JUDGMENT M.C. Desai, C.J. - This appeal which came up for hearing before Mithan Lal, J. has been referred by him to a larger Bench because it involves a question of importance and reconsideration of the decision in Kallu Khan v. Kamrulnisa, 1962 ALJ 1039. The appellant is aggrieved by the decree passed for his ejectment under Section 209 of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act in a suit instituted by the respondent in a revenue court on 9.9.1957. The trial court framed issued on 28.10.1957 anyone of them was whether the plaintiff respondent was bhumidhar of the land in dispute. The Act then contained Section 332 which required that an issue regarding bhumidhari rights arising in a suit pending in a revenue court should be remitted by it to a civil court that the civil court should determine it and send its finding to the revenue court and that the revenue court should after taking it as the finding on the issue framed by it decided the suit. In accordance with this provision of the revenue court remitted the issue on 28.10.1957 to a civil court. While the civil court was considering the issue the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act was amended by Act No. 37 of 1858 which came in to force on 7.11.1958 and which deleted Sections 332, 332-A and 332-B. In spite of the deletion of Section 332 the civil court recorded evidence on 11.3.1959 and decided the issue on 13.4.1959 in favour of the respondent and returned the record to the revenue court with its finding. It was not contended before on it behalf of the appellant or the respondent that the deletion of Section 332 deprived it of its jurisdiction to determine the issue and that it should return the record to the revenue court without determining it. When the revenue court receiving upon it and after deciding other issued decreed the suit against the appellant. Before it also it was not contended on behalf of the appellant that the finding given by the civil court on the issue was without jurisdiction and that the revenue court was no longer required to be found by it and ought to determine the issue itself along with other issues and then decided the suit. Before it also it was not contended on behalf of the appellant that the finding given by the civil court on the issue was without jurisdiction and that the revenue court was no longer required to be found by it and ought to determine the issue itself along with other issues and then decided the suit. The appellant preferred an appeal from the decree which was dismissed by the District Judge and he came up to this Court in second appeal. Even in the appeal before the District Judge he did not challenge the jurisdiction of the civil court to decide the issue and the jurisdiction of the original revenue court to accept the civil court finding as the finding on the issue. The question has been taken up for the first time in this second appeal. 2. Section 331 bars the jurisdiction of a civil court in respect of any suit, application or proceedings mentioned in columns 3 of the Schedule II of the Act and an appeal from a final order will lie to the court or authority mentioned in Col. 5 Section authority mentioned in Col. 5 Section 332 as originally enacted. laid down that it in ja suit instituted in revenue court a question arose regarding the title of any party to the land in dispute it could stay the suit and direct a party to file a suit within a certain time in a a civil court having jurisdiction. Section 332 was amended by Act No. XVI of 1953 which provided that in such a suit the revenue court would frame an issue on the question of title and submit the record to the competent civil court for its decision on that issue only that the civil court would decide the issue and return the record together with its finding to the revenue court that the letter would decide the suit accepting the finding of the civil court on the issue referred to the civil court on the issue referred to it and that an appeal from the revenue court decree in such a suit would lie to the District Judge or the High Court depending upon the valuation. Section 332-A was added with effect from 6-8-1954 laying down that a question whether a person as adhivasi or asami of the land in dispute would not be deemed to raise a question of title. Section 332-A was added with effect from 6-8-1954 laying down that a question whether a person as adhivasi or asami of the land in dispute would not be deemed to raise a question of title. Section 332-B was also added by the same Act, No. XX of 1954, with effect from 6.8.1954 and laid down that it in a suit relating the land institute in a civil court a question arose whether any party was adhivasi or asami it would frame an issue and submit the record to the Collector for decision or it that the Collector for decision of it that the collector would decide the issue and return the record with his finding and that the civil court would proceed to decided the suit accepting the collector finding, which would be deemed to be a part of the civil court finding for the purpose of appeal. Sections 332-A and 332-B were amended by U.P. Land reforms Amendment Act No. 18 of 1956 and the word "sirdar" was added just before the words "adhivas or asami" Section 331-A was added by the U.P. Land Reforms amendment Act No. 37 of the 1958 and lays down that if in a civil court in respect of land held by a bhumidhar the question arises whether it is or is not used for agricultural purposes the court should frame an issue on the question and send the record to the Sub Divisional officer for his decision on it. By the same Amendment Act Sections 332, 332-A and 332-B were deleted. This Amendment act of 1958 came in to force on 7-11-1958 but Section 87(1) provides that "any amendment made by this court shall not affect the validity effect or consequence of anything already done or suffered or any right title obligation or liability already acquired accrued or incurred or any jurisdiction already exercised and any proceeding instituted or commenced before any Court prior to the commencement of this Act shall commencement of this Act notwithstanding any continue to be heard and decided by such court." 3. On 28-10-1957 the revenue court framed an issue regarding bhumidhari rights as was required by Section 332 which was then in force and referred it to a civil court for its decision thereon. On 28-10-1957 the revenue court framed an issue regarding bhumidhari rights as was required by Section 332 which was then in force and referred it to a civil court for its decision thereon. While the civil court was considering the issue Section 332 was decided and the question at once arose whether the civil court could still decided the issue since Section 87 (1) of the Amendment Act of 1958, which deleted Section 332. laid down that the deletion was not affect that validity effect or consequence of anything already done or any jurisdiction already exercised it follows that the reference of the issue to the civil court and the assumption by the civil court of jurisdiction over it remained unaffected by the deletion in other words the civil court was bound to decide the issue as if Section 332 had not been deleted. The Civil courts deciding the issue was a proceedings commenced before it prior to 7.11.1958 and Section 87 (1) of the amendment act required it to be continued to be heard and decided by it notwithstanding the deletion of Section 332. Again when the civil court decision on the issue was received by the revenue court the question arose whether it was required to accept the civil courts decision and to decide the suit on its basis, Section 332 was deleted but again Section 87(1) provided that it would not affect the effect or consequence of the reference of the issue to the civil court made before the deletion or the right acquired by one party to have the suit decided on the basis of the civil courts finding and the liability incurred by the other party to be governed by the civil court finding. In other words the revenue court was bound to decide the court finding as if Section 332 had not been deleted. If the civil court was allowed to decided the issue it must have been with purpose that its decision should be accepted by the revenue court and that it should decide the suit on its basis. The revenue court was no account of the deletion no longer bound to accept the civil court finding it would have been useless for the legislature's allowing the civil court to decide the issue after the deletion. The revenue court was no account of the deletion no longer bound to accept the civil court finding it would have been useless for the legislature's allowing the civil court to decide the issue after the deletion. This legal position was rightly understood by the appellant and his counsel and that explains why they did not challenge the civil court's jurisdiction to decide the issue and the revenue court's jurisdiction to accept the civil court's decision on the issue and decide the suit on its basis. 4. The material facts in Kallu Khan's case were as follows : In a suit instituted in a civil court a question regarding sirdari rights was raised by a party and the civil court framed an issue about it. The civil court itself decided the issue instead of referring it to the revenue court and Nigam and S.D. Singh, JJ., N.U. Beg, J. dissenting, held that the issue should have been referred to the Collector under Section 332-B, which was enacted during the pendency of the suit and that, if the issue was not referred to him before 7-11-1958, Section 332-B ceased to apply and it could not be referred to the Collector after that date. The view taken by the learned Judges was that whether the civil court had jurisdiction to decide the issue itself or not was governed by the law in force on the date of the decision of the suit and not the law in force on the date of its institute. Under the law in force on the date of institution of the suit an issue regarding sirdari rights raised before a civil court was not required by it to be referred to the Collector for his decision. While the suit was pending the Amendment Act of 1956 came into force and the jurisdiction to decide an issue regarding sirdari rights was transferred to revenue courts. The suit remained ending (in second appeal ) till 1962, in which year Section 332-B did not exist, and it was no longer necessary for the civil court to refer the issue to revenue court. The suit remained ending (in second appeal ) till 1962, in which year Section 332-B did not exist, and it was no longer necessary for the civil court to refer the issue to revenue court. The Amending Act of 1956 contained a saving clause (Sec. 23) to the effect that any amendment made by it would not effect the validity, effect or consequence of anything already done, or any right or liability already acquired or incurred, or any jurisdiction already exercised,and that any proceeding instituted or commenced before any court prior to the commencement of the Act would, notwithstanding any amendment made by it, continue to be heard and decided by such court. The amendment effected by the Act by inserting Section 332-B was undoubtedly procedural and took immediate effect and applied to the suit even though it had been instituted before it was passed. Consequently the issue regarding sirdari rights became referable to a revenue court under Section 332-B and there was nothing in Section 23 to take away this effect. The civil court had assumed jurisdiction only over the suit and could not be said to have assumed jurisdiction separately over the sirdari issue and it could not be argued that because it had assumed jurisdiction over the sirdari issue it was required by Section 23 to retain it. The second clause of Section 23 dealt with the continuation of the proceeding instituted before the Act was passed and simply laid down that it would continue to be decided by the court notwithstanding anything to the contrary in it. The form of the suit was not changed at all by the Act and the suit even under the Act was required to be heard and decided by the civil court ; consequently there did not arise any question of applying the second clause of Section 23 in that case. The suit could be said to be heard and decided by the civil court even though the issue regarding sirdari rights was remitted by it to a revenue court and it had to accept its decision on it. The suit could be said to be heard and decided by the civil court even though the issue regarding sirdari rights was remitted by it to a revenue court and it had to accept its decision on it. When a civil court or a revenue court refers an issue to a revenue court or a civil court respectively and decides the suit after accepting its decision thereon, it still decides the whole suit and it cannot be said that it and the civil court jointly decide it or that they decide it in parts. Consequently if the civil court remitted the issue regarding sirdari rights to the revenue court and then decided the suit on the basis of its decision thereon it was still a case of its continuing to hear and decide the suit. The object behind the second clause was that if the forum of a suit was changed by the amendment Act after its institution, the court in which it was instituted would retain the jurisdiction notwithstanding the change. No question of applying this rule arose in this case and, therefore, it was not really necessary for the learned Judges to decide whether the word "proceeding" includes a suit or not. However they held, on a consideration of the provisions of the amendment Act, that it does not include a suit. They observed at pages 1048 that the word "proceeding" used in Section 87(1) of the amendment Act of 1958 also does not include a suit. I have great doubts about the correctness of their view that the word "proceeding"is not wide enough to include a suit and means a proceeding other than a suit, but it is not necessary for me to suggest reconsideration of the view by a larger Bench because even if the word "proceeding" in Section 87(1) did not include suit, it only meant that the second clause of it was not applicable in the suit. The 1958 amendment Act being equally a procedural law took effect at once and applied to the suit even though it had commenced earlier. After he deletion of Section 332-B by it, it became no longer necessary for the civil court to refer the sirdari issue to a revenue court for its decision. The 1958 amendment Act being equally a procedural law took effect at once and applied to the suit even though it had commenced earlier. After he deletion of Section 332-B by it, it became no longer necessary for the civil court to refer the sirdari issue to a revenue court for its decision. If it had already referred it, the reference would have been saved by the first clause of Section 87(1) but since it had not referred it there was nothing to be saved by the first clause. It made no difference whether the second clause applied or not because it only provided for continuation of the jurisdiction of the court; if it applied the jurisdiction would continue and if it did not apply even then it would continue because it was not taken away by any provision of the 1958 amendment Act. Further, as I said earlier a suit can be said to be heard and decided by the court even though it decides it the basis of a finding given by another court. 5. Sanwal Singh v. Jwala 1962 A.L.J. 384 also was a decision of S.D. Singh, J. He set aside and order of a Munsif in a suit instituted on 18.7.1958 remitting after 7.11.1958 issues regarding sirdari rights to a revenue court. The decision of the learned Judge is in conformity with the view that I have expressed; on the date the Munsif referred the issues Section 332-B stood deleted and he had no jurisdiction to refer them and since the issue had not been referred prior to the deletion there was nothing to be saved by Section 87(1). By deleting Section 332-B the legislature neither conferred jurisdiction upon the civil court nor took away jurisdiction from the revenue court. The revenue court ceased to have jurisdiction since the date of the deletion but the deletion did not take away the jurisdiction already acquired by it. In order to deprive it of its jurisdiction already acquired there had to be an express provision to this effect but there was none in the amendment Act of 1958. The revenue court ceased to have jurisdiction since the date of the deletion but the deletion did not take away the jurisdiction already acquired by it. In order to deprive it of its jurisdiction already acquired there had to be an express provision to this effect but there was none in the amendment Act of 1958. Since however it did not acquire any jurisdiction as no issue had been referred to it there did not arise question of its being deprived of the jurisdiction already acquired and the only question that could possibly arise was whether it had jurisdiction after the deletion to decide the issue and it had to be answered in the negative. 6. Another case to which we were referred is Parsidhan Singh v. Gaya Prasad 1957 A.L.J. 628. A revenue court referred an issue regarding adhivasi rights to a civil court, while the civil court was considering the issue the 1954 amendment Ordinance (which later was substituted by an Act) came into force laying down that an issue regarding adhivasi rights did not raise a question of title and V.D. Bhargava, J. held that the civil court lost jurisdiction to decide the issue. The learned Judge did not have to consider the effect of any saving clause as was contained in the amendment Act of 1956 and the amendment Act of 1958 and he had to decide the question by applying Section 6 of the General Clause Act. He held that section did not apply because no question of right or privilege or obligation was involved in the amendment Ordinance of 1954. No such consideration arises in the instant case and the decision is of no assistance at all. 7. He held that section did not apply because no question of right or privilege or obligation was involved in the amendment Ordinance of 1954. No such consideration arises in the instant case and the decision is of no assistance at all. 7. The facts in Kunwas Bharat Singh v. Chandra Bhushan Singh 1963 R.D. 97, were that a suit instituted in the court of a Munsif and involving a dispute regarding sirdari rights was referred to arbitration under an arbitration agreement, the arbitrator made an award, then the 1956 amendment Act came into force, still the Munsif passed a decree on the basis of the award, an appeal was preferred from the decree and while it was pending the 1958 amendment Act came into force and this Court held that the Munsif after the 1956 amendment was bound to refer the issue regarding sirdari rights to a revenue court and could not be governed by the award and that the deletion of Section 332-B by the 1958 Amendment Act during the pendency of the appeal had no effect on the illegality committed by him. The arbitrator had acquired jurisdiction and the parties had acquired rights and liabilities under the awards made by him and section 23 of the 1956 Amendment Act saved the effect of the arbitrator's jurisdiction and the right and the liabilities acquired under his award. The Munsif, therefore, could decree the suit on the basis of the award notwithstanding the addition of Section 332-B by the amendment Act. The 1958 amendment Act came into force while the suit was still pending in appeal but it did not matter whether it was given effect to in the suit or not. If it was given effect to in the suit it only meant that the Munsif could have decided the issue and he had decided it (though on the basis of the award). If it was not given effect to what had been validity done remained valid. If it was given effect to in the suit it only meant that the Munsif could have decided the issue and he had decided it (though on the basis of the award). If it was not given effect to what had been validity done remained valid. What had been done was valid according to the Zamindari Abolition and Land Re-forms Act as it stood after the 1958 amendment and also valid according to the law as it existed after the 1956 amendment and was undoubtedly valid according to the law as it stood prior to the law as it stood prior to the 1956 amendment; therefore it was irrelevant to consider whether the amendment Acts applied or did not apply to the facts of the case. With great respect to our brother Manchanda I do not think that the civil court committed any error of law. The attention of the learned Judge does not seem to have been drawn to the provision of Section 23 of the 1956 amendment Act and Section 87(1) of the 1958 amendment Act; if he had considered them his decision would have been different . 8. The appeal should be dismissed with costs.