Judgment :- Venkataraman, J. This appeal arises out of an application filed under the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948. This application was filed under S.75(2) of the Act by the Employees' State Insurance Corporation, to recover contribution due from the employer, namely, the Solar Works, the appellant in the appeal (respondent in the application), before the Employees' Insurance Court, the Principal Judge of the City Civil Court, Madras. The application was filed for the recovery of contribution relating to the period between March 1957 and November 1958. It was filed on 21 June, 1959. The Act does not prescribe any period of limitation within which such an application should be filed, but rule 17 of the rules framed by the Madras State Government prescribes a period of twelve months from the date on which the cause of action arose or the claim became due. There is a proviso that the Court may entertain an application after the said period of twelve months, if it is satisfied that the applicant had sufficient reasons for not making the application within the said period. The Corporation invoked the benefit of this proviso; in their application they stated that they became aware of the liability of the employer only on 16 February, 1959 when the insurance inspector inspected the records of the employer. The employer opposed the claim as barred by limitation and urged that no satisfactory reasons had been adduced under the proviso to rule 17 for excusing the delay. At the time of the arguments on the application before the Employees' State Insurance Court, it appears to have been contended on behalf of the employer that rule 17 was valid but not the proviso thereto; and that under no circumstances could the delay be condoned. On the other hand, it appears to have been contended on behalf of the Corporation that rule 17 itself was ultra vires ... On the other hand, it appears to have been contended on behalf of the Corporation that rule 17 itself was ultra vires ... the State Government, because the Act itself did not provide any period of limitation for such an application for contribution and on a true construction of the Act it would follow that the intention of the legislature was that there could be no period of limitation at all for such an application.The Employees' State Insurance Court accepted the contention of the Corporation to a substantial extent, namely, that the Act did not specifically provide for any limitation and that rule 17 was ultra vires the Act. At the same time it was not prepared to accept the further contention of the Corporation that there would be no limit of time at all for such an application and it held that the period of limitation would be the same as if a regular suit had been filed in the ordinary civil Court for recovering the contribution. In that view it held that Art. 120 of the Limitation Act would apply, and, if so, the claim would be within time. The Court passed this order in a batch of applications and posted the applications for further consideration, on the other points at issue. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant, Sri G. Krishnamurthi Ayyar is that the Employees' Insurance Court is wrong in its view that rule 17 is ultra vires the State Government, and he says that the matter must go back in order that the Insurance Court may consider whether there are reasonable grounds for condoning the delay under the proviso to rule 17. The learned counsel for the appellant does not contend before me that the proviso is invalid as was contended on behalf of the employer before the Insurance Court. As against this, Sri Rangarajan representing the Government Pleader who appears for the Corporation contends that rule 17 is ultra vires the State Government and that on a true construction of the Act it should be held that no limitation is prescribed at all under the Act. The further question whether Art. 120 of the Limitation Act would apply has not been argued before me, because it cannot arise. The further question whether Art. 120 of the Limitation Act would apply has not been argued before me, because it cannot arise. The question is whether rule 17 is valid; if so, the application should go back for consideration whether there are reasonable grounds for condoning the delay or whether rule 17 is ultra vires, in which case the application should be held to be within time.This question was decided by Kailasam, J., in Appeal Against Order No. 6 of 1960 arising out of another application dealt with by the Employees' Insurance Court in the same order. Kailasam, J., took the view that rule 17 is intra vires the State Government; and he remanded that particular application for consideration of the question whether there were reasonable grounds for condoning the delay. Prima facie, I am unable to share the view of Kailasam, J., and that is why I feel that it is better that the matter is decided by a Bench, and I am making this order of reference to a Bench. Section75(2) of the Act says that the claims mentioned therein shall be decided by the Employees' Insurance Court. Clause (a) deals with the claim for recovery of contributions from the principal employer. Sub-section (3) of S. 75 says : "No civil Court shall have jurisdiction to decide or deal with any question or dispute as aforesaid or to adjudicate on any liability which by or under this Act is to be decided by the Employees' Insurance Court." * Section 76 says that the institution of proceedings shall be in the particular Insurance Court appointed for the purpose. Section 77 says : "Commencement of proceedings. - (1) The proceedings before an Employees' Insurance Court shall be commenced by application. (2) Every such application shall be in such form and shall contain such particulars and shall be accompanied by such fee, if any, as may be prescribed by rules made by the State Government in consultation with the Corporation." It is also necessary to quote S. 78 in full : " Powers of Employees' Insurance Courts. (2) Every such application shall be in such form and shall contain such particulars and shall be accompanied by such fee, if any, as may be prescribed by rules made by the State Government in consultation with the Corporation." It is also necessary to quote S. 78 in full : " Powers of Employees' Insurance Courts. - (1) the Employees' Insurance Court shall have all the powers of a civil Court for the purposes of summoning and enforcing the attendance of witnesses, compelling the discovery and production of documents and material objects, administering oath and recording evidence and such Court shall be deemed to be a civil Court within the meaning of S. 195 and Chap. XXXV of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (V of 1998).(2) The Employees' Insurance Court shall follow such procedure as may be prescribed by rules made by the State Government. (3) All costs incidental to any proceedings before an Employees' Insurance Court shall, subject to such rules as may be made in this behalf by the State Government, be in the discretion of the Court. (4) An order of the Employees' Insurance Court shall be enforceable as if it were a decree passed in a suit by a civil Court." Section96(1) of the Act in so far as it is material says : " Power of State Government to make rules. - (1) The State Government may, subject to the condition of previous publication, make rules not inconsistent with this Act in regard to all or any of the following matters, namely :- (a) the constitution of Employees' Insurance Courts, the qualifications of persons who may be appointed Judges thereof, and the conditions of service of such Judges; (b) the procedure to be followed in proceedings before such Courts and the execution of orders made by such Courts; (c) the fee payable in respect of application made to the Employees' Insurance Court, the costs incidental to the proceedings in such Court, the form in which application should be made to it and the particulars to be specified in such applications : (h) any other matter which is required or allowed by this Act to be prescribed by the State Government. (2) Rules made under this section shall be published in the official gazette and thereupon shall have effect as if enacted in this Act." Rule 17 says thus : " Limitation. (2) Rules made under this section shall be published in the official gazette and thereupon shall have effect as if enacted in this Act." Rule 17 says thus : " Limitation. - (1) Every application to the Court shall be brought within twelve months from the date on which the cause of action arose or, as the case may be, the claim became due :Provided that the Court may entertain the application after the said period of twelve months if it is satisfied that the applicant has sufficient reasons for not making the application within the said period. (2) Subject as aforesaid, the provisions of Parts II and III of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, shall, so far as may be, apply to every such application." * The contention on behalf of the employer which found favour with Kailasam, J., and which is repeated before me, is that limitation is a matter of procedure and, therefore, rule 17 is valid if read along with Ss. 78(2) and 96(1)(b) and 96(2). For the proposition that limitation is a rule of procedure, reliance is placed on the observations of the Full Bench of this Court in Kandaswami v. Kannappa 1952 ILR(Mad) 421]. The question there was whether the period of twelve years prescribed under S. 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the last application for execution of the decree is absolute or is controlled by S.15(1) of the Indian Limitation Act which provides for exclusion of the period covered by stay or injunction. In that context the Full Bench held that both the Code of Civil Procedure and the Limitation Act are enactments relating to procedure which have to be read together and that S.15(1) of the Limitation Act would control S. 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Dealing with this question, Kailasam, J., observed : "Thus the Act is self-contained regarding the institution, commencement and the procedure to be followed by the Employees' Insurance Court. Rules of limitation are only rules of procedure and when the statute empowers the Government to frame rules regarding the procedure to be followed in proceedings before the Employees' Insurance Court, that includes the power also to prescribe the period of limitation. A rule of limitation may cease to be a mere procedure when it defeats the vested rights which had already accrued. A rule of limitation may cease to be a mere procedure when it defeats the vested rights which had already accrued. The Corporation has no vested right to file an application whenever it chooses. It cannot be said that the present rules in any way affect the vested rights. The statute authorizes the State Government to frame rules regarding the procedure which includes the time before which applications should be filed. I hold that rule 17 of the Madras Employees' Insurance Court Rules, 1951, is within the rule-making power conferred on the Government by S.96(2) of the Employees' State Insurance Act." The reason why I prima facie find myself unable to agree with Kailasam, J., is that if it was the intention of the legislature that S. 78(2) which says that "The Employees' Insurance Court shall follow such procedure as may be prescribed by rules made by the State Government" * should govern also the period of limitation within which the application should be filed, we could reasonably expect it to have been provided for in S. 77 which deals with "commencement of proceedings." Section 77(2) provides : "Every such application shall be in such form and shall contain such particulars and shall be accompanied by such fee, if any, as may be prescribed by rules made by the State Government in consultation with the Corporation." * It would have been the easiest and normal thing to say that it should be filed within such time as may be prescribed either by the Act or by the rules to be framed. Section 78(2) seems, in my opinion, to have more appropriateness with reference to the procedure to be followed by the Employees' Insurance Court after the application is filed. It has to be read in conjunction with Sub-sec. (1) to S. 78 which deals with the powers of the Employees' Insurance Court, regulating the procedure for the enquiry of the applications before it after they have been instituted. The question whether an application is filed within time is one anterior to the stage for the provisions as made in S. 78, and is one for which we could more legitimately expect a provision to be made in the earlier S. 77. In this connexion it is relevant to note that some of the sections in the Act itself have specifically provided periods of limitation. In this connexion it is relevant to note that some of the sections in the Act itself have specifically provided periods of limitation. Thus S.80 of the Act says : "Benefit not admissible unless claimed in time. - An Employees' Insurance Court shall not direct the payment of any benefit to a person unless he had made a claim for such benefit in accordance with the regulations made in that behalf within twelve months after the claim became due :Provided that if the Court is satisfied that there was reasonable excuse for not making a claim for the benefit within twelve months after it became due, it may direct the payment of the benefit as if the claim had been made in time." Similarly S.82 of the Act runs : " Appeal. - (1) Save as expressly provided in this section no appeal shall lie from an order of an Employees' Insurance Court. (2) An appeal shall lie to the High Court from an order of an Employees' Insurance Court if it involves a substantial question of law. (3) The period of limitation for an appeal under this section shall be sixty days. (4) The provisions of Ss.5 and 12 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (XL of 1908), shall apply to appeals under this section." * This shows that it is not as if the legislature was unaware of the necessity of providing for periods of limitation where it thought fit to do so. Section 96(1)(b) must be interpreted in the same manner as S. 78(2) just as S. 96(1)(c) has to be interpreted in the light of S. 77(2). In this view of the matter S. 96(1)(b) cannot enlarge the scope of S. 78(2). Section 96(2) on which reliance has been placed cannot really help the appellant because it only means that the rule made in S.96(1) shall have effect as if enacted in the Act and, therefore, he must fall back upon S. 96(1). Section 96(1)(h) cannot be of much assistance to the appellant because, apart from S. 78(2), S. 77 itself does not say that the period of limitation should be prescribed by the State Government. In some enactments we find that without prejudice to the particular matters specified as subjects on which rules could be made by the Government, the Government may make rules for carrying out the provisions of the Act and its objects. In some enactments we find that without prejudice to the particular matters specified as subjects on which rules could be made by the Government, the Government may make rules for carrying out the provisions of the Act and its objects. If such a provision has found place in S. 96, it may be arguable that there is a power for prescribing the period of limitation, but unfortunately such a general power has not been vested in the Government under S. 96(1). Under S. 96(1) rules on particular matters alone can be framed by the State Government and even S. 96(1)(h), though it is rather general in scope, permits the State Government to make rules only in respect of a matter which is required or allowed by the Act to be prescribed by the State Government. But, if on a true construction of Ss.77 and 78 of the Act, limitation is not such a matter, S. 96(1)(h) cannot enable the Government to make a rule about limitation.The result of this will no doubt be that there is a lacuna in the Act in respect of this matter - casus omissus as it is called. But with regard to this, a few observations may be made. The first is that while an Act should be so construed as to avoid if possible casus omissus, still we should not strain the language of the Act where the omission clearly appears. As the Privy Council has observed in connexion with a different matter in Hansraj Gupta v. Official Liquidators of Dehra Dun, etc., Company "It is either an application made within time, or it is an application made for which no period of limitation is prescribed. The case may be casus omissus. If it be so, then it is for others than their lordships to remedy the defect." * On behalf of the Corporation it can also be argued that while there may be some justification for imposing a limit of twelve months within which a claim for benefit should be made, it may not be right to impose such a time-limit over a claim by the Corporation for contribution by the employer particularly as the whole scheme depends on contributions by the employer to a large extent. Anyway; it is a matter for the legislature to rectify by drafting the Act clearly. Anyway; it is a matter for the legislature to rectify by drafting the Act clearly. The business of the Court is to interpret the Act as it stands. It seems to me that in view of the considerations which I have outlined above, it is desirable that the matter is decided by a Bench. The matter is accordingly referred to a Bench. The papers will be placed before my lord the Chief Justice. JUDGMENT - II In pursuance of the aforesaid order of reference, this appeal coming on this day for hearing this day before this Bench (Justice Sri Anantanarayanan and Justice Sri Venkatadri), the Court delivered the following judgment :Per Anantanarayanan, J. :- The civil miscellaneous appeal really involves the brief question whether rule 17 framed by the Government under the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948, the Madras Employees' Insurance Courts Rules, 1951, is intra vires of the delegated powers of the State or otherwise. The matter has come up on difference of opinion between two learned Judges of this Court, Kailasam, J., and Venkataraman, J., Venkataraman, J., taking the view that this is a matter of a casus omissus in the Act itself, and hence that there is no valid delegation of power to Government with regard to limitation, which would render the rule intra vires of the rule-making powers of the State. We have heared the learned counsel for the employer (Solar Works), learned counsel for the Employees' State Insurance Corporation, the learned Advocate-General as amicus curiae, and learned Government Pleader. We have no doubt whatever that the view expressed by Venkataraman, J., is correct, and that the rule, as it stands, cannot be supported upon the delegation of powers conferred by the Act in favour of the State, in order to make rules for the purposes of the Act. The point is really quite simple, and may be precisely expressed in the following form. Where an Act itself does not provide for limitation with reference to a particular matter, and the delegation of power to make rules is conferred by a sectionof the Act which does not, expressly or impliedly, relate to the power to prescribe time, the authority to which the power is delegated, namely, the State in this case, cannot make a rule prescribing limitation. This is because, even under the Constitution [Art. 145(1)(c)], where the Supreme Court is authorized to make rules for the practice and procedure of the Court, there is specific reference to a power to prescribe limitation for applications to Court. As the learned Advocate-General rightly stresses, in the Government of India Act, 1935, List 3, entry (4), the power to prescribe limitation was included as part of the civil procedure; but a significant departure appears in List 3, entry (13), of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. There the power to prescribe limitation has been segregated. The learned Advocate-General has also been at pains to furnish us with a table of Central and State Acts, all the particulars of which need not be reproduced here, which definitely proves that, where the rule-making power is conferred by a sectionof the Act, and it is contemplated that the rule-making authority might also prescribe limitation, there is a specific reference to the power to prescribe time, in some form or another, in the section concerned. It is sufficient for us to point out that there is an impressive list of the Central Acts exhibiting this uniform feature, as well as at least ten or more Madras Acts, also having the same characteristic.When we turn to the matter actually in issue before us, we find further difficulties in adopting the view that the rule-making power generally conferred in the present case under S. 96(1)(b), namely, the power to make rules with regard to "the procedure to be followed in proceedings before such Courts and the execution of orders made by such Courts," * will, by necessary implication, include the power to prescribe limitation. First of all, as the learned Advocate-General has emphasized, the liability under the Act to make the relevant contributions, the failure to make which has led to the application by the employees of the Corporation in this case, is primarily that of the employer. Actually, the default in this respect might be brought to the notice of the Corporation only if an individual case arose, and if there is to be a strict rule of limitation in this behalf, as envisaged by rule 17, the result may constitute very great hardship to the employees and their organization, and deprivation of the benefits. Actually, the default in this respect might be brought to the notice of the Corporation only if an individual case arose, and if there is to be a strict rule of limitation in this behalf, as envisaged by rule 17, the result may constitute very great hardship to the employees and their organization, and deprivation of the benefits. Again, it is note-worthy that S. 96(1)(b) which we have just reproduced, does not refer, in any sense, to a power to prescribe time, or to lay down any rule of limitation. In the light of the tendency shown in recent times, not to consider the power to prescribe limitation as merely a part of procedural provisions, at least as far as legislative competence is concerned, we agree with the argument of the learned Advocate-General that S. 96(h) will not authorize the State Government to make a rule for limitation, as for instance, rule 17 which is now in controversy. The learned Government Pleader for the State has offered no arguments to counter this contention. Hence, we agree with Venkataraman, J., that rule 17, as it stands, is ultra vires of the rule-making power of the State, and that, in the present case, the application by the employees of the State Insurance Corporation is not time-barred in any sense, and needs no condonation. The civil miscellaneous appeal is dismissed accordingly. In the circumstances we direct that the parties will bear their own costs.