, Aziz Rahman Vs. Bepin Behary AIR 1938 Calcutta 162, Sakkargauda Vs. Bhimappa AIR 1931 Bombay 128, Bahadur Singh Dugar Vs. Basiruddin Ahmmad AIR. 1925 Calcutta 1135 and Sha Karamchand Gokaldas Vs. G. Chakaldas ILR 19 Bombay 34. In the last mentioned cases it was held that where the execution application does not contain statement as to what assistance the decree-holder desires from the Court, it is not one accordance with law nor a step-in-aid of execution. Basiruddin Ahmmad AIR. 1925 Calcutta 1135 and Sha Karamchand Gokaldas Vs. G. Chakaldas ILR 19 Bombay 34. In the last mentioned cases it was held that where the execution application does not contain statement as to what assistance the decree-holder desires from the Court, it is not one accordance with law nor a step-in-aid of execution. Another reason suggested for holding the claim in execution as barred was that the first execution application as it was originally submitted or one submitted in a duly corrected from on 11-7-1946 was not signed by all the decree-holders and although in the second application form it was mentioned that the same was being submitted for the benefit of and on behalf of all yet for that reason it became an application of a totally different character than the original and could not have been one within the contemplation of Order 21, Rule 17 C.P.C. It relied upon the decision in Mr. Nasiban Vs. Surendra Nath AIR 1945 Patna 459, in that connection the appellate Court said nothing about the legality of the second execution application No. 192 of 1948 or otherwise. The appeal was consequently allowed and the execution petition No. 524 of 1951 was held to be untenable as being barred by limitation. The judgment-debtors were held competent to raise the point of limitation as they had no notice of both the earlier petitions. 6. In this appeal by the decree-holders it is contended that the lower appellate Court was not right in holding that the claim of the decree-holders was barred by time because of the defective character of the execution petition No. 121 of 1945. 7. As regards the first execution petition No. 121 of 1945 the petition, to begin with, was highly defective in as much as the figures as to the amount allowed by the decree for which the execution was sought were not entered in columns Nos. 7 and 8 nor did it indicate in what manner the assistance of the Court was required. Besides these defects of substantial sort which would make the application not in accordance with law there were other defects. 7 and 8 nor did it indicate in what manner the assistance of the Court was required. Besides these defects of substantial sort which would make the application not in accordance with law there were other defects. But later by 6-3-1946 up to which the decree-holders were granted time to procure and produce copy of the decree he submitted an application form with the above-mentioned defects made upto a certain extent and finally by 11-7-1946 the execution application was found to be perfectly in accordance with law and accepted as such by the Court. However two of the patties namely judgment-debtor Bapusa and decree-holder Damodar were found dead by that time and steps were asked to be taken to bring their legal representatives on record. But before this could be done the execution petition was not disposed of by the decree-holders on the ground that some compromise with judgment-debtors was in sight. The question is, can it be said that this execution petition, which was initially defective and which was later supplemented by a duly corrected application after the expiry of the period of limitation which could not be proceeded with without legal representatives of Damodar and Bapusa being brought on record could be said to be in accordance with 'law' so as to save limitation. 8. Now as regards the defective character of the application the executing Court no doubt has power to grant time to allow the defect to be remedied. It has by reason of section 148 C.P.C. power to enlarge time; Where the defect is remedied and the execution petition is brought in order, it relates back to the date when it was initially presented. Rule 17 of Order 21 which confers this power to permit defects in the execution application to be remedied with reference to requirements under Order 21, Rules 11 to 14 does not limit it to only immaterial or formal defects but extends to defects even of substantial character. The power is no doubt discretionary and in exercising its discretion the executing Court could either permit the defects to be remedied or reject the application. The power is no doubt discretionary and in exercising its discretion the executing Court could either permit the defects to be remedied or reject the application. But if it does the former, it could at any time later be said that the original petition was defective and the Court in permitting the defects to be remedied acted without jurisdiction and consequently the execution application should be deemed to be not in accordance with law. The deeming provision in sub-rule (2) of Rule 17 lays down that where an (execution) application is amended under sub-rule(1) it shall be deemed to be in accordance with law and presented on the day it was first presented. They thus preclude the judgment-debtor from raising any objection that the execution application was not in accordance with Jaw at the time it was presented, vide Abdul Karim Saheb Vs. Lakshmanaswami AIR 1928 Madras 440 (443). In this case Wallace and Thiruvekatachariar, JJ., observed:- "The object of legislature in enacting in sub-rule (2) of Rule 17 (Order 21) ............is to preclude any question being raised by the judgment-debtor as to its validity at a later stage of the execution proceedings in the same case." It does not appear from the wording of Rule 17 that the power to grant amendment can be exercised only after notice to the judgment-debtor and that if no notice is given to the judgment-debtor it is open for him to question the propriety of granting amendment. Some of the decisions seems to take the view that only formal defects could be ordered to be cured and not those of substantial nature vide, Gajanand Sha Vs. Dayanand Thakur AIR 1943 Patna 127, Marulasiddappa Vs. Lakshmipathi AIR 1950 Mysore 64 (69). But even these cases accept the fact that defects occurring for failure to give details as required under Order 21, Rule 11 or omission to give proper description of properly to be attached are defects of formal character though where the property is properly described but by a later application for amendment another property is sought to be substituted for it then such a later application for amendment cannot be said to be within the ambit of power under Rule 17. 9. It is next contended that the one of the judgment-debtor Bapusa and the decree-holder Damodar were dead and before their legal representatives were brought on record the execution application was dismissed. 9. It is next contended that the one of the judgment-debtor Bapusa and the decree-holder Damodar were dead and before their legal representatives were brought on record the execution application was dismissed. Even if that be so the original execution application does not become one not in accordance with law as it was not established that the sole decree-holder Damodar was dead when the execution petition was filed on 1-12-1945. Nor is it established that Bapusa was not then alive. Moreover there were other judgment-debtors who could be proceeded against. Moreover as held in Asa Ram Vs. Babu Ram AIR 1956 Allahabad 494, even if the execution application was filed against the deceased judgment debtor before limitation and an application to proceed against his legal representatives is made after the expiry of limitation the execution petition cannot be said to be barred by time. The decision in Bhupendra Vs. Janeswar AIR 1926 Patna 533, upon which the lower appellate Court relied has no application. In that case the execution petition was defective in as much as columns Nos. 5 and 6 were not correctly entered as required by order 21, Rule 11, no list of property to be attached was given. The Munsif who was dealing with the execution petition finding such a defective application called upon the decree-holder to show cause why the application be not rejected. The decree-holder showed cause in writing. The petition was registered thereafter but this was done by the clerk without any order from the Munsif. He thereupon ignored the entry as to registration of the application and rejected it as barred by time. It does appear that the original petition which was defective was returned back for making up the omissions but the app1ication was not corrected by supplying omissions till it became barred. It was at that stage that the decree-holder was asked to show cause. It is clear from this that the executing Court had not allowed the defects to be remedied. 10. In the above Patna case the Court acted in exercise of its discretionary power to reject the application instead of permitting the defects to be remedied. Had it not done so and allowed the defects to be remedied by acting under Order 21, Rule 17 the position would have been otherwise. 11. 10. In the above Patna case the Court acted in exercise of its discretionary power to reject the application instead of permitting the defects to be remedied. Had it not done so and allowed the defects to be remedied by acting under Order 21, Rule 17 the position would have been otherwise. 11. In the present case it is clear that the defects were all remedied and the execution application was accepted as proper and orders were passed for bringing legal representatives on record. 12. It was contended that it was really not a case of amendment. The decree-holders knowing that the first execution petition was no petition at all submitted a fresh petition duly filling in the form. The first petition was nothing better than an apology for an execution petition. In my opinion this constitution too cannot be accepted. 'Whether the amendment is effected on the same execution petition which was filed to begin with or a duly amended petition is filed later on will make little difference as long as the Court having jurisdiction to allow the defects in the original application allows this to be done. It then ceases to be a matter of substance and becomes one of form. It therefore follows that the first execution petition having been allowed to he substituted by a duly corrected application though after limitation it related back to the date when the execution petition was first filed i.e. on 1-12-1945. It was disposed of at the instance of the decree-holders subject to reservation of their costs on 3-9-1946. 13. This takes us to the second execution petition filed on 3-12-1948 which was filed by only one of the legal representatives of the original decree-holder for and on behalf of all. The office on 9-12-1948 reported that column No. 7 was wrongly entered as in this column the amount awarded by the decree sought to have been stated instead of a composite figure inclusive of costs awarded by the Court. Such costs could, it must have been assumed by the office, be stated only in column No. 8 and not in column No. 7. There was an error as to calculation of interest. The decree-holder was granted time to remedy the defects as they were assumed to exist upto 17-12-1948. The decree-holder did nothing. Such costs could, it must have been assumed by the office, be stated only in column No. 8 and not in column No. 7. There was an error as to calculation of interest. The decree-holder was granted time to remedy the defects as they were assumed to exist upto 17-12-1948. The decree-holder did nothing. On the other hand the decree-holder requested that the execution application might be disposed of without costs. It was accordingly dismissed. Although the lower appellate Court has not considered the legality of this execution petition before we can hold the present execution application filed on 28-11-1951 to be within time, the legality of the second execution application has to be considered. For if the second application is held to be not in accordance with law the appeal will fail. 14. Question to be considered therefore is whether it is open for the decree-holders to contend that the execution application filed by only one of the decree-holders on behalf of the rest and which contained the abovementioned defects can be said to be one in accordance with law. 15. As regards the first part of the question it is dear by reference to Order 21, Rule 16 that one of the legal representatives of the deceased decree-holder can apply for execution for the benefit of all and the execution application will not be had particularly when he states so in his application. In Mst. Amiran Vs. Mst. Kaniz Aisha AIR 1934 Patna 627, it is held that where a decree is passed in favour of one person and that person dies leaving behind him person in whom his right devolves by operation of law the decree can be executed by such persons by reason of specific provisions contained in Order 21, Rule 16 and in such a case Order 21, Rule 15 is inapplicable. The decree in such a case can be executed by anyone of the heirs. The Court can by invoking principle underlying Order 21, Rule 15 safe-guard the interest of the other heirs. The person applying may also specifically state that he is applying for execution for the benefit of other heirs as well. In Motilal Shivnarayan Vs. Santaram Bala AIR 1954 Bombay 273, it was observed by Gajendragadkar J, at page 274- "There can be no doubt that by operation of law the decree-holder's rights can devolve upon more then one person. The person applying may also specifically state that he is applying for execution for the benefit of other heirs as well. In Motilal Shivnarayan Vs. Santaram Bala AIR 1954 Bombay 273, it was observed by Gajendragadkar J, at page 274- "There can be no doubt that by operation of law the decree-holder's rights can devolve upon more then one person. Cases of devolution of estates in favour of more heirs than one are not unknown; and so wherever the decree-holders rights have by succession vested in more heirs than one, they or any of them would be entitled to apply to execute the decree Under Order 21, Rule 16 read if necessary with Order 21, Rule 10." Similar view is taken in Khadim Hussain Vs. Abdur Rahman AIR 1956 Allahabad 575, 16. Having regard to the provisions of Order 21 Rule 16 read with Order 21 Rule 15 or principle underlying it and Section 146 C.P.C. it is clear that the one of the heirs of the deceased decree holder could apply execution and could certainly do so for the benefit of all. 17. As regards the next objection of its being in accordance with law it seems that although the executing Court dealing with that execution had dismissed it for failure of the person applying to remedy the alleged defects yet in considering the question whether it can be taken to be in accordance with law we will have to consider whether the defects were of a material sort or were immaterial and the execution could be considered to be in accordance with law inspit of them. 18. For considering this question we should look to the requirements of Order 21 Rule 17 and the authorities bearing on the question as to non-compliance with anyone or more of its requirement and its effect. Portion of clause (g) of Order 21 Rule 11 material for our present purpose requires statement as to- "The amount with interest (if any) due upon the decree, or other relief granted thereby." and clause (h) requires statement as to costs (if any) awarded. The decree-holder had put the figure of the amounts covered by clauses (g) and (h) as one. The decree-holder had put the figure of the amounts covered by clauses (g) and (h) as one. The defect obviously is immaterial because the rule does not prohibit amalgamation of these in a single item though it is more convenient to put these various requirements in separate columns in a statement in tabular from. There was also slight error as to interest claimed. 19. In Fulchand Hirchand Vs. Pal Marian AIR 1943 Nagpur 296, it is held by the Division Bench consisting of Niyogi and Digby, JJ., that where finding that the decree holder to whom time was granted to remedy the defects in an execution application in exercise of its powers under Order 21 Rule 17, his failed to do so, dismissing the application such dismissal is not an adjudication that the application so dismissed was not in accordance with law. The learned Judges approved the principle laid down in the Full Bench decision in Gulam Ali Vs. Rajkumar 18 MPLC 13 = AIR 1931 Nagpur 154 and later applied in Md. Abdul Sattar Vs. Rahimuddin 25 MPLC 356 = AIR 1940 Nagpur 87 and Nathmal Vs. Balkrishan AIR 1941 Nagpur 152. 20. It therefore follows that it is open for this Court to consider the question as to legality of that application and determine it judicially now. 21. The defects as to the form in which columns No. 7 and 8 ought to be filled or a slight error in calculation of interest due to overlapping of a short period in making the calculation cannot be said to be defects of substantial sort but may at the most amount to irregularity. In such a situation that execution application cannot be held to be not in accordance with law. 22. For these reasons the Court of first instance was right in directing execution to proceed and the Court of appeal erroneously held the petition to be barred by limitation. 23. The appeal is therefore allowed and the execution petition is held to be competent. The execution case is consequently sent back to the Court of first instance which shall proceed to execute it in accordance with law. 24. The appellants are entitled to costs throughout.