JUDGMENT M.S. Menon, C.J. 1. These two appeals were heard together and a common judgment will suffice. Writ appeal No. 129 of 1963 is from the decision in O. P. No. 1191 of 1962 and writ appeal No. 130 of 1963 is from the decision in O. P. No. 1206 of 1962. The appellants are the same in both the appeals; they were respondents 3 to 5 in both the Original Petitions. 2. The petitioner in O. P. No. 1191 of 1962 -- the Bharat Plywood and Timber Products (Private) Limited -- and the petitioner in O. P. No. 1206 of 1962 -- Puthiyamadathumel Peringadi Cheria Mammoo -- applied to the Collector of Kozhikode for permission to cut trees under S.3(2) of the Madras Preservation of Private Forests Act, 1949, which provides that "no owner of any forest and no person claiming under him, whether by virtue of a contract, licence or any other transaction entered into before or after the commencement of the Madras Preservation of Private Forests Act, 1946, or any other person shall, without the previous permission of the District Collector, cut trees or do any act likely to denude the forest or diminish its utility as a forest". 3. By Ext. P4 dated 31-7-1959 the Collector rejected the applications. The petitioners then took up the matter in appeal under S.4 of the Act and the Government after considering the questions raised before them remanded the cases to the Collector for a fresh investigation and disposal by Ext. P5 dated 21-4-1960. They said : "In the circumstances, Government consider that both the cases may be referred back to the Collector for more detailed enquiry and they order accordingly. The Collector will inspect the area locally along with representatives of both the parties, arrive at a proper identification of the Kadanthara river with reference to the Survey of India map and the other maps prepared in this case, and decide the issue". 4. After the remand by the Government some investigations were conducted by the Collector, not directly but through the Assistant Collector, and Ext. P9 dated 7-4-1962 is the order passed by him. In that order also the Collector came to the conclusion that the permission sought by the petitioners cannot be granted. 5. The petitioners then moved this Court under Art.226 of the Constitution. P9 dated 7-4-1962 is the order passed by him. In that order also the Collector came to the conclusion that the permission sought by the petitioners cannot be granted. 5. The petitioners then moved this Court under Art.226 of the Constitution. The judgment under appeal -- a common judgment for both the Original Petitions mentioned in paragraph 1 above -- set aside Ext. P9 and directed the Collector to consider the applications afresh in the light of the observations made in that judgment. 6. S.4 of the Madras Preservation of Private Forests Act, 1949, provides that any person aggrieved by an order under sub-s.(2) of S.3 of that Act in regard to the permission referred to in that sub-section may, within two months of the receipt of such order, prefer an appeal in writing to the State Government and the State Government shall pass such orders on the appeal as they may think fit. There can be no doubt that if the petitioners felt themselves aggrieved by Ext. P9, their proper remedy was to appeal to the State Government under section 4 as they did when they felt themselves aggrieved by Ext. P4, the earlier order of the Collector rejecting their applications. Instead of doing so, they approached this Court under Art.226 of the Constitution. This procedure was unwarranted and should not be countenanced. 7. S.4 of the Madras Preservation of Private Forests Act, 1949, provides an adequate and effective remedy. That remedy is in no way more costly or in any way less efficacious or speedy than an application under Art.226 of the Constitution. As stated by the Supreme Court in Union of India v. T. R. Varma (AIR 1957 Supreme Court 882): "It is well settled that when an alternative and equally efficacious remedy is open to a litigant, he should be required to pursue that remedy and not invoke the special jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a prerogative writ," 8. This is not because the existence of another remedy affects the jurisdiction of the High Court; it is because the existence of an alternative remdey that is adequate is of paramount importance in the issuance of a writ that is discretionary. The normal rule in such cases -- the "sound exercise of discretion", in the words of the Supreme Court in the decision above mentioned is to refuse an interference under Art.226 of the Constitution. The normal rule in such cases -- the "sound exercise of discretion", in the words of the Supreme Court in the decision above mentioned is to refuse an interference under Art.226 of the Constitution. 9. We find nothing in the facts and circumstances of these cases which persuades or compels us to hold that the remedy by way of appeal to the State Government provided by S.4 of the Act is in any way inadequate or less beneficial. And We cannot but hold that proceedings under Art.226 of the Constitution are not substitutes for ordinary remedies, that the statutory procedure embodied in S.4 of the Madras Preservation of Private Forests Act, 1949, should not be allowed to be short circuited by applications under that Article, that these Writ appeals should be allowed that the Original Petitions from which they arise should be dismissed. We decide accordingly; but without any order as to costs.