JUDGMENT K.K. Mathew, J. 1. The plaintiff is the appellant. The suit was for recovery of 22 bags of country cotton seized by the 2nd defendant. The 2nd defendant is a Police Head Constable and the 3rd defendant a Forester in the service of the 1st defendant, the State. According to the plaintiff he purchased 22 bags of country cotton from one Kuppan Chettiyar and when he was transporting the same on 11-3-1955 they were seized at Mayannur by the 2nd defendant on the ground that the transport of cotton without permit or pass was illegal. The cotton was removed to the Police Station at Pazhayannur on 12-3-1955, and three days after, it was handed over to the 3rd defendant. The plaintiff thereafter applied to the Divisional Forest Officer on 26-4-1955 for the return of the cotton seized. As his request was not complied with, he has issued a notice to the 1st defendant and has instituted the suit claiming delivery of the specific movables viz., the 22 bags of cotton which were seized from him or in the alternative for recovery of Rs. 462/- towards their value with interest at 6% and for recovery of Rs. 300/- as damages and for the costs of this suit and other incidental reliefs. 2. The 1st defendant State contended that it had no vicarious liability for the tortious act of any of its agents in the performance of their statutory functions, that the plaintiff, in transporting the country cotton without a pass was committing an offence under the Forest Act, that the seizure of cotton was legal, that a Criminal case C. C. No. 1939/1955 of the Second Class Magistrate's Court, Talappilly was filed against the plaintiff, that the defendants 2 and 3 acted with bona fides in seizing the cotton in the exercise of their statutory duties and prayed for the dismissal of the suit. The 2nd defendant contended that he had demanded the plaintiff to show the pass for transporting the cotton as required by the Forest Act, that the plaintiff did not produce or show the pass as required and therefore he in the discharge of his duty, was justified in seizing the article. The 2nd defendant contended that he had demanded the plaintiff to show the pass for transporting the cotton as required by the Forest Act, that the plaintiff did not produce or show the pass as required and therefore he in the discharge of his duty, was justified in seizing the article. The 3rd defendant contended that the suit having been filed without notice to him, was not maintainable, that he acted only in the discharge of his official duties and as such he was not liable for any of the reliefs claimed by the plaintiff. 3. The court below found that country cotton was a forest produce, that the transportation of the same without a permit or pass was an offence and therefore it was liable to be seized by the authorities, that the plaintiff had no cause of action against the defendants and that the plaintiff could be given no remedy. It therefore dismissed the suit, and this appeal is against that decree. 4. Counsel for the appellant did not contest the correctness of the finding of the court below that country cotton is a forest produce although in the court below there was some controversy on the question whether country cotton is a forest produce or not. So I proceed on the assumption that the country cotton seized in this case was a forest produce. Then the only question is whether the transportation of such cotton without a pass or permit would constitute an offence under the Travancore - Cochin Forest Act, (Act III of 1952) hereinafter called the Act. S.101(3) says that notwithstanding the repeal of the Travancore and the Cochin Forest Acts the rules framed under those Acts will continue to be in force in so far as those rules are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act. If the Rules are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act there is no point in the contention of counsel for the appellant that under the Act there was no power in the Government to make rules for regulating the transit of forest produce. It is clear from S.19 of the Cochin Act, as it originally stood, that it did not authorise the Government to make rules for regulating the transit of forest produce. It is clear from S.19 of the Cochin Act, as it originally stood, that it did not authorise the Government to make rules for regulating the transit of forest produce. By a subsequent amendment of that section the ambit of the rule making power was enlarged to embrace the regulation of forest produce also. And according to the rules framed on 26-11-1107 under the amended S.19 of the Cochin Forest Act, transport of forest produce required a pass and the violation of the rules was made an offence. Those rules were published in the Cochin Gazette dated 26-11-1107 (see Part I, pages 431 and 432). It was argued that S.19 of the Cochin Act empowered the Diwan to make rules in respect of forest produce also whereas S.38 of the Act did not give the power to frame rules in respect of forest produce, and therefore the rules under the Cochin Act regarding the transport of forest produce are inconsistent with S.38 conferring power to make rules only in respect of transit of timber. It is true that S.19 of the Cochin Act provided for regulation of the transport of forest produce also. But the rules framed under S.19 of the Cochin Act regarding the transport of forest produce are not in any way inconsistent with any of the provisions in the Act. The real question, as I understand it is whether the relevant rule is inconsistent with the provisions of the Act. The rule that there shall be no transportation of forest produce without a Pass is in no way inconsistent with the provisions of the Act. Even otherwise I think S.38 gave power to the Government to make rules for transit of forest produce also. The heading of the chapter where under S.38 occurs is 'the control of timber and other forest products in transit'. No doubt S.38 provides only for making rules for the transit of timber alone, S.38 is as follows : "38. The Government may make (rules to regulate the transit of all timber or of certain classes of timber within local limits as may appear to be necessary. Such rules may (among other matters) ...................." In clause (1) of that section there was a provision which shows that the Government may make rules to safeguard the revenue from the forest. The Government may make (rules to regulate the transit of all timber or of certain classes of timber within local limits as may appear to be necessary. Such rules may (among other matters) ...................." In clause (1) of that section there was a provision which shows that the Government may make rules to safeguard the revenue from the forest. Counsel for the appellant contended that that clause must be construed ejusdem generis and if so construed it would not take in a power to make rules to regulate the transit of forest produce. I am unable to come to that conclusion. In my opinion S.38 authorised the Government to make rules for regulating the transit of the forest produce also. 5. S.40 makes it clear that the Legislature intended to confer upon the Government the power to make rules for regulating the, transit of forest produce also. S.40 provided that the holder of every pass issued under the Rules framed under S.38 shall, while such timber or forest produce is in transit, be bound to produce the same for inspection on being required to do so by any Magistrate or Forest or Police Officer. The section therefore contemplated the framing of rules under S.38 for regulating the transit of forest produce as well. In these circumstances I come to the conclusion that the relevant rule requiring a pass for transportation of forest produce framed under the Cochin Act is not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act. 6. If that be so the only question is whether the plaintiff has committed an offence. There can be no dispute on that. It is therefore clear that the 2nd defendant was justified in seizing the cotton from the possession of the plaintiff on his failure to show the pass. As already indicated a case was filed against the plaintiff before the Magistrate, but the Magistrate acquitted him on some ground which is not known as the judgment of the Magistrate has not been produced in this case. On the acquittal of the accused the Magistrate has to pass some order as regards the disposal of cotton produced before him. I think the defendants are not liable for the plaint claim. On the acquittal of the accused the Magistrate has to pass some order as regards the disposal of cotton produced before him. I think the defendants are not liable for the plaint claim. The 1st defendant cannot in any view be made liable for tortuous acts committed by the 2nd defendant or the 3rd defendant in carrying out their duties connected with the sovereign function of the State. 7. In the result, the appeal fails and it is dismissed with costs.