JUDGMENT R.S. Pathak, J. - This is a revision application against an order of the learned District Judge, Jhansi dismissing an application under Section 7 of the Provincial Insolvency Act. 2. The applicant, as Karta of a joint Hindu family carrying on business under the name of M/s Mithoo Lal Tek Chand presented a petition before the Insolvency Judge, Orai praying that the respondents be adjudged insolvents. It was alleged that the respondents had taken loans from the applicant from time to time, that they had sold their goods through the commission agency of the applicant and that they had also entered into partnership with the applicant to carry on business in hemp. It was asserted that the commission agency account between the parties was "mutual, open and current," and that a sum of Rs. 19,206-13-3 besides interest was the "ascertained sum" payable by the respondents to the applicant in this account, and it was also claimed that a sum of Rs. 62,546/1/3 was due to the applicant in the partnership account as representing the balance of capital due. It was alleged that the respondents had committed an act of insolvency and were, therefore, liable to be adjudged insolvents. 3. The petition was opposed by the respondents on a number of grounds, among them being that no liquidated sum was payable to the applicant and, therefore, the petition was not maintainable. 4. The Insolvency Court framed a preliminary issue on the question whether the petition was maintainable. It appears that before the Insolvency Court the applicant supported the maintainability of the petition on the ground that the debt was a liquidated sum exceeding one thousand rupees and that it was a liquidated sum. The Insolvency Court held that the amount claimed by the applicant as due on account of the commission agency was an ascertained sum even though the commission agency account had not been finally settled, and as that was in excess of one thousand rupees the petition was maintainable. Against this finding the respondents preferred an appeal before the learned District Judge. He held that neither the amount claimed upon the commission agency account nor upon the partnership account could be said to be liquidated and, therefore, the petition was not maintainable. The present revision petition is directed against this order. 5. Two points have been urged before us. Against this finding the respondents preferred an appeal before the learned District Judge. He held that neither the amount claimed upon the commission agency account nor upon the partnership account could be said to be liquidated and, therefore, the petition was not maintainable. The present revision petition is directed against this order. 5. Two points have been urged before us. It is contended that the appeal before the learned District Judge was not maintainable because an appeal will lie only if it is preferred against "a decision come to or an order made" in the exercise of insolvency jurisdiction as provided in Section 75(1) of the Provincial Insolvency Act and that as the finding that the application was maintainable was "neither a decision nor an order" no appeal would lie. In support of this contention learned counsel relies upon a number of decisions laying down that a finding upon an issue was not open to revision under Section 115, C.P.C. and urges that the same principle should apply to the interpretation of Section 75(1). We do not find it possible to accept this contention. The decisions cited by learned counsel turn upon the meaning of the words "case decided" in Section 115 of the Code and are not relevant for the purpose of determining the scope of Section 75(1). Learned counsel then urges that the words "decision come to or an order made" refer to a determination which finally disposes of the rights of the parties. After careful consideration, we have come to the opinion that this contention also cannot be accepted. 6. It is possible that the words "an order made" may be construed as referring to a final order and there appears to be authority in support of the applicant to this end. But "a decision come to" in the exercise of insolvency jurisdiction includes, in our view, a finding upon an issue material to the determination of the entire case. 7. The right of appeal from the determination of an insolvency court is conferred by Section 75(1) in language of the widest amplitude and there is nothing in that provision to curtail the right to one of an appeal against a final decision only. A "decision" is defined in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary (3rd Edn. 743) as "a popular, and not a technical word, and means little more than a concluded opinion. A "decision" is defined in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary (3rd Edn. 743) as "a popular, and not a technical word, and means little more than a concluded opinion. It does not, by itself, amount to judgment or order." 8. That appears to be plain meaning of the word, and there appears to be nothing to suggest that it is any thing more. Insolvency jurisdiction is a creature of the statute, and Section 4(1) expressly empowers the Insolvency Court to decide all questions of any nature whatsoever. This includes the power to decide whether it has jurisdiction in a particular case. Moreover, the provisions of Section 75(1) make a distinction between a decision and an order made by the Insolvency Court. That would seem to suggest that not merely an order but a decision, which does not contain any direction or require compliance, is also contemplated within the meaning of Section 75(1). Such a decision would include a decision upon an issue. Moreover Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure speaks of a suit which has been finally decided, and it must be supposed that the legislature was aware of the use of this expression. Section 75(1) does not speak of "final decision" but merely of a "decision." Having regard to all these considerations, we are not impressed by the contention that an appeal against the decision of an Insolvency Court under Section 75(1) must be an appeal against a final determination of the proceeding pending before it. 9. What is a "decision" within the meaning of Section 75(1) has been considered in Wamanrao Deorao v. Shrikumar Jai Kumar, A.I.R. 1946 Nag. 42 where the Nagpur High Court expressed the view that a determination of the issue whether the Insolvency Court had jurisdiction to set aside a transfer of property was such "decision." This case has been noticed with approval in Sri Jagat Dhis v. Gurcharan Singh, A.I.R. 1952 Pun. 49. Learned counsel for the applicant places considerable reliance upon a decision of this Court in Wali Mohammad v. Higan Lal, A.I.R. 1936 All. 49. Learned counsel for the applicant places considerable reliance upon a decision of this Court in Wali Mohammad v. Higan Lal, A.I.R. 1936 All. 80 : 1936 A.L.J. 9 where it was stated that the word "decision" must be considered as having "an element of finality so far as a particular court is concerned and an interlocutory order of a Court cannot be said to be a decision of that Court." That however, was a case where a substitution application filed during the pendency of an appeal before the learned District Judge had been disposed of and against that order a second appeal was filed under the second proviso to Section 75(1). The words "decision of the district court" occurring in that proviso, could, we think in the context which they appear, only mean the order finally disposing of the appeal. The Court was not concerned with the meaning of the word "decision" with reference to an Insolvency Court. 10. Learned counsel for the applicant also relies upon Balmukand v. Kalyan Das, A.I.R. 1946 Nag. 42 but in that case Bhide, J. merely held that an appeal would not lie against an interlocutory order of the District Judge refusing to stay the insolvency proceedings pending before him. Such an order, it cannot be doubted, is materially different from a finding on the issue whether an insolvency petition is maintainable. The order before Bhide, J. was an order passed within the discretion of the learned District Judge and of a nature which it is difficult to conceive could have been intended by the legislature to be the subject of an appeal. Reference was also made to Vellavappa v. Official Assignees, A.I.R. 1934 Rang. 525 where the Rangoon High Court held that there was no right of appeal against a finding in regard to jurisdiction only, but that decision proceeded upon the provisions of Section 8 of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act which are wholly different from those of Section 75(1) of the Provincial Insolvency Act. 11. The decision in K. Lakshmappa v. Talasain Venkatha Reddi, A.I.R. 1942 Mad. 305 is also distinguishable. The point considered in that case was whether a finding on the question of jurisdiction was appealable under Section 75(3) of the Provincial Insolvency Act as an order made by a district court. 12. 11. The decision in K. Lakshmappa v. Talasain Venkatha Reddi, A.I.R. 1942 Mad. 305 is also distinguishable. The point considered in that case was whether a finding on the question of jurisdiction was appealable under Section 75(3) of the Provincial Insolvency Act as an order made by a district court. 12. In the view that we are taking, an appeal lay against the finding of the Insolvency Court the petition was maintainable, and the first contention of the applicant must, therefore, fail. 13. Learned counsel next contends that the view taken by the learned District Judge that the petition did not contain a claim in respect of a liquidated debt is erroneous. He urges that the claim in respect of the commission agency transactions was for a specific and ascertained sum. This contention, to our mind, is equally without force the jurisdiction of the Insolvency Court to entertain the petition for insolvency must be determined primarily by reference to the allegations contained in the insolvency petition and from paragraph 5 of the petition it clearly appears that the commission agency account was alleged to have been "mutual, open and current." It is well accepted that a sum can be said to be a liquidated sum only if it is an ascertained sum or one that can be immediately computed with certainty. Where there is a mutual, open and current account it is not possible to say that a liquidated sum is owed by one party to the other. What is a mutual, open and current amount was considered by this Court in Puttu Lal v. Babu Jagannath, A.I.R. 1935 All. 53 : 1935 A.L.J. 33 and reliance was placed upon the following passage from Ram Prasad v. Harbans Singh, (1907) C.L.J. 158. "Now it is well settled that an open account is one which is continuous or current, uninterrupted or unclosed by settlement or otherwise consisting of a series of transactions. An account current is an open or running account between two or more parties or an account which contains items between the parties from which the balance due to one of them is, or can be, ascertained from which it follows that such an account comes under the term of an open account, in so far as it is running, unsettled or unclosed. Mutual accounts are such as consist of reciprocity of dealings between the parties and do not embrace those having items on one side only, though made up of debits and credits." The point was also considered in The Tea Financing Syndicate v. Chandra Kamal, A.I.R. 1931 Cal. 359 where Pankin, C. J. observed: "that an account was open when the balance was not struck or though struck, was not accepted or acknowledged to be correct by the parties concerned." The nature of mutual, open and current account was briefly summarised Kalipada v. Sree Bank Ltd, A.I.R. 1960 Cal. 285 in the following words". "It is well settled today by a series of authorities that the main feature of such an account is that the transaction must be both on the debit and credit sides creating independent obligations. No dogmatic test can be uniformly or invariably applied. This much, however, is settled that payment shown on one side should not merely be offset by entries of repayment of a debt due to the other side, but payment in the course of independent transaction. A mutual accountability between the parties is a test based on the existence of reciprocity of demands. While the balance may be a shifting balance it is now held that even the absence of a shifting balance is not conclusive on the question. The essence of a mutual, open and current account is that there must be independent dealings between the parties that which can be duly offset against each other." Therefore, having regard to the case set up by the applicant in their petition that the commission agency account was a mutual, open and current account, it cannot be said that any ascertained or liquidated sum was due upon the commission agency account. In Elower v. Herbert, (1862) 28 E.R. 210 it was observed that a claim on an account is not a claim on a liquidated sum. The point was also considered in Mahadeo Prasad v. Sheo Dass, A.I.R. 1955 All. 352 : 1955 A.L.J. 52 where it was held that an amount which may be found due on accounting cannot be said to be a liquidated sum. 14. No attempt has been made to establish that the amount due upon the partnership account was an ascertained or liquidated debt. 15. 352 : 1955 A.L.J. 52 where it was held that an amount which may be found due on accounting cannot be said to be a liquidated sum. 14. No attempt has been made to establish that the amount due upon the partnership account was an ascertained or liquidated debt. 15. In the circumstances, the conclusion of the learned District Judge that the petition did not make out the existence of a liquidated debt must be sustained. 16. We are, therefore, of the view that this revision application cannot succeed. It is, accordingly, dismissed with costs.