JUDGMENT D.S. Mathur, J. - This is an application u/s 561-A, Cr.P.C. by Shamshul Haq and two others for quashing the order dated 28.5.1963 of the civil court allowing the restoration application and setting aside the ex parte order passed on 19.3.1963. 2. The material facts of the case are that on a report form P.S. Kotwali, Moradabad, the City Magistrate took proceeding u/s 145, Cr.P.C. with regard to a piece of land situated in Mohalla Asalatupra Bhura within the city of Moradabad. As there was an apprehension of the breach of peace the plot of land was attached and the parties were directed to appear in Court and file their written statements in respect of their claim of actual possession and also to adduce evidence in accordance with the law. The present applicants and also Aziz Ahmad, opposite party no. 2, claimed to be in possession thereof and filed their written statements and evidence. The Magistrate found it difficult to arrive at a finding with regard to possession and made a reference to the civil court u/s 146, Cr.P.C. for determination of the question of possession. The Magistrate's order is dated 15.1.1963. 3. As would appear from the impugned order dated 28.5.1963, 18.3.1963 was fixed for the hearing of the reference. On that date the opposite party absented himself and the reference was decided ex parte on 19.3.1963. The civil court, namely, the Civil Judge of Moradabad, accepted the statement on oath of Shamshul Haq and as there was nothing to rebut his statement the reference was decided in favour of the applicants. 4. On 20.3.1963 Aziz Ahmad moved a restoration application on the ground that on 18.3.1963 he had an attack of dysentery and consequently could not appear in Court. The restoration application was opposed by the applicants though unsuccessfully. The civil court (Civil Judge) allowed the restoration application under order dated 28.5.1963. 5. The impugned order is challenged on the ground that it is without jurisdiction and amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court. 6. In the counter-affidavit the opposite-party has raised questions affecting his title and also his possession. These matters cannot be looked into in the present proceedings though it shall be open to him to lead all such evidence in a proper proceedings, if so advised. 6. In the counter-affidavit the opposite-party has raised questions affecting his title and also his possession. These matters cannot be looked into in the present proceedings though it shall be open to him to lead all such evidence in a proper proceedings, if so advised. It is, however, contended on his behalf that this Court should not set aside the impugned order for the reason that no injustice has been done to the applicants considering that the reference shall be decided again on merits. The other point urged is that the civil court deciding the reference had the inherent jurisdiction and in exercise to such jurisdiction could set aside an ex parte order. The third point raised is that the reference was originally decided without hearing the opposite party and such an order could not be permitted to remain on the record with the result that the impugned order was a reasonable one and be not set aside. None of these contentions have any force. 7. Sub-section (1D) of Section 146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure bars an appeal, review or revision against any finding of the civil court given on a reference under this Section, but not against any other passed by that court. Consequently, this Court can entertain a revision against the impugned order. The order can also be quashed the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction u/s 561-A, Cr.P.C. provided that this Court is satisfied that the order shall result in the abuse of the process of the Court of the exercise of inherent jurisdiction is necessary in the interest of justice. I have made this observation simply to indicate that an illegal order can be set aside by the High Court in exercise of one jurisdiction or the other. 8. Whether an injustice has been done to a party or the passing of an order is necessary in the ends of justice, shall, depend upon the law and facts of the case, for example, if the subordinate court sets aside an order which has become final and has conferred a right in the party, an injustice is done to that party and the High Court can exercise inherent jurisdiction u/s 561-A to restore the conditions which should remain under the law in force. Where no restoration application is maintainable and even then the restoration application is allowed, that would be an abuse of the process of Court and that will be another ground for the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction. In any case, this Court can exercise the revisional jurisdiction to set aside an illegal order. 9. The points for consideration, therefore, are whether the restoration application was maintainable, and if not, if this Court would have set aside the original order if moved by opposite-party no. 2 in exercise of its inherent or revisional jurisdiction. If the original order would have been set aside by this Court, it can refuse to interfere with the impugned order on the ground that in the interest of justice it would be necessary to set aside not only the impugned order but also the earlier order and in effect the impugned order shall come into force. 10. In the Code of Criminal Procedure there is no provision for setting aside an ex parte order passed in an appeal, revision or other proceeding. Consequently, every order though passed ex parte must be passed on merits, and, in the eye of law, an ex parte order is at par with an order passed on merits, the only difference being that in case of contest there is that evidence of both the parties and where only one party puts in appearance and adduced evidence, there may be one-sided evidence on record. In the instant case, evidence had been adduced before the Magistrate and that evidence could be taken into consideration. Consequently, an ex parte order passed on a reference u/s 146, Cr.P.C. is not ex parte in the sense that one party had not at all adduced his evidence. In other words, no restoration application was maintainable. 11. Even the subordinate courts have the inherent jurisdiction to pass certain orders, but they cannot set aside or materially modify a final order passed by them. It is, however, a settled law that inherent jurisdiction cannot be exercised against the provisions of the law. If the Law prohibits the modification of an order, the order cannot be modified in exercise of the inherent jurisdiction. It is, however, a settled law that inherent jurisdiction cannot be exercised against the provisions of the law. If the Law prohibits the modification of an order, the order cannot be modified in exercise of the inherent jurisdiction. It is a different thing that where there is violation of the principles of natural justice on account of a mistake on the part of the office of the Court, the Court may set aside the order wrongly obtained on the ground that, in the eye of law, no legal order had been passed. 12. A reference has already been made to sub-Section (1D) of Section 146, Cr.P.C. It clearly provided that no appeal shall lie from any finding of the Civil Court given on a reference under this section, nor shall any review or revision of such finding be allowed. Appeal or revision lies before a higher court while the order is reviewed by the same Court. Whenever a restoration application is allowed and a fresh order passed on the reference, there is, in substance, a review of the earlier order. Of course, the order is not reviewed where the same order is passed all over again. No one shall like to move a restoration application simply to bring on record the order sought to be set aside with the additional words that order was being passed on merits after giving a hearing. In other words, an order passed by the civil court u/s 146 Cr.P.C. cannot be set aside or modified by that Court and, in such circumstances, no restoration application shall be maintainable, nor can a so called ex parte order be set aside in exercise of the inherent jurisdiction. Further the order of the civil court could be questioned before a higher court in appeal or revision and hence could not be set aside at the instance of opposite party no. 2. 13. Section 146, Cr.P.C. does make a provision for adducing evidence, but it does not mean that if a party does not put in appearance, no final order can be passed. 14. In the end, it may also be observed that Aziz Ahmad, opposite-party, cannot escape responsibility for the passing of the order on 19.3.1963. He was residing in the city of Moradabad and even if he was ill, he could apply to the court for adjournment on the ground of illness. 14. In the end, it may also be observed that Aziz Ahmad, opposite-party, cannot escape responsibility for the passing of the order on 19.3.1963. He was residing in the city of Moradabad and even if he was ill, he could apply to the court for adjournment on the ground of illness. The adjournment application would be made on 18.3.1963, in any case, on 19.3.1963 before the final order was passed on the reference. When Aziz Ahmad did not move an application on the 18th, nor on the 19th, he shall be held to have been grossly negligent in the prosecution of the proceeding and such a negligent party cannot deserve any leniency though it shall be open to him to seek remedy before a competent Court as permissible under the law. 15. To sum up, the order passed by the civil court on 19.3.1963, on the reference made to it u/s 146, Cr.P.C. and become final and could not be revived by that Court. In the circumstances, that order could not be set aside even on the ground that on account of illness Aziz Ahmad could not put in appearance on the date of hearing. This Court must, therefore, pass an order to make the order dated 19.3.1963 of the civil court enforceable in other words, to set aside the impugned order dated 28.5.1963 and at the same time to direct that the restoration application being not maintainable shall stand rejected. This order shall be deemed to have been passed in exercise of the inherent jurisdiction or in any case, in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction. 16. The application is hereby allowed and the impugned order dated 28.5.1963 of the civil court is set aside. The restoration application shall be deemed to have been dismissed.