JUDGMENT Satish Chandra, J. - This is an appeal by Defendant No. 1 and arises out of a suit for demolition and injunction. The land in dispute belongs to the defendants. On the western and eastern sides of the land in dispute are situate the houses of the plaintiffs. On the north and south of the land run public pathways. The main doors of this plaintiffs' houses open on these public pathways. The plaintiff have side doors opening on the land in suit. The plaintiffs alleged that they have acquired a prescriptive right of way over the land in suit and that the defendant have started making construction on this land and have obstructed the right of way. They claim demolition of the constructions and an injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the `plaintiffs' right of way on the land in suit. 2. The defence was that the plaintiffs had not acquired any right of way as their side doors were opened about 10 years prior to the suit; and that the plaintiffs had their egress and ingress over the public pathways through their main doors opening thereon. 3. Both the court below have held that the plaintiffs have perfected a prescriptive right of passage over the land in dispute; that the defendant No. 1 has, in fact, completely closed one door of the house of plaintiff No. 2; that though the defendants have left a passage 3 feet wide for the egress and ingress from the side doors of the plaintiffs' houses, that was in-sufficient. The plaintiffs have a general right of way including a right to carry funeral and marriage processions over the land in dispute, and, as such, a way 12 feet wide ought to have been left. On these findings, the suit has been decreed for demolition of construction so as to leave a 12 feet wide passage by the side of the plaintiff's houses. 4. Aggrieved the defendant No. 1 has come to this Court in second appeal. Defendant No. 2 has acquiesced in the decree and has not appealed. 5. On these findings, the suit has been decreed for demolition of construction so as to leave a 12 feet wide passage by the side of the plaintiff's houses. 4. Aggrieved the defendant No. 1 has come to this Court in second appeal. Defendant No. 2 has acquiesced in the decree and has not appealed. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant submits that the plaintiffs have only proved a right of passing and repassing over the land in suit, and for such a purpose, a passage 3 feet wide was sufficient, and the courts below erred in holding that the right of passage established by evidence included a right to carry funeral or marriage processions over the land in suit. Learned counsel for the respondents contends that a right of way generally includes not merely a right of passing and repassing on foot but also a right to carry funeral or marriage processions. 6. The evidence adduced by the plaintiffs is uniformly to the effect that the plaintiffs use to pass and repass over the disputed land. There is no positive evidence to the effect that the land in suit was ever used for carrying any vehicular traffic or funeral, or marriage processions. In the plaint, a right of passage was alone pleaded. There was no indication that any other special kind of way was intended to be established. The courts below have relied upon a stray sentence in the oral testimony of plaintiff no. 1 Khacheru and (P.W. 2) that now arthis cannot be taken out through these doors, in cross-examination, admitted that "arthis" could be taken out through the main doors of the plaintiffs' houses. 7. The courts below have held that a right of way normally would include not merely a right to pass and repass on foot but also to carry funeral and marriage processions. In this view of the law, they have placed on the respondents the burden of proving that the right of way was not of that character but was confined only to a right of passing and repassing on foot on the defendants' land. They have found that the defendants have not established that the right of way was so confined, and, as such, they have held that the plaintiffs have established a right to carry funeral and marriage processions over the land in suit. 8. They have found that the defendants have not established that the right of way was so confined, and, as such, they have held that the plaintiffs have established a right to carry funeral and marriage processions over the land in suit. 8. The vital question to be determined is whether there is a presumption in law that a right of way includes a right to carry funeral or marriage processions. 9. The plaintiffs, in this case, are claiming an easement by prescription under Section 15 of the Indian Easement Act. Section 15 of the Indian Easement Act. Section 28 of that Act defines the extent of easements. The relevant portions of that section run as follows:- "An easement of necessity is co-extensive with the necessity as it existed when the easement was imposed. The extent of any other easement and the mode of its enjoyment must be fixed with reference to the probable intention of the parties, and the purpose for which the right was imposed or acquired. In the absence of evidence as to such intention and purpose...... (a) right of way of any one kind does not include a right of way of any other kind." 10. Prima facie, the extent of an easement depends on the intention and the purpose for which the right was acquired. In the first instance, therefore, it has to be established as to how the easement was being enjoyed during the prescriptive period, as also the purpose for which it was being acquired. The person who claims an easement, has to establish these things. The section further says if there is no evidence to establish the intention and the purpose, the right of way of one kind will not include a right of any other kind. This presupposes that there are rights of way of different kinds. The statute does not mention any positive division of the rights of way into distinct classes. Rights of way are susceptible of infinite variety. Easements are restrictions on the property rights of the owners of servant tenements. They impose a burden or inconvenience on the servant tenement. The quantum of inconvenience caused could form a basis of classification. Rights of way which impose a similar amount of inconvenience, can be treated as being of the same kind. Easements are restrictions on the property rights of the owners of servant tenements. They impose a burden or inconvenience on the servant tenement. The quantum of inconvenience caused could form a basis of classification. Rights of way which impose a similar amount of inconvenience, can be treated as being of the same kind. Thus a right of way to pass on foot will need a space of say about three feet to by conveniently enjoyed whereas a right of way to carry cattle or vehicular traffic would need a much broader space. These right of way are hence of altogether different kinds. Whether the right in a particular case is of one kind or another would depend on the actual extent of user proved. 11. Similarly, rights of way may be limited as to the purpose for which they may be exercised. Thus there may be a way for agricultural purpose only (Reignolds v. Edwards, (1741) Willes 282) or for the carriage of coals only (Iveson v. Moore (1700) 1 Ld. Raym, 486) or for the carriage of article except coal (Stafford v. Coyney (1827) 7B & C. 257). Civil Law (Roman) as cited by Lord Coke (4) mentions three kinds of ways; first is a footway which is called iter; the second is a horse way which is called actus and the third is via that is a cart way. In Civil Law (5) the superior class of easement comprehends the inferior, that is, proof of a cart-way would include the other two kinds, and the proofs of a horse way would include a horse way and a foot way. In English Law, a similar rule obtains, but not to the same extent. By the law of England, proof of a superior class raises a rebuttable presumption that it includes proof of an easement of an equal of inferior degree (Ballard v. Dyson (1808) 1 Taunt 279). This is on the principle that proof of one right of way is `evidence' of the whole class to which it belongs and that the inferior right is naturally comprised in the more extensive right. (4)(Code on Litt. 56) (5)(Gale on Easements 12th Edition, page 312) 12. But even in Civil Law or the Law of England, there is no presumption for the reverse proposition. (4)(Code on Litt. 56) (5)(Gale on Easements 12th Edition, page 312) 12. But even in Civil Law or the Law of England, there is no presumption for the reverse proposition. Proof of a right of an inferior class would not be an evidence of a right of a superior class. Halsburys Laws of England explains the position thus:- "When a private right of way is claimed by prescription.... the only mode of measuring the nature and extent of the right of having regard to the mode of enjoyment, and the way is therefore definite and limited by the evidence of user. If a way has been used for several purposes, there may be a ground for inferring that there is a right of way for all purposes; but evidence of user for one purpose, or for particular purposes only, will not give rise to such an inference." (7) (7)(Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edition, Volume XII, Para 1250 at page 576)." 13. The law, therefore, does not countenance the position that an allegation that a person has a right of way, will give rise to a presumption that he has right of way unlimited in character or extent (Bahsir Ahmed v. Chandulal (A.I.R. 1947 All. 86) : 1946 A.L.J. 365). The nature of the right acquired will in each case depend on the evidence of the accustomed user. The burden is on the claimant to allege and furnish evidence of the specific right which he claims. 14. In the instant case, the plaintiffs claimed a right of carrying funeral and marriage processions on the land in suit. They had to allege such a right and prove by evidence that they had been, during the prescriptive period, using the land for these purposes and with such an intention. 15. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs-respondents has relied upon two cases (9 and 10). In the first case, question of a public right of way over a thoroughfare was involved. The law in respect of thoroughfares is different. Same principle cannot be applied to private pathways. It was alleged and proved that the thoroughfare had been used for carrying marriage and other processions. It was held that a general right of thoroughfare included a right of way for marriage or other processions of the like nature. The case, therefore, is distinguishable on facts. The second case merely follows the first. It was alleged and proved that the thoroughfare had been used for carrying marriage and other processions. It was held that a general right of thoroughfare included a right of way for marriage or other processions of the like nature. The case, therefore, is distinguishable on facts. The second case merely follows the first. In this case also, the special right to worry marriage and funeral processions was specifically pleaded and proved. Moreover, these cases were decided before the Indian Easements Act came on the statute book in 1882 and cannot be considered to be good authorities under this Act, for the proposition that a right of way included a right to carry marriage and funeral processions. 16. In Murli Prasad Gupta v. Sheo Kishore Narain, A.I.R. 1950 Pat. 432, the Patna High Court held that if a person uses a plot of parti land as a short cut for going from one road to another, the only right which he can claim to have acquired, is to pass on foot and he can claim no higher right; and that a three feet wide passage is sufficient for such a right. The courts below, therefore, were not right in holding that a claim of a right of way generally included a right to carry marriage and funeral processions and that the plaintiffs need not have specifically alleged in the plaint that they used to passage for taking funeral and marriage processions. In my opinion, the plaintiffs ought to have alleged and proved this fact. If the plaintiffs had established a prima facie case, then alone the defendants could be asked to rebut it. The courts below approached the evidence from an erroneous legal view point. Their conclusions cannot be accepted. The evidence has been placed before me. The plaintiffs only proved a user of passing and repassing. The main gates of the plaintiff's houses open on public roads. It is admitted that funeral or marriage processions can be taken through the main doors. In view of the facts and circumstances, the plaintiffs have failed to establish a right of way to carry funeral or marriage procession through the side doors of their houses. They have established only a right of way to pass on foot. The defendants have left a three feet wide passage for this purpose. This is sufficient. 17. In view of the facts and circumstances, the plaintiffs have failed to establish a right of way to carry funeral or marriage procession through the side doors of their houses. They have established only a right of way to pass on foot. The defendants have left a three feet wide passage for this purpose. This is sufficient. 17. It has been found that one of the two side doors in the house of plaintiff No. 2 has been completely closed by the constructions made by the first defendant. The wall of the defendants house has been built close to one of the doors and has been completely barred. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs urges that they are entered to a way of at least three feet wide in front of this door. The plaintiff No. 2 has two doors on this side. They are close to each other. There is no evidence that by reason for the closure of one door the plaintiffs would suffer material discomfort or any special damage or that the other door will not suffice for egress and ingress, from this side of the plaintiffs' house. The defendants have built their house. Granting relief to the plaintiff's would mean demolition of a part of the defendants' house. Injunction can be granted only is special damage is proved, vide Sections 33 and 35 of the Indian Easement Act. The facts and circumstances of this case do not warrant a decree for demolition on this account. 18. In the result, the plaintiffs have a right of way 3 feet wide which is already there; the appeal of defendant No. 1 is allowed, the decree is modified and the suit is dismissed as against him with costs.